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order that we eventually realize the vision of what ADM Hogg calls, “The Fully-Netted 
Force.”  Dan and I began with so many questions, and while we think we found a few 
answers, there are many more to be found.  When we started, we didn’t know where all 
this would lead, but we think we found the right direction to continue, and to all who 
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have encouraged me throughout this FnEPs project. 
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did, for without you, I would not have achieved much at all. 
To Carol and Raymon Henry for recognizing potential and taking the time to 
show me the world of possibilities.  Your mentoring, teaching, and continuous gentle 
prodding, caused me to expand my horizons and stretch for my dreams.  For this you will 
always have a special place in my heart. 
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during the course of my pursuits have been nothing short of phenomenal.  You both are 
such veritable role models, often emulated but never equaled, that your sage advice and 
wisdom makes everything seem possible. 
Most importantly, love and heartfelt thanks are such inadequate words for my 
wonderful wife and best friend, Lisa K. Bruer.  You have always supported me and this 
endeavor has been no exception.  You have allowed me to take occasional “leaves of 
absence” from family life in order that I may work towards the completion of this thesis 
and pursue my Navy career.  For your patience, support and encouragement I am 
eternally grateful.  To my beautiful and talented daughter, Calista Rose, you are the 
center of our universe.  You light up our lives like nothing else can and are such a 
blessing in all aspects of the word. 
To all of you deserve the praise for allowing me to pursue this work.  Thank you 





The theme of our thesis, FnEPs . . . 
Think Different . . . Fight Different1 has its 
background in the work recently completed as Associate Fellows as a part of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) Strategic Studies Group 
(SSG) XXII.  The CNO tasked SSG XXII to examine 
Sea Supremacy in the context of Sea Power 21.  In 
response to the tasking, SSG XXII proposed the 
overarching theme of achieving Sea Supremacy 
through the “Coherent Adaptive Force” (CAF).  This 
theme was based upon five concepts: Coherent 
Adaptive Command (CAC), Operational Human 
Systems Integration (OpHSI), FORCEnet 
Engagement Packs (FnEPs), Global Maritime 
Awareness (GMA), and Deep Red.  CAC seeks to 
align planning, command and execution to provide a 
process that can match the timescales of combat.  
OpHSI seeks to develop and support the commanders 
for the operational level of war.  FnEPs represents the 
opportunity to accelerate the development and 
“operationalization” of FORCEnet focused on engagement capabilities.  GMA seeks to 
deploy systems that will provide a surface picture around the world in support of Sea 
Supremacy and defense of U.S. shores.  Insights into an uncertain world (Deep Red) 
seeks to institutionalize a robust, innovative, effective Navy-wide approach to red 
teaming, providing reachback for the operational commander, and exploiting massive 
multi-user persistent environments.  
 
                                                 
1 Apple “Think Different,” Apple Online [Home Page On-Line]; Available at 
[http://www.apple.com/thinkdifferent]; Accessed 1 October 2003. 




The round pegs in the square holes.
The ones who see things differently.
They’re not fond of rules.
And they have no respect for the status quo.
You can praise them, disagree with them, quote them,
disbelieve them, glorify or vilify them.
About the only thing you can’t do is ignore
them.
Because they change things.
They invent. They imagine. They heal.
They explore. They create. They inspire.
They push the human race forward.
Maybe they have to be crazy.
How else can you stare at an empty canvas and see a
work of art?
Or sit in silence and hear a song that’s never been written?
Or gaze at a red planet and see a laboratory on wheels?
We make tools for these kinds of people . 
While some see them as the crazy ones,
we see genius.
Because the people who are crazy enough to think
they can change the world, are the ones who do.
FnEPs . . . Think Different . . . Fight Different
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The FnEPs Concept represents the operational construct for FORCEnet and 
demonstrates the power of FORCEnet by integrating a specific set of joint sensors, 
platforms, weapons, warriors, networks and command & control systems, for the purpose 
of performing mission-specific engagements.  Initial pack asset allocation and 
configuration to constitute a pack will be based on a specific threat or mission; however, 
the capability to dynamically re-configure and re-allocate assets “on the fly,” to 
reconstitute a new pack will enable cross-mission engagement capabilities.  Integrating 
the six FORCEnet factors must focus on enabling five critical functions called the 
“Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs)”.  These CRCs are:  Integrated Fire Control (IFC), 
Automated Battle Management Aids (ABMAs), Composite Tracking (CT), Composite 
Combat Identification (CCID), and Common/Single Integrated Pictures (CP).  
Ultimately, FnEPs will help “operationalize” FORCEnet by demonstrating a network-
centric operational construct that supports an increase in combat reach and provides an 
order of magnitude increase in combat power by creating more effective engagements, 
better sensor-shooter-weapon assignments and improved utilization of assets.  FnEPs 
achieves fully integrated joint capabilities focused on the engagement chain, and 
represents a revolutionary transformation in Naval operations complimentary to 
FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea Supremacy. 
It is important to note that while FnEPs is in large measure complimentary to the 
FORCEnet concept, four key aspects differentiate FnEPs from current FORCEnet 
initiatives: 
Joint – “Packs” will be developed as Joint systems-of-systems distinguishing 
FORCEnet from the Army Future Combat System (FCS) and Air Force C2 Constellation.  
Adaptive – “Packs” will provide robust sensor-shooter-weapon linkages allowing 
components to cross-connect “on-the-fly” supporting mission area-to-mission area 
engagements.  
Engagement Oriented – “Packs” will demonstrate application of combat power 
by:   
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· Self-synchronization through the use of ABMAs 
· Supporting cross-platform and cross-service IFC 
· Developing theater-wide shared battle space awareness through CT, 
CCID, and CP. 
Field near-term net-centric capabilities – Technology enabling FnEPs is available 
today, including the intra- and inter-service system engineering know how required to 
integrate individual systems into the “packs”.  Initial Operating Capability of the first 
Engagement Pack is achievable in five years from program initiation. 2 
This thesis has two goals.  First, we will conduct analysis to better understand the 
FnEPs Concept including the myriad of technical, organizational, and programmatic 
requirements for its implementation.  Second, we will propose a roadmap for the 
continued development and ‘institutionalization’ of the FnEPs Concept that is in 
accordance with both Commander, NAVNETWARCOM, VADM Mayo’s tasker to 
develop an FnEPs prototype for trial in FY04, and the original timeline provided to the 
CNO (Block I, FnEPs IOC in 2009).  In order to accomplish these two objectives, 1) we 
have engaged a wide variety of experts from DoD, government, academia and the 
commercial sectors, in order to better understand the challenges highlighted above and 
possible solutions, 2) we have engaged a variety of DoN organizations to begin 
development of an FnEPs prototype and a roadmap for its development, 3) we engaged 
SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston and the FORCEnet Architecture Chief Engineer’s 












                                                 




























The following thesis introduces 
the concept of FORCEnet Engagement 
Packs (FnEPs).  The FnEPs Concept 
represents the operational construct for 
FORCEnet and demonstrates the power 
of FORCEnet by integrating a specific 
set of joint sensors, platforms, weapons, 
warriors, networks and command & 
control systems, for the purpose of 
performing mission-specific 
engagements.  Initial pack asset 
allocation and configuration to constitute 
a pack will be based on a specific threat 
or mission; however, the capability to dynamically re-configure and re-allocate assets “on 
the fly,” to reconstitute a new pack will enable cross-mission engagement capabilities. 
Integrating the six FORCEnet factors must focus on enabling five critical 
functions called the “Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs)”.  These CRCs are:  Integrated 
Fire Control (IFC), Automated Battle Management Aids (ABMAs), Composite Tracking 
(CT), Composite Combat Identification (CCID), and Common/Single Integrated Pictures 
(CP).  The diagram above, generated by SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston, is a good 
depiction of how FnEPs seeks to integrate these five CRCs in order to strike a target.  
Ultimately, FnEPs will help “operationalize” FORCEnet by demonstrating a network-
centric operational construct that supports an increase in combat reach and provides an 
order of magnitude increase in combat power by creating more effective engagements, 
better sensor-shooter-weapon assignments and improved utilization of assets.  FnEPs 
achieves fully integrated joint capabilities focused on the engagement chain, and 
represents a revolutionary transformation in Naval operations complimentary to 
FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea Supremacy. 
2 
To date the vast majority of “publicity” related to FnEPs has been via literally 
dozens of PowerPoint-based briefings.  Such briefings have resulted in strong and near 
universal endorsement from the CNO and many other members of Naval leadership, 
Government, academia, and the commercial sector.  While the thesis that follows is, 
admittedly, long and perhaps overly wide in scope and level of detail for a Masters- level 
research effort, we believe such a presentation is necessary to chronicle the diverse 
efforts of those people who forged the concept and have assisted its analysis and 
continued development.  Moreover, such depth and detail is important to ensure 1) An 
understanding of the challenges the Navy and DoD currently face in terms of C4ISR 
system interoperability.  2) How we will address these challenges in order to better 
design, and implement the large information systems the Navy will require in the future.  
3) Sound technical, organizational, programmatic and acquisition-related 
recommendations which will combine to ensure our future C4ISR systems and 
architecture(s) will provide the functionality required by NCW, FORCEnet, and FnEPs.  
Only by understanding all three of these aspects of the cha llenge can we provide the basis 
upon which to remain on the proper road ahead for the continued development FnEPs and 
the “operationalization” of FORCEnet. 
Accordingly, our thesis is organized into five chapters. 
Chapter I lays the foundation for understanding the challenges Navy and DoD 
currently face as the services attempt to maximize combat efficiency and effectiveness in 
the 21st Century through the principles of NCW.  From a naval perspective, these goals 
are captured in the Concept of SEA POWER 21, which critically depends on FORCEnet 
as the “glue” which binds together and enables Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  
As will be discussed in greater detail, while FORCEnet does not consist solely of a 
network or networks, it critically depends upon the interoperability of C4ISR systems and 
an integrated C4ISR network architecture.   
Chapter II introduces the FnEPs concept and develops it within the larger context 
of FORCEnet.  Most importantly this chapter will illustrate how the FnEPs concept will 
enable the “operationalization” of FORCEnet through the integration of the six 
FORCEnet Factors around five key “Combat Reach Capabilites.” 
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Chapter III will present the analysis we, in conjunction with others, have 
conducted.  This analysis will not only objectively demonstrate the tremendous 
improvements in efficiency, effectiveness, and increased “Combat Reach” FnEPs 
enables, but will help to provide greater development and deeper understanding of 
FORCEnet and the FnEPs concept. 
Chapter IV presents both a general discussion of some of the critical technical 
factors impacting the future of the networking and military applications, as well as a 
more specific examination of the “Warfighting Internet” required to support FORCEnet 
and FnEPs. 
Finally, Chapter V will present 1) Our significant results and findings as a result 
of our analysis, 2) Our general conclusions drawn from these results, and 3) Most 
importantly, a series of recommendations that seek to provide a roadmap for the 
continued development and “Institutionalization” of FnEPs. 
Chapter I represents an introduction to our thesis.  Sections A provides the 
purpose of our research.  Sections B & C provides a background discussion of the current 
Navy C4ISR architecture and a general discussion of what we believe is a solution to 
these challenges as they relate to FORCEnet and a new concept we have developed called 
FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs). Sections D-G presents our research 
methodology, the scope of our thesis, our assumptions, and some basic definitions. 
A. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of our thesis is the introduction, continued development, and further 
refinement of a new concept called FORCEnet Engagment Packs (FnEPs).  
Fundamentally, the FnEPs concept is the operational construct for FORCEnet and 
represents the opportunity to “operationalize” FORCEnet.  In doing so, FnEPs 
demonstrates the power of FORCEnet to improve the combat reach and effectiveness for 
the JTF Commander.  More specifically, our research will address two major areas.  First 
we will identify the technical and non-technical challenges facing the FnEPs concept and 
the “operationalization” of FORCEnet, including networking and related requirements, 
organizational and process related challenges, and programmatic and acquisition related 
issues.  Second, we will continue the analysis of the FnEPs concept by focusing on a 
deeper understanding of the five specific FnEPs functional requirements we have 
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identified as “Combat Reach Capabilities” (CRCs) and how the CRCs map to the 
ASN(RDA) Common System Functions List (CSFL).  Finally, in completing this thesis 
we will provide recommendations for continued development and implementation of 
FnEPs which 1) Respond to the tasker given by VADM Mayo, (Commander, 
NETWARCOM) to develop a prototype FnEP “Pack” for review and potential fleet trial 
in TRIDENT WARRIORFY04 and, 2) Are in accordance with the recommendations 
made to the CNO by SSG XXII (FnEPs Block I (IOC), 2009). 
We need to take a systems approach and coevolve capabilities that will 
support missions throughout the detect, decide, attack, and assess 
sequence.  Experimentation will help us correct for fire.  As we optimize 
information flow through current systems, network limitations will 
highlight areas for future investment based on mission versus platform 
needs.  The key is to reorganize now and start the process.  NCW has a 
long way to go.3 
Ultimately, the FnEPs concept seeks to achieve fully integrated joint capabilities focused 
on the engagement chain, thereby achieving a revolutionary transformation in Naval 
operations complimentary to the concepts of FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea 
Supremacy. 
B. NAVAL C4ISR ARCHITECTURE INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES 
Before embarking on a discussion of the challenges facing today’s C4ISR 
infrastructure, it is important to understand two key concepts upon which solutions to 
these challenges must be based – Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and FORCEnet.  
NCW has its roots in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which resulted 
from changes in American society that were dominated by the co-evolution of 
economics, information technology, and business processes and organizations.  These are 
linked by three themes: 
· The shift in focus from centralized (i.e., platform-centric) resources to 
distributed (i.e., network-centric) resources. 
· The shift from viewing actors as independent to viewing them as part of a 
continuously adapting ecosystem. 
                                                 
3 Hardesty, 71. 
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· The importance of making strategic choices to adapt or even survive in 
such changing ecosystems.4 
In their book Network Centric Warfare, Alberts, Garstka, and Stein define 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as follows: 
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and 
shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, 
higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a 
degree of self-synchronization. 5 
Figure 1 depicts the idea of NCW as it relates to the quality and proximity of 
information.  Realizing the network-centric information advantage requires a migration 
beyond local, platform-centric information that is low in information quality (e.g. 
content, accuracy, timeliness, relevance) to a “network-centric information age” where 
information is globally available and high in information quality. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Network Centric Operations…The Way Ahead6. 
 
                                                 
4 James F. Moore, “The Death of Competition:  Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems,” 
Harper Business, 1996. 
5 David S. Alberts and others, Network Centric Warfare, 2nd Edition (Revised), (CCRP, 2000), 2. 
6 Phil Charles, Assessments to Define Composeable Mission Capability, (SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston, 
SC, 2003), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 3. 
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A related concept, FORCEnet, seeks to implement the theory of NCW.7  The 
Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group XXI defined FORCEnet as: 
The operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in 
the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command 
and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat 
force that is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and 
sea to land.8 
FORCEnet is critical to the Navy’s most recent concept for future naval 
operations, SEA POWER 21, which “envisions transformed operational capabilities that 
will allow sea-based forces to execute the full range of joint operations from the maritime 
domain . . .”9  While SEA POWER 21 will be made possible by Sea Strike, Sea Shield, 
and Sea Basing, the key or “glue” which ties these concepts together is FORCEnet. 
The Navy’s C4ISR architecture has evolved over a long period of time and has 
witnessed tremendous advancements in technology and capabilities.  Unfortunately, for a 
number of various reasons, evolution of the Navy’s C4ISR architecture has not fully taken 
advantage of such advances and capabilities.  These reasons are widely varied, and 
extend beyond technical hurdles to include fiscal, programmatic, and acquisition-related 
challenges.  Ultimately, organizational and cultural resistance has played a significant 
role as well.  As a result of these challenges, our current C4ISR architecture is ill-suited to 
support the achievement of the vision for concepts such as NCW and SEA POWER 21.  
The remainder of Section A will discuss these challenges more specifically as follows:   
· Architecture versus infrastructure 
· Sub-optimized resources for the JTF Commander 







                                                 
7 Richard W. Mayo, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, John Nathman, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, “FORCEnet: Turning 
Information into Power,” Proceedings, February 2003, x. 
8 SSG XXI Report to CNO (August, 2002), 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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1. Architecture versus Infrastructure – A Misguided Focus  
Fundamentally, the challenge currently 
facing NCW and FORCEnet can be derived from 
their very names!  Both concepts rely critically on 
“networking” of many things (e.g., computers, 
humans, organizations, ideas, systems, platforms, 
weapons, information, etc.) and imply the need for 
system integration, interoperability, and ultimately, 
a supporting C4ISR network.  Unfortunately, many of the current C4ISR systems and 
weapon system to weapon system interfaces have been developed in a stove-piped 
manner, generally without consideration of the need for integration and interoperability 
with other C4ISR or weapon systems outside a narrowly defined scope.  As a result, some 
redundant systems and capabilities exist, while in other cases critical capabilities and 
system interoperability are absent.  Even considering a specific functional area focus on 
integration in regards to ISR, C2, or FC systems does not improve the challenge, because 
from the perspective of NCW and FORCEnet, the list of systems requiring integration 
and interoperability is not only extremely large, but indeterminate.  Further, NCW and 
FORCEnet currently lack a sufficiently focused and well defined set of requirements or 
capabilities which are necessary to determine the systems integration and interoperability 
requirements.  This process must begin with integration and fleet-validated 
interoperability requirements derived from desired warfighting capabilities.  This will 
lead to systems with the appropriately aligned system functionality in response to those 
capabilities. 
While current C4ISR systems and components are collectively referred to as an 
architecture of systems, this label is woefully misleading.  The problem stems from a 
general misunderstanding of the definitions of architecture and infrastructure which lead 
to poor and over generalized use of the terms throughout the Navy and DoD in general.  
Terms like architecture and infrastructure have come to mean so many things to so many 
people that their actual meanings have been lost.  Documents like the Joint Technical 
Architecture (JTA) are really not architecture documents, but more appropriately 
described as a collection of standards to be applied to almost anything.  The JTA does not 
“…the ability to collect, 
communicate, process, and 
protect information is the 
most important factor 
defining military power.” 
 
- Bruce Berkowitz 
The New Face of War 
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provide an overall framework for how systems should be architected or planned for in 
response to a specific (or set of specific) business or warfighting requirements.  The 
Information Technology Standards Guidance (ITSG) was one example of a document 
which set out to propose standards and guidance for their use, but never seemed to catch 
on.  Examples of subtle, but important distinctions between several terms, including 
architecture and infrastructure should be clarified:   
· Infrastructure (e.g. “system of public works”; the communication pipes 
themselves) 
· Architecture in the plural (usually descriptions of infrastructures, how they 
should act and in response to a specific requirement) 
· Provisioning (e.g. allowance parts list, range and quantity of items, or 
configuration; making a service available for use) 
· Systems engineering (getting the right boxes connected appropriately) 
· Machine language dictionaries such as the “instruction set architecture”' 
for Intel Architecture chips or MilStd 1750 processors10 
Overall, the problem emerges from the lack of an architectural “standard” and 
common understanding of requirements to which system engineers and program 
managers must adhere. 
Thus far, the discussion highlights the critical need for system integration.  From 
our current perspective there are four major challenges facing system integration:  
· Platform-centric integration 
· Inadequate information exchange requirements 
· Vertical versus horizontal integration 
· Domain-focused integration 
· Stove-piped, tightly coupled, and brittle integration. 
Each of these areas is addressed below. 
Platform-centric integration – In considering platform-centric integration, the 
following quote by RDML Sharp, is helpful in characterizing past and current efforts 
aimed at integration.  FORCEnet, RDML Sharp said, “is about interoperability – it’s 
about boxes and wires and ones and zeros, protocols, frequencies, bandwidth, and linking 
                                                 
10 Rex Buddenberg. “What’s Wrong with DoD’s So-Called Information Architectures and What We Ought to be 
Doing About It,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000, 3. 
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things together.”11  RDML Sharp cited the evolution of capabilities since the 1983 
invasion of Grenada, when an air controller called in air support using a pay phone.  
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the public could see video of weapons homing 
in on targets.  Operation Enduring Freedom produced authentic knowledge management, 
with the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) battle group in late 2001 using worldwide web-based 
knowledge-management tools to share operational data as shown in Figure 2.  Operation 
Iraqi Freedom demonstrated further FORCEnet- like processes.12 
 
 
Figure 2.   USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) Tactical Flag Command Center13. 
 
In addition to these general considerations, an additional set of C4ISR architecture 
interoperability challenges arise when a more narrow focus is placed on operational 
warfighting mission requirements and what it takes to place a weapon on a target.  
Consider the advantages of simultaneously integrating engagement functions such as 
ISR, C2, and FC with mission support functions such as training, logistics, and modeling, 
in order to support a specific mission or engagement.  Certainly, not all mission support 
functions are required for all mission engagements all the time, but there will always be 
                                                 
11 Mike Sharp, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy. “Inching Toward FORCEnet,” Proceedings, September 2003, 104. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 105. 
10 
“threads” of systems from each of the three functional domains (ISR, C2, and FC) which 
must be integrated to ensure the successful engagement or mission accomplishment.  For 
a variety of reasons, these mission engagement “threads” (or parts of them) have 
historically been bolted to an individual platform such as the F/A-18, a destroyer or other 
physical platform.  These interoperability challenges include programmatic funding 
limitations or operational requirements for unit independence (historically, there was 
minimal need to interoperate beyond the boundaries of a ship, plane, submarine, etc. 
because that was how they were designed to be employed).  Due to this “platform-
specific” design methodology, the mission integration within these platforms and specific 
functional areas on those platforms (e.g., destroyer and its FC systems) has typically been 
very tight.  As an example, a sensor or fire control radar on a ship is typically designed to 
only work with the weapon launcher and weapons organic to that specific ship.  Today, 
these systems are “composed” of stove-piped, non- interoperable, message-oriented 
systems burdened with costly and lengthy integration and maintenance support cycles.  A 
better solution are “composeable” services where components are “Plug-and-Fight,” and 
able to assemble capabilities on-the-fly, discovery (publish and subscribe) based, and 
tailorable to the mission or user.  Such capabilities require integration across and between 
a variety of sensors, shooters, and weapons, but these requirements have never been 
articulated or developed into modern systems. 
Inadequate information exchange requirements – Another perspective requiring 
consideration is that of information exchange requirements (IERs) between the systems 
discussed above.  Historically speaking, IERs have been defined, designed, tested, 
programmed, funded, and operated from a platform-centric perspective between specific 
pairs of systems.  More recently a vertical, “functional” perspective (e.g., within C2 or 
ISR, etc.) has been adopted, but inadequate standards, especially interface standards, 
continues to pose challenges to system interoperability.  This challenge is growing even 
more critical as we continue to shift towards a horizontal “mission” or “engagement-
chain” perspective.  Collectively, the effects of these architectural challenges are 
reflected in the following quote by Captain David C. Hardesty in his recent Proceedings 
article, “Fix Net Centric for the Operators.”   
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With all the clamor about network-centric warfare (NCW) and the U.S. 
Navy’s evolving FORCEnet, one would think the Navy is moving rapidly 
toward a well thought out, connected force with seamless data paths that 
reach from sensors, through appropriate command and control, to our wide 
array of available weapons.  At least in the near term, this is not the case.14 
Vertical versus horizontal integration – The above discussion also highlights the 
reason today’s systems are large ly integrated in a vertical manner, and along functional 
“lanes,” including ISR for operational support; C2 for organizational command and 
control; and FC for weapons delivery.  Figure 3 depicts such vertical integration. 
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14 David C. Hardesty, Captain, U.S. Navy. “Fix Net Centric for the Operators,” Proceedings, September 2003, 68. 
15 Robert W. Hesser and Danny M. Rieken. FORCEnet Engagment Packs (FnEPs), (Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2003), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 11. 
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This focus on improving and streamlining the integration of vertical, like-functional 
systems has yielded only marginal improvements in functionality and integration within 
these functional areas; however, and has missed opportunities to increase overall mission 
capabilities for the Navy and Marine Corps.  Figure 4 visually depicts the road vertical 










Figure 4.   Today’s Complexity and Integration Status16. 
 
Another result of the focus on vertical integration is that data interchange 
requirements between systems have evolved into a set of separate and distinct 
requirements manifested in radically different software and hardware with vastly 
different functionality.  As a result, building flexible and responsive force capabilities is 
nearly impossible and most systems can at best meet only a specific set of requirements.  
Such systems are then “locked down” by the system designers and builders, unable to 
interact or even interoperate with other systems, even those consisting of similar 
technologies.  This locked down mentality results in rigid, non-adaptable functions, 
                                                 
16 Ken Slaght, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, FORCEnet Stakeholder Program Review Brief, (24 March 2003), 
(PowerPoint Brief), Slide 57. 
13 
efficient for their particular function but limited in flexibility and agility of the overall 
systems to perform in a total force construct such as FORCEnet.  This prevents rapidly 
changing requirements for new or different sets of functions or adapting as the 
operational situation changes.  The solution of such interoperability problems is at the top 
of the priority requirements from the Fleet and Field Commanders17 and while progress 
has been made, integration between systems across functional areas has lagged.  CAPT 
Hardesty continues, 
Implementation of network-centric warfare at the tactical level has been 
flawed.  Typifying incompatibilities is the software in the Navy’s F-14D . 
. .  in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom—which was unable to synch 
with Air Force electronic reconnaissance aircraft over targets in Iraq.  A 
systems approach and coevolution of capabilities are needed now. 18 
The way information is actually managed and provided to the warfighter is the 
transformational part of FORCEnet which FnEPs seeks to refine from a combat 
engagement chain perspective.  Today, requests for information and provision of that 
information are processed through dedicated systems.  These processes also lack a means 
to turn this information into actionable knowledge and directly influence the ability to 
carry out engagements via the engagement chain.  Again, CAPT Hardesty captures the 
impact of these shortcomings, 
The Navy has failed to make significant progress in applying network-
centric warfare concepts to tactical weapons and sensors that are deployed 
or under development.  This is particularly true in naval aviation, where 
we continue systems acquisition and development in the same platform-
centric manner.  To implement network-centric warfare effectively and 
connect our tactical forces intelligently, we must reorganize.  Each 
mission-area kill-chain sequence—detect, decide, attack, assess—must be 
examined to determine information exchange requirements among all 
platforms contributing to that mission area.  Only then can we implement 
the co-evolution of systems, organization, and doctrine that will allow us 
to reap the benefits of network-centric warfare.19 
                                                 
17 SPAWAR Code 05, Office of the Chief Engineer. FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture (GRA) 
Vision, (Version 1.0, 08 April 2003), 4-5. 
18 Hardesty, 68. 
19 Ibid. 
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While falling far short of what FnEPs requires in terms of integration and 
interoperability, systems like CEC and the Aegis Weapon System (AWS), represent 
examples of, at least, minimal cross-functional integration and hint at the potential for 
full horizontal, mission area integration.  An even better example is that of Joint Fires 
Network (JFN); however, as the following quote indicates, JFN does not go far enough to 
accomplish full horizontal integration across the engagement chain. 
JFN is another major NCW effort designed to address critical operational 
deficiencies in time-sensitive targeting/time-critical strike against rapidly 
relocatable targets.  Although JFN has demonstrated significant 
improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
management and integration with targeting, command, and control 
functions aboard ship, it has limited ability to provide engagement 
information to the weapon systems that can engage relocatable targets 
rapidly.20 
At the heart of such systems’ potential is the integration of appropriate systems from the 
ISR, C2, and FC functional domains which contribute to engagement effectiveness by 
using cooperative and networked resources from similarly equipped platforms.  Again 
citing the examples of CEC and AWS, horizontal integration across functional domains is 
accomplished through a very deliberate and conscious effort to control all aspects of this 
mission within all functional domains.  “The [fleet battle] experiments (FBE) have 
improved our understanding of how to accelerate time-sensitive targeting/time-critical 
strike, but they have been weak on integrating with actual weapon systems.”21 
Domain-focused integration – Another perspective requiring consideration is that 
of domain focused integration across ashore, afloat, and space domains.  While the 
previous section highlighted the problems associated with solely focusing on vertical 
integration, domain-focused integration further exacerbates the challenges.  Domain 
focused integration proposes there are separate and unique integration requirements 
among the afloat, ashore, and space domains.  Specifically, systems employed afloat on 
ships will have different interoperability requirements than those systems terrestrially 
employed to support expeditionary requirements for the Marine Corps or other space-
                                                 
20 Ibid., 69. 
21 Ibid. 
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based information systems.  Domain-focus integration challenges have critical 
implications for the engagement chain because the (optimal) integration of systems must 
cross domains.  Such integration implies a dynamic aspect as well, due to the mobile and 
ad hoc nature of Navy and Marine Corps deployments, Joint Task Force composition, 
and allied and coalition operations. 
Stove-piped and tightly coupled integration – Solutions to date have been the 
result of stove-piped and tightly coupled integration leading to “brittle” systems 
incapable of functional flexibility.  Returning to the example of CEC and AWS, 
proponents of the integration displayed in current Navy systems often cite these systems 
as examples for the future.  It should be noted that “integrated” is a relative term; 
however, and CEC and AWS do not demonstrate the degree of integration necessary to 
realize the capabilities envisioned by NCW, FORCEnet, and FnEPs.  Worse still, these 
systems are tightly coupled.  Such tight coupling of the architecture is neither sufficiently 
flexible nor adaptive with respect to time-critical targets or dynamic to emergent 
operational requirements and can often lead to cascading effects throughout other parts of 
the architecture.  Conversely, our current capability to respond to changing mission 
reorientations, operational configurations, or in response to equipment failures usually 
require manual, time-consuming, and labor- intensive efforts—if possible at all!  Even 
CEC is highly mutually-dependent and based on a non-modular design.  As such, CEC is 
a relatively “brittle” system where even relatively minor configuration changes result in 
wide-reaching ripple effects.  Granted, CEC and AWS are extremely important and 
capable systems, critical to today’s mission success, but these systems still leave room for 
improvement!   
Finally, security remains a major concern within the functional ISR, C2, and FC 
system domains.  Historically, security has been bolted on as an afterthought rather than 
being designed from the beginning as an integral part of an overall system.  As systems 
become integrated and more interoperable, this challenge will become even more 
prominent.  Our ability to transition technology to operational use critically depends on 
how well it can be secured and upon its reliability.  Security must be built into the C4ISR 
infrastructure structure such that our systems are secure while being integrated and 
networked robustly, seamlessly, and coherently. 
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2. Sub-Optimized Resources for the Joint Task Force Commander 
In today’s warfighting environment, engagements require complex deconfliction 
to prevent fratricide or “blue-on-blue” events.  While such deconfliction can be ensured 
by a variety of means (e.g., time or space) most importantly, manual deconfliction results 
in segmented domains.  Within the theater of operations, physical space, including, air, 
ground and maritime environments are physically divided into engagement zones.  Figure 
5 depicts the engagement zones as 3-dimensional boxes that assist in the integration of 









Figure 5.   Engagement Zones22. 
 
Unfortunately, while helping to prevent fratricide these air, ground, and maritime 
engagement zones also have the negative consequence of sub-optimizing the capabilities 
of many of our weapons systems and platforms by limiting what, where, and how these 
                                                 
22 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 44. 
17 
assets are employed.  As an example, many modern systems are limited to the use of 
organic track data from a sensor to a weapon.  This may lead to situations where weapons 
are limited to specific engagement ranges and against specific targets and conditions.  
This challenge is discussed in greater detail in the scenarios presented below.  
Geographic deconfliction by engagement zones also potentially limits the full use of 
sensors, especially those “outside” a given engagement zone.  While this simplifies the 
integration challenge by limiting the responsibility for a given set of targets to those 
sensors and targets within the specified engagement zone, it also limits the ability of 
sensors to provide data on all targets they may have within their field of view.  As sensors 
become more powerful (and expensive), this sub-optimization can become critical. 
As discussed above, engagement zones chiefly focus on the prevention of blue-
on-blue incidents.  This is accomplished by physically limiting or prescribing the location 
of friendly forces to predetermined areas.  Not only is this method inefficient, especially 
given the increasingly fluid and dynamic nature of today’s battlespace, but there are 
many tragic examples accidents despite such boundaries.  As a result, even given 
engagement zones, visual identification (VID) is required before engaging a target.  
While VID is certainly beneficial, it is not always practical and may preclude the 
engagement of targets under conditions unsuited to VID.  VID results in a number of 
challenges.  1) One of the largest negative impacts of the requirement for VID is the 
allocation of critical assets to perform this function when they might otherwise be able to 
conduct other missions.  2) The requirement for VID typically lengthens the time 
required to complete the engagement of targets.  3) Interoperability challenges and the 
inability to pass identification information between engagement zones and the assets 
within these zones must be considered. 
Suboptimal allocation of resources is also a result of many of the interoperability 
challenges highlighted above.  While most of these challenges were presented from the 
perspective of Navy systems, the problem is even greater when the focus is expanded to 




DoD and the Navy are committed to network-centric warfare as a 
foundation of transformation.  Unfortunately, NCW implementation at the 
tactical level has been lackluster.  There is no overarching NCW vision or 
plan at the tactical level.  Platform-centric decisions have driven the 
problem and left us with incompatible implementations.  Contractors, who 
have little incentive to make the systems we already have work together, 
offer new capabilities that would take years to field and still not provide 
the joint and multinational interoperability we need.23 
The implication is clear, one of the most critical overarching challenges facing the 
Navy’s C4ISR architecture, is also its lack of “Jointness” and its lack of joint, allied and 
coalition systems integration.  
3. Insufficient Focus on Engagement Chain 
On of the most critical shortcomings of the the current C4ISR architecture, and 
perhaps most overlooked, is an insufficient focus on the “Engagement Chain.” 
To date, collaboration and planning activities have received a great deal of focus, 
and tremendous progress has been made.  Activities like Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlepsace (IPB), joint sensor and weapon system planning, mission planning, and 
communication services planning historically been the focus of a great deal of research 
and development.  In contrast, unfortunately, less effort has been focused on the actual 
engagement of targets.  Figure 6 introduces the engagement chain process and shows how 
this focus is different than that of planning and collaboration. 
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Figure 6.   Refocusing on Engagement Chain vs. Planning and Collaboration24. 
 
As an example, systems like Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and 
Global Command and Support System (GCSS) have evolved to enable robust 
collaboration, planning and situational awareness capabilities.  Unfortunately; however, 
even GCCS Maritime, 
through which force self-synchronization is supposed to occur, takes only 
a one-way passive feed from tactical data links.  Information available in 
the common operational picture from other sources is not “pushed” 
automatically and cannot be even digitally transmitted to tactical platforms 
via data link.  Without this information push, crucial tactical information 
is not supplied to the platforms with the sensors and weapons that enable 
target engagement unless it is passed by voice.25 
There are many other systems which help to accomplish the various tasks 
associated with planning and C2, including planning for war contingencies and exercises, 
collaboration, Course of Action (COA) development, and the development of a “common 
picture” and accurate situational awareness; however, such systems stop short of closing 
the engagement loop.  
                                                 
24 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 47. 
25 Hardesty, 69. 
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As previously discussed, physically segmented, separately managed, and non-
integrated engagement zones also produce sub-optimal use of weapons’ kinematic 
(range) capabilities.  If a weapon has a kinematic capability greater than that of the sensor 
or fire control system of the firing platform, the weapon will never be used to its full 
combat reach capability unless “handed off.” to another sensor.  Another example of sub-
optimization that results from weapons being limited to the inputs of their organic firing 
platform is that of target-weapon-shooter “mismatches”.  Such mismatches occur, for 
example, when target-weapon pairings are made based on physical proximity rather than 
on an optimum solution based on all available sensors, weapons, or shooters.  Greater 
integration among available assets would improve these suboptimal assignments by 
allowing optimal target-weapon pairings, regardless of geographical location or other 
limitation.  It should be noted, however, that assigning optimal target-weapon-shooter 
pairings is a far more difficult challenge than simply integrating all sensors, weapons, and 
shooters.  While a given solution to a particular threat may be optimal at the local or 
tactical level, the solution may not be optimal when considered from an operational or 
strategic perspective. 
A final, general observation is that fundamentally speaking, the Navy’s current 
C4ISR architecture is, at best, simply a set of pipes which facilitates data transfer and the 
support of various end-user systems.  The network must improve in order to facilitate the 
full utilization of available warfighting applications and the use of such applications as 
“distributed services” among all assets.  Put another way – the network needs to be more 
than just a set of pipes and infrastructure – the network should be an integral part of the 
warfighting solution by supporting all network-aware applications for all network 
“nodes”, whatever they may be or how they may be manifested, to collaborate, self-
synchronize, sense, and react to environmental stimulus.  In this way, the C4ISR 









C. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO INTEROPERABILITY 
The lack of interoperability of our current 
system is in large part due to lack of a fundamentally 
sound C4ISR “architecture”.  The way systems are 
interconnected today is process and platform 
dependent.  Their ability to interact and collaborate 
is limited and their behavior is primarily platform or 
system centric.  This severely limits adaptability and 
modularity. 26 As discussed previously, there are a number of reasons and factors 
contributing to this problem; According to Rex Buddenberg, Senior Lecturer of 
Information Science at the Naval Postgraduate School, the technical aspects of the 
solution depend upon three requirements: 
· The need for a definition of architecture as a means to achieve 
interoperability. 
· Ensure the modularization of systems matches the Sense, Decide, and Act 
taxonomic functions. 
· The need to define a set of interface standards. 
Each of these requirements is generally discussed below 
The need for a definition of “Architecture” – According to Buddenberg, a major 
part of the problems surrounding interoperability and our current C4ISR architecture is an 
“undisciplined definition.”27  Buddenberg further contends, “The best and most 
applicable definition for architecture is “Design.  The way things fit together….such a 
prescriptional, design-focused definition, as a means to interoperability is the proper area 
of concern to the architect (CIO)”. 28  In this definition, “things” refers to information 
systems (both large and small), all of which can be decomposed into sense, decide, and 
act functions, connected by communications.29  By “large” information systems, we are 
referring to those which cross platform, program, service and allied boundaries.  Chapter 
                                                 
26 Charles, GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, 
Slide 8. 
27 Buddenberg, 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 4. 
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without change, and those 
who cannot change their 
minds cannot change 
anything.” 
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II will introduce and fully discuss a new concept called FORCEnet Engagement Packs 
(FnEPs), but is is important to note here the information systems necessary to support 
FnEPs will all be considered large information systems.  This perspective also aligns well 
with the FnEPs concept because by being focused on optimizing combat engagements 
across all functions of the engagement chain, FnEPs will require systems which cross 
platform, program, service and allied boundaries. 
The Navy knows how to build small information systems – those where it is 
possible to get boundaries drawn around the entire system and placed under a single 
program manager.  An example highlighted by Buddenberg is that of the California Class 
CGN, a ship program that demonstrated as soon as a program expands to a multiple 
program manager information system problem, the level of complexity jumps30.  In this 
case, there were multiple program managers but only a single platform.  From the 
California Class CGNs Aegis was born, and with it the “mega program manger” (PMS-
400) with enough responsibility and authority to force end-to-end integration along a 
single mission area which crossed many functional area (C2, ISR, FC, etc.) boundaries.  
Unfortunately, this massive, multi-billion dollar program lacked the ability to scale up to 
that of cross-platform integration and interoperability – which remains the critical next 
step and a valuable lesson learned from CEC. 
Buddenberg also highlights the fact that as we evolve in the “Information Age” 
we must better understand the value of information and that there are significant potential 
benefits and improvements if we can design, develop, and implement systems properly.  
Buddenberg observes a number of “painful lessons” learned by the military and private 
industry about how to approach large, complex information systems and identifies a 
number of characteristics the architecture should exhibit.  According to Buddenberg, in 
general the architecture should be:  
· Simple 
· Minimal and extensible 
· Scaleable 
                                                 
30 The California Class CGNs were the last pre-Aegis cruisers and are widely understood today to have had 
inoperable combat systems when they were commissioned. 
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· Real (meaning it requires no “uninvented” technology to implement) 
· Platform and function independent31 
These characteristics are all fundamental to FnEPs as well.  The challenges 
highlighted above are also similar.  As Buddenberg points out, “large information 
systems today are like large software systems a quarter of a century ago.  We understand 
the problem poorly and we haven’t settled on a real discipline, or even a good 
methodology, yet.”32  A large part of the problem FnEPs tries to address is the 
interoperability and integration requirements problem when you look at information 
systems from the engagement chain perspective.  Unfortunately, DoD is constrained 
beyond technical solutions.  As a prime example, the Defense Reorganization Act 
(Goldwater-Nichols) puts into place a requirements system designed for the procurement 
and engineering of stove-piped platforms, not large integrated and network-centric 
information systems.   
Implement a standard set of Interfaces – A key to the solution lies in the 
implementation of a standard set of interfaces for whatever nodes or end systems are to 
connect to the network.  If we achieve this, then these end systems, including the sensors, 
weapons, and other components of a given FnEPs “Pack” can interconnect in a “Plug and 
Fight” manner – a key requirement to the dynamic allocation and reallocation of assets to 
packs and mission areas. 
Buddenberg contends a coherent architecture must use a common network 
structure.33  In the case of virtually all current and future programs related to C4ISR 
networks, the focus is on the implementation of internet technology.  Further, 
Buddenberg identifies several key assumptions about the network any architecture must 
support.  These include: 
· Within the network cloud we have e-mail Message Transfer Agents. 
· A network monitoring capability that uses SNMP.  
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 5. 
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· We need a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).34   
· The network must support QoS services.35 
The first architectural rule is that all end systems attach to the network; never 
directly to each other. Providing these systems qualify as “Good Network Citizens,”36 
they can be easily attached to an Internet.  Good Network Citizens should have the 
following characteristics:  
· A LAN interface 
· An “enveloping” interface.  
· A management interface. 
· A PKI-base capability to authenticate itself. 
· An ability to request QoS services if best-effort delivery is not adequate.37 
Buddenberg acknowledges that while this description is not explicit, these 
specifications are sufficient and allow for modifications without wholesale changes to the 
end system38.     
It is important to note there has been much discussion regarding what the most 
appropriate technologies are to support the architectural characteristics and network 
required by the Navy and DoD.  Most of this discussion, especially related to QOS, 
centers on the suitability of Internet technology and of the IP and IPv6 protocols in 
particular.  In the context of FnEPs, such considerations become even more critical as 
they impact functions associated with the engagement chain.  The characteristics 
discussed above will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV, along with a discussion 
of the current and emerging technologies most likely to impact the performance of this 
recommended architecture. 
                                                 
34 According to Buddenberg, PKI, in turn, implies a directory structure.  This directory may do many things, but 
the architectural requirement is that it authentically serve public keys. Resistance to denial of service attacks, link 
crypto, low probability of intercept and detection are all issues that belong inside the network cloud; they are not of 
architectural concern to end systems attached to the network. 
35 Buddenberg, 5. 
36 For a more in-depth discussion, refer to Buddenberg’s “What’s Wrong with DoD’s So-Called Information 
Architectures and What We Ought to be Doing About It,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000.  WWW Link: 
[http://web1.nps.navy.mil/~budden/lecture.notes/good_net_citizen.html], Accessed October 2003. 
37 Buddenberg, 5. 
38 Ibid. 
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Modularization of Systems – The purpose of the interface definition discussion 
above is fundamentally related to answering the challenge of connecting end systems to 
the network itself.  The remaining challenge is ensuring the interface of end systems 
amongst each other.  For this reason the core of the architecture must display a 
modularization methodology.  Buddenberg observes that interoperability problems with 
the current “architecture” can generally be viewed as deficiencies related to mis-
modularization of the systems or where the complexity of the systems and processes do 
not cleanly nest.39  These issues can be solved by addressing the following rules: 
· Make the functions of sense, decide and act match the module boundaries.  
Avoid, in particular, placing single sensor integration functions in the 
decision module.  Modularize the end systems consistent ly to increase the 
probability that a sensor originally part of one program can provide data 
effectively to a decision support module that was part of another.  
· Nest cleanly.  The best illustration is in structured software langages that 
make it very difficult for a subroutine to return to any place other than 
where it was called from.  Clean nesting allows reuse of modules and 
building of arbitrarily complex information systems.  
· Chain properly.  Ensure that the act function (not the decide) of one 
system represents the sense function of the next system.  Recognize sense-
decide-decide-act chains not as chaining at all, but as poor (but often 
necessary) halfway steps that should only be indulged in to accommodate 
legacy.40 
A FORCEnet Architecture – Fortunately, given the current state of commercial 
and Department of Defense technology, improvements are possible beginning today and 
could be implemented using a spiral development approach.  Such an approach would 
also allow leveraging legacy systems and emerging technology in ways that are fiscally 
and programmatically viable.  Contrary to the picture of today’s C4ISR architecture, we 
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· More closely integrate all components, including legacy systems, 
advanced technology, and joint assets     
· Be more capabilities-based and focused on a refined set of Mission 
Capabilities Packages (MCPs). 
· More focused on the engagement chain 
The remainder of this section seeks to address each of these. 
1. Integration of Legacy, Advanced and Joint Systems  
From a technical (not to mention fiscal and organizational) standpoint, 
improvements to today’s C4ISR architecture require an evolutionary process which builds 
on already existing capabilities.  While we lack some of the technical answers and cannot 
afford to recapitalize the entire fleet’s capabilities all at once, many of our current 
systems have demonstrated a high level of performance and proven capability to 
“accomplish the mission.”  Captain Robert Whitkop, former director of the Navy 
Network Warfare Command’s FORCEnet division, said, “FORCEnet Block 0 already 
exists in the fielded Navy networks operated by [Navy Network Warfare Command] that 
serve some 7,000 personnel.”41  Accordingly, we should leverage existing capabilities 
and systems where possible and seek the integration of new and advanced technology 
through a spiral development process.  Using a spiral development process will 
accomplish integration in an incremental manner and enable the sound management of 
cost and risk.  This methodology is also better for risk management and mitigation over 
the long term because as related integration and supporting development takes place, 
better short term corrections can be made with a lower cost threshold and minimal impact 
to overall development.   
Beyond simply integrating legacy and advanced systems however; joint, including 
allied and coalition integration will also be critical.  There are two chief reasons for this.  
1) Only by including joint systems and capabilities can we realize the full synergies 
possible with an integrated C4ISR infrastructure.  2) Each of the services and our allies 
and coalition partners possesses core competencies.  As a result of the services becoming 
more specialized with respect to these core competencies—and optimized towards 
specific statutorily mandated roles and missions, individual services cannot function and 
                                                 
41 Sharp, 104. 
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“fight” independently.  Today’s combat operations are chiefly focused around the 
establishment and effective operation of JTFs.  These JTFs would benefit greatly from 
the synergistic effects and capabilities that an integrated C4ISR infrastructure would 
enable.  As a specific example, consider the recent example of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  Throughout OEF, the Navy was required (and able!) to 
support forces ashore across a distance in excess of 600 miles.  Such support was not 
seamless; however, especially from the perspective of fire support, and tragic blue-on-
blue accidents resulted.    
The following excerpt from CAPT Hardesty’s article characterizes such a “joint” 
C4ISR architecture,  
While initial focus of the tactical NCW organization will be on rapid 
correction of current interoperability shortfalls, its mission-area-based 
analysis will result in development of a long-range NCW plan that is 
synchronized with the other services.  Marine Corps operators must be 
included . . . to provide the interface to all relevant Marine Corps systems.  
The plan must include a means to pass relevant digital data from the 
Army’s Tactical Internet to supporting naval tactical units.  A coherent 
plan integrating and deconflicting naval aviation with Army artillery and 
naval fire control systems is required.  Multiplatform sensor-integration 
efforts . . . must be coordinated to ensure both Navy and Air Force 
platforms can participate.  Information from assets in space should be 
integrated directly into tactical kill chains.42 
While joint integration is difficult, as discussed above, a spiral development and 
implementation methodology would help to realize more robust capabilities over time, 
without unrealistically high hurdles enroute.  RDML Sharp, Captain Whitkop, and others 
have stressed that,  
FORCEnet requires a joint-service architecture achieved through the use 
of common standards and protocols.  All the services want to be linked.  
They have to push the joint arena.  Everyone is doing C4I [command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence].  They need a Joint 
Forces Command 43 to force them to work towards a common 
architecture.44   
                                                 
42 Hardesty, 71. 
43 Note: The Joint Ballistic Missile Command and Control (JBMC2) Agency currently has this responsibility. 
44 Sharp, 104. 
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Finally, joint integration has the potential to reduce redundancies and increase 
efficiencies within the Navy and across the other services—an important quality in the 
current fiscal and budgetary environment.  It should be noted that certain standards 
currently exist as validated requirements, including MIL STD 6016 (TADIL-J), the future 
standard for all joint tactical data communications.  Unfortunately, such standards are 
neither being uniformly adhered to or enforced on a joint basis. 
While it is understood that a fully- integrated joint C4ISR infrastructure is likely 
many years from full realization, there also remains a critical need for near-term 
solutions.  Not only does our current C4ISR architecture and infrastructure lack the 
flexibility and adaptability to effectively counter the ever-changing threat environment 
posed by new, emerging asymmetric threats, but our traditional adversaries and threat 
remain viable and demand attention.  Ultimately, the current and future threat landscape 
will be increasingly characterized by non- linear behavior and asymmetric threats.  Such a 
landscape demands a C4ISR infrastructure that is “time-critically agile” in order to 
respond to this multi-dimensional enmeshment of new and traditional threats on a global 
scale. 
2. Capabilities-Based and Focused on MCPs 45 
As highlighted in Section A, the current C4ISR infrastructure suffers from highly 
stove-piped systems and integration that is at best vertically focused along the functional 
lines of ISR, C2, and FC.  Conversely, what is needed is greater horizontal integration 
focused on warfighting capabilities.  The Navy’s Mission Capability Packages (MCPs) 
provide an excellent framework for several reasons.  1) MCPs are capability-based.  
Currently, examples of MCPs include Missile Defense (MD), Strike, Undersea Warfare 
(USW or ASW), Anti-surface Warfare (ASuW), among others.  Such names highlight the 
highly focused nature of MCPs on specific capabilities rather than functional areas.  2) 
MCPs are joint by definition.  As discussed above, joint integration is critical to the 
success of a future C4ISR infrastructure.  3) From a Naval perspective, MCPs support the 
establishment and sustainment of Sea Supremacy.  This is important because SEA 
POWER 21 relies critically upon Sea Supremacy.  Citing the CNO's words, Sea 
                                                 
45 Naval Capability Pillars (NCPs) are the 4 SEA POWER 21 Pillars of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing and 
FORCEnet.  MCPs being distinct from and a subset of NCPs, include such specific mission areas as Strike and TAMD. 
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Supremacy is “a prerequisite for Sea Basing, an enabler of Sea Strike, and integral to Sea 
Shield.”46  In the context of SEA POWER 21, Sea Supremacy can be defined as 
dominating control of information flow and the maneuver area (space, cyberspace, air, 
sea, land, undersea) to allow undeterred Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing, where 
contesting this control is futile.  4), Sea Supremacy supports full spectrum dominance of 
the battle space.  This dominance is achieved through the integration with Joint force and 
interagency capabilities, operating unilaterally or with multinational partners, to defeat an 
adversary or control a situation across the complete range of military operations.  
Obviously, the accomplishment of Sea Supremacy is critically dependant upon an 
effective and efficient C4ISR infrastructure that supports FORCEnet and the MCPs.  
Figure 7 depicts a further characterization of MCPs. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Mission Capability Package (MCP)47. 
                                                 
46 CNO Task to SSG XXII (September 2002). 
47 Charles, Slide 4. 
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3. Focus on Engagement Chain 
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, there has been a tremendous 
amount of progress made in the areas of C2, planning, collaborative technologies, and 
other related areas that significantly and positively impact the challenges facing the 
current  C4ISR architecture and its support of the operations of the Navy.  System 
integration and interoperability, while still far from a desired end-state, are certainly 
headed in a positive direction.  Further, there is a great deal of advanced research and 
development ongoing in critical aspects of C2 as it relates to human systems integration 
and decision support.  Collectively, these advancements are all steps in the right 
direction, but they do not go far enough to solve one of the most fundamental and critical 
shortcomings of the current C4ISR architecture.  Highlighted above, this challenge is a 
lack of focus on the engagement chain.  Previous sections have also highlighted many of 
the challenges facing the integration and interoperability of sensors, weapons, and other 
related combat systems, amongst themselves; however, a greater challenges surfaces 
when it is realized that today there are extremely few examples of weapons and related 
“combat” systems that are horizontally integrated with the advanced C2 capabilities and 
functionality we currently have.  To express the point from the perspective of the 
warfighter, all the command and control, communications, situational awareness, and 
other information available across the battlefield does not do a bit of good if the 
warfighter can’t ultimately engage the enemy!  What is needed is a C4ISR architecture 
that supports not only the full spectrum of C2 and related functionality, but the ability to 
ultimately bring decision making to bear in the form of engagements against our 
adversaries. 
Thus far, Section B has presented a general characterization of the future C4ISR 
infrastructure—namely that of the need for greater integration that is more joint, more 
focused on the engagement chain, and achieves greater warfighting capabilities in the 
near-term.  A recent concept developed by the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, called 
FORCEnet Engagment Packs (FnEPs) seeks to achieve these goals and is the focus of the 
remainder of this thesis.  The following sections will outline the purpose, methodology, 
and scope of our research, as well as present a set of assumptions and basic definitions. 
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D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Our methodology consists of three key aspects.  First, we intend to engage a wide 
variety of experts from DoD, government, academia and the commercial sectors in order 
to better understand the broad array of challenges facing the current C4ISR architecture 
and the implications these challenges have for FORCEnet and FnEPs.  Second, we will 
engage SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston and the FORCEnet Architecture Chief 
Engineer’s office to conduct objective analysis in support of the continued development 
of the FnEPs concept.  In conducting this analysis, we will use SPAWAR’s Gobal 
Engineering Methods: Initiative for Naval Integration and Interoperability, (GEMINII) 
and tool set, which provides the capability to conduct both static and dynamic 
interoperability analysis through first order system architecture decomposition and gap 
analysis.  Using GEMINI we will 1)  Perform scenario-based analysis of TAMD and 
Strike FnEPs “Packs”, and 2)  Define and assess the specific functionality of FnEPs 
CRCs and how they map to the ASN (RD&A) Common System Functions List (CSFL).  
Ultimately we will seek the discovery of requirements for near-term systems integration 
and those systems necessary to support the development of near-term FORCEnet and 
FnEP functionality.  Finally, we will coordinate with a variety of DoN organizations to 
begin development of an FnEPs prototype and a roadmap for its development.  
Specifically related to this final requirement, we will provide recommendations for 
continued development and implementation of FnEPs which 1) Respond to the tasker 
given by VADM Mayo, (Commander, NAVNETWARCOM) to develop a prototype 
FnEPs “Pack” for review and potential fleet trial in TRIDENT WARRIORFY04 and, 2) 
Are in accordance with the recommendations made to the CNO by SSG XXII (FnEPs 
Block I (IOC), 2009). 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
In accordance with the goals of our research, the scope of this thesis will focus on 
the development and refinement of the FnEPs concept and its relationship and 
implications for NCW, FORCEnet and SEA POWER 21.  As part of this refinement, we 
will also provide a series of recommendations and “Roadmap” focused on the continued  
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development of FnEPs and the “institutionalization” of the FORCEnet and FnEPs in the 
near term, in accordance with VADM Mayo’s tasker and the recommendations provided 
to the CNO.   
It is important to note that while we will broadly identify and address the array of 
challenges facing the implementation of FORCEnet and FnEPs, including 1) technical 
and non-technical challenges, 2) organizational and process related challenges, and 3) 
programmatic and acquisition related issues, the specific “answers” to such challenges lie 
well beyond the scope of this thesis and our research.  We have chosen to focus primarily 
on the technical and network-related challenges facing FORCEnet and FnEPs, while 
providing limited recommendations with respect to the other challenges.  Chapter V will 
address further areas for future development.  
F. DEFINITIONS 
This section seeks to define some basic terms that will be used throughout this 
thesis.   
Architecture – The design or way systems and/or other components of a network 
fit together such that modularity is achieved, enabling architecture scaleability.  Key 
assumptions in this definition include the implementation of a standard set of interfaces 
for whatever nodes are to connect to the network and a common network structure. 
Bundle – System function/information exchange mapping to service area (e.g., 
sense, decide, or act) 
Capabilities – Warfighter, outcome-based effects based on two types of variables, 
conditions (i.e., things we ‘set’) and metrics (i.e., things we ‘measure’) like weather, 
AOR geometry, threat, lethality, coverage (sensor, engagement) survivability, timeliness, 
or time, space and force factors. 
Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs) – Fundamentally, CRCs are further 
refinements of Garstka’s Network-Centric Warfare principles.  Beyond these general 
principles; however, the CRCs seek to define specific warfighting functionality necessary 
to improve combat power.  There are five specific CRCs include Integrated Fire Control 
(IFC), Automated Battle Management Aids (ABMA), Composite Tracking (CT),  
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Composite Combat Identification (CCID), and Common/Single Integrated Pictures (CP).  
These CRCs are the product of specific FORCEnet factor integration focused and must 
be engineered to achieve critical, end-to-end combat functions. 
Derived Capabilities – Derived capabilities are parameters of services (e.g., 
security, connectivity, availability, maintainability, bandwidth efficiency, 
interoperability, latency, delay, jitter, etc.).  These derived capabilities may be articulated 
in the form of requirements, quality of service (QoS) or in service level agreements 
(SLAs). 
Engagement Chain – The process by which missions are conducted for the 
purposes of prosecuting targets.  This process includes the following steps:  Find, Fix, 
Target, Track, Engage, and Assess. 
Engagement Pack – a specific set of joint sensors, platforms, weapons, warriors, 
networks and command & control systems, for the purpose of performing mission-
specific engagements.  Initial pack asset allocation and configuration to constitute a pack 
will be based on a specific threat or mission; however, the capability to dynamically re-
configure and re-allocate assets “on-the-fly,” to reconstitute a new pack will enable cross-
mission engagement capabilities.  Integrating the six FORCEnet factors must focus on 
enabling five critical functions called the “Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs)”.  These 
CRCs are:  Integrated Fire Control (IFC), Automated Battle Management Aids 
(ABMAs), Composite Tracking (CT), Composite Combat Identification (CCID), and 
Common/Single Integrated Pictures (CP).  Ultimately, FnEPs will help “operationalize” 
FORCEnet by demonstrating a network-centric operational construct that supports an 
increase in combat reach and provides an order of magnitude increase in combat power 
by creating more effective engagements, better sensor-shooter-weapon assignments and 
improved utilization of assets.  FnEPs achieves fully integrated joint capabilities focused 
on the engagement chain, and represents a revolutionary transformation in Naval 
operations complimentary to FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea Supremacy. 
Each “pack” contains a mix of legacy and advanced Joint capabilities which 
leverages available assets to provide fire power on demand and adaptive to support any 
type of conflict or combat any type of threat the JTF Commander might require.  Spiral 
development of FnEPs supports a process that leads incrementally to a fully integrated 
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Joint Force, providing a near-term set of FORCEnet engagement functions to the JTF 
Commander.  Information is passed by way of common protocols and standards, 
supported by unique bandwidth allocations depending on the requirements of the 
individual mission areas through all phases of the kill chain; find, fix, target, track, 
engage and assess.  Perhaps most significantly, the FnEPs concept will provide mission-
specific capabilities that are scalable, adaptable, and dynamically reconfigurable as a 
single warfighting system of systems.  “Packs” have specific functionality acting 
collectively to support common objectives both within a pack and as a collection of 
packs.  This is unlike ‘swarm’ that implies a mass of common functions, supporting a 
common objective.  A pack consists of a mix of manned and unmanned systems.  The 
pack is a system of engagement subsystems adaptable for a particular mission area, and 
in many cases, multi- functional, so that a pack can support another mission area on 
demand48. 
FORCEnet – “The operational construct and architectural framework for naval 
warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force that is 
scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.”49 
FORCEnet Engagement Packs  (FnEPs) – The concept that defines the 
operational construct for the realization of FORCEnet as it relates to the engagement 
chain.   
Infrastructure – The physical instantiation of an architecture, especially is it 
relates to the actual networks which support the exchange of all types of C4ISR related 
information. 
Integration – The bringing of different systems together into a coherent 
architecture such that unrestricted and equal association between those systems is 
possible.  These systems could be different from a functional, technical or design-based  
                                                 
48 Joseph Giaquinto, Captain, U.S. Navy. FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs), (SSG XXII, June 2003), 
(PowerPoint Brief), Slide 13. 
49 SSG XXI. 
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perspective; however, this coherent architecture allows these systems or functional 
capabilities to work seamlessly towards a common goal.  Integration seeks to achieve 
interoperability. 
Interoperability – From a networking perspective, this implies the ability of 
software and hardware on multiple machines from multiple vendors to communicate.  In 
a more general DoD sense, interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to 
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 
Network – Unless otherwise specified, our use of this term refers to the 
interconnectivity of information systems that either generate or consume data and are 
largely comprised of communications resources and C4ISR related networks, including 
both IP and non-IP (e.g., Link-16, CEC) systems. 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) -  “An information superiority-enabled concept 
of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher 
tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization.”50 
Open Architecture (OA) – A standards-based approach to creating modular, 
interoperable, and scaleable systems.  Further OA allows for the use of future technology 
and insertion of components from one generation to the next based on hardware and 
software products that conform to open standards, thereby resulting in significant savings 
and improving interoperability.  From a Navy perspective, the Open Architecture 
Computing Environment (OACE) seeks to implement an OA approach, inc luding 
specifications for interfaces, services, and supporting formats.  OA will enable properly 
engineered components to be utilized across a wide range of systems with minimal 
change requirements necessary to interoperate with components on local and remote 
systems. 
                                                 
50 Alberts, 2. 
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“Operationalize” – Transforming a theoretical concept into practical terms.  In the 
context of FORCEnet, “operationalize” is about realizing the vision of FORCEnet in a 
warfighting context focused on the engagement chain in order to achieve the potential of 
Network-Centric Warfare. 
Pack – Minimum end-to-end sequence of service areas mapped to integrated 
components (systems), (e.g., specific “Pack”) 
Portfolio – Program mapping to multiple end-to-end packs aligned to mission area 
capabilities 
Strike – As defined in Joint Publication, JP 1-02, an attack that is intended to 
inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective.  The Strike MCP will evaluate mission 
capability to inflict damage on or destroy an objective. 
Tactical Situations (TACSITs) – TACSITs are graphical representations of MCP 
mission areas and depict what activities occur along the Engagement Chain.  Further, 
TACSITs refine the Operational Situations (OPSITs) based on a specific Design 
Reference Mission (DRM).  Finally, TACSITs depict how the engagement chain 
activities are linked as an end-to-end set of processes.  These characteristics allow 
TACSITs to be used as baseline reference documentation in a variety of settings, 
including the modeling and validation of OPNAV budget submissions.  
Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) – Mission area created within the 
JTAMD process that states activities within the mission area seek to: Prevent, defeat, and 
minimize the consequences of adversary employment of ballistic, cruise, and air-to-
surface missiles and aircraft, especially those equipped with weapons of mass 
destruction.  Preventing entails destroying launchers, missiles, aircraft, and their 
sustaining and enabling infrastructure on the ground, or otherwise suppressing missile 
launchers and aircraft sorties.  Defeating involves intercepting missiles and aircraft in 
flight to destroy their payloads.  Minimizing consequences deals with warning specific 
personnel and areas at risk of missile and aircraft attack in time to enhance their 
protective posture.51  As defined in Joint Publication, JP 3-01, all defensive measures 
                                                 
51 Herbert C. Kaler, Robert Riche, and Timothy B. Hassell, “A Vision for Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, 68. 
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designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope or 
atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.  Destroy enemy 
theater missiles in flight or prior to launch or to otherwise disrupt enemy's theater missile 
operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense; 
active missile defense; attack operations; and supporting command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence measures.  More generally, TAMD ensures 
all around air defense of the battlespace from attack by enemy aircraft, anti-surface 
missiles, surface to surface missiles, and theater ballistic missiles. TAMD MCP will 
evaluate naval capabilities to provide critical point defense, area air and missile defense, 
and contribute to theater air and missile defense. 
G.   ASSUMPTIONS  
This thesis makes the following assumptions with respect to the FnEPs concept 
and its “operationalizing” FORCEnet.   
FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs) – In its most technical sense, FORCEnet 
is about the integration and networking of systems together, a process which currently 
faces tremendous cultural, process-related, and, to a lesser degree, technical issues.  As a 
result, fully achieving the ultimate objective of FORCEnet-- a “fully- integrated” family 
of systems—is not realistically achievable in the near-term time frame with which SSG 
XXII was chartered by the CNO.  Cultural and process-related challenges 
notwithstanding, there has been a great deal of technological progress made, leaving us 
poised to make significant strides towards the realization of FORCEnet in the near-term.  
SSG XXII envisioned the evolution of a set of mission-oriented joint capabilities 
developed as warfighting “packs.”  The collection of mission packs can be linked 
together to provide the JTF Commander a single system-of-systems construct, which we 
have labeled FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs).  In short, FnEPs represents an 
operational construct for the realization, or “operationalization,” of FORCEnet in the near 
term (FnEPs Block I IOC 2009). 
Even an initial “Pack” must integrate joint assets simply because the Navy and 
Marine Corps do not have all the assets required to perform certain critical missions such 
as TAMD.  Due to the first responder presence the Navy and Marine Corps in-theater,  
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initial pack constitution may be limited and primarily Naval in nature.  As other service 
assets become available, “packs” will be augmented with those joint assets in order to 
fully develop the warfighting capability required. 
Human C2 versus Automated Systems and Processes – Although FORCEnet and 
FnEPs will leverage the power of networks and IT technology and utilized increased 
levels of automation to achieve increased combat effectiveness and efficiency, these 
concepts will never eliminate the warfighter as a critical part of such concepts.  Recall the 
definition of FORCEnet that lists integration of the warfigther as the first of six critical 
FORCEnet factors.   Similarly, while the current hierarchical C2 structure is at times 
inefficient, span of operational control is still going to be an important operational 
requirement for the management of complex, large-scale combat operations, and we do 
not foresee the possibility for a single C2 “layer” which controls all networked activities 
within the “packs.” 
“Pooled Resources Paradigm” – While increases in the numbers and varieties of 
integrated and “networked” systems will enable FnEPs to provide orders of magnitude 
increase in combat power, challenges associated with increased networking will likely 
emerge.  We assume a paradigm shift will be required, whereby an individual will be 
required to release ownership of dedicated, direct control authority for assets in order to 
create “pools” of warfighting assets in realizing distributed warfighting services.  This 
“pooled asset paradigm” would make assets dynamically available for assignment to 
engagements optimized across the entire force.  This paradigm has two key aspects.  
First, pooled assets do not change the presumption that these warfighting assets would 
still be available to their organic “owners” for such requirements as self-defense.  
Secondly, this paradigm will require a cultural shift towards trusting the use of weapons 
and sensors beyond the control of single firing platform.  A possible example of the 
benefits of this is an Aegis cruiser that has been designated to engage a land-based target, 
such as a Silkworm missile, beyond the range of its own organic radar.  In order to utilize 
the full kinematic range of the Standard missile, control must be handed off to another 
entity for control, in this case perhaps an Army Patriot battery.  In this scenario, we 
assume the Patriot battery cannot engage the target due to the lower range capabilities of 
the Patriot missile; however the Patriot fire control radar is capable of controlling the 
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Standard missile fired by the Aegis ship out to the range required in this scenario.  This 
scenario could be extended to reflect a second missile threat—in this case, a second 
Silkworm missile is fired at the Aegis ship. Although the ship is aware of possible danger 
to itself, rather than defaulting to a self-defense posture, the pooled resource paradigm 
enables a more optimal solution by allowing the Aegis to continue its original 
engagement in conjunction with the Patriot battery while a second Aegis ship or second 
Patriot battery (possibly even working together!) perform the defensive engagement for 
the first Aegis ship!  This scenario demonstrates that from an engagement perspective, 
the integration of systems results in capabilities not possible among individual systems,  
Another related assumption to network-pooled resources is that “more” is always 
“better.”  In this case increasing the connection nodes in a network among previously 
segmented systems might create the effect of reducing independent capability.  Greater 
levels of communication and data exchange may in fact create more noise and become 
counterproductive in certain circumstances, adding to the “fog of war.”  In this way, the 
value of such exchanges could substantially degrade across the network.  FnEPs seeks to 
reduce this problem by optimizing connectivity such that only the required systems are 
connected and only when necessary.  
Trust – Trust in networked assets and their capabilities is inherent. The scenario 
discussed above depicts the critical nature of trust, and by implication, the security, 
reliability, and availability requirements for network resources and warfighting assets.  
Trust is closely interrelated with authenticity of data and information.  Such 
characteristics must be engineered into the systems upon which FORCEnet and FnEPs 
will function. 
TACSITs – The Strike and TAMD Tactical Situations (TACSITs) used for this 
thesis were defined using a single F/A-18 doing TAMD and Strike missions equipped 
with Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW).  TACSITs are occurring simultaneously, with 
aircraft shifting between missions based on the operational scenario.  This means that 
related information elements are available to both missions simultaneously and that there 
are information exchange correlation efforts ongoing (full, partial or minimal) according 
to Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.   Concurrent Strike and TAMD TACSITs 52. 
 
In the approach used, there were 235 identified information element dependencies 
in both Strike and TAMD TACSITS 53 
Technology and Automation – Warfare has always been and will remain a clash 
of human wills.  Commanders will always be surrounded by their staffs and other subject 
matter experts.  FnEPs does not seek to eliminate human decision-making from the 
engagement process but rather to use technology where it makes the most sense to 
augment the human decision-making process.  Accorinding to Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) 6: 
We believe that the object of technology is not to reduce the role of people 
in the command and control process, but rather to enhance their 
performance – although technology should allow us to decrease the 
                                                 
52 Phil Charles, FnEPs Analysis Status Brief, SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston, SC, 16 May 2003, 
(PowerPoint Brief), Slide 8. 
53 Ibid., Slide 7. 
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number of people involved in the process . . . Technology should seek to 
automate routine functions which machines can accomplish more 
efficiently than people in order to free people to focus on the aspects of 
command and control which require judgment and intuition.54 
FnEPs will likely never replace judgment and intuition; however, ABMA functionality 
will enhance the decision-making process for the commander and their staff. 
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II. FORCENET ENGAGEMENT PACK BACKGROUND 
Chapter II seeks to provide both background for, and an understanding of the 
FnEPs concept.  Part A will seek to discuss the background of the FnEPs concept, much 
of which is derived from the principles of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and the 
FORCEnet discussed in Chapter I.  Part B will discuss the FnEPs concept itself, and its 
potential to “operationalize” FORCEnet and realize achieve Sea Supremacy via the 
CNO’s vision of Sea Power 21. 
A. FORCENET ROOTS – NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and 
dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive 
power, defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force 
Commanders. 
    --Admiral Vern Clark “Sea Power 21”55 
Chapter I began with a basic discussion of the concepts of NCW and FORCEnet.  
In addition to defining NCW, Alberts, Garstka, and Stein identified three fundamental 
network-centric principles, including: 
Self Synchronization – The ability of a well- informed force to organize and 
synchronize complex warfare activities from the bottom up.  The organizing principles 
are unity of effort, clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules of 
engagement.  Self-synchronization is enabled by a high level of knowledge of one's own 
forces, enemy forces, and all appropriate elements of the operating environment.  It 
overcomes the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command directed 
synchronization characteristic of more conventional doctrine and converts combat from a 
step function to a high-speed continuum.56 
 
                                                 
55 Vern Clark, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.  Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint 
Capabilities, October 2002. 
56 Arthur Cebrowski, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare:  Its Origin and 
Future,” Proceedings, January 1998. 
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Remote Sensor Engagements – Historically, DoD has focused on platform-centric 
operations, whereby combat power is often sub-optimized due to the fact platforms are 
unable to generate engagement quality information at ranges greater than or equal to the 
maximum engagement range of the platform’s organic weapons.  As an example, recall 
the discussion of AEGIS and CEC in Chapter I.  In contrast, network-centric operations 
focus on engagements facilitated via robust networks and digital data links that will allow 
the optimized use of weapons and sensors independent of platform restrictions. 
Shared Battlespace Awareness - This concept is often mistakenly considered as a 
single picture or a perspective that must be common amongst all users or participants.  
Actually, NCW holds that battlespace awareness really exists in a distributed form.  From 
the user’s perspective, only a slice of “operational picture” is available at any given time.  
This view can take the form of either a particular detail or a more general, overall 
perspective.  The ability to move up and down these levels of abstraction without 
introducing distortions is a critical aspect of such an operational picture. 
The following figure illustrates the military as a Network-Centric Enterprise and 
relates these network-centric principles via a model that graphically depicts the definition 
of NCW and the network-centric principles discussed above. 
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Figure 9.   The Military as a Network-Centric Enterprise57 
 
1. Today’s Vision for FORCEnet . . . A Fully-Netted Force 
As discussed previously, FORCEnet involves the integration of warriors, sensors, 
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons.  The end-state goal for 
FORCEnet is to implement NCW through a “fully-netted force.”  This fully-netted force 
is characterized by distributed capabilities that make up the multi-tiered sensor, C2, and 
weapons grid, where numerous unattended, autonomous vehicles operate and engage 
alongside manned aircraft, ships and land combat systems.  Naval Forces will be 
dispersed over large geographic battlespaces and be required to process sensor 
information such that large scale, dynamic targeting can be coordinated and 
                                                 
57 Alberts, 89. 
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deconflicted.58  Capabilities of the fully-netted force include not only those NCW 
principles addressed above (self-synchronization, remote sensor engagements, joint 
shared battlespace awareness), but also critically depend on full human-centered 
integration as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Evolution to FORCEnet59. 
 
Such capabilities portray FORCEnet in its “full dimension,” and are depicted graphically 
below in the form of the FORCEnet Operational View (OV-1).  
                                                 
58 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 45.  
59 CNO SSG XXII Brief to CNO, 17 July 2003, Slide 5. 
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Figure 11.   Operational Overview (OV-1)60. 
 
It is critical to note the power of full dimension FORCEnet does not come just 
from networks alone.  While networks form the foundation for FORCEnet, the power of 
full dimension FORCEnet comes from the integration of all six FORCEnet factors around 
those NCW capabilities discussed above.  Such integration results in synergies which 
extend combat reach with far superior increases in combat power than that generated by 
improvements to any individual FORCEnet factor or NCW capability.  SSG XXI called 
this, the “Combat Reach Function” as shown in Figure 12.61   
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Figure 12.   Combat Reach Function62. 
 
Extending combat reach results in the expansion and extension of engagement 
envelopes and immediately improves Sea Strike and Sea Shield capabilities to project 
offensive and defensive power.  More targets are held at risk that creates additional 
engagement and re-engagement opportunities.  A more robust layered defense results in a 
larger protective footprint for not only the Sea Base, but also for maneuvering forces 
ashore and Allies.  In this way, FORCEnet facilitates attaining Sea Supremacy.  To 
achieve FORCEnet in its full dimension, all six of the FORCEnet Factors must be 
integrated.  It is through this integration that order of magnitude increases in combat 
power identified by SSG XXI are generated63.  Unfortunately, to date it has been difficult 
to implement FORCEnet.  RDML Sharp characterizes recent efforts by saying, 
“FORCEnet usually is shown as gratuitous cloud charts with lightening bolts…So far 
we’ve failed to put meat on the bones behind it.”64  
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Sharp, 104. 
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As discussed in Chapter IV, successful network design requires 1) The definition 
of the capabilities desired for the network, and 2) A functional decomposition of these 
capabilities in order to determine the requirements for the network.  Similarly, NCW and 
NCO must be functionally decomposed in order to determine the requirements necessary 
to build FORCEnet.  In technical networking terms, these requirements will translate into 
the technology, topologies, protocols, and standards necessary to “build” FORCEnet.  
Although this decomposition remains relatively vague and indeterminate in terms of the 
development of specific requirements for FORCEnet, Naval Network Warfare Command 
(NAVNETWARCOM) published the “FORCEnet Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
(Coordination Draft) on 5 February 2003.  The FORCEnet ICD contains a preliminary 
compilation of FORCEnet functional requirements.  Subsequently on 8 April 2003, 
SPAWAR, the chief engineers for FORCEnet, released a FORCEnet Government 
Reference Architecture (GRA) designed to “describe a vision for the Naval FORCEnet 
initiative”. 65  The GRA was later updated and released as the FORCEnet Architecture 
Vision on 18 July 2003.  Finally, the FORCEnet Architecture and Standards Document 
(Vols. I and II) were released on 3 Nov 2003.  Figure 13 depicts the various levels of 
system engineering architectural views presented in these documents. 
                                                 
65 FORCEnet GRA. 
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Figure 13.   Using Architecture Products in Systems Engineering and Acquisition66. 
 
The remainder of this section will provide a high level discussion of FORCEnet, 
from the perspective of these documents, generally discussing architecture and 
specifically addressing how FORCEnet will meet functional requirements related to 
networking.  Chapter IV will address more specifically the technical aspects of 
networking and the implications of the FnEPs concept on the C4ISR network 
infrastructure currently being developed to support and enable FORCEnet.  
FORCEnet will utilize a Technical Reference Model (FnTRM)67 based on a 
Distributed Service Architecture, and will be web-services based, thus enabling 
applications and services to be implemented on a single computer or group of 
heterogeneous computing platforms.68  Further, the FnTRM will implement 
                                                 
66 Charles, Assessments to define Composeable Mission Capability, 9. 
67 To date however, most TRMs, including JTA, are poor examples.  Most offer far too much detail, while being 
technically obsolete and unfocused.  As a result, most TRMs have been sacks full of standards. 
68 SPAWAR, FORCEnet GRA, 25. 
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“composeable services,”69 allowing the user to flexibly and dynamically combine those 
services necessary to accomplish a given mission.  Figure 14 depicts the goal of this 
approach, namely Composeable Mission Capabilities. 
 
 
Figure 14.   The Vision:  Composeable Mission Capability70. 
 
Composeability occurs when “selections” from functional (such as sensors or 
communications) “bins,” are combined to facilitate mission accomplishment.  
FORCEnet’s distributed services architecture and its ability to facilitate composeability is 
closely aligned with and critically important to the FnEPs concept.  This relationship is 
analyzed and discussed in greater detail in both Chapters III and IV.   
 
 
                                                 
69 Composeable services requires a focus on architectural modularity and defining modular boundaries. 
70 Phil Charles and Rebecca Reed, GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration 
and Interoperability, (SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston, South Carolina, 2003), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 10. 
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FnTRM will also ensure the network infrastructure is highly available, reliable, 
scalable, and will ensure robust security functionality.  In order to accomplish all this, the 
FnTRM will be based on a four- layer architecture (not to be confused with the traditional 
four-layer architecture discussed in Chapter IV that parallels modern commercial 
Enterprise Architectures,) and includes the following functionality:71 
· Client Side Presentation Layer 
· Client Side Business Logic 
· Server Side Presentation Layer 
· Server Side Business Logic 
· Enterprise Information Systems Layer (Infrastructure) 
Finally, the FnTRM will make maximum use of commercial standards.  This will 
ensure increased interoperability and the ability to leverage, rather that duplicate, 
supporting infrastructure and services.  Some of the key existing and emerging industry 
and DoD standards the FnTRM intends to be implemented include:72 
· Joint Technical Architecture 
· IEEE 802 (wireless) profiled for FORCEnet 
· IPv6 
As discussed previously, NAVNETWARCOM published the FORCEnet ICD, 
which contained a preliminary compilation of FORCEnet functional requirements.  
Subsequently, the FORCEnet GRA and Architecture Vision documents described “a 
vision for the Naval FORCEnet initiative”. 73  As set forth in these documents, FORCEnet 
functional requirements include:74 
· Provide dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks 
· Conduct distributed, collaborative command and control 
· Provide expeditionary, multi-tiered sensor and weapon information 
 
 
                                                 
71 SPAWAR, FORCEnet GRA, 25. 
72 SPAWAR, FORCEnet GRA, 27. 
73 Ibid. 
74 SPAWAR, Code 05, Office of the Chief Engineer.,FORCEnet Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), 
(Coordination Draft, 5 February 2003), 22.  
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2. “Operationalizing” FORCEnet in the Near Term 
The preceding section has discussed NCW and FORCEnet from the perspective 
of their ultimate realization.  We assess two of the major hurdles existing between 
today’s FORCEnet and the ultimate goal of the “fully-netted force” include: 1) Time, and 
2) A lack of focus on end-to-end warfighting capabilities, including the engagement 
chain.  In terms of time, the ultimate realization of FORCEnet will likely not occur for 
many years despite many favorable factors, including advanced technology, changes in 
operational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and even positive changes in the 
acquisition field.  More importantly, FORCEnet currently lacks focus on the engagement 
of targets.  Figure 15 depicts an assessment by SSG XXII of how the Navy could 
accelerate the evolution to FORCEnet from current capabilities to that Future Vision, and 
along the way, deploy a set of network centric engagement capabilities. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Evolution to FORCEnet75. 
                                                 
75 CNO SSG XXII Brief to CNO, 17 July 2003, Slide 6. 
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The concept for doing this is what SSG XXII called – FORCEnet Engagement 
Packs (FnEPs).  With a spiral development approach, the Navy will be able to provide the 
JTF Commander jointly integrated combat capabilities in the near term, while 
simultaneously taking a large step on the evolutionary path, to the future vision of 
FORCEnet.  The following section discusses FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs) as a 
transformational method to “operationalize” FORCEnet through a new focus on the 
engagement chain. 
B. FORCENET ENGAGEMENT PACKS (FNEPS) 
FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs) seeks to develop an approach to manage 
(plan and implement) five critical “Combat Reach Capabilities” (CRCs) to implement 
composeable warfighting capabilities.  We know the technology foundation for 
FORCEnet will be formed around distributed enterprise services, but an ability to match 
these composeable combat reach capabilities to the available resources (computing, 
communication and human) on a particular node to a command hierarchy (e.g., business 
process) is still the art that needs to be explored and defined. 
1. FnEP Concept Vision and Definition 
In the Fall of 2002, the CNO 
tasked SSG XXII with examining Sea 
Supremacy in the context of SEA 
POWER 21.  In response to this tasking, 
SSG XXII proposed the overarching 
theme of achieving Sea Supremacy 
through the “Coherent Adaptive Force” (CAF).  This theme was based upon five related 
concepts: Coherent Adaptive Command (CAC), Operational Human Systems Integration 
(OpHSI), FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs), Global Maritime Awareness (GMA) 
and Deep Red. 
In particular, the FnEPs concept leverages SSG XXI’s work on the “Combat 




By implementing the Combat Reach Function, FnEPs will provide net-
centric engagement capabilities to the Joint war fighter in the near term 
(Block I, 2009).  These “Packs” will support a spiral development effort 
that leads incrementally to a fully integrated Joint Force.  A capabilities-
based approach will support “Pack” development providing mission-to-
mission distributed services.76 
a. What is a “Pack” 
As discussed previously in the definition section, each FnEPs “Pack” will 
be an ensemble of FORCEnet factors (i.e. warriors, sensors, C2 systems, networks, 
platforms, and weapons) that are generally integrated around and across particular 
Mission Capability Packages (MCPs) such as Strike or Theater Area Missile Defense 
(TAMD).  “Packs” are finite collections of small pieces of warfighting functionality 
loosely joined to address a threat.  Most importantly, “packs” will bind not just technical, 
system functionality, but humans and business processes in new collaborative ways.  The 
FnEPs Concept represents the operational construct for FORCEnet and demonstrates the 
power of FORCEnet by integrating a specific set of joint sensors, platforms, weapons, 
warriors, networks and command & control systems, for the purpose of performing 
mission-specific engagements.  Initial pack asset allocation and configuration to 
constitute a pack will be based on a specific threat or mission; however, the capability to 
dynamically re-configure and re-allocate assets “on the fly,” to reconstitute a new pack 
will enable cross-mission engagement capabilities.  Integrating the six FORCEnet factors 
must focus on enabling five critical functions called the “Combat Reach Capabilities 
(CRCs)”.  These CRCs are:  Integrated Fire Control (IFC), Automated Battle 
Management Aids (ABMAs), Composite Tracking (CT), Composite Combat 
Identification (CCID), and Common/Single Integrated Pictures (CP).  Ultimately, FnEPs 
will help “operationalize” FORCEnet by demonstrating a network-centric operational 
construct that supports an increase in combat reach and provides an order of magnitude 
increase in combat power by creating more effective engagements, better sensor-shooter-
weapon assignments and improved utilization of assets.  FnEPs achieves fully integrated 
joint capabilities focused on the engagement chain, and represents a revolutionary 
transformation in Naval operations complimentary to FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and 
                                                 
76 SSG XXII Readahead to CNO, 1. 
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Sea Supremacy.  Packs provide tightly integrated end-to-end engagement capabilities 
through three distinct information flow domains of Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), Command and Control (C2) and Fire Control (FC).  Such 
integration will remain loosely coupled; however, ensuring FnEPs will be inherently 
flexible, scalable, and focused on supporting the full spectrum of threat engagement, 
including detection, tracking, identification, sensor and weapon management, fire control 
solution generation, battle damage assessment, and re-engagement actions.  Finally, 
FnEPs will be the result of a spiral development process, which leads incrementally to a 
fully integrated joint force.   
While such descriptions generally highlight the importance of integration 
and interoperability of systems to both the FORCEnet and FnEPs concepts, several key 
aspects differentiate FnEPs from current FORCEnet initiatives.77  FnEPs: 
· Leverage joint assets 
· Demonstrate adaptability across multiple mission areas 
· Focus on the Engagement Chain 
· Can be fielded in the near-term 
The following section briefly discusses each of these 
Joint – “Packs” will be developed as Joint systems-of-systems 
distinguishing FORCEnet from the Army Future Combat System (FCS) and Air Force C2 
Constellation.  Ultimately, this jointness would extend to include full- interoperability 
across coalition and allied forces as well. 
Adaptive – “Packs” will provide robust sensor-shooter-weapon linkages 
allowing components to cross-connect “on-the-fly” supporting mission area-to-mission 
area engagements.  Unlike the case with current weapons systems; “pack” assets are not 
permanently or specifically tasked to support specific MCPs or “bolted together” into 
tightly coupled, stove-piped, or proprietary systems.  Instead, “packs” form, engage, and 
disperse in response to specific tasks or missions, with pack assets assigned dynamically 
on an as-needed basis.  This concept was introduced and discussed in Chapter I as the  
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
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“Pooled Assets Paradigm.”  In this way, individual “packs” are capable of dynamically 
adapting, not only to various targets or missions within a given MCP, but between 
different MCPs altogether, “on the fly,” and in response to changing threat scenarios.   
The adaptability of the “packs” is best exhibited by the ability of the same 
set of Fn “Factors” to engage threats from one mission area to another “on-the-fly”.  For 
example, a Missile Defense (MD) “pack” involved in integrated air defense operations, 
can use sensing information generated by national assets and airborne surveillance 
platforms to find, fix, target, track and assess moving and mobile ground targets, passing 
that information to multi-mission “shooters” and their weapons (e.g. DDGs, Fighters, 
UAVs, others).  The same set of assets can provide optimized sensor-shooter-weapon to 
target assignments to neutralize ground targets (or maritime surface contacts) “in-stride” 
of the MD operations.  These attack operations adaptively support MD, Strike, SuW, and 
other mission areas.   
It is critical to note that while FnEPs adaptability is specifically enabled by 
the CRCs identified previously, more generally, Pack assets or “FORCEnet Factors” 
must be system engineered to support the five CRCs through a high level of integration 
and interoperability.  Adaptability will require common interface protocols, and 
reasoning algorithms.  Further, human machine integration (HMI) must be built into the 
FORCEnet “Factors” to support the sharing, evaluation, and passing (to weapons in-
flight) of composite tracking and identification information.  Automated Battle 
Management Aids (ABMAs) aid both the tactical and operational commander by 
supporting composite common threat evaluations, dynamically-bidded preferred shot 
recommendations, and dynamic- interactive sensor coordination.  This kind of 
adaptability supports distributed combat operations and enables the JTF commander to 
extend his combat reach while efficiently managing his/her resources.  As an analogy, 
consider the human body and its immune system that uses antigens to discriminate 
between, and in some cases attack certain protein chains.  Similarly, FnEPs when 
threatened, produce defenses in the form of “Packs” which are volumetric, 
discriminative, and adaptive based on the threat situation. 
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Engagement Oriented – “Packs” will demonstrate application of combat 
power by: self-synchronization through the use of ABMAs; supporting cross-platform 
and cross-service IFC; and developing theater-wide shared battle space awareness 
through CT, CCID, and CP.  Ultimately, FnEPs seeks to utilize distributed forces to 
achieve massed effects against the complete spectrum of missions, targets, and 
adversaries.   
Field Near-Term Net-Centric Capabilities – Technology supporting the 
five CRCs is available today, along with intra- and inter-service system engineering 
know how.  Initial Operating Capability of the first Engagement Pack is achievable in 
five years from program initiation (Block I IOC in FY09). 
The remainder of Chapter II will highlight how a specific set of five 
Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs) will make the FnEPs concept possible. 
2. Combat Reach Capabilities 
To show how significant improvements in 
combat reach can be accomplished by 
“operationalizing” FORCEnet via the FnEPs 
concept, it is useful to consider the following 
analog.  Today the Internet and other commercial 
network infrastructures are continuing to evolve beyond the mere passing of information, 
to the point these networks support and facilitate the ‘work’ of the business world 
transactions (e.g., e-business, e-commerce, e-trade, etc.).  Today and in the future, 
military networks should be similarly evolving to a level where they support the 
warfighting ‘work’ of conducting engagements.  In this way, FORCEnet can be 
“operationalized” for use in a military setting in much the same way the Internet has been 
“operationalized” for use in a business enterprise setting.  Fundamentally, FnEPs 
provides the overarching framework and capabilities necessary to drive integration and 
interoperability requirements.  This can be accomplished across existing systems, 
programs, and other related initiatives, thereby reducing the risk level associated with 
new sytems and technology.  
“Change your thoughts and 
you change your world.” 
 
- The Rev. Dr. Norman 
Vincent Peale 
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While today’s civilian data and communications networks have advanced far 
beyond those of yesterday and the original ARPANET, the future will demand even 
greater performance and technological advancement.  The most critical technological 
challenges for these networks include the need to support advanced applications requiring 
ever-increasing levels of bandwidth and quality of service, often over wireless media and 
via mobile means.  Further, such applications and services are becoming more and 
critical to the successful operation of individuals and organizations alike, demanding 
higher levels of security and information assurance in general.   
However, if these challenges seem daunting in the civilian sector, they are even 
greater for our military.  While wireless and mobile technologies are still largely a 
convenience in the civilian sector, such technologies are indispensable to the military, 
especially in deployed scenarios.  Under combat conditions security and information 
assurance assume life and death importance.  While businesses and individuals certainly 
depend on the timely delivery of their critical data and information, military weapons 
systems often require a much higher order of performance in terms of quality of service 
and security.  Finally, the unique nature of deployed and combat environments result in 
special human systems integration (HSI) considerations, including training and 
integration related issues.78 
Continuing this comparison of the military with the commercial sector, over the 
progression of time, information technology has become increasingly important to 
businesses throughout all of a company’s business processes.  Starting with automating a 
simple business process like printing paychecks, businesses have increasingly automated 
and enhanced more and more of their business processes (Figure 16 depicts these 
processes in orange shaded areas) through the use of information technology.  Ultimately, 
information technology supports and enables the integration of these closely related 
business processes, thereby initiating a synergistic effect and enhancing other business 
processes.  This figure also depicts that, knowingly or not, businesses have increased 
their overall reliance on IT, QoS demands, cost of failure and operational risk.  Within 
this business process context, the Navy continues along this same path; however, with the 
                                                 
78 Hesser, A Warfighting Internet, 2. 
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Navy’s increasing reliance on IT, the organization should address operational risk, cost of 
failure and quality of service demands through a more focused approach to NCW.  
FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs) attempts to address these issues and bound our 
consideration to that of the engagement chain.   
 
 
Figure 16.   Increasing Reliance of Businesses on Information Technology. 79 
 
Returning to consideration of the achievement of effects and the expansion of 
combat reach, we now specifically assess the five “Combat Reach Capabilities,” (CRCs).  
Recalling the definition of NCW, Alberts, Garstka, and Stein identified several 
fundamental network-centric principles, including Self-Synchronization, Remote Sensor 
Engagements, and Shared Battlespace Awareness.  The CRCs roughly map to these 
principles as depicted in Figure 17. 
                                                 
79 IBM Research Division, Global Technology Outlook – 2003, (IBM Research Division, Watson, New York, 
2003), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 2. 
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9
Key Combat Reach Capabilities
• Self-synchronization
• Remote sensor 
engagement
• Shared battlespace 
awareness
Network Centric Principles
Kill Chain                    
Combat Reach Capabilities
• Automated Battle  
Management Aids
• Integrated Fire Control
• Composite Tracking
• Composite Combat ID
• Single/Common Pictures
 
Figure 17.   Key Combat Reach Capabilities80. 
 
Each of the CRCs are addressed in greater detail below. 
a. Automated Battle Management Aids (ABMAs) 
ABMAs are the set of interconnected, distributed, decision support tools 
which support the warrior in the management, prioritization and optimization of sensor, 
weapon and C2 resources.  Collectively, ABMAs together a set of decision support tools 
as a distributed service that will support the individual FnEPs “packs” by providing the 
flexibility and adaptability to effectively manage the engagement chain.  At the 
operational level of war, ABMAs supports centralized force- level planning and 
coordination and distributed execution of all TTPs and applicable Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) in accordance with Joint and Combined doctrine.  
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b. ABMAs Characteristics and Requirements 
· Distributed and networked 
· A set of interconnected decision support tools 
· A set of action and reaction agents that monitor the collective, but 
distributed, ‘state-space’ of the nodal characteristics of the pack assets 
within this networked, virtua l environment 
· Requires common algorithms and inputs, detailed information about 
system members, and a means to codify options to ensure consistency and 
quality of decision support information.  Such tools will reduce 
complexity to manage available mission area resources. 
· Ability to address the challenges posed by the management of widely 
dispersed, highly technical assets over extended geographical areas.  In the 
context of the TAMD mission area, expanded air and missile defense 
resources throughout the joint battlespace require selecting a proper mix of 
assets quickly and accurately, and exercising effective control in a 
dynamic environment.  ABMAs represent the set of tools Commanders 
need to take advantage of the extended battlespace made available by the  
CRCs and the distributed services supported by FORCEnet in order to 
efficiently and effectively engage the enemy. 
· Ability support a common threat evaluation (CTE), assessment, and 
prioritization 
· Ability to make dynamic-bidded shot opportunities and preferred shooter 
recommendations. 
· Ability to facilitate distributed engagement resource allocation and 
coordination 
· Ability to conduct distributed sensor coordination (DSC) 
· Ability to generate, and when approved by humans to do so, implement 
warfighting options executable in (near) real- time. 
· Ability to constitute a mission ‘pack’ on request by pulling from the pool 
of networked assets in response to specific tasks, mission requirements or 
threat, assigned dynamically and only on an as-needed basis.  ABMA 
manages the adaptive, reconfigurable, flexible, and time-sensitive nature 
of the pack.  ABMAs’ ability to manage those pack assets may be enabled 
using a common or unique set of MIBs (like SNMP) designed to manage 
ALL pack network nodes.  ABMAs are able to disperse a “pack” (or 
release “pack” assets back to the networked environment or to another 
“pack”) once the threat has disappeared or been neutralized. 
· Ability to act in a ‘passive’ mode by listening to network assets and 
distributed services (i.e., ‘sensing’ agents in a networked-virtual 
environments model.) 
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· Ability to act in an ‘active’ mode by actively commanding and adapting to 
the threat environment by tasking assets as part of given FnEP “packs” 
(e.g. ‘reacting’ agents in the networked-virtual environment s model.)  
Such command functions might also include monitoring and directing 
resources to reposition themselves for optimum sensor coverage.  
· Ability to help minimize the occurrence of combat weapon system 
mismatches where engagements would be a sub-optimal use of weapon 
kinematic (range) capabilities.  As an example, if a weapon has a 
kinematic capability greater than that of the organic sensor or fire control 
system of the firing platform, unless “handed off”, or “forward-passed” to 
another sensor.   
· Ability to pass relevant data (e.g., radar tracks and associated 
measurement data) amongst all joint ‘pack’ components and provide 
deconfliction options between pack components. 
· Ability to assist in multiplatform sensor integration or reconfiguration, 
such that dynamic sensor assignments or retaskings can be made in order 
to generate requisite fidelity of data to make appropriate sensor-weapon 
pairings. 
· Ability to configure situationally-dependant network architectures 
providing dynamic bandwidth allocation and alternate path redundancy to 
aid in survivability and redundancy. 
· Manage a set of composeable warfighting pack assets through distributed 
enterprise services and be able to optimize these composeable combat 
reach capabilities according to available resources (computing, 
communication and human) on a particular node to a command hierarchy 
(e.g., business process). 
· Ability to support common composite threat assessment, positive hostile 
ID (95% common among participating units), and prioritization through 
multi-source automated fusion.  Subsequently, calculate weapon to target 
error baskets and assign/prioritize sensor-shooter-weapon linkages.  These 
linkages should be made by dynamic-bidded shot opportunities and 
creating preferred shooter recommendations based on all sensors and 
weapons delivery platforms/resources available and engagement 
geometries encountered.   
· Assist in the “self-synchronization” of pack assets, which is the ability of a 
well- informed force to organize and synchronize complex warfare 
activities from the bottom up.  The organizing principles are unity of 
effort, clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully crafted rules 
of engagement.  Self-synchronization is enabled by a high level of 
knowledge of one's own forces, enemy forces, and all appropriate 
elements of the operating environment.  It overcomes the loss of combat  
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power inherent in top-down command directed synchronization 
characteristic of more conventional doctrine and converts combat from a 
step function to a high-speed continuum. 
· Minimize unengaged threats (free riders) while also minimizing 
unintentional redundant engagements (over engagements) 
· Logistics system information, when integrated into a “pack,” will be able 
to provide just-in-time logistic supplies, maintenance requirements and 
anticipatory warfighting needs.  These logistics systems are integral FnEP 
pack factors and will be able to demonstrate the application of combat 
effectiveness of “user interface agents” Included in this functionality is the 
ability to automatically notify crews and schedule required corrective 
maintenance actions when ammunition or other warfighting supplies need 
replenishment.  Such notification will be based on in- line condition or 
utilization of monitoring data, and will serve to update commanders and 
other decision makers regarding the status of their forces.  Other related 
capabilities include the ability to compute mileage a vehicle can travel 
based on fuel capacity and proposed mission parameters. 
· Modeling and simulation systems integrated into a “pack” could possibly 
capture and store, for later use and analysis, real-world warfighting 
activities to be used in doctrine refinement or new tactical procedures.  
The use of modeling and simulation systems as “quiet observers” of 
“pack” activity could help answer many questions such as; when and 
where should packs form, how “packs” should form, what resources 
should “packs” use, when should those resources be used and from whom, 
threat engagement, better sensor-weapon-shooter linkages, etc.  Modeling 
and simulation should have the ability to conduct real-time or off- line 
operational option analysis and course of action analysis which could 
either help with time-critical decisions in real-word operations or be used 
to build up the repository of ABMAs options and baseline analysis for use 
in a set of circumstances at a later time.  Integrated modeling and 
simulation assets into a “pack” would be able to conduct COA analysis in 
(near) real time.   
· The manner in which TPFDDs are produced and carried out could 
foreseeably be changed significantly given the ABMAs function within an 
FnEP.  TPFDDs could be automated by the ABMAs such that plans for 
scheduling and movement of forces, loading of transportation (e.g., size, 
weight, deck space, etc.) and dispersion of routing deploying units to the 
AOR would be optimally planned and automatically produced.  The 
deliberate and crisis action planning processes would take advantage of all 
five of the FnEP CRCs to make the strategic planning, movement and 
execution more automated, efficient and optimized.  The automated 
generation and processing of TPFDD, Warning, Planning, Alert, Execute, 
Deployment and Fragmentary (FRAGO’s) Orders by the ABMAs and 
supported by integrated logistics systems using humans as decision 
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makers would make the planning products fully integrated, logistically 
supportable, politically acceptable, and executable within an optimized set 
of criteria. 
c. ABMAs Performance Metrics (Notional) 
· # of leakers 
· # of free riders  
· # of fratricide  
· % total attrition 
· # kills within keep-out threshold of defended assets 
· Missile utilization efficiency  
· # of possible Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) engagements 
· Expanded area defended per force structure  
· Decision range 
· # Engagement opportunities per target  
· # Blue defended assets lost  
· # Red not launched due to Blue engagements  
· # Engagement options per target  
· # Rounds used per theater  
· # Rounds used per kill  
· Range (negated) from defended point  
· Range (engagement) per weapons range  
· Distance target penetrated Blue air space  
· Success of attack offensive counter air target 
· 98% Threat killed in Common Reference Scenario(s) 
· 1% Leakers in Common Reference Scenario(s) 
· 1% Free Riders/unengaged Common Reference Scenario(s) 
d. Integrated Fire Control (IFC) 
This is the capability to perform beyond line-of-sight engagements using 
remote sensors to support precision tracking updates to in-flight weapons.  IFC is 
generally responsible for the management of weapons and weapons fly-out.  The  
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definition of IFC implies that this CRC be required to support real time and/or near real 
time data received/transmit capability and be capable of receiving and processing real 
time sensor data between IFC systems.  Particular functionality of IFC also includes:     
· Engage-on-remote (remote sensor provides track shooter provides uplink)  
· Forward Pass (remote sensor controls weapon) 
· In-Flight Target Updates (IFTU) (data updates to change the guidance of 
ordnance during flight) 
The following sequence reflects the requirements to conduct the EOR using the Aegis 
Weapon System (AWS)81 
1. Sensor Detects Target 
2. Target is tracked,  
3. Sensor data passed to CEC sensor network 
4. CEC passes sensor data to ship 
5. Shipboard CEC filters sensor data, 
6. AWS receives CEC Track and evaluates threat 
7. AWS request additiona l Off-board sensor data via CEC 
8. CEC request additional data from Sensor platform 
9. Sensor platform passes additional sensor data to CEC 
10. CEC sends additional Sensor data to ship 
11. AWS receives CEC Track from CEC 
12. AWS conducts pre-engagement calculations 
13. AWS requests additional off-board sensor, via CEC 
14. AWS erects missile (provides missile initial launch conditions (pitch roll, 
location), fly out parameters and initial course directions 
15. Off board sensor affirmatively responds to engagement requests via CEC, 
schedules dedicated support 
16. AWS launches weapon and establishes S band uplink 
17. Off-board sensor increase reporting rate via CEC 
18. AWS uplinks Off-board Sensor data till OTH 
19. AWS enables inertial mid-course guidance 
20. Missile receives S-band up link data (E-2C data and WCS mid-course 
corrections) 
21. Missile calculates own mid course corrections and compares with uplink, 
fly’s independent when OTH 
22. Missile seeker turns on, searches hand over basket, maneuvers, detects and 
engages threat. 
23. Off-board sensor provides Data on engaged track for Kill Assessment 
24. AWS Performs Kill Assessment 
 
                                                 
81 Swift, Lloyd. Naval Integrated Fire Control—Counter Air, (RDA CHENG Off-Site, 10-11 September 2003), 
(PowerPoint Brief), Slides 29-30.  
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e. IFC Characteristics and Requirements 
· Ability to maximize the effective use of limited airborne sensor resources 
to support over the horizon engagements of enemy raids to defend assets 
ashore and afloat. 
· Ability to coordinate surveillance, acquisition, and tracking coverage 
throughout the battle space to simultaneously support defense of theater 
assets ashore, area defense and self defense. 
· Ability to have graceful degradation such that degraded capability is no 
worse than current capability and such that communications breakdowns 
do not result in over-engagement 
· Ability to be responsive in simultaneous, multi-mission scenarios to new 
or maneuvering threats. 
· Ability to be adaptive to control by direction, negation, etc. 
· Ability to synchronize engagement coordination within fire control loops 
· Ability to Forward Pass control of weapons in flight by remote tracking 
and control of weapon in flight to error basket. 
· Ability to be consistent such that there is not ambiguity in threat 
prioritization 
· Ability to keep message latency requirements very small for dynamic 
processing 
· Ability to conduct In Flight Target Updates (IFTUs) to weapons in flight 
· Ability to control weapons in flight from off-board sensors and sensors 
other than those organic sensors located on the platforms which launched 
the weapons. 
· Ability to exploit the full kinematic range of any joint weapon system. 
· Ability to launch and control weapons from any weapons delivery vehicle, 
manned or unmanned. 
· Ability to engage on remote (EOR) where remote tracking to shooter 
continues to provide target uplinks to a weapon in flight. 
· Ability to create increased offensive and defensive power projection. 
· Ability to change focus from platform self-defense to integrated force 
defense and thus, create higher volume of sortie and strike rates due to 
effective combined arms engagement of targets. 
· Ability to create target engagement solutions sooner, creating more 
reaction time, and multiple re-engagement opportunities should the initial 
engagements fail. 
· Ability to handle small, time-sensitive strike threats with appropriate 
weapons. 
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· Ability to have weapon/sensor independent functionality, thereby reducing 
life cycle costs through the minimization of modifications when systems 
are added or deleted. 
f. IFC Performance Metrics (Notional) 
· RMS accuracy of track handover ID to a participant 
· RMS accuracy of cue to a Fire Control Radar 
· RMS accuracy of vector cue for a fighter to a target 
· RMS accuracy of remote IFTU to interceptor 
· % of time cue enabled fighter to acquired target at a tactically significant 
range (beyond enemy targeting range) 
· % of time enabled fighter to engage target and get one or more shots 
before the merge 
· Number of fighters required for DCA 
· Range of intercept  
· # kills within keep-out threshold of defended assets 
· % of effective BLOS engagements 
· Range (negated) from defended point  
· Range (engagement) per weapons range  
· Distance target penetrated Blue air space 
· Range (negated) from defended point 
· Range (engagement) per weapons range  
· Distance target penetrated Blue air space 
· Minimize number of free riders 
· % of increase in ability to handle larger raids 
· Minimize unintentional over-engagements 
· % increase in engagement sustainability 
· % increase in engagement effectiveness (engagement with higher 
probability of success is selected) 
· Decreased confusion and clarified conflicting data 
· % increase in depth of fire 
· % increase in sortie generation 
· % increase in engagement rate 
· % increase in engagement volume (area coverage) 
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g. Composite Combat Identification (CCID) 
CCID is generally focused on the management of signature data for the 
purpose of determining the identity of an entity (e.g. individuals, equipment).  This 
capability requires the means and processes to exp loit all relevant information including: 
intelligence systems and fusion centers, and national asset data for the purpose of 
associating, correlating, combining and/or fusing that data within “common” processes 
that consider the relative “goodness” of each element of information.  Figure 18 depicts 
the process of establishing CCID:82 
 
How CCID Will Work
Attribute/ID data available on all
platforms connected to LAN
(with CCID Fusion Engine).
All Platforms (C2) on the LAN utilize a Common 
ID Reasoning Engine.  Since ALL attributes 
and ID declarations are shared and /or 
common across the Networks, each platform
will derive a common ID on the network tracks. 
Wide Area Network (Link 16)
Local Area Network (CEC)
Network Feed
CDL between SSES and 
EP-3E for sharing attributes
and CEC “TRACK” data.
Associated Measurement Reports 
and Shared Attributes from selected
ID sensors. 
ID Attributes from TACAIR 
and Other Link 16 Participants
Shared with all LAN Platforms
SSES scrubs data (via Radiant Mercury) 
and provides Attributes/ID to other 











Figure 18.   The Process of Establishing CCID. 
 
Figure 19 reflects the potential sensors and other sources of data which 
will determine CCID.  
 
                                                 
82 “How CCID Will Work” (Taken from ONR Missile Defense FNC PPT, 
[www.onr.navy.mil/02/baa/baa01_024/ccid_over.ppt], Accessed November 2003.  
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Figure 19.   Potential Sensors and Other Sources of Data to Determine CCID.  
 
h. CCID Characteristics and Requirements 
· Ability to automate support for sensor data fusion 
· Ability to accurately transform targeting information from multiple 
sensors on one or more joint platforms to one common coordinate frame. 
· Ability to integrate identification originating from Air, Surface/ground and 
SIGINT domains.  Using ground truth CEC and link track files, sensors & 
sources, cooperative, non-cooperative, indirect and procedural inputs use 
an identification building inferential reasoning algorithm to produce the 
identification (friend, foe or neutral), its classification, nationality, 
platform type and mission configuration/intent. 
· Ability to correlate, fuse and identify fused tracks 
· Ability to use knowledge agents and fused track to represent a single, 
physical entity and identify that physical entity 
· Ability to assess track accuracy and reliability, completeness and 
consistency and timely using ID Reasoning algorithms 
· Ability to perform ISR integration from many sources 
· Provide correct and common identity across TACAIR and other Link 16 
and CEC participants 
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· Ability to automatically take regional commercial air corridors, combine 
with point of origin, air tasking order and battle group protection to 
prepare tracks. 
· Ability to fuse sensor tracks and resolve conflicts using CEC and Link 16 
or other independent CID source. 
· Ability to process land fixed targets and identify redundant reports on the 
same emitter, fuse data and convolve ellipses. 
· Ability to combine emitters into sites and link sites into networks. 
· Analogous to Multi-Source Integration 
i. CCID Performance Metrics (Notional) 
· % participants with common, clear, and accurate ID 
· % of tracks with CID prior to entering AOI 
· Probability a detected object is correctly classified 
· Probability a detected object is correctly identified 
· False ID rate 
· % of airborne objects identified correctly 
· % of airborne objects classified correctly 
· Range at with ID or classification was made 
· Time to correct ID from initial detection 
· # of times a ID changes on a target 
· % of ID improvement due to ID fusion 
· % of time ID fusion is achieved 
· % of threat objects held “in-track” upon entering AOI 
· Number of Blue losses due to Air Picture  
· Probability to develop/designate High Payoff Target 
j. Composite Tracking (CT) 
Create and maintain a network-wide track state based on all measurements 
of the target made by all sensors in the network.  CT is generally analogous to Sensor 
Fused Tracking (SFT) and is responsible for the management of measurement level 
sensor data.  The following diagram graphically depicts CT. 
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k. CT Characteristics and Requirements83 
Figure 20 depicts what is generally thought of as a composite track.  The 
notional depiction of what is meant by an identical, accurate and comprehensive track are 
shown below: 
 
Figure 20.   Composite Tracking and Identification.  
 
· Ability to remove unmitigated track bias errors which can significantly 
impact a target’s handover error basket, which reduces the probabilities of 
successful handover and intercept. 
· Ability to remove network time synchronization errors by using common 
and stable clocks. 
· Ability to remove biases as they become observable – at the measurement, 
sensor, and platform levels. 
· Ability to decrease target error basket by removing inter-platform position 
and alignment errors using accurate INS/GPS, Precise Participant 
Location and Identification (PPLI), common track pair algorithms, 
differential tracking of interceptor/target 
· Ability to remove intra-platform position and alignment errors (i.e., 
platform radar/launcher misalignments) by taking ownership of calibration 
and alignment functions 
· Ability to remove inherent sensor measurement biases by using accurate 
radar, sensor and location calibration 
 
 
                                                 
83 Ken Cambell, Theaterwide Collaborative Tracking, SPAWAR Systems Center, San Diego, California, 
Available at  [http://seal.gatech.edu/onr_workshop/2000/campbell_00.pdf], Accessed December 2003. (PowerPoint 
Brief) Slide 10. 
73 
l. CT Performance Metrics (Notional) 
· Number of Blue losses due to Air Picture error  
· Probability to develop/designate High Payoff Target  
· Success of attack offensive counter air target 
· Percent of detecting and tracking of all air vehicles 
· Quality of tracks formed when non-composite sources are combined with 
composite tracks  
· QoS of Composite Tracking networks as determined by latency and error 
rates 
m. Single/Common Pictures (CP) 
CP is the integrated capability to receive, correlate, and display a Common 
Tactical Picture (CTP), including planning applications and theater-generated 
overlays/projections (i.E., Meteorological and Oceangraphic (METOC), battleplans, force 
position projections).  Overlays and projections may include location of friendly, hostile, 
and neutral units, assets, and reference points.  The CP may include information relevant 
to the tactical and strategic level of command.  This includes, but is not limited to, any 
geographically oriented data, planning data from Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES), readiness data from Status of Resources and Training System 
(SORTS), intelligence (including imagery overlays), reconnaissance data from the Global 
Reconnaissance Information System (GRIS), weather from METOC, predictions of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) fallout, and Air Tasking Order (ATO) data.84 
n. CP Characteristics and Requirements 
· Common grid-reference frames 
· Common correlation schemes 
· Common tracking methodologies 
· Time synchronization 
· Common Communication protocols 
o. CP Performance Metrics  
· Completeness: The picture is complete when all objects are detected, 
tracked and reported. 
                                                 
84 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3151.01. Global Command and Control System 
Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements , 10 June 1997. 
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· Clarity: The picture is clear when it does not include ambiguous or 
spurious tracks, there is no dualing present and tracks are not dropped. 
· Continuity: The picture is continuous when the tracks are long lived and 
stable. 
· Kinematic Accuracy: The picture is kinematically accurate when the 
position and velocity of a track agrees with the position and velocity of the 
associated object. 
· ID Completeness: The ID is complete when all tracked objects are labeled 
in a state other than unknown. 
· ID Accuracy: The ID is accurate when all tracked objects are labeled 
correctly. 
· ID Clarity: The ID is ambiguous when a tracked object has two or more 
conflicting ID states. 
· Commonality: The picture is common when the tracks held by each 
participant have the same track number, position, and ID. 
As Figure 21 depicts, the integration of the six FORCEnet Factors form 
the foundation upon which the five CRCs are built.  However, it is the specifically 
focused integration of the six FORCEnet Factors to achieve the five CRCs which will 
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Figure 21.   FORCEnet Engagement Pack Relationships85. 
 
Each of these capabilities will impose both general requirements on the 
networks and network infrastructure in terms of performance, (e.g., bandwidth, quality of 
service (QoS), and information assurance) and specific requirements (e.g., interfaces and 
information exchange requirements (IERs)) between and among the nodes in each of the 
FnEP “packs.”  Chapter III will provide a more in-depth discussion of these 
requirements. 
3. FnEPs . . .  Beginnings of a Real World Example 
The following operational vignette will help to illustrate three of the most critical 
pack characteristics, those being Adaptability, the use of Combat Reach Capabilities, and 
Joint Integration. 
 
                                                 














Figure 22.   FnEPs Operational Vignette Part I86. 
 
A pre-planned Strike “Pack” is enroute to its assigned target set, a Ballistic 
Missile TEL, along with other joint assets when the pack is retasked to engage a “pop-
up” time critical target, in this case a group of fast surface vessels approaching a logistics 
ship.  ISR information obtained from a submarine collecting intelligence near the 
coastline is rapidly shared with other assets throughout the battlespace, including an Air 
Force surveillance aircraft on station to support the pre-planned strike mission.  Self-
synchronization through ABMAs optimizes the best sensors-shooters-weapons 
combinations to engage the approaching surface vessels.  Sensor packages onboard 
MC2A, P-3, Global Hawk, an AEGIS Destroyer and Predator are exploited.  C2 
information flow assigns sensors and shooters that in this case are Navy and Marine Corp 
F-18s, a DDG, and LCS.  CT and CCIDs are formed using measurements of the target 
from the optimized sensors to exploit the strengths of their combined sensors including 
SAR, ISAR, IR, EO, and MTI systems.  With CCID satisfied, weapons are now 
deployed.  
                                                 
86 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 52. 
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One of the key and unique points made at this point in the scenario is that inbound 
weapons receive In-flight Target Updates (IFTUs) not from the platforms that launched 
them – but from a distributed network of nonorganic sensors.  In the near-term, legacy 
systems will be leveraged, including P-3, Predator, and Global Hawk.  Future systems 
will likely include MMA, BAMs, and UCAV-N.  Regardless of the systems involved; 
however, the important distinction is the engagement envelope will no longer be limited 
to the range of the organic sensors, but rather the maximum kinematic range of the 
weapons being employed.  IFC supports the capability to engage mobile and moving 
targets from safe stand-off ranges outside threat engagement envelopes, thus ensuring the 
desired effect against the target. 
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Figure 23.   FnEPs Operational Vignette Part II87. 
 
Following the successful engagement of the surface vessels, the “pack” 
reconfigures to its original strike mission; however must rapidly adapt “on the fly” to a 
new tasking – Theater Air Missile Defense (TAMD) – when Air Force and Army 
surveillance sensors detect a raid of Land Attack Cruise Missiles targeting joint forces 
ashore.  Radar tracks and their associated measurement data are shared among other 
                                                 
87 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 54. 
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airborne and surface sensors.  ABMAs assign sensors and prioritize shooters based on 
resources available and engagement geometries.  In this case, JLENS, MC2A, F-18, P-3, 
DDG, LCS, and Patriot are the “pack” components that will rapidly integrate and exploit 
the strengths of each system to successfully engage the inbound cruise missiles.  The C2 
information flow supports the creation of a CP in the form of a Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP).  CTs are formed and shared among surveillance and fire control sensors, 
while a common threat evaluation and positive hostile ID is provided by multi-source 
automatic fusion assisted by the ABMAs.  Weapon to target error baskets are calculated 
and are used to assign sensor-shooter-weapon linkages.  Finally, weapons are released 
and supported by in-flight target updates as needed by assigned offboard fire control 
sensors.  Highlighted in this scenario is the potential role a P-3 plays in missile defense, 
demonstrating the power of all five CRCs.  In spite of the lack of an organic missile 
defense fire control system, the P-3 could be used solely as a launch platform with 
offboard weapons control.  With successful engagement of the Cruise Missiles, the 
“pack” returns to, and reconfigures for, its original strike mission, and successfully 
destroys a moving ballistic missile TEL from a safe stand-off range.  This scenario 
further demonstrates the adaptability, agility, and combat reach capabilities of the 
FnEPs.  
C. CONCLUSION 
In its most general sense, FnEPs strives to achieve fully integrated joint 
capabilities focused on the engagement chain, thereby achieving economies of scale and 
economies of scope.  As a result, FnEPs promises a revolutionary transformation in naval 
operations complimentary to the concepts of FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea 
Supremacy. 
Implicit to realizing FnEPs are a host of C4ISR and networking-related 
requirements which must be defined, understood, supported technologically and 
operationally implemented from the engagement chain perspective.  As outlined in 
Chapter I, currently, the Department of Navy’s C4ISR network infrastructure is a 
collection of many vertically-oriented, stove-piped and legacy systems built around 
common data interchange requirements which have difficulty communicating effectively 
or efficiently in a sufficiently timely manner.  Most of these vertically-oriented, stove-
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piped legacy systems historically have not been designed with a horizontal mission 
capability focus.  As a result, interoperability and integration challenges result in a sub-
optimization of overall warfighting mission capabilities.  More critically, such sub-
optimization is a result of many things, both technically and programmatically related. 
From a technical standpoint the DoD C4ISR architecture is a complex 
environment with many different sensors, communication systems, weapon systems, and 
platforms performing many different functions.  The architecture demonstrates a number 
of characteristics incompatible with FORCEnet, the SEA POWER 21 vision and FnEPs, 
including: 
· A point-to-point framework with system interoperability challenges 
· Is circuit and/or platform centric 
· Offers only fixed services with pre-allocated resources 
· Is inefficient in its usage of available spectrum and bandwidth 
Overall, today’s C4ISR architecture is unable to dynamically respond to different 
mixes and matches of force elements and as a result faces difficulties in terms of the 
integration of new/different platforms, adaptation of communication systems to 
unanticipated missions, and challenges associated with the seamless integration of new 
C4ISR systems.  These poor interoperability characteristics also result in systems that are 
difficult to maintain from a life-cycle perspective due to component obsolescence and 
mission or threat changes.     
From a programmatic standpoint, the DoN continues to procure communication 
and weapon systems in a fragmented, uncoordinated and financially disjointed manner 
with no real end-to-end strategic plan.  As a result of all these challenges, operations are 
often relegated to the lowest common denominator, which include, for example, satellite 
communications or weapon engagement ranges.  Unfortunately, even projected systems 
do not present an answer to many of the challenges that exceed current system 
capabilities. 
The successful development and fleet implementation of FnEPs and the 
“operationization” of FORCEnet will require addressing these technical and 
programmatic challenges.  Perhaps an even greater challenge facing the success of these 
80 
concepts is the need for organizational and process-related changes that are necessary if 
DoD is to realize the tremendous potential improvements in operational effectiveness 
FnEPs and FORCEnet have to offer. 
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III. FORCENET ENGAGEMENT PACKS (FNEPS) ANALYSIS 
As discussed 
previously, we 
assess the ultimate 
vision of 
FORCEnet characterized by ADM Jim Hogg (Ret.), director of the SSG, as “The fully 
netted force” which faces a number of technical, programmatic, and organization 
challenges.  From a technical perspective alone, the complexity generated by the potential 
explosion of system interactions is huge, unaffordable, and unrealizable in the near term.  
FnEPs seeks the integration of specific “packs” of FORCEnet factors, including legacy 
systems and advanced technology, in order to achieve or “operationalize” FORCEnet in 
the near-term.  The discovery of requirements for such near-term integration and the 
systems necessary to support the development of near-term FORCEnet and FnEPs 
functionality requires a robust and unique analysis effort.  Chapter IV is devoted to a 
discussion of the analytic methodology and results we obtained from this methodology 
and will be broken into three parts.  Part I will discuss the research methodology itself 
and describe the analysis process.  Part II will discuss the actual analysis conducted in 
support of the FnEPs concept and the development of a prototype pack.  Part III will 
discuss analysis not yet completed, but that remains critical to the development and 
fielding of FnEPs in accordance with the timeline briefed to the CNO. 
A. THE GEMINII METHODOLOGY 
As part of the development of the FnEPs concept, SSG XXII sought analysis to 
support the benefits we believed FORCEnet and FnEPs could bring directly to the 
warfigthers and operating forces.  More specifically, our analysis seeks to more fully 
understand the system decomposition into FnEPs factor components as the first step in 
the Combat Reach integration process.  When recomposing factor components into 
“packs,” the five Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs) become critical enablers to pack 
composition (horizontal ‘lanes’).  Additionally, understanding how these CRCs provide 
warfighting distributed services are key to understanding how distributed services support 
pack adaptability across both Strike and TAMD.  We discovered an evolving toolset and 
 
 “We cannot solve our problems with the same 
           thinking we used when we created them”  
                                      -- Albert Einstein 
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analytic methodology developed by SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston (SSC-C) 
which would help to better understand these questions and dynamics.  This toolset, 
originally designed to support Y2K efforts when end to end laboratory testing was a 
necessity, seeks to provide interoperability analysis through first order system 
architecture decomposition and gap analysis.  Called the Gobal Engineering Methods: 
Initiative for Naval Integration and Interoperability, (GEMINII) reveals and validates the 
tremendous near-term potential of FORCEnet and FnEPs to our operational forces.  
Termed GEMINII, this evolving toolset and methodology will be used to further refine 
the FnEPs concept as it specifically relates to Strike and TAMD ‘Packs’.  This toolset has 
been used to support many analysis processes similar in nature and has been proven and 
validated by independent research conducted by others.  GEMINII is a compilation of 
many tools, integrated and designed to conduct architectural analysis which has many 
stakeholders throughout the Department of Navy and Department of Defense as evidence 
of a trusted analysis process.  GEMINII supports a capabilities-based architecture 
assessment as depicted in Figure 24 below. 
 
Figure 24.   Architecture Assessment Process and Toolset88. 
                                                 
88 Charles, Assessments to define Composeable Mission Capability, Slide 15. 
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More specifically, GEMINI is an integrated toolset designed to facilitate both 
static and dynamic architectural analysis, and is depicted in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25.   GEMINII Architecture Assessment Process and Toolset89. 
 
Furthermore, from the perspective of FnEPs, the GEMINII methodology 
approach supports more detailed understanding of integration management, and if 
specific system inter-relationships are possible, optimal or affordable.  From a systems 
engineering perspective, system designers require such information in order to focus on 
interactions that yield the most effectiveness.  The remainder of this section will discuss 
the GEMINII methodology and the toolset itself in greater detail.   
Specifically, GEMINII was used to analyze C2, ISR, and FC information flows 
for specific Tactical Situations (TACSITs).  The first step involved the identification of 
                                                 
89 Charles, GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, 
Slide 25. 
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appropriate TACSITs based on the FnEPs Concept.  We desired to focus on the unique 
aspects of FnEPs including its near-term focus, (including legacy systems) emphasis on 
joint system integration and interoperability, and the demonstration of an ability to 
dynamically adapt “on-the-fly” to multiple missions.  For these reasons, we focused on 
the Strike and TAMD TACSITs. 
The baseline TAMD and Strike TACSIT use-cases used are shown below in 
Figures 26 and 27 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Baseline TAMD TACSIT90. 
 
                                                 
90 Charles, Initial FORCEnet Engagement Pack Assessment for CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII, Slide 3. 
85 
 
Figure 27.   Baseline Strike TACSIT91. 
 
These TACSITs depict what activities occur along the Find, Fix, Target, Track, 
Engage and Access phases of the engagement chain.  These TACSITs show how the 
engagement chain activities are linked during this set of processes.  Decision points are 
depicted and what systems or platforms are possible suppliers or consumers of the 
information are shown.  These TACSITs are important to understand the end-to-end 
engagement process as it currently exists today in order to make improvements within a 
network centric environment.  These two TACSITs form the basis of the initial FnEPs 
analysis. 
The next phase of the analysis was to select a set of systems or “Pack” Factors 
(PFs) to support these TACSITS and to use existing system architectures to develop a 
model for future TACSITS.  Following the selection of these PFs, we validated the 
activity sequence for the newly combined TACSIT.  These baseline TACSITS correlate 
                                                 
91 Ibid., Slide 4. 
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well with previous Mission Capability Packages (MCPs), architecture analysis and were 
used by OPNAV N70 to validate PR-05 and POM-06 President budget submissions.  
Next, a definition of “Inter-Mission” Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) were 
developed for both forward and backward directions of the TACSIT activity sequence.  
This final step is iterative and supports the development of a ‘Super-TACSIT’ based on 
activity sequence discovery routines that sequence and identify newly formed activity 
cycles/interfaces.  This newly formed, ‘Super-TACSIT’ is the product of an effort to first 
define the “As-Is” architecture and then create a “To-Be” architecture, notionally as 
shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28.    “As-Is” –vs- “To-Be” Architectures92. 
 
                                                 
92 Charles. FnEPs Analysis Status Brief, Slide 16. 
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The diagram above illustrates how related system interface (SV-6) lines are 
sequenced and correlated in terms of Information Exchanges (IEs) and function (‘Super 
SV-6) interface lines from the perspective of a possible “As-Is” architecture.  The 
ultimate objective of this process is the creation of a new ‘Super-System’ architectural 
view.  Such an architecture can be further ana lyzed using a “Service Discovery Routine” 
which results in fused, integrated, distributed and composite services.   
In completing the above analysis, GEMINII facilitated both a static “As-Is” and 
dynamic “To-Be” architecture interoperability analysis to discover engineering level 
trade off situations and discovers new “To-Be” packages of capabilities.  The following 
sections discussed these individually. 
1. Static Analysis of FnEPs  
The first part of the GEMINII methodology involved a static, or “As-Is”, 
architecture assessment that allowed for the synthesis and assessment of system 
integration requirements from the perspective of FORCEnet and FnEPs amongst many 
different systems.  In this case, we sought to assess potential integration requirements for 
“packs” capable of Strike and TAMD missions.  Additionally, we sought to identify 
“capability gaps” in terms of the ability to achieve the five CRCs and answer the 
question, “can we do this today?”  To accomplish this static assessment GEMINII was 
integrated with TVDB and the DSM.  Together these tools help to better align resources 
for multiple mission area assessments, management of FORCEnet factor integration 
complexity, and the identification of requirements for future architectures, including 
interface and functional requirements to achieve the five CRCs independent of 
technology.  Importantly, this static assessment also identified optimized portfolios of 
service bundles necessary to support FORCEnet and FnEPs based on gaps or overlaps in 
system functionality, and current fleet issues.  DSM uses this information to evaluate 
system function and activity interactions to help understand the clustering and 
partitioning of system functionality. 
2. Dynamic Analysis of FnEPs  
A useful framework to consider this part of the analysis is that of the “To-Be” 
perspective in terms of legacy and future systems and the degree of integration and 
interoperability required for them to support FORCEnet and FnEPs.  More specifically, 
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this dynamic sensitivity analysis uses GEMINII and DSM tools to determine 
performance sensitivity analysis on “To-Be” architectures to evaluate the sensitivity a 
particular system function has on the contribution to the overall capability metrics.  This 
sensitivity analysis is further supported by tools such as NSS, JWARS, DSMsim, Extend, 
OPNET and NETWARS.  The dynamic assessment also defines performance 
requirements for the “pack” interactions, including timeliness, reliability, and dynamic 
adaptability required to support the engagement chain.  A final example of the results of 
the dynamic assessment is demonstrated through the use of the Joint Warfare System 
(JWARS) to assess the capability of FnPEs in a warfighting scenario based on a dynamic 
mission or campaign level modeling perspective, such as those shown below for TAMD 
and Strike assessments in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.   TAMD and Strike Pack Architecture Interoperability Use Cases93. 
 
To put the GEMINII methodology into a process perspective, Figure 30 
represents the overall process of architecture interoperability analysis.  This cycle starts at 
the top of the diagram, with the current framework and principals.  This process is 
                                                 
93 Ibid., Slide 27. 
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constantly interactive with respect to requirements, and traverses around the diagram in a 
clockwise manner helping to transition the architecture vision into a migration strategy.  
Ultimately, this process leads to implementation of the architecture. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Architecture Interoperability Process Perspective 94. 
 
Figure 30 also helps to put into context the steps necessary to develop a “pack” 
utilizing the GEMINII methodology.  These steps include: 
· A discovery phase of uncovering system relationships.  This requires the 
construction of a template of required activity and system function 
information exchanges as defined in TVDB based on known interface 
requirements for the specified mission(s).  The template also defines the 
class of system (sensor, ground-based C2, or weapon) required for each 
end of the given interface.   
· The systems and platforms of interest in the analysis are then categorized 
into classes.  An algorithm is subsequently used to discover the set of all 
                                                 
94 Charles, Initial FORCEnet Engagement Pack Assessment for CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII, Slide 5. 
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potential interactions between the PFs and platforms for the specified 
mission(s).  In the case of the analysis of PFs, activity to system function 
information exchange pairings, as well as activity sequencing can be 
discovered using TVDB and DSM.   
· The framework organization as seen in Figure 31 shows the hierarchy of 
system, platform and cell independent and specific descriptions and how 
they relate to each other.  These descriptions define system boundaries, 
interfaces and attributes to enable modular descriptions of systems, 
platforms and cells.  Activity to platform interdependencies (PIDs) can be 
discovered via TVDB.  System function as well as system to equipment 




Figure 31.   Framework Organization95. 
 
· Systems or equipment to platform relationships can be discovered and 
dependencies drawn from TVDB and DSM.  These relationships can 
possibly show system or equipment collaborations or sequences as they 
relate to platforms.   
· Once the systems are broken down into their modular or more simplistic 
components, they can be repackaged into service areas.  This activity 
seeks to discover services of system function to information exchange 
pairs (information producers).  A ranking of these system function to 
information exchange pairs is completed according to the number of 
                                                 
95 Cambell, FnEPs Assessment Overview Brief, Slide 34. 
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consumers of this data across all services.  A second ranking of system 
function to information exchange pairs is completed according to 
uniqueness, Integration & Interoperability (I & I), performance, vision or 
other criteria.   
Services are prioritized by program where the system function/information 
exchange pairs are compared with redundancy and programmatic issues (maturity, 
funding, volatility, risk, cost, FORCnet impact) or by optimizing opportunities for legacy 
to distributed services solutions. 
Having generally discussed the GEMINI methodology, it is useful to understand 
the individual tools GEMINII includes. 
3. TVDB 
The Technical View Database (TVDB) is an analysis tool that translates the 
TACSIT architectures into system function/information exchange pairs useful for 
analyzing the current engagement chain processes.  TVDB will also allow new TACSIT 
interfaces and activities to be created or connected in new ways to analyze their effects 
on the rest of the TACSIT.  TVDB uses Casualty Reports (CASREPS) for systems on the 
NWAS-Corona Troubled Systems Process list and Battlegroup Situation (BGSIT) Report 
data to capture current system functional and technical shortfalls. 
4. NTIRA 
The Naval Tool for Interoperability Risk Assessment (NTIRA) is also part of the 
GEMINII advanced engineering assessment process which uses authoritative inputs to 
FORCEnet and Naval Capability Pillar (NCP) analysis, using valid current and planned 
configuration data, validated requirements and warfighting capabilities to assess system 
viability vs. fit.  NTIRA is a web-based tool to analyze major IT investments and 
requirements in terms of the proposed investment’s contribution to the Navy’s 
warfighting mission.  NTIRA provides unique, capabilities-based view of maritime strike 
groups and their supporting systems.  NTIRA displays the effect of proposed investments 
on Joint and Navy capabilities using the Fleet-validated Joint/Navy Mission Essential 
Task Lists (J/NMETL), a detailed analysis of each C4I system, and the training 
requirements resident in the Training Information Management System (NTIMS).   
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NTIRA is currently supporting Navy-wide programming and acquisition 
decisions and is expected to play a significant role in the development of FORCEnet.  
NTIRA offers the following additional important functionality: 
· Allows for capability-based C4I acquisition, using Fleet-validated 
J/NMETLs to relate fiscal decisions to warfighting requirements.   
· Supports the FORCEnet Investment Matrix process and has its roots as the 
initial IT-21 capability matrix (a.k.a. ‘Victory’ matrix) used to manage IT-
21 capability investments.   
· Supports stakeholder requirements and as a fiscal planning and 
coordination tool by helping to identify and assess business management 
trade-off analysis.  NTIRA helps to assess ‘As-Is’ implementation options 
by using optimization routines to perform portfolio analysis based on cost, 
budget, execution year plans and POM out year plans, thus enabling the 
determination of “viability versus fit” of various architecture 
interoperability use cases.   
· NTIRA is a Task Force Web (TFW) compliant web application and web 
services program designed to effectively manage C4I requirements, 
acquisition and fielding issues.  NTIRA is a data cache that pulls from 
authoritative data sources to provide timely, coherent C4I information for 
all users, as depicted in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure 32.   Authoritative Data Sources Feeding NTIRA96. 
                                                 
96 Charles, GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, 
Slide 19. 
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NTIRA is composed of seven modules: 
· Fiscal Module tracks program cost variance and deviation as well as ties 
planning, programming and budgeting (PPBS) costs directly to Program 
Element (PE), Base Line Item (BLI) and their sub programs’ fiscal data.   
· Composition Module contains platform alignment to organization 
information, for instance the Battle Group, Immediate Superior In 
Command (ISIC), Fleet homeport information.  In containing this data, the 
Composition Module can rapidly change Battle Group composition, move 
platforms into and out of CVBGs, ARGs, ESGs and CSGs and identify 
fiscal or capability effects throughout the newly composed force.   
· Configuration Module contains system installation status, configuration 
evolution over time, version/variant information and describes the current 
system architectural inter-relationships.  
· Capability Module contains the operational to system mapping and can 
show a specific mission contribution of systems and can answer the 
question, ‘How well does a particular system support the mission?’   
· Authoritative Data Source Manager provides overall management of 
the NTIRA tool, including the data population and comparisons from 
those authoritative sources shown in Figure 32.  Also, NTIRA is able to 
resolve discrepancies between those authoritative data sources and feed 
them back to the database owners for resolution. 
· Requirements Module captures fleet-validated requirements to begin the 
analysis process and is able to map those requirements to material 
solutions.  
· Fleet Response Program (FRP) Module provides relevant information to 
fleet users and the Systems Commands to support the new Fleet Response 
Program.  In order to support the CNO and CFFC’s initiative to change the 
way the Navy deploys into CSGs and ESGs in the future, the process 
requires a much more robust tool which can accommodate flexible ship 
deployment schedules, ship workup periods, ship availability dates and 
exercises within the new phased deployment readiness framework.  Being 
developed in conjunction with NAVSEA, this module helps to manage 
this new FRP process 
All of the NTIRA modules are tied together by workspaces, making the analysis 
seamless and interoperable.  Both GEMINII and NTIRA use the same underlying 
‘methods’ and software reuse library. 
5. DSM 
Successful systems engineering relies heavily on system function decomposition 
and integration.  Design Structure Matrix (DSM) tools can help solve this challenge by 
providing a simple, compact, and visual representation of a complex system that supports 
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innovative solutions to decomposition and integration problems.  The DSM is a matrix 
identifying interactions between stages of development, delivery or operation of a 
system.  This matrix complements the IDEF models of the past.  DSM provides a tool to 
simplify, focus and align sub-processes of system development and provides a framework 
to assess rework, risk, key performance parameters and system interactions through the 
use of metrics.  DSMs have been used extens ively in the past97, and their use increased 
greatly in the 1990s throughout a number of industries including semiconductor design, 
automotive, and aerospace.98  DSMs can be broken into both static and expanded 
parametric based types.  The GEMINII methodology currently uses a static DSM which 
is basically a square matrix representing architectural components and interfaces. 
 
 
Figure 33.   Static DSM. 
 
In the example DSM in Figure 33, elements are represented by the shaded 
elements along the diagonal.  An off-diagonal mark signifies the dependency of one 
element on another.  Reading down a column reveals input sources, while reading across 
a row indicates output destinations.  Thus, in Figure 33, element B provides input to 
elements A, C, D, F, H, and I, and it depends on input from elements C, D, F, and H. 99. 
                                                 
97 Browning, p. 293. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Browning, p. 292.  
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The point of the matrix is to illuminate the interdependency structure and aid in 
the design and optimization of products, processes, and organizations.  Several types of 
static DSMs exist; however, the type used as part of the Gemini/NTIRA toolset in 
support of the analysis of the FnEPs concept is specifically a “Component-Based” or 
“Architecture” DSM.  Such DSMs are generally used to:  
· Model system architectures based on components and/or subsystems and 
their relationships. 
· Understand and document the interactions between the elements (e.g. their 
integration). 
· Analyze potential reintegration of the elements via clustering (e.g. 
integration analysis).100  
One of the most important and useful aspects of DSM used for the analysis of 
FnEPs is its utility in analyzing components of the architecture.  Product architecture is 
the arrangement of functional elements into physical partitions that become the building 
blocks for a product or family of products.101  Partitions should implement one or a few 
functions entirely, and interactions between partitions should be well defined.  This 
supports the creation of modular, reconfigurable, and scaleable system architectures 
which have advantages in simplicity and reusability for a produc t family or 
platform. 102,103   Further, a lesson can be learned from the research showing that 
innovative product architectures can be a source of competitive advantage for product 
development firms104.  This applies to FnEPs in that the “packs” are analogous to these 
innovative product architectures.  The analogy can be extended by considering the 
relationships among elements are what give systems their added value, and, furthermore, 
that the greatest leverage in systems architecting is at the interfaces105.  The “innovation” 
                                                 
100 T. U. Pimmler and S. D. Eppinger, “Integration Analysis of Product Decompositions,” (Proc. ASME 6th Int. 
Conf. on Design Theory and Methodology), Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1994. 
101 K. T. Ulrich and S. D. Eppinger, Product Design and Development, 2nd,, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000. 
102 C. Y. Baldwin and K. B. Clark, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 2000, Vol. 1. 
103 R. Sanchez and J. T. Mahoney, “Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in Product and 
Organization Design,” IEEE Eng. Manage.Rev ., pp. 50–61, 1997. 
104 R. M. Henderson and K. B. Clark, “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product 
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms,” Administ. Sci. Quart., Vol. 35, pp. 9–30, 1990. 
105 E. Rechtin, Systems Architecting: Creating & Building Complex Systems, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1991.  
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referred to above is predicated on an understanding of the interfaces or interactions 
between system elements.  Developers can innovate on top of the standard and provide 
unique advantages without breaking the interaction or interface requirements.  This is the 
primary function of a static DSM such as that being used to analyze FnEPs!  The use of 
GEMINII and DSM together discovers previously unknown integration patterns and 
reveals key information flows for the five CRCs that enable a “pack.” 
6. Summary 
In summary, the GEMINII methodology assists in the development of an end-to-
end, integrated, out-come based capability, enterprise architecture and provides a 
foundation for balancing future requirements versus resources to improve war fighter 
capability.  This GEMINII methodology and sensitivity analysis of the five CRCs 
measures operational benefit by answering questions and providing metrics for questions 
such as the following: 
· Has the engagement envelope been extended?  
· Has C2 decision time decreased?  
· Has the engagement time decreased?  
· Has defense in depth been increased or strengthened?  
· Has there been an improvement in performance in terms of such metrics as 
lethality, survivability, coverage, persistence, or timeliness?   
From the perspective of FnEPs, this methodology seeks to produce and evaluate 
an architecture capable of supporting dynamically re-configurable mission capabilities, 
enabled by the CRC’s including Composite Tracking (CT), Composite Combat 
Identification (CCID), Common/Single Pictures (CP), Automated Battle Management 
Aids (ABMAs) and Integrated Fire Control (IFC).  By using the modular, reconfigurable, 
integrated architecture framework envisioned by FORCEnet combined with the 
GEMINII methodology and modeling tools, we were able to manage the complexity of 
NCW, obtain greater understanding of the FnEPs’ concept and evaluate FnEPs’ potential 
for increase end-to-end warfighting effectiveness in general. 
B. CURRENT ANALYSIS OF FNEPS  
Beyond its initial development for use in Y2K, GEMINII was more recently 
adapted for use in support of the OPNAV N6 POM06 assessment process.  This 
assessment sought to provide analysis in support of the identification of systems and 
97 
programs that would (or would not) support the general integration and interoperability 
requirements of FORCEnet.  While considering the POM06 assessment for FORCEnet 
programs as part of our development of the FnEPs concept, SSG XXII assessed the same 
toolset and analytic methodology could be applied to FnEPs.  SSC-C agreed, and together 
we undertook the evaluation of a set of joint assets or “Pack Factors” (PFs) as potential 
FnEPs “pack” candidates.  These PFs included a representative set of weapons, sensors, 
platforms, and other FORCEnet factors and generally focused on the Strike and Theater 
Area Missile Defense (TAMD) Naval Mission Capability Packages (MCPs).  
Specifically, the GEMINII toolset  
· Supported first order assessment of the PF decomposition process and the 
recomposition of “packs” necessary to support the Strike and TAMD 
MCPs. 
· Generated system inter-relationships with respect to the five Combat 
Reach Capabilities (CRCs), including Automated Battle Management 
Aids, (ABMAs) Integrated Fire Control, (IFC) Composite Tracking, (CT) 
Composite Combat ID, (CCID) and Single and Common Pictures (CP). 
More generally, our initial analysis enabled us to evaluate activity sequences, 
required system interactions, potential integration shortfalls, and the adaptability of 
‘packs’ across mission areas.  Overall, we identified over 85,000 potential integration 
inter-relationships tied to the five CRCs listed above.  Further, the process allowed for a 
sensitivity analysis of these inter-relationships that supported optimized system to system 
integration.  Overall, our analysis provided important insights from this process 
including: 
· System decomposition into factor components is just the first step in the 
integration process. 
· When recomposing PFs into “packs,” the five CRCs become the critical 
enablers to “pack” functionality. 
· Not all system inter-relationships are possible, optimal or affordable. 
System designers will need to focus on interactions that yield the most 
effectiveness.  
· The five CRCs support the FORCEnet Chief Engineer’s Architecture 
Vision by providing distributed combat services, dynamically composed 
and adaptable across both Strike and TAMD MCPs. 
· Most importantly--our sensitivity analysis demonstrated that while 
incremental improvements could be realized through each of the CRCs, a 
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dramatic increase in system inter-relationships and engagement 
performance occurred when ALL five CRCs were implemented together.  
We reaffirmed the true benefits of FORCEnet can only be achieved by 
engineering complete packages of CRC functionality into our systems.   
In addition to the ana lysis conducted with SSC-C, we conducted several other first order 
analysis efforts.  While our thesis does not specifically review such analysis, in general, 
all analytical work demonstrated that Strike and TAMD “Packs” improve combat reach 
and overall warfighting effectiveness.  Selected results demonstrated: 
· A 40% better utilization of Blue assets in ASW and Offensive Counter Air 
operations.  
· A 40% improvement in TAMD kills against cruise missile raids. 
· A 50% reduction in the number of leakers against massive raids of 
ballistic missiles. 
· A 100% increase in engagement envelope as measured by engagement 
range. 
· An up to ten-fold increase in overland-protected footprint highlighting Sea 
Shield’s potential contribution to littoral TAMD. 
This chapter will summarize analysis that has been done to date.  As Plato would 
have said, “The beginning is the most important part of the work”, so with this in mind 
the beginning part of the analysis is a critical first step.  The first step is to set up goals 
and scenarios illustrating issues and viewpoints wanting to be examined.  Utilizing the 
“SMART” Business Scenario, we aim to be Specific by defining what needs to be done 
in the FnEPs “business.”  In this case, the specific focus is going to be on CONOPS and 
Tactical Situation (TACSIT) activities and not merely system boxes.  This analysis aims 
to be Measurable through clear metrics, linked to outcome based effects.  This analysis 
seeks to be Actionable, by clearly segmenting the problem and providing the basis for 
determining elements and plans for the solution (guidance and priorities).  This analysis 
seeks to be Realistic, in that the problem can be solved within the bounds of physical 
reality.  Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs), time and cost are all some of the 
realistic constraints which will help bound the problem.  Lastly, this work should be 
Time-sensitive such that there is a clear statement of when the solution opportunity 
expires therefore implying a deadline and sense of urgency for implementation. 
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With this in mind, our analysis faces two key challenges.  1) Identify and validate 
the warfighting architecture improvements required to significantly enhance naval 
warfighting effectiveness in 2009 within the context of FnEPs, and 2) Demonstrate the 
concept of distributed services as a tool for analyzing and optimizing warfighting 
architectures will be utilized.  In order to get from the “As-Is” to the “To-Be” 
architecture, several key aspects must be understood,  
· Understand what the warfighting requirement is and what capabilities it 
will take to win in a network-centric warfare environment.  
· Understand the “As-Is” architecture from a weapons coordination 
standpoint and its attendant problems of manually configured systems, 
with multiple, non- integrated stove piped functionality and rigid command 
and control. 
· Understand the “To-Be” architecture from the FnEP perspective taking 
into account the five Combat Reach Capabilities.  Understanding these 
CRCs implies a high level of autonomous action and awareness of other 
engagement units, both friendly and unfriendly.  
· Understand what metrics will validate these improvements.   
Questions like, “will the coherence and reliability of a tactical picture or a 
shortened kill chain reduce blue on blue and blue on white engagements” will be looked 
at.  This work will analyze “pack” deployment that can provide the five CRCs with a 
target timeframe of 2009.  This analysis work will be completed by examining 
capabilities from a warfighter outcome-based perspective.  These capabilities are based 
on two types of variables, 1) Conditions (i.e., things we ‘set’) and 2) Metrics (i.e., things 
we ‘measure’) like weather, AOR-Geometry, threat, lethality, coverage (sensor, 
engagement) survivability, timeliness, OR time, space, force factors.  These warfighting, 
effects-based capability variables produce derived capabilities that must exist to support 
the overarching objectives.  These derived capabilities are parameters of services (e.g., 
security, connectivity, availability, maintainability, bandwidth efficiency, 
interoperability, latency, delay, jitter, etc.) and may be articulated in the form of 
requirements or in service level agreements (SLAs).  Figure 34 depicts the reference 
implementation and architecture that will frame all follow on discussions.  In an 
operational sense, there are warfighting activities, nodal functions, information, and 
systems used in achieving a mission.  Mission requirements require collaboration and 
100 
sequencing of system information flows to understand how the mission will be 
accomplished.  Simply stated, this is the warfighters’ view of the world.  Conversely, the 
engineer views FORCEnet by breaking it down into the functions of Mission Planning 
(MP), the five CRCs, as well as supporting services, for example, Precision Navigation 
and Time (PNT), Maneuver Control (MC), and the FORCEnet Information Grid (FnIG) 
as describing what is to be delivered.  How these functions are inter-related and 
interdependent will be reflected in the architecture and illustrates intent.  Performance 




Figure 34.   FORCEnet Reference Implementation and Architecture106. 
 
The analysis process begins with an overall look at a set of requirements that 
frame the vision of the operational concept and the capability (described immediately 
                                                 
106 Phil Charles, Initial FORCEnet Engagement Pack Assessment for CNO Strategic Studies Group XXII, 
(SPAWAR Systems Center, Charleston, SC, 1 October 2003), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 18. 
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following), including timeframes and goals/intents.  More technically, there are 
integration requirements (SV-6 diagrams) that help to understand the integration needed.  
Then system requirements in terms of System Independent Description (SID) and System 
Specific Description (SSD) are needed.  Next, platform requirements in the form of 
Platform Independent Description (PID) and Platform Specific Description (PSD) are 
needed.  Also, human systems integration and human factors must be defined according 
to Cell Independent Description (CID) and Cell Specific Description (CSD) as shown in 
Figures 51 and 52 below. 
C. NOTIONAL OPERATIONAL PACK SCENARIO 
Notionally, this FnEPs scena rio is designed to fit within the validated Design 
Reference Mission (DRM) of either Southeast Asia (SEA) or Northeast Asia (NEA) 
around the 2012 timeframe or a WESTPAC Region around the 2020 timeframe.  Design 
Reference Missions (DRMs) normally drive the Operational Situation (OPSIT) of red 
force and blue force laydowns, known threats and other operational considerations.  From 
these OPSITs are derived Tactical Situations (TACSITs) which form the basis of this 
analysis effort.  For reasons of constrained time and other resources we chose to focus 
exclusively on the Strike and Theater Air Missile Defense (TAMD) mission areas.  The 
priorities of this assessment work was 1) Focus on including joint assets, 2) Protecting 
maneuver forces ashore, 3) Conducting a sensitivity analysis of the five CRCs in an effort 
to determine the value in terms of warfighting capabilities such as 1) Has the engagement 
envelope been expanded? 2) Has C2 decision time decreased? 3) Has target engagement 
time decreased? 4) Has defense in depth been increased or strengthened? 5) Has there 
been an improvement in lethality, survivability, coverage, persistence or timeliness?  This 
analysis was undertaken with a mid-term (2009) operational scenario in mind with a few 
goals in mind.  
· To produce and validate an architecture capable of supporting dynamically 
re-configurable, joint, end-to-end warfighting mission capabilities.   
· To conduct this analysis using validated and integrated architecture 
methodologies and modeling tools to manage complexity, and 
demonstrate potential for increase in end-to-end warfighting effectiveness.    
· To developing a transition roadmap for the five CRCs 
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The desired end-results of this analysis were to 
· Identify Joint, service-specific  pack components  
· Identify trade space between legacy, stove-piped functional systems and 
distributed services, taking into account the spiral development method.   
· Recommend actions to synchronize identified PFs and deploy a 
FORCEnet Initial Prototype Demonstration (IPD).   
· Provide a roadmap and recommendations for continued development of 
FnEPs. 
Some side benefits might be to lend insight into the FORCEnet Information Grid 
issues, address Sea Warrior issues and help to address acquisition issues and guidance. 
The following operational vignettes107 will illustrate three critical points. 1) 
Adaptability – the ability of engagement packs to adapt from Strike to Surface Warfare to 
Theater Air and Missile Defense and back to strike, 2) IFC – providing In-Flight Target 
Updates (IFTU) to organic sensors and or in-flight weapons from distributed off-board 
sensors, and 3) Joint – leveraging the capabilities of joint assets to complete the kill 
chain.   
The first “act” of the operational scenario is depicted graphically below.  It begins 
as a notional pre-planned Strike “Pack” which is enroute to its assigned target set along 
with other joint assets when the pack is retasked to engage a ‘pop-up’, time-critical target 
– fast surface vessels approaching a logistics ship. 
                                                 
107 We acknowledge these scenarios were presented previously; however, their applicability to both Chapter II 
and Chapter III requires their inclusion in both locations. 
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Figure 35.   Strike to SuW Pack Example108. 
 
ISR information obtained from a submarine collecting intelligence near the 
coastline is rapidly shared with other assets throughout the battlespace including an Air 
Force surveillance aircraft on station to support the pre-planned strike mission.  Self-
synchronization through ABMAs optimizes the best sensors-shooters-weapons 
combinations to engage the approaching surface vessels.  Sensor packages onboard an 
MC2A, P-3, Global Hawk, an AEGIS Destroyer and Predator are exploited.  C2 
information flow assigns sensors and shooters.  Navy and Marine Corp F-18s, a DDG, 
and LCS are the optimized shooters.  CTs and CCIDs are formed using measurements of 
the target from the optimized sensors allowing Global Hawk and Predator UAVs, in this 
example, to exploit the strengths of their combined ISAR, IR, Elint, and MTI radar 
sensors.  With CCID satisfied, weapons are now deployed.  The key point here is that 
inbound weapons are receiving In-flight Target Updates (IFTUs) not from the platforms 
                                                 
108 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, 52. 
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that launched them, but from the network supported by the distributed off-board sensors 
onboard P-3, Predator, and Global Hawk.  The engagement envelope is not limited to the 
range of the organic sensor, but rather the maximum kinematic range of the weapons 
being employed.  IFC supports the capability to engage mobile and moving targets from 
safe stand-off ranges outside threat engagement envelopes, thus ensuring the desired 
effects in a highly contested environment providing persistent combat power.  Figure 36, 
shows the Surface Warfare to Missile Defense Pack Scenario. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Surface Warfare to Missile Defense Pack Scenario 109. 
 
The second “act” of the operational scenario occurs when following the 
successful engagement of the surface vessels, Air Force and Army surveillance sensors 
detect a raid of Land Attack Cruise Missiles targeting joint forces ashore.  The “pack,” 
originally tasked for Strike, rapidly adapts “on the fly” to tasking for a Missile Defense 
                                                 
109 Ibid., 53. 
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mission.  Radar tracks and their associated measurement data are shared among other 
airborne and surface sensors.  ABMAs assign sensors and prioritize shooters based on 
resources available and engagement geometries.  In this case, JLENS, MC2A, F-18, P-3, 
DDG, LCS, and Patriot are the “pack” components that will rapidly integrate and explo it 
the strengths of each system to successfully engage the inbound cruise missiles.  The C2 
information flow supports the creation of a CP in the form of a Single Integrated Air 
Picture (SIAP).  CTs are formed and shared among surveillance and fire control sensors.  
A common threat evaluation and positive hostile ID are assisted by ABMAs.  Weapon to 
target error baskets are calculated and are used to assign sensor-shooter-weapon linkages.  
Weapons are released and are uplinked in-flight target updates as needed by assigned 
offboard fire control sensors.  The potential role P-3 plays in missile defense highlighted 
in this vignette shows the power of all five CRCs.  In spite of the lack of an organic 
missile defense fire control system, the P-3 could be used solely as a launch platform 
with off-board weapons control.  With successful engagement of the Cruise Missiles, the 
“pack” returns to, and reconfigures for its original strike mission, further demonstrating 
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Potential TAMD Pack Systems
 
Figure 37.   Potential TAMD Pack Systems110. 
 
To develop the “packs” and capabilities just illustrated in the scenarios, there 
needs to be an appropriate collection of players and systems used.  Figure 37 depicts a 
potential set of Joint TAMD critical systems.  While the desire would be to integrate all 
the potential TAMD systems depicted, a first step is to jointly agree to a manageable set 
so that they can be engineered as an ensemble into a “pack.”  Such a set might be what is 
highlighted.  As discussed previously; however, it is not the interconnections of nodes 
that demonstrate the power of FORCEnet, it is the integration of all six FORCEnet 
Factors. Accordingly, further decomposition of the Service-specific systems into the 
specific FORCEnet Factor categories is required. 
                                                 













































Figure 38.   Point-to-Point Integration111. 
 
Sensors, command and control, networks, warriors, weapons and platforms make 
up the headings, however, the integration of these factors into packs can not be done as 
point-to-point solutions (as shown) or a “boxology”/“science project” approach.  As 
discussed in Chapter I, this is where we are today.  Today’s systems are somewhat 
integrated; however, they are also tightly coupled and designed, built, and tested as a 
system.  This leads to poor flexibility, ill-define (if at all!) interfaces, and a general lack 
of information exchange requirements.  Further, we lack the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures necessary to allow system interoperability.  Figure 38 details how current 
systems and platforms inherently limit warfighting flexibility by being integrated in a 
very inflexible manner.  In systems used for the operational scenario, only some of the 
platforms provide a true end-to-end capability, and they are limited in coverage 
effectiveness due to geography or sensor limitation.  This is akin to thinking of 
integration within each vertical area (which is typically the focus of integration efforts) as 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 55. 
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inter-nodal while the true end-to-end integration FnEPs requires intra-nodal integration.  
Currently; however, platform centric, unique sensor-shooter-weapon linkages limit our 
integration ability across platforms and mission areas and ultimately result in sub-optimal 











































Combat Reach CapabilitiesCapa ilities based approach
 
Figure 39.   Capabilities Based Approach112. 
 
Figure 39 depicts a capabilities based approach based on the five CRCs.  These 
five CRCs form the focus around which there should be pack re-composition.  This 
integration across functional domains will yield a capability-based approach, ultimately 
providing distributed services across systems and mission areas. 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 56. 
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Figure 40.   Distributed Services113. 
 
Figure 40 walks through a scenario that seeks to highlight how distributed 
services will work within an FnEP “Pack.”  With initial ELINT or ISR surveillance hits 
on a target of interest, a composite track begins to be made (green stars) by the available 
sensors.  This information is fed into the beginnings of a composite picture (CP), at 
which time the ABMAs may task three other sensors (yellow stars) to get a better look.  
ABMAs may require better resolution imagery and retask a sensor in a better operational 
position to get better identification data.  The assets may be retasked UAVs or orders 
generated for a retasked mission of some joint ISR asset like P-3 or MC2A.  The 
additional sensor data is added into the CP.  This CP, including a composite combat ID 
(CCID) of the target, is shared between all pack assets.  The ABMA now works to figure 
out the best sensor to shooter to weapon linkages and may recommend a third sensor 
(red) be tasked to directly provide input to the most appropriate weapon off a specific 
weapons delivery platform.  This depiction shows, sensors, ISR/C2/FC networks, 
                                                 
113 Ibid., 57. 
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warriors, weapons and platforms are now generic entities, standardized by interface and 
information flows such that their modularity and interoperability supports any sensor to 
ISR/C2/FC network to weapon to platform linkages.  One of the ABMAs’ tasks is to 
optimize this selection process and determine the most appropriate set of assets for 
inclusion in the pack.  While it is noted that not all systems are generic and posess similar 
functionality, the generalized nature of these pack factors speak to their modularity only.  
These systems still have very specific functional capabilities that the ABMAs will have 
knowledge of.  ABMAs will select from among those specific functional capabilities via 
standard interfaces, interoperability and modular approaches, in much the same way one 
would call a class object in object oriented software by simply referring to an objects 
attribute.  So, this figure shows how, we will fuse sensor information from multiple 
sources into high quality Composite Tracks (CT) with Composite Combat Identifications 
(CCID) contributing to common and single integrated pictures (CP) for our operators.  
This real time shared information state across our ISR/C2/FC networks, and among our 
warriors and platforms will create a true condition of shared battlespace awareness.  
Analysis of these inter-relationships support sensitivity studies that help optimize system 
to system integration.  There were some important insights gained from this process, 
including supporting a virtual environment of automation aided sensor to weapon 
assignments providing potentially hundreds of simultaneous engagements and extending 
combat reach far inland against raids of cruise and ballistic missiles.  These distributed 
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Figure 41.   Distributed Services114. 
 
Figure 41 depicts how distributed services within a pack will support a virtual 
networked environment of automation-aided sensor to weapon linkages providing 
potentially thousands of rounds on target per hour and extending combat reach far inland 
against raids of cruise and ballistic missiles.  These distributed services support the vision 
of FORCEnet and Sea Power 21.  However, the complexity generated by the potential 
explosion of interactions between many sensors, many ISRC2/FC networks, weapons and 
platforms is huge, unaffordable, and doesn’t provide optimized sensor to shooter to 
weapon linkages due to inherent specific system functionality.  In order to address these 
interactions and analyze which ones provide the biggest return on investment, SPAWAR 
System Center Charleson (SSC C) developed the GEMINI toolset and methodology to 
support first order system architecture decomposition and gap analysis.  GEMINII 
supported SSG XXII’s first order assessment of the PF decomposition process and the 
recomposition of “packs” based on the five CRCs.  As was mentioned in Chapter I, this 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 58. 
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methodology is broken down into the static and dynamic architecture assessments.  The 
process is to discover relationships between system functions and their information 
exchange requirements, understand the dependencies, package these services into service 
areas and prioritize them by program.   




Figure 42.   How Do We Move to Distributed Services?115 
 
Figure 42 depicts what is meant by distributed services.  In today’s environment, 
the ability to tap into any kind of service, whether it be common operational picture, data 
link subscription, etc.  Those distributed services are complex, have duplicative functions 
and information and are not really distributed because those information flows are only 
available to those systems specifically designed to interoperate with specific other 
                                                 
115 Charles, Assessments to Define Composeable Mission Capability, Slide 33. 
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systems.  The information is delivered by numerous legacy systems from a closed, not an 
open, architecture.  The information flows are not flexible, adaptable and cannot be 
composed into different information flows very easily, if at all.  The interoperability 
requirements for these various information flows are process dependant and very 
inflexible, often the result of the way the organizations are set up that designed and 
implemented them.  Finally, these brittle information flows are focused on Navy 
requirements rather on Joint or Naval (to include USMC) requirements. 
The distributed services FnEPs seeks to create or take advantage of in a 
networked virtual environment look much different.  The services should be much 
simpler in operation.  These services should focus on providing standardized enterprise-
wide service, functions and information, not information flows.  Distributed services 
allow portable applications and an optimization of “where” the application is executed.  
This could be termed “locality” of an application where there is a balance to be struck 
between where the data physically resides, where the processing power is coming from 
and what network assets are needed and available to support these activities.  This is one 
area that ABMAs would have to manage and optimize.  The processed outcome would be 
exploited where it was consumed by the user.  This concept requires the Open 
Architecture Computing Environment (OACE), and a management of producer and 
consumer activities.  Figure 43 shows how “composeable capabilities” based on 
distributed services allow system like capability to be “composed” in response to 
requirements, challenges and demands of the very dynamic current operational situation.  
The ability to make “composeable” Joint organizations and “composable” tactics and 
doctrine enable the “pack” to be flexible, adaptable and responsive to any emerging 
threats.  The composeable services foundation provides flexible and dynamic 
functionality and the interoperability achieved permits composeable organizations across 
Navy, Joint and potentially Allied and Coalition components.  The flexibility in 
organizational structure and services allows the composition of Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures and Doctrine at all levels of warfighting.  The co-evolution of the technology, 
organization, doctrine and TTPs are at the heart of the concepts based experimentation 
process for FORCEnet and Sea Trial.  Collectively, “composeability”, based on 
distributed services leads to the flexible and agile “pack”. 
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Figure 43.   Distributed Services Provides Composeable Capabilities116. 
 
Distributed services should be collaborative in nature using the ‘publish and 
subscribe’ ontology.  Distributed services also have a need for ‘fixed applications’ based 
on an optimization of the ‘pub lish and subscribe’ architecture.  There could be a need for 
centralized execution or processing with the results being published for use.  This 
architecture would require a directory service of services.  The distributed services 
architecture would also require an automated schema for marketing to consumers and 
consumers must somehow know about ‘relevant available services’.  Distributed services 
must also be supported by global data models where the ontology is meta-data tagging 
and knowledge discovery and knowledge management mechanisms.  Directory services 
must be supported by an infrastructure of enterprise services like NCES, DoDIIS, 
DII/COE, etc.  Another facet of distributed services, diffusion, is seen as distributed 
services spread across a sector, domain or warfighting area/pack and will cause an 
increase in productivity.  However, while productivity gains are realized, individual 
competitive advantages (differentiation) will be eroded (diffused). 
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Distributed services are envisioned to work in a ‘publish and subscribe’ manner 
such as depicted in Figure 44. 
 
 
Figure 44.   Establishing Distributed Services, Overland Cruise Missile Defense 
(Example)117. 
 
As depicted in this figure, a given combat node or element will logon and 
authenticate (register) themselves to “publish and subscribe” to services.  This example 
depicts an AEGIS cruiser that is assigned the mission to project overland cruise missile 
defense to defend a ground force.  Additionally, a joint theater Global Hawk asset has 
been assigned to support the mission.  This example has each of the nodes advertising 
and registering services that it has available to support the mission, additionally, each of 
the nodes request to subscribe to services that are needed for the node to execute its 
mission.  This figure demonstrates when a new member wishes to join a distributed 
service, once authenticated, the user publishes to the rest of the distributed services 
subscribers what kinds of information, what data formats, system functionalities are 
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supported, and what are the things this new member can provide to the collective 
members of the service.  However, for the other half of this transaction, the new 
distributed service member must subscribe to what other system functionalities are being 
provided by the rest of the distributed service members.  The new member of this 
distributed service asks for certain data, information, interface requirements, formats and 
system functionalities being provided by the rest of the distributed service members, 
irrespective of geographic considerations due to its network-centric nature.  Once this 
handshake between what information the new member can provide to the distributed 
service members and what information the new member needs from the distributed 




Figure 45.   Service Delivery, Overland Cruise Missile Defense (Example)118. 
 
 
                                                 
118 Ibid., Slide 7. 
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Once the ABMAs have composed the operational approach that will be used to 
execute the overland cruise missile capability, the FORCEnet infrastructure is quickly 
configured to support the publish and subscribe services (capabilities) needed.  In this 
example, the network establishes two consumer-to-consumer (C2C) services that allow 
the three nodes to exchange information.  One is a basic track services and the other 
missile alert service.  In this case, the AEGIS cruiser has subscribed to receive AMTI 
sensor feeds from the Global Hawk’s MP-RTIP radar.  The AEGIS cruiser’s on-board 
distributed sensor processor has the ability to mix the Global Hawk’s remote sensor with 
its local sensors to detect and ID a cruise missile threat, and to immediately report this 
data to prepare for an attack (employ chemical and biological defense mechanisms).  In 
addition, it provides the same information back to the Global Hawk so that the MP-RTIP 
radar can execute a High Resolution Radar (HRR) continuous track update information to 
the AEGIS cruiser.  This information is sufficient to provide the AEGIS with a fire 
quality solution that can be used to engage the cruise missile remotely. 
Further, the AEGIS has been made aware of the Global Hawk’s ability to not only 
support a remote engagement (sensor-to-shooter paradigm) for remote engagement, but 
also has the ability to support forward pass (sensor-to-weapon paradigm). This allows the 
Global Hawk to take control of the SM-2 and provide mid-course and terminal guidance 
support directly to the SM-2 in flight.  This enables the AEGIS to engage the cruise 
missile at a greater range, and potentially support a shoot- look-shoot to engage the threat. 
As the scenario plays-out, the AEGIS indicates that it will engage the target, and 
request forward pass support from the Global Hawk.  The Global Hawk indicates it will 
comply with the engagement request – the AEGIS launches the SM-2, controls initial 
weapon fly-out, then turns final engagement over to the Global Hawk.  We assume a 
successful engagement and this example ends. 
Distributed services must be built on a common, open architecture that allows the 
ability to interoperate and collaborate without consideration to all the possible 
combinations or permutations of possible systems both already in operational use or those 
being designed.  Open architectures built on secure, common standards will allow nesting 
and chaining the most simple, well defined and completely defined interface of any 
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number of architecture pieces into the most complex service.  This approach allows 
distributed services to be composed of modular system functionality as the need or 
situation dictates and allows for the architecture and ‘infostructure’ to be as flexible and 
adaptable as needed.  These composeability, flexibility, and adaptability characteristics 
produce the needed ‘small pieces, loosely coupled’ architecture so critically important to 
FnEPs.  These enterprise-wide, standard services will be able to support business 
processes as they evolve and change based on the response needed to environmental or 
threat inputs.  As with all initiatives, including FnEPs, this notion of distributed services 
must be joint and incorporate service participants from all services because the FnEPs 
concept cannot be achieved with only single service inputs.  The question remains, how 
do distributed services become a reality?  Figure 46 seeks to show a process to be used 
that would accomplish the goal of realizing distributed services. 
 
 
Figure 46.   FnEP Strategy to Align Systems with Warfighting Capabilities119. 
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Figure 46 is an FnEPs strategy to align systems and programs.  Our thesis seeks to 
more fully understand the system decomposition into FnEP factor components (depicted 
in Figure 46) as the first step in the Combat Reach integration process.  When 
recomposing factor components into “packs,” the five CRCs and a few critical services 
(horizontal ‘lanes’) become critical enablers to pack composition.  The GEMINII 
approach supports more detailed understanding of integration management to understand 
if all system interrelationships are possible, optimal, desired or affordable.  There would 
be a need for sys tem designers to use this information to focus on interactions that yield 
the most effectiveness.  Understanding how combat reach capabilities provide 
warfighting distributed services are key to understanding how distributed services support 
“pack” adaptability across both Strike and TAMD mission areas. 
The first step in the process is to establish the FORCEnet architecture with respect 
to services required.  As stated before, FnEPs requires specific integration of all six 
FORCEnet factors (warriors, sensors, platforms, networks, command and control and 
weapons) focused on the five CRCs.  The five CRCs and services depicted in Figure 46 
are: sensors, common tracks, composite combat identification, common tactical pictures, 
automated battle management aids, integrated fire control, weapons, common/single 
operational picture, mission planning, precision navigation and timing, and FORCnet 
information grid.  In Figure 46, the FORCEnet services along the left are a combination 
of both FORCEnet Factors and CRCs.  The five primary FnEP CRCs are supported by 
other services such as Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT), Mission Planning (MP) 
and FORCEnet Information Grid (Fn IG)) while Single/Common Pictures is further 
broken down into the Common Tactical Picture (CTP).  In the next step, “As-Is” 
operational systems/programs are overlaid onto a map that shows how these individual 
Stove-piped systems’ deliver the required FnEP capabilities.  The next step is to 
decompose these “As-Is” operational systems into their system functions and/or 
information categories and map them to the respective CRCs and services.  This is where 
the transformation process begins by decomposing systems into small pieces (system 
functions/information pairs) which will align functionality to distributed services.  The 
SSC-C GEMINII methodology (NTIRA, TVDB and associated tools) will be the toolset 
by which this decomposition takes place.  The next step is to analyze the gaps and 
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overlaps of system functionality as provided by current systems in support of the defined 
FORCEnet services.  The GEMINII methodology supports the gap and overlap analysis 
process but also provides tools to do dynamic modeling of new integrated, distributed 
architectures.  This realigned system functionality, combined with defined architectural 
interfaces at the CRC and service level and organized around and end-to-end perspective 
of the engagement chain will make FnEP analysis possible.  The objective at this juncture 
is to perform architectural analysis from a CRC and distributed service perspective of 
“like” systems and maintain capability context within a particular engagement chain, 
called TACSITs in this situation.  The final and critical step is to align and integrate those 
new CRCs (system functions) and distributed services along the TACSIT-defined 
engagement chain and propose new funding and integration alignment changes which 
will allow for an end-to-end engagement chain integration based service.  This process 
will allow prioritization and synchronization of program funding and capability 
increments across naval and joint programs.  This strategy also begins to support 
composeable warfighting analysis because the analysis is general and abstract enough 
such that it is not strictly limited to an individual TACSIT, but can define a whole new 
TACSIT based on whatever operational threat or situation is presented.  This strategy and 
analysis process can support operational architectures of FORCEnet factors based on new 
tactics, techniques and procedures as they evolve.  The composeability aspect of 
FORCEnet factor integration and analysis is interesting because it provides benefits on 
both the operational (common interfaces, a ‘toolset’ that gives you the flexibility to 
define what you want and need) and acquisition (only build/pay for a function once) 
levels. 
Factor Integration Analysis – To begin the FORCEnet factor integration 
analysis, SSC Charleston began by supporting the SSG to conduct a pack factor (system 
functional) decomposition, focusing only in the Strike and TAMD mission areas.  Using 
the same potential Navy and Joint Systems in both mission areas, the SSG and SSC-C 
decomposed these factors into appropriate sensors, networks, command and control 
nodes, weapons and evaluated the 85,000 information exchange requirements supporting 
the five CRCs.  This analysis yielded sequences of activities and Factor interactions 
required to fulfill Strike and TAMD mission areas and adapt between these missions.  
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This level of analysis is required to support the Operational, System, and Tactical Views 
within the system engineering framework of architecture definition, however this FnEP 
analysis is focused on the System View (SV-6) part of the system engineering framework 
to help lend understanding and linkages to the FORCEnet Chief Engineer’s Architecture 
Vision. 
The first part of the TACSIT analysis is to assess interfaces between activities.  
Figure 47 shows an example interface (IFACE 1) between a Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) on an LCC using TBMCS sending Joint  Target List data to a 
Strike Commander on a CVN using GCCS-M as part of the planning process for a F/A-
18 Strike Mission (Figure 47).  The objective is to clearly and unambiguously capture the 
integration requirements between these two boxes such that further integration analysis 
can be done once all integration and interfaces are accurately and completely 
characterized in the GEMINII toolset. 
 
Figure 47.   Scenario-WESTPAC TACSIT-4 (F-S), F/A-18E/F with JSOW120. 
                                                 




Figure 48.   Generate Interoperability Requirement 121. 
 
The first step in characterizing the activity interfaces are to understand the system 
functions, the integration and information exchange (interoperability) requirements.  This 
screen capture (Figure 48) of the Technical View Database (TVDB) tool shows the 
activity producing the information being defined, in this case the joint target data list 
activity, being linked to the activities which consume the data, namely the ‘determine 
asset availability’, ‘determine sensor availability’ and ‘Strike Commander Guidance’ 
activities as they relate to the IFACE 1 interface being analyzed.  The activities have to 
be further broken down in order to more fully analyze their interfaces and information 
data requirements.  To understand the activities further, activities such as the Joint Target 
Data List, is mapped to a system function within a hierarchy of system functions, in this 
case 2.2.1 – Force Planning.  Currently there are at least 4 different system function lists 
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in varied amounts of use and maturity within parts of the Navy, however the Assistant 
Secretary of Navy (ASN) for Research Development and Acquisition (RDA), is currently 
working to consolidate efforts into a single Common System Function List (CSFL) of 
about 1100 system functions which maps those system functions down to 9 tiers of 
granularity within this hierarchy.  System elements, like TBMCS shown, are systems 
which perform these system functions within the mission environment of this particular 
Strike TACSIT.  Further, these systems must reside on particular platform(s), so those are 
captured and the organization associated with this information producing activity is 
captured as well.  Likewise on the consumer side, the producing activity (Joint Target 
Data List) data is consumed by certain activities on the receiving end of this interface 
(IFACE 1) being examined within this Strike TACSIT.  Here, it is shown that ‘all’ 
activities associated with system function 2.2.2 – Operations Planning, receives this data.  
Further, ‘GCCS-M’ is being highlighted from the pull down list as being the system 
element to which the information from TBMCS is being sent to and consumed by.  
Similarly, a specific platform to which GCCS-M resides and the organization for which 
will use this information put into GCCS-M will be listed under their respective pull-down 
windows.  This is also beginning to populate the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) method 
discussed in Chapter III, where producers and consumers of information will be mapped 




Figure 49.   Strike Interoperability Requirements122. 
 
Once all the producers and consumer interoperability requirements have been 
defined, Figure 49 shows a tabular listing of all 2,857 WESTPAC Strike TACSIT 
interoperability requirements (rows) that were defined to characterize all 39 Strike 
TACSITs, including the WESTPAC scenario, in this first order of magnitude analysis.  
Figure 49 represents each row as a data interoperability requirement from source system, 
platform, organization, activity and function to destination system, platform, 
organization, activity, and function for a specific information data element.  Once all 
these interoperability requirements are captured then other analysis can proceed like 
connectivity analysis. 
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Figure 50.   Assessment Team Methodology Final Checklist123. 
 
Figure 50, is the final checklist the initial SSC-C assessment team followed to 
ensure interface definition and characterization was consistent and complete.  Once the 
use-case interfaces were defined, they were validated to ensure systems we able to 
perform the activities which were being assigned to it in TVDB.  A variety of data 
sources were used to perform this functionality validation, including the DoN CIO 
Integrated Architecture Database (DIAD), ASN RDA CHENG Architecture Framework 
Products defined in PR-05 and the System Functional Description Documents (FDDs).  A 
validation of platform and system connectivity ensured systems were not passing 
information to other systems that had no connectivity in the real world.  To perform this 
step, the DIAD as well as the SSC-C Platform Independent Description (PID) and 
Platform Specific Description (PSD) were queried for any connectivity issues.  The PID 
and System Independent Description (SID) reference models are shown below in Figures 
51 and 52 respectively to better understand how the boundaries are defined to help in the 
modular systems analysis in accordance with the reference framework discussed 
previously. 
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Figure 51.   PID Reference Platform Models124. 
 
 
Figure 52.   SID Reference System Models125. 
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An identification of battle force command and control or infrastructure 
requirements were made known as well as identifying any known system problems which 
may impact the definition of the current use-case interface requirements was made and 
noted.  A final assessment of TACSIT defined interface requirements were made against 
current or planned configuration changes was made to validate those requirements.  A 
final roll-up and reporting of risk areas was made.  The TVDB compiles risk factors 
identified in each of the checklist steps.  Each risk factor is assigned a relative importance 
by the decision-maker (the default risk calculation assumes all risks are of equal 
importance).  The tool then performs a weighted summation of the risk factors for each 
interoperability requirement.  Additional averaging schemes are applied to roll-up these 
risk factors to the TACSIT, System and Activity levels. 
The following sequence of figures illustrates a portion of the above assessment 
checklist.  Figure 53 below, shows how the Visio ES Tool was used to identify 
infrastructure requirements by assessing TBMCS Equipment Strings and RF alternatives 
on the USS CORONADO (AGF-11) Ringchart.  The areas highlighted in pink show a 




Figure 53.   Visio ES Tool126. 
 
Figure 54, is an operational impact screen capture of another one of the static 
interoperability assessment tools known as the Battle Force (BF) Electromagnetic 
Interference (EMI) Impact Assessment Tool (IAT).  The Battle Force EMI Impact 
Assessment Tool is an analytical assessment tool for RF support of the fleet’s 
information exchange requirements (IERs).  This tool is also used to identify 
infrastructure requirements and alternatives.  This example shows Challenge Athena 
(CA) III supporting Fleet IERs on the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), validating 
functionality and connectivity between the JFACC and the Strike Warfare Command 
Center (STWC) on the USS Abraham Lincoln, also showing three alternative RF paths 
(EHF, SHF and UHF SATCOM). 
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Figure 54.   Battle Force (BF) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Impact Assessment 
Tool (IAT)127. 
 
Figure 55, shows how the BF EMI IAT tool analyzes RF support of Fleet IERs.  
This screen shows a set of SEMCIP Technical Assistance Network (STAN) EMI issues 
by RF System.  The Shipboard Electromagnetic Compatibility Improvement Program 
(SEMCIP) is a CNO sponsored, NAVSEASYSCOM managed program that identifies 
and develops fixes for EMI problems 128.  STAN is an on-line database geared to provide 
the EMI engineers and technicians with access to the latest information on the status of 
EMI problems.  STAN also provides ship administrative information to assist in all 
phases of SEMCIP and information on the development, installation, and verification of 
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[http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/navy/docs/swos/e1/MOD3LES2.html]; Accessed October 2003. 
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known fixes.  Additionally, STAN contains Electromagnetic Control Topside 
Arrangement Drawings129.  In this example, STAN is one of the databases queried to 
identify known system issues, the next step in the assessment checklist. 
 
 
Figure 55.   BF EMI IAT130. 
 
Another database that is used to identify system issues is the Battle Group 
Situation Report (BGSIT) database.  Figure 56 shows the LANTFLT BGSITs for 
TBMCS and GCCS-M. 
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Figure 56.   Static Assessment, BGSIT Database131. 
 
The next step in the assessment checklist is to identify configuration and funding 
issues.  Figure 57 shows a NTIRA configuration data view for individual platforms, 
which systems are installed or when they are planned to be installed.  This view may be 
used to identify potential gaps (application and infrastructure level) in supporting the 
interoperability requirements defined in Figure 49. 
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Figure 57.   NTIRA FORCEnet Execution Plan132. 
 
NTIRA is currently used by OPNAV, NETWARCOM and CFFC to optimize 
funding and Battle Group composition based on capability requirements.  Figure 58 
shows an example of how NTIRA can be used to move ships between Battle Groups to 
optimize their warfighting capability. 
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Figure 58.   Force Composition Realignments133. 
 
Here, NTIRA is being used to reassign the USS DONALD COOK (DDG-75) 
from the ENTERPRISE Battlegroup/NASSAU ARG to the USS RONALD REAGAN 
Battlegroup/PELILEU ARG.  By reassigning the USS DONALD COOK, all 
configuration, costing, installation, and funding dependencies are automatically reflected 
in the new battlegroup composition and throughout the rest of the associated NTIRA 
data.  
Once battlegroup and amphibious readiness group compositions are known, 
installation planning can be managed and assessed using data shown in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59.   NTIRA Install Counts134. 
 
The previous set of Figures illustrates how GEMINII is used to identify risk 
factors in a set of interoperability requirements.  Each of the risks identified in the 
checklist, including infrastructure, EMI, BGSIT, configuration and funding issues, are 
reflected as firecrackers in Figure 60. 
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Figure 60.   WESTPAC TACSIT135. 
 
Figure 61 is an assessment report roll-up across 41 Strike TACSIT use-cases 
based on the issues identified in this static interoperability assessment.  This TACSIT risk 
assessment is ranked according to end-to-end capabilities.  The rank is based on activity 
and system interfaces.  Essentially, the risk assessment is a weighted average based on 
the interoperability issues identified in each of the 41 TACSIT use-cases, normalized to 
1.  The risk assessment is a weighted sum of all risk factors like; infrastructure, EMI, 
BGSIT, configuration, funding, PR-05 assessments, functionality, connectivity, tactical 
data link, JITC certification and other fleet issues, where the risk factors can be weighted 
equally or more weight put on one type of interoperability over another given specific 
fleet priorities.  The horizontal axis is simply the ordinal number of each TACSIT use- 
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case, 1 through 41.  The differentiation between red, yellow and green use-cases were 
defined by simply looking for natural breaks in use-case risk.  Overall, this graph was a 
rollup assessment of all TACSIT use-cases across all risk areas. 
 
 
Figure 61.   MCP TVDB Assessment Reports136. 
 
Figure 62 shows the assessment reports roll-up across 41 Strike TACSIT use-
cases based on static interoperability assessment (by system).  Again, the horizontal axis 
is the ordinal number of TACSIT use-cases from 1 to 41.  The vertical axis is another 
normalized, weighted average of risks, this time focused on just the func tionality and 
connectivity (F & C) risks, but from a system perspective.  This graph was produced in 
exactly the same manner, using the exact same data as the previous slide, but now simply 
rolled-up from a different perspective.  This is an interesting perspective, because this 
data shows which systems have more or less interoperability risk associated with them. 
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Figure 62.   MCP TVDB Assessment Reports, by System137. 
 
Figure 63 shows the assessment reports which show a roll-up across all 41 Strike 
TACSIT use-cases based on their static interoperability assessment organized by activity.  
Here the horizontal axis is the ordinal number of TACSIT systems from 1 to 94.  The 
vertical axis is another normalized, weighted average of risks, this time rolled up to the 
system level.  Produced using the exact same risk assessment data as the previous two 
figures, this figure shows yet another perspective of interoperability risk, that from a 
rolled up system perspective.  This is interesting to see because the data points to certain 
activities which have more or less interoperability risk associated with them. 
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Figure 63.   MCP TVDB Assessment Reports, by Activity138. 
 
Once the TACSIT use-case interoperability requirements are defined, verified and 
validated, the next step in the static GEMINII analysis is to address the system’s 
capability gaps and overlaps.  Figure 64, is the beginning of this capability gap and/or 
overlap analysis within TVDB. 
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Figure 64.   Technical View Generator, Gap/Overlap Analysis 139. 
 
Figure 65, is a view of TVDB that shows how to select which activities and 
systems to analyze for gaps and duplications in capability.  Here all the TACSIT 
activities have been selected.  There is also the capability to add in a new system that can 
have system functions assigned to it. 
                                                 
139 Ibid., Slide 18. 
140 
 
Figure 65.   Analyze Capability Gaps and Duplications 140. 
 
Figure 66, is a screen shot of TVDB showing activities as they are arranged in the 
TACSIT and four systems (FORCEnet System 1, GCCS-M, SHARP, TARPS) within the 
specific Strike TACSIT. 
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Figure 66.   Selected Systems, Activities in TACSIT141. 
 
By looking at the view/edit system function matrix of all the TACSIT activities 
and the selected four systems (FORCEnet System1, GCCS-M, SHARP and TARPS) 
from Figure 66, a matrix is automatically formed with each row being an information 
exchange requirement mapped against which systems perform those system functions.  
Figure 67 is that automatically generated matrix which shows how the selected systems 
currently support the selected activity sequence in this Strike TACSIT.  As can be seen, 
each intersection of a defined system function with one of the four systems supports has 
an ‘X’ to delineate this requirement has been met by the associated system.  Where there 
is an information requirement defined which is not covered by any system, there is an ‘X’ 
marked in the ‘Gap’ column.  As seen in Figure 67, there are gaps in the ‘Plan Force 
Disposition’, ‘Identify Targets’ and ‘Perform Deconfliction’ activities because there are 
no systems currently being used which have those system functionalities built in.  This 
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matrix also shows where system functionalities are duplicative and which systems 
contain the duplicative functionality.  In Figure 67, the systems SHARP and TARPS have 
identically the same functionality (at this level of granularity) and shows up in the matrix.  
Further functional system decomposition would be required to make trade-offs between 
these two systems. 
 
 
Figure 67.   System Support to Selected Activities142. 
 
In Figure 68, this screen shot demonstrates the ability to manually edit the system 
function matrix.  In this example, the three (3) capability gaps are assigned to the new 
FORCEnet System 1 while the duplicative TARPS functionality has been removed.  The 
fact that the information exchange requirements have been decomposed into discreet 
entities and stored in a database, essentially making the manipulation much feasible 
makes this part of the analysis possible.  In a much larger matrix which contains many 
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more system functions and systems involved in supporting those functions, the ability to 
quickly scan for gaps and duplicates in provided system functionality becomes more 
readily apparent.  The ability to manually edit the system function matrix by reassigning 
gaps to new or existing systems while realigning or taking out duplicative system 
functionality out of other systems, the TVDB and DSM tools are now beginning to 
rearrange architectures and interfaces based on realigned or streamlined system 
functionality to produce new TACSITs for further analysis. 
 
 
Figure 68.   Editing System Function Matrix143. 
 
With a newly modified system function matrix that has realigned system 
functions, now, new SV-6 architectural views can be produced from the changes.  Figure 
69 shows what the old and new SV-6 information exchange lines would look like based 
on these previous modifications that were just made.  Since the information requirements 
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have been decomposed new interoperability requirements can be created, which creates 
new information exchange requirements because each producer and consumer of 
information have to be linked and the database keeps track of which system functions can 
be performed by which systems.  Once the new SV-6 information exchange requirements 
are applied to the TACSIT, the impact can be seen. 
 
 
Figure 69.   Modified SV-6 TACSIT144. 
 
Figure 70, shows the impact of the changes made to the system function matrix to 
the selected TACSIT.  The 3 gaps have been covered by the new FORCEnet System 1, so 
there are no gaps now.  The duplicative functions have been cut by getting rid of TARPS.  
Sole (or aggregate) capabilities have increased due to the new FORCEnet System and the 
removal of TARPS. 
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Figure 70.   GAPS/DUPS Report145. 
 
If those system function realignments which addressed gaps and duplicative 
system functions just described in the previous matrix were applied to one TACSIT, 
Figure 70 showed the result.  Those exact same system function realignments can be 
applied to all Strike TACSITs defined within TVDB.  Figure 71 shows all those system 
functional changes being applied across all of the Strike TACSITs. 
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Figure 71.   Applied Changes to All Strike TACSITs146. 
 
Figure 72 shows the impact of applying the realigned system functions for each of 
the Strike TACSITs.  TACSIT 13 (the selected TACSIT which was being specifically 
realigned in the previous pages) has the biggest impact because the focus was on 
manually optimizing that particular TACSIT – but changes impacted all the other Strike 
TACSITs as well, but to varying degrees. 
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Figure 72.   Impacts on Other Strike TACSITs147. 
 
Figure 73, shows how the user can drill down and see details, by TACSIT, of the 
number of systems that support each system function activity.  A trend seen in Figure 73 
is that the number of systems supporting several of the system functions has decreased by 
one.  This decrease is due to the elimination of the TARPS system and the functions it 
duplicated are the functions shown which now have two other systems providing that 
same functionality.  This view of each TACSIT makes it fairly straightforward for the 
user to see how many systems cover each activity.  Seeing the impact, the changes have 
on the individual TACSITs from a slightly different perspective before and after changes 
were made to the system function matrix and how it impacts each TACSIT can be 
important. 
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Figure 73.   Number of Systems by Activity148. 
 
The figures shown up until this point illustrate how TVDB can be used to identify 
interoperability requirements, assess and prioritize risk, and identify gaps and 
duplications in system functionality.  Figure 74 shows that the interoperability 
requirements are fed into Operations Research (OR) tools (e.g., MATLAB, LINDO, 
‘What’s Best! Excel Add-In’, etc.).  The objectives such as maximize capability, 
minimize EMI impact, etc. can be used as criteria with constraints such as budget, time, 
etc. defined.  The solvers then determine the optimal set(s) of systems, issues, platforms, 
etc. 
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Figure 74.   Portfolio Discovery Discussion149. 
 
Once optimized portfolios of systems and activities are defined, they then can be 
fed into NTIRA for costing analysis, Figure 75.  Having it’s start in the MS Excel 
spreadsheet known as the ‘IT-21 Victory Matrix”, NTIRA is a tool that has evolved as a 
more automated and easier way to keep track of cost and programmatic data associated 
with certain shipboard communication systems.  NTIRA uses current program install 
schedules, costing details and configuration data to estimate costs associated with the 
proposed portfolios of systems.  NTIRA provides the ability to easily do ‘what- if’ costing 
analysis on a per hull or per system basis if ships are moved around based on the Type 
Commanders’ (SURFPAC, AIRPAC, SUBPAC, etc.) force reconfiguration plans.  
NTIRA also provides the ability to easily do ‘what- if’ costing analysis as a result of 
programmatic changes in schedule, capitalization costs, changes to system functionality 
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or look at ways to reconfigure system installations in response to OPNAV budget 
reductions all the while taking into consideration the operational linkages between 
systems which have to occur in order to install a ‘IT-21’ composed capability to the fleet.  
 
 
Figure 75.   NTIRA Analysis150. 
 
This afloat FY-03 installation plan shows system platform composition, 
configuration status, installation timeline/schedule and some cost traceability information 
which will be helpful in the system/platform assessment of CRC supportability and 
degree of interoperability.   
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Figure 76.   Cost Rollup and Analysis151. 
 
NTIRA’s ability to track all costing data associated with SPAWAR systems will 
be able to help understand the trade space for system realignments, migration or 
divestiture actions will impact other systems and funds. 
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Figure 77.   Rapid Cost Shifting152. 
 
NTIRA’s added ability to rapidly and easily add, delete, change or realign costs to 
system installation plans (shown, the afloat FY03 plan) provides the tools to do ‘what- if’ 
analysis and evaluate options for aligning systems to become FnEP enabled.  
The next phase of the analysis within TVDB is the identification of FORCEnet 
distributed services.  Figure 78, begins this new discussion of how FORCEnet distributed 
services are defined and characterized within TVDB such that they can be modeled and 
understood within the context of a TACSIT. 
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Figure 78.   FORCEnet Distributed Services153. 
 
Figure 79, shows the FORCEnet distributed interoperability requirements screen 
where 56 high level services are defined for the Strike TACSIT.  TVDB defines a Service 
as a System Function/Information Element pairing.  These 56 services are produced by 
various systems and activities while at the same time they are subscribed to by various 
systems and activities for the mission of Strike.  Each of the 56 high level services 
corresponds to a set of legacy interoperability requirements seen at the bottom that shows 
the dependencies between the source and destination systems and activities.  The Service 
selected in this view (Single Sensor Sense/Target Type) was generated from 31 legacy, 
point-to-point interoperability requirements, all of which may go away if this Service 
were to be implemented in a distributed environment. 
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Figure 79.   FORCEnet Distributed Interoperability Requirements154. 
 
As seen in Figure 79, there is a way to assign system functions into a FORCEnet 
hierarchy.  This FORCEnet hierarchy attempts to organize, and put a framework around 
system functions such that this kind of system function decomposition can be made 
possible.  Figure 80 is the FORCEnet Strategic/Operational/Tactical Hierarchy as 
depicted in the FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture.  The new Combined 
System Function List (CSFL) mentioned previously and under development by ASN 
(RDA), has approximately 1100 system functions organized into a 9 tiered structure.  The 
initial FnEPs analysis being discussed here, began by taking into account 68 system 
functions as a first order of magnitude effort.  These system functions, paired with the 
Information Elements required in the TACSITs, are mapped to the FORCEnet 
Strategic/Operational/Tactical Hierarchy that is the common baseline all systems within 
Navy will be measured against.  The FORCEnet Hierarchy depicted in Figure 80 is a 
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method for decomposing warfighting activities from the highest theater environment 
level, in this case a joint command and control cell, into an operational environment 
consisting of air/space, ground, and maritime maneuver cells as well as a SOF cell.  The 
third tier attempts to break those cells down into operational sub-functions.  With the 
continuing decomposition of warfighting activities into offensive/defensive activities, 
warfare support activities, battlespace awareness and force support activities, naturally, 
the activities continue to become more highly refined.  The continuing efforts of FnEPs 
analysis seeks to begin using the CSFL and map those system functions already 
organized according to the FORCEnet Hierarchy into the five CRCs needed for FnEPs.  
The other important aspect of the FORCEnet Hierarchy is the acknowledgement that each 




Figure 80.   FORCEnet Strategic/Operational/Tactical Hierarchy155. 
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As an example, Figure 81 is a depiction of what activities might be utilized for a 
Joint Strike example as used in the FORCEnet Government Reference Architecture 
(GRA). 
 
Figure 81.   FORCEnet Strategic/Operational/Tactical Hierarchy (Joint Strike 
Example)156. 
 
These mappings of services to FORCEnet Strategic/Operational/Tactical 
Hierarchy is captured within TVDB as shown in Figure 82.  Currently, TVDB only maps 
the first two tiers of the Fn Hierarchy, but as the analysis matures and the CSFL becomes 
more widely used and matures, TVDB will undoubtedly mature with it. 
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Figure 82.   Service Mapping to FORCEnet Hierarchy157. 
 
Figure 83 depicts the current mappings (about 1/3 of service functions mapped so 
far) of service functions to FORCEnet Hierarchy.  The new CSFL will greatly expand 
this mapping and lend a much greater level of fidelity and granularity as future FnEPs 
analysis continues.  As can be seen in Figure 83, a certain system function may have 
many information elements and each information element may be used in any number of 
warfighting activities as defined by the FORCEnet Hierarchy. 
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Figure 83.   Current Service Mappings to FORCEnet Hierarchy158. 
 
For each legacy producer and subscriber of a given service, Figure 84 shows how 
that information is passed in the “As-Is” architecture (data format, standard).  It is these 
duplicative data formats that may be retired as FORCEnet becomes a reality and 
information is produced and subscribed to using a common DoD framework. 
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Figure 84.   Data Format Details159. 
 
The next section of this analysis will examine how composeable mission services 
are defined and used within TVDB.  Figure 85 shows the composeable mission services 
analysis part of TVDB. 
                                                 
159 Ibid., Slide 34. 
160 
 
Figure 85.   Composable Mission Services160. 
 
Figure 86 shows the composeable mission capability screen.  The user can select a 
set of TACSIT activities and move them to the ‘activities selected’ window.  By selecting 
TACSIT activities the services which may need to be subscribed to (left) and the services 
which may need to be produced (right) are automatically populated based on previous 
distributed services definitions entered into TVDB.  This screen also shows on the left 
which TACSIT activities and which systems produce the services needing to be 
subscribed to.  On the right of the screen, the services produced are linked to the 
supported TACSIT activities and systems.  This analysis is important because the way the 
system function matrix has now been defined within TVDB will show which distributed 
services are needed for certain TACSIT activities and which services need to be produced 
to support other TACSIT activities. 
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Figure 86.   Composable Mission Capability161. 
 
The following sequence of screen shots shows how TVDB can be used to provide 
FnEP assessments.  The screen shot, Figure 87, shows TVDB being used to begin 
defining a working, warfighting scenario using defined TACSITs within TVDB. 
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Figure 87.   Technical View Database – Working Scenario Builder162. 
 
When using the Technical View Database to initially define a working, 
warfighting scenario much like the ones outlined in the beginning of this chapter and 
which forms the basis for all this analysis, the working scena rio builder is invoked, which 
looks like Figure 88.  This TVDB screen shows how to create a new or edit an existing 
scenario or add one or more TACSITs to the scenario.  In this example, the SSG Scenario 
1, has one Strike and TAMD TACSIT as part of the scenario which is in keeping with the 
original scenarios defined at the beginning of this chapter.  By creating a new scenario or 
editing an existing scenario, those TACSITs can be added to or removed from the 
scenario by using the input boxes circled in green.  There are currently 41 Strike, 50 
TAMD and 1 STOM TACSITs defined within TVDB.   
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Figure 88.   Activity Timing, Choosing TACSITS to Use.163. 
 
As shown in Figure 88, this same TVDB screen, once TACSIT 1 and TACSIT 2 
are selected from the drop-down list, displays the required activity sequences.  These two 
input fields allow the analyst to create forward and backward dependencies between 
activities within the two TACSITs.  This ‘tieing’ of activities (shown in Figure 89) 
between TACSITS creates additional, cross-mission interoperability requirements.  There 
is also a method in the latest release of TVDB (7.7) to use the DSM tool to show the 
defined scenario cross-tabular matrix and automatically partition the activities within a 
cross-tabular matrix generated by DSM. 
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Figure 89.   Activity Timing, Choosing Dependencies164. 
 
Defining forward and backward activity dependencies between the two TACSITs 
is shown in Figure 90.  Only one-to-one dependencies are currently allowed to be defined 
between the two TACSITs.  In this example, a forward dependency from the Strike 
activity: Plan Force Disposition to the TAMD activity: Distribute/Disseminate Orders is 
shown.  With each dependency defined, a new line in the SV-6 definition shows the 
defined forward and backward dependencies under the ‘All Scenario Dependencies’ input 
box that is circled in green. 
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Figure 90.   Activity Timing, Defining Dependencies165. 
 
Likewise, Figure 91 defines a backward dependency from the TAMD Activity: 
Prepare Active Operations Plan in TACSIT 2 to the Strike Activity:  DDD Target in 
TACSIT 1.  The new dependency is seen added to the ‘All Scenario Dependencies’ input 
box that keeps track of source and destination activity, information element, etc.   
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Figure 91.   Activity Timing, Defining Dependencies166. 
 
Once the warfighting scenario has been fully defined with the appropriate 
TACSITs and all interdependencies between the two TACSITs identified, the Design 
Structure Matrix (DSM) tool becomes the method to analyze the scenario.  Figure 92 
shows the output of the DSM tool for this particular scenario.  As defined previously, 
DSM is a tool to analyze activity interdependencies.  The square matrix has the same 
identical list of all TACSIT activities along the vertical axis as well as the horizontal axis, 
except only the vertical axis activities are labeled because both axis are identical.  The 
blocked off cells in a 45-degree angle going down the matrix is where each TACSIT 
activity refers to itself and is of no consequence.  The cells marked with an ‘X’ are those 
interdependencies which have been identified either within each TACSIT itself or 
between TACSITs.  In Figure 92, the DSM output shows, in the upper left quadrant, the 
dependencies in the Strike TACSIT, while the bottom right quadrant shows the 
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dependencies in the TAMD TACSIT.  The off-diagonals (green-circles) store the 
dependencies between the two TACSITs which were shown in Figure 91.  In general, the 
TACSIT activities are dependent upon getting information from intersecting activities in 
the horizontal direction and provides information to the intersecting activities in the 
vertical direction of the matrix.  In Figure 47, the Strike TACSIT activity Strike 
Commander Guidance is dependant on getting information from no other activity, but 
provides information to the Joint Target List. 
 
 
Figure 92.   DSM Output 167. 
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Figure 93.   TVDB Screen Shot168. 
 
With a goal to develop an initial capability in this spiral approach method for a 
candidate Strike Engagement Pack this method provides an initial look at Naval 
components with the objective of Strike.  Tactical Situations (TACSITs) are embedded in 
the TVDB tool enabling analysts to first choose a mission area (item 1) Strike, TAMD or 
both as shown here in Figure 93, then a threat (item 2) is selected, for example mobile 
launched ballistic missiles and Silkworm cruise missiles, then a potential pack based on a 
choice of legacy platforms (item 3) is composed of associated sensors, weapons and 
command and control systems.   
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This methodology generated system inter-relationships with respect to combat 
reach capabilities and perhaps more importantly, enabled us to evaluate activity 
sequences, required system interactions, potential integration shortfalls, and the 
adaptability of packs across mission areas.  Initially, there were over 85,000 potential 
integration inter-relationships tied to the five CRCs (Figure 94)169. 
 
 
Figure 94.   Analysis of Integration Inter-Relationships170. 
 
Figure 95 shows a GEMINII screen where integration of inter-relationships tries 
to link together threats and sensors while also linking weapons to threats via C2 nodes 
such that options in scenario circumstances (weather, threat characteristics, etc.) can be 
made.  This figure is an attempt to discuss the notion of distributed services and how they 
might work based on the defined SV-6 lines in TVDB.  Figure 95 is an attempt to show 
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current platforms which would be involved in the TAMD “pack” scenario using 15 
platforms and their associated systems.  The systems were categorized or aligned with an 
early version of the CRCs to understand their interoperability requirements.  These threat, 
sensor, C2, weapon and threat categories were to show which platforms and systems 
could, today, perform end to end engagement capabilities to some degree.  As seen in the 
Aegis CG/DDG (BL 5.4 & 7.2) and Patriot systems, they are two systems that can 
perform end to end engagement functionality to some degree.   
 
 
Figure 95.   GEMINII Integration of Inter-Relationships171. 
 
One product of the static architecture assessment phase where architecture system 
functions to information exchange requirements was examined for the Strike and TAMD 
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mission areas is seen in Figure 96.  Figure 96 shows how system functions or services 
already defined either in the Common System Function List (CSFL) or one of the other 
system function lists being used in the Navy today, maps into the FnEPs CRCs. 
 
 
Figure 96.   Discover FnEP Services:  Service to Function Mapping172. 
 
Figure 96 is the original system function (SF)/information exchange (IE) pairing 
that SPAWAR System Center Charleston (SSC-C) mapped to the five CRCs, including a 
sixth one SSC-C called Mission Planning (MP).  This first mapping of SF/IE pairs from 
the TAMD As-Is architecture into the CRC definitions was the initial way to try and 
better understand the CRCs.  Doing a bottom-up analysis of the SF/IE pair from the As-Is 
architecture and trying to apply it to FnEPs concept yielded initial insights.  However, an 
additional process of building upon the FORCEnet principles to help define the CRCs 
was also a useful endeavor.  Using these two approaches, a procedural mapping of system 
functionalities can begin to not only help understand the CRCs but also help to 
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understand how the TACSITs and Programs of Record (POR) fit into FnEPs.  The 
Common System Function List (CSFL) mapping into the CRCs which has been now 
done builds on this first start.  [It should be included here, spreadsheet and further 
analysis].  The more detailed descriptions of the five CRCs, their definitions, operational 
characteristics, requirements and some first order metrics are also found in this thesis, 
which helps to better map the SF/IE pairings to the CRCs.  These mapping is important 
because it helps to define interfaces between system functions and the data that must pass 
between the activities.  Once the data is known and POR systems are tied to the specific 
system functions they provide, interfaces between systems can be characterized as well as 
gaps and duplicative system functionality between systems. 
 
 
Figure 97.   Portfolio Development & Metcalf’s Law173. 
 
These system function/information exchange pairs are predicated on knowing 
who the producers and consumers of the information are, thus helping to define the 
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information which must flow between them.  Figure 97 shows why the thrust to 
understand the producers of information and the consumers of information is important.  
If the consumers of the information feel it’s valuable, than the producers become more 
important.  The corollary is that consumers of information in a distributed services 
environment will lead to force composeability where the ABMAs function produces the 
FnEPs’ adaptability and flexibility.  Both Figures 98 and 99 were derived from the Phase 
B assessment.  The Phase B assessments were the end-to-end assessments performed by 
the virtual SYSCOM – independent of the program managers’ Phase A assessments. 
 
 
Figure 98.   Rank Functions by Service:  Producer174. 
 
In trying to understand the dynamics of consumers and producers of information 
and the information’s relative worth in an “FnEPs environment,” Figure 98 shows who 
and what produces information in this first assessment.  This data came from the first 
phase (phase A) SPAWAR Program Managers’ (PMs’) ranking of their individual 
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systems’ POM-06 assessments conducted in June/July 2002 timeframe.  SSC-C simply 
re-analyzed the data given to them with the specific criteria and FnEPs focus as listed in 
the spreadsheet.  The producer of the information is a specific system, associated with a 
particular system function/information exchange pair.  Each individual row are SV-6 
interface lines, which shows a producer/service pairing, as generated from the individual 
TACSIT interoperability requirements.  The “As-Is Validation” column (missing is an 
identical column, “To-Be Validation”) is an acknowledgement that in the current “As-Is” 
architecture there currently is a validated interface between the producer and system 
function/information exchange pair.  The SV-6 lines column is the number of SV-6 
interfaces this producer is supporting.  This number is a simple measure of the 
information’s value and interface complexity.  Both interface inputs and outputs are 
counted in this column.  The Average Cost column is a place for sparsely received 
costing data is to be plugged in.  In Figure 98, there just happened to be no costing 
figures provided.  The most important aspect about Figure 98, is that this lays the 
foundation for further analysis by being the first half (producers) of the definition for the 
interaction matrix used by the DSM tool to further analyze system interactions.  This 
information will be used in DSM as the columns (producers) in the DSM interaction 
matrix.  The second half of the analysis is an understanding of system 
function/information exchange pairs from the consumer of information’s perspective.  
Figure 99 shows a ranked order function list by service to consumer. 
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Figure 99.   Rank Functions by Service:  Consumer175. 
 
This is the same POM-06 system assessment data provided to SSC-C by the 
individual systems’ program managers as Figure 98, simply from a consumer’s 
perspective.  Figure 99 shows a few more columns, e.g., Average Performance, Average 
Schedule, Average Interoperability, Average Redundancy, populated with the actual 
ranking numbers provided by the SPAWAR Program Managers’ office on their 
individual systems.  Again, this POM-06 assessment data was gathered during the  
June/July 2002 timeframe and was done as “Phase A” of system assessments.  Because 
the programs were being assessed by their own program offices, the rankings were 
somewhat suspect.  With a somewhat broad definition of what the 1-4 rankings on 
individual system aspects were, it was determined to conduct a “Phase B” system 
assessment conducted using more independent and deterministic criteria to remove as 
much bias as possible.  However, the bottom line of Figure 99 is that it depicts who and 
                                                 
175 Ibid., Slide 16. 
176 
what systems consume what information.  More importantly, this information provides 
the second half of the DSM interaction matrix data (rows) of consumer interactions 
allowing for further analytical work to be done. 
Figure 100, is an attempt to take the five CRCs and one additional supporting 
distributed service (Mission Planning) and understand how they might be assembled from 
the system function/information exchange pairs.  These services are depicted as a 
sequence of system functions that support or help to define the  capabilities needed within 
each of the six FnEP services.  These system functions are rank ordered (from more to 
less) by the number of SV-6 lines that support each CRC.  This depiction of fishboned 
system function/information exchange pairs imply they drive and produce the CRC 
capabilities based on what system function/information exchange pairs are supporting a 
particular CRC or distributed service.  This may not be entirely accurate or provide the 
entire picture.  The other part of this analysis may be the opposite, where each CRC or 
distributed service drives and defines the requirements for what should be in each system 
function/information exchange pair.  This way the CRC is not the product of existing 
individual system function/information exchange pairs functionality, but the CRC 
functionality drives the requirements for what each system function/information 
exchange pair does.  Two different ways of looking at CRC functionality with, quite 
possibly, two totally different outcomes.  
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Figure 100.   FnEPs Services176. 
 
As stated in Chapter I, Methodology, in order to build a FORCEnet Portfolio of 
services, there first must be a discovery phase of the “As- is” architecture.  These service 
function to information exchange relationships have to be understood within a mission 
area and across multiple mission areas.  In order to maximize the effectiveness of a 
“pack,” there must be maximum information exchanges across multiple mission areas 
and threat responses.  There has to also be an optimized trade-off between stove-piped, 
legacy systems and the capabilities and vulnerabilities distributed services brings.  Once 
these tradeoffs are understood, there must be joint funding aligned with the desired 
system function to information exchange pair as well as programmed in redundancy, 
security and support. 
A “pack” also has to have characteristics of adaptability and composeability.  
From an operational aspect, there has to be an adaptability assessment of FORCEnet 
                                                 
176 Ibid., Slide 20. 
178 
factors and their ability to be relocatable services via some dynamic means.  From a 
service composeability perspective, the “pack” must have built in redundancy and 
reconfigurability ‘on-the-fly’ as well.  A first step in doing this next part of the analysis is 
to analyze the Strike and TAMD TACSITs for this potential integration flexibility.  
Figure 101 is a static assessment of the Strike and TAMD TACSIT scenario where 
potential integration points may be discovered. 
 
 
Figure 101.   Static Assessment – SSG Scenario (To-Be Phase 1)177. 
 
Figure 101 shows the system integration requirements, otherwise known as SV-6 
lines.  Each SV-6 line, being a unidirectional interface requirement, defines information 
that must be produced by someone, something or some system and be given to a 
destination entity, activity or function.  This interaction matrix is then represented in a 
DSM interaction matrix of consumers, or systems receiving information populated in the 
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DSM as rows and systems provided information are populated in the DSM matrix as 
columns.  The row in Figure 101 highlighting the potential integration requirements for 
the JLENS and E-2C sensors is a way of showing the traceability between the SV-6 lines 
defined from the Strike and TAMD TACSITs and the DSM interaction matrix tool 
results.  Figure 102 shows a representative output from the DSM tool. 
 
 
Figure 102.   Example Partitions 178. 
 
This square matrix of system interactions shows example partitions of those 
interactions between consumers and producers of information.  In performing a DSM 
analysis, there are several steps that have to take place in order to arrive at and 
understand this interaction information179.  The first step is the collaboration of entities 
(activities/platforms/systems/system functions) into the interaction matrix.  TVDB helps 
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to define these sets of interactions, either from an “As-Is” architecture or from a “To-Be” 
architecture perspective.  The second step is to perform sequencing of those entities based 
on spatial, energy, information, material or human factors180 perspectives.  The third step 
is to use DSM to discover sets of interactions.  These sets of interactions are first done by 
‘banding’ interactions.  Banding of interactions simply finds choke points in the 
interactions by looking at activities which can occur in parallel or those which must occur 
concurrently (because entities are waiting for information from another provider).  In 
banding, activities that can occur in parallel will show up in multiple bands, while 
activities which must occur concurrently will show up as only one band with one way 
through the band of interactions.  The second, and higher level of analysis within DSM is 
to look at interaction ‘partitioning’, Figure 102 being an example of this.  DSM partitions 
and reorders the sequence of entity interactions in order to minimize feedback loops.  
Here, feedback refers to an entity’s starting a task and then having to wait for information 
from some other producer before being able to finish the original task.  The attempt to 
minimize entity feedback helps to make the processes and tasks more efficient.  The third 
and last level of analysis within DSM is to look at ‘clustering’.  DSM’s clusters look for 
subsets of DSM elements and arrange them such that the clusters are mutually exclusive, 
or unique, in their tasks or that those DSM elements are minimally interacting.  This 
allows DSM entities to be unique providers and consumers of information while 
minimizing feedback delays and being optimally sequenced in relation to other tasks 
being performed.  Figure 103 is the first step in analyzing current (“As-Is”), platform-
centric architectures within the context of FnEPs. 
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Figure 103.   ‘As- is’ Platform Centric Architecture181. 
 
By overlaying the five CRCs on top of the way the TAMD mission is currently 
conducted, the architecture was modeled within DSMsim182 the TAMD analysis results 
of the “As-Is” architecture had leakers get through in 51 of 100 runs.  The engagement 
envelope for the Standard Surface Missile (SSM) was 25 Nautical Miles from shore and 
the average mission execution time was 229 seconds.  The time to engage was based on 
individual platform capability (sensor to shooter).  The knowledge from sensor fusion 
was limited to that provided by the Joint Data Networks (C2 links) and used the simulated 
LHD and F/A-18 as multi-mission platforms. 
The DSM methodology yielded these five partitions shown in Figure 102 above, 
is from this “As-Is” TAMD, platform-centric TACSIT architecture.  Partition one is the 
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JSTARS sensor talking to the JSTARS C2 element.  Partition two is the SOF force talking 
to SOF command center on the LHD.  Partition three is the P-3 fire control talking to the 
two P-3 weapons (AAMRAM missiles).  Partition four is the C2 Grid because most of the 
interactions in this grid are of the C2 type.  Partition five is the IFC Grid and is interesting 
to show how some typical or not-so-typical interactions here are working.  The purple 
horizontal and vertical ovals (top and leftmost ovals) encircle 1s denoting the E-2C fire 
control talking to the CG/DDG fire control and the ships’ four Standard Missiles (SM-2).  
Essentially the E-2C is the off board sensor controlling the CG/DDG’s missiles through 
it’s on board fire control system.  The next inmost sets of ovals (green) show how the 
JLENS fire control is talking to the Patriot fire control and the four PAC-3 missiles.  
Again, this is showing how an off board sensor might control a set of weapons.  The next 
set of small ovals show how a set of more typical interactions would be shown, here the 
CG/DDG ships’ fire control system is talking to the onboard Standard Missiles (SM-2). 
Finally, the bottom and rightmost set of ovals show how the Patriot fire control system is 
talking to the PAC-3 missiles, a more typical set of interactions.  Figure 104 shows the 
DSM matrix of discovered partitions as the current, “As-Is” TAMD TACSIT architecture 
is configured and its stove-piped patterns. 
 
Figure 104.   Integration Pattern Emergence183. 
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DSM helps to visualize how stove-piped and concurrent the system interactions 
are, but also helps to visualize the emergence of sensor, C2 and weapons grid in this 
figure.  The stove-piped partitions of SOF Team (observing and reporting a missile 
threat), Intel (with the Intel process of Taking, Collection, Processing, Exploitation and 
Dissemination the missile threat), Patriot (being initially tasked with tracking), C2 (for 
missile threat coordination), and finally CG/DDG engagement and destruction of the 
missile threat are sequenced in order of performance.  This means in a typical TAMD 
scenario, the SOF team first views/designates the target, the intelligence processes work 
to verify it, Patriot batteries are ready to be engaged and then the C2 processes take over 
for coordination.  This big C2 cluster of interactions in the middle of the engagement 
process slows everything down requesting information from other systems and having to 
wait (because of feedback time) for the information requested before using the CG/DDG 
to engage and destroy the threat.  The factors of Patriot versus CG/DDG also shows the 
obvious effect engagement zones, their boundaries and implications have on who takes 
the shot and how much / how big the C2 coordination partition is.  Obviously this has a 
deleterious effect on how efficiently the end-to-end engagement chain process works. 
The next step was to change the TAMD Architecture such that there was just the 
IFC CRC added.  This added set of interactions between fire control systems and C2 




Figure 105.   Architecture (‘To-Be’ (Phase 1))184. 
 
TAMD Architecture analysis done in DSMsim, the results of the (“To-Be” phase 
1) scenario, only 1 of 100 runs showed leakers getting through the defensive platforms.  
The engagement envelope for the Standard Surface Missile (SSM) was increased slightly 
to 25++ Nautical Miles from shore, based on an F/A-18 AIM-120 engagement with an 
average mission execution time of 266 seconds (5.7% increase).  The time to engage was 
based on individual platform capability (fire control to shooter) with improved 
knowledge from sensor fusion due to an additional sensor net, sensor-fused targeting, and 
common pictures to augment existing joint data networks (C2 links).  The multi-mission 
platforms used in DSMsim were an LHD, F/A-18, P-3 and Predator.  Figure 106 shows 
the new DSM partitioning as a result of the slightly improved TAMD Architecture. 
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Figure 106.   Discovered Partitions (“To-Be” Phase 1)185. 
 
Figure 106 is the potential partition that was discovered with slightly improved 
integration constraints added (integration between fire control systems and C2 systems).  
These two partitions were discovered using DSM by clustering everything but the IFC.  
The feedback integration requirements were deleted or minimized in the interaction 
matrix, thereby minimizing the end-to-end engagement time.  DSM reacted to this 
removal of feedback by creating this potential, initial FnEP and leaving the P-3 partition 
out, as requested.  This is the start of an adaptation phase where everyone can do 
something and everyone is wired (connected) to interact, even if there is no practical 
reason for them to do so.  This is perhaps the most, far right potential network-centric 
warfare will be able to provide.  Here, the sequence dictates who needs to talk to whom.  
The P-3 with an AIM-120 missile186 was specifically looked at as a requirement of SSG 
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XXII’s analysis to understand the impacts of the P-3 simply acting as a weapon delivery 
vehicle for some other off-board weapon sensor/control mechanism.  The small, P-3 
partition, symbolizes the P-3 simply talking to itself and not being integrated because the 
P-3 wasn’t yet given the IFC, CCID, CT, or CCID CRC capabilities.  The P-3 was only 
given an ABMAs capability, but this was done to show a P-3 could be just a weapons 
delivery vehicle that once a weapon was launched, the AIM-120 could be controlled from 
some other off-board, non-organic sensor or platform. 
Figure 107 shows the static assessment of the SSG Scenario of the slightly 
improved TAMD Architecture (“To-Be” Phase 1) which sought to find out what the most 
extreme solution to a shortened engagement chain would be when all constraints were 




Figure 107.   Static Assessment – SSG Scenario (“To-Be” Phase 1)187. 
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With all interoperability constraints removed, several interesting observations can 
be made.  The DSM clustering algorithms came up with six clusters, identified in the blue 
sidebar of Figure 107.  Starting from the top left hand corner, the clusters start out with 
the largest one first, i.e., the cluster that takes the most time in the engagement chain, and 
orders the clusters according to amounts of interactions and time.  The big clusters have 
more interactions and take longer time to complete.  From there, sequentially smaller, 
faster, more independent clusters of activities show up.  Therefore, the absolutely shortest 
time an engagement can take is the physical fly-out of the weapon, which is why in 
Figure 107, the largest and first cluster is made up of the E2-C and CG/DDG fire control 
systems launching the SM-2 missiles.  This shows that the shortest engagement chain 
process in this IDEALIZED (shortest engagement), once a target is identified, is to 
launch the weapons (here SM-2s off a CG/DDG) and then control them by other assets 
once they are in flight.  With the other clusters following immediately thereafter, target 
identification, sensor refinement/CCID and finally in-flight target updates would happen 
as the weapon is in its fly-out phase to the target.  Obviously, this is in a very idealized 
world where CCID target verification would take place before weapons are released, this 
illustration is simply a way of validating the DSM results make analytical sense.  With 
runs done in DSMsim using this idealized, constraint-free environment, engagement 
chain completion times were down around 25-90 seconds, the time needed for the 
Standard Surface Missile to fly out to its maximum kinematic range.  
188 
 
Figure 108.   Integration Pattern Emergence188. 
 
Figure 108 is a quick comparison of how the initial, “As-Is” TAMD TACSIT 
produced stove-piped patterns and visually depicts an architecture with a low degree of 
integration.  The TAMD mission is highly dependent on a concurrent flow of information 
and any in the critical path failing results in the maximum risk to successful mission 
completion.  The To-Be improved TAMD TACSIT architecture has somewhat improved 
integration which results in improved adaptability and a lower risk that any one system 
failure will have a catastrophic impact on the mission success. 
The next step in the TAMD analysis, the “pack” has the sensor net (area in 
magenta), added to it the IFC to E2-C and JLENS as depicted in Figure 109. 
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Figure 109.   Architecture (“To-Be” Phase 2)189. 
 
The initial DSMsim analysis results of this “To-Be” phase 2 architecture had 0 of 
100 runs showing leakers through the defense with an engagement envelope for Standard 
Surface Missile (SSM) expanded to 50 Nautical Miles from shore with the average 
mission execution time being 227 seconds.  The time to engage was based on a 
composition of netted sensor, C2, Fire Control and weapons.  Knowledge from the sensor 
fusion improved due to the addition of the sensor net, SFT and CP to existing joint data 
networks (C2 links).  The multi-mission platforms included were LHD, E2-C, JLENS, 
F/A-18, P-3 and Predator. 
The DSM modeling of this “To-Be” phase 2 TAMD Architecture was such that 
the large, potential FnEP partition was further broken down into these three main 
partitions; sensor, C2 and weapons grid patterns.  The P-3 interaction partition is still 
shown as not being integrated on the lower right hand corner because it still had not 
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received the other CRCs.  The P-3 was only given the ABMAs functionality, so it did not 
have the capability to integrate and is acting as a weapons delivery vehicle only.  This 
“To-Be” TAMD architecture still has a number of unnecessary feedback interfaces in it, 




Figure 110.   Discovered Partitions (To-Be Phase 2)190. 
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Figure 111.   Alternative Engagement Pack (“To-Be” Phase 2)191. 
 
As shown in Figure 111, by eliminating non-possible interactions, (and strictly 
focusing on the as- implemented TAMD TACSIT) a few patterns emerge.  The SOF and 
P-3 interaction matrices are still outliers, however the C2 grid is smaller.  The weapons 
grid is also smaller, and it can be seen from the weapons grid, the horizontal and vertical 
line of five 1s shows how the E-2C fire control is talking to the Patriot fire control and 
the four PAC-3 missiles.  Essentially, the Patriot has forward passed the control of its 
four PAC-3 missiles to the E-2C platform, which has a much wider field of view and can 
perhaps pass control off of the missiles to someone else on the ground, but most 
importantly, using the PAC-3 missiles to their full kinematic fly-out range.  The weapons 
grid also shows how, with IFC, the JLENS fire control system is talking to the CG/DDG 
fire control and four SM-2 missiles.  Here again, this is the interaction depicting the four 
Standard Missiles’ (SM-2s) control being forward passed to a JLENS fire control system. 
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Figure 112.   Integration Pattern Emergence192. 
 
Figure 112 is simply a summary of the phase 2, “To-Be” TAMD architecture 
analysis done which showed how additional integration patterns began to emerge as more 
FORCEnet distributed services were added.  Closer integration allowed for more ways in 
which the components could interact.  The initial clusters of interactions broke 
themselves out into three grids; the sensor, C2 and weapon grids.  By improving the 
integration and removing unneeded or unnecessary integration and feedback interactions, 
the 3 previous grids became smaller and more well-defined.  The Patriot forward pass to 
E-2C and SM-2 forward pass to JLENS become better defined.  This particular technical 
option was modeled in JWARS and SAIC’s JUDY system that resulted in improved 
coverage, lethality, survivability and timeliness in executing the TAMD mission. 
                                                 




Figure 113.   Integration Pattern Emergence Summary193. 
 
Figure 113 is simply a summary of the 4-phased process and analytical results 
discovered in going from the “As-Is” phase 1 modeling to the “To-Be” phase 2 modeling. 
The next step in the GEMINII Assessment Process is to validate the analytical 
results described above in order to better understand the warfighter impact from 
additional perspectives.  JWARS was used to conduct this analytical modeling and 
validation.  JWARS is a campaign modeling and analysis tool which models the 
warfighting impacts through a library of standard, modeled architectural elements which 
will also take a scenario as an input (in this case, Strike – TAMD multi-mission scenario 
defined by SSG XXII) to simulate the new analytical results.  In order to better 
understand the warfighting impacts of these “packs,” JWARS will model the 
effectiveness of the interoperability assessments done thus far through DSM and TVDB.  
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The DSM inputs were taken and put into a JWARS model and run through a simulated 
120-day campaign to see if the same kind of performance increases were seen in the 
JWARS model as were seen by DSMsim.  The “As-Is” Scenario which was translated 
into JWARS is seen in Figure 114. 
 
 
Figure 114.   “As- is” Strike-TAMD Multi-Mission Scenario Translated into JWARS 194. 
 
Some illustrative results were obtained by conducting this JWARS analysis:  40% 
better utilization of blue assets in ASW and offensive counter air operations, 40% 
improvement in TAMD kills against cruise missile raids, 50% reduction in number of 
leakers against massive raids of ballistic missiles, 100% increase in engagement envelope 
as measured by engagement range and up to ten-fold increase in overland protected 
footprint highlighting Sea Shield’s potential contribution to littoral TAMD. 
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In some of the initial sensitivity analysis findings, the engagement envelope 
expansion and the ability to engage the threat was dependant on ALL five combat reach 
functions working together and the managed pairing of sensor, weapon and threat was 
imperative.  C2 decision time was dependant on CT, CCID and CP were the significant 
contributors towards required C2 decision time.  This requirement has impacts on systems 
and training.  The engagement time was dependent of CT, CCID and CP were the 
significant contributors towards required engagement time (ability to fire sooner).  
Defense in depth was dependent on multiplicity of CT, CCID, CP, ABMAs and IFC 
which would allow defense in depth.  The addition of these combat reach functions 
provided more options to engage. 
Some observations about the results were the capability of the FnEP “pack” 
increases as combat reach functions are enabled.  A number of integration requirements 
increases as FORCEnet combat reach functions are enabled.  The number of logical 
interfaces explodes meaning there are now redundant ways to accomplish the mission 
which gives it the ability to adapt.  FORCEnet introduces increased complexity which 
requires disciplined engineering and tools to manage this complexity.  The integration 
patterns discovered helps to define capability and allow management of the ensuing 
complexity. 
The next part of the GEMINII analysis methodology is to analyze just how these 
To-Be architectures can be implemented using a spiral developmental strategy and 
starting with the legacy systems the Navy has today.  The first part in doing this analysis 
is to further study the area of distributed services in an effort to make the interactions 
modeled above possible.  In analyzing this notion of distributed services, it is necessary 
to go back to the baseline Strike and TAMD TACSITs.  Figure 115 describes the process 
for how distributed services were put together and analyzed with the goal to setup the 
inputs for an optimization tool like MATLAB to come up with an optimal way to put the 
needed distributed services together. 
196 
 
Figure 115.   Services Portfolio Discovery (Notional Values).195 
 
The first step was to rank the importance of each 41 TACSIT use-case.  This 
relative weighting of each TACSIT use-case was done to set the objective function which 
will be optimized later.  The second step is to set the constraints of the objective function.  
Here, the constraints are done relative to the cost to implement a specific service with 
notional costs used as inputs.  The third step was to set the target threshold for how many 
TACSIT use-cases the distributed services had to support end-to-end.  In Figure 115, the 
threshold was set at 50%.  Therefore, the optimized solution of distributed services had to 
cover all end-to-end implementation requirements for at least half (50%) of all TACSIT 
use-cases.  The optimization model put together 35 different bundles of distributed 
services to support these Strike TACSIT use-cases.  The first bundle of distributed 
services which met the 50% coverage of all TACSIT use-cases was bundle 19.  The last 
step was to understand what the total cost of bundle 19 would be to buy.  For bundle 19, 
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the total notional cost was $4.9M and included the recommended list seen in Figure 115 
of those services to buy which would provide end-to-end coverage of at least 50% of all 
41 Strike TACSIT use-cases.  Figure 116 is an illustrative example of how the different 
bundles of distributed services were put together and the resulting end-to-end coverage of 
the Strike TACSIT use-cases. 
 
 
Figure 116.   Defining a FORCEnet Spiral Engagement Pack:  Illustrative Example 196. 
 
Figure 116 is a graph of TACSIT use-case (thread) coverage for a Strike “Pack” 
along the vertical axis with the 35 bundles of different services running along the bottom, 
horizontal axis.  The objective was to run optimized bundles of distributed services such 
that greater than (>) 50% of the Strike TACSIT use-cases were covered.  As can be seen 
in Figure 60, the first bundle implemented 14 distributed services to get an ETE coverage 
on 3 Strike TACSIT use-cases.  The first bundle which had greater than 50% of ETE use-
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case coverage was with 19 distributed services and got ETE coverage on 26 Strike 
TACSIT use-cases.  Figure 117 shows the extent to how all 41 TACSIT use-cases were 
covered by bundle 19. 
 
 
Figure 117.   % End to End Coverage by TACSIT for Target Bundle 197. 
 
With bundle 19 being the target bundle, this graph shows the actual % of end-to-
end coverage each TACSIT use-case received.  Because the threshold was set to at least 
50% of all the TACSIT use-cases had to have end-to-end coverage (100%), there are 26 
use-cases that are covered 100%.  The other TACSIT use-cases were also covered by the 
distributed services in bundle 19, however their specific end-to-end coverage was not 
100%, but something less.  Figure 117 shows that even though these other TACSIT use-
cases were not covered 100%, they were generally well above 80% covered. 
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Once the bundle of FORCEnet distributed services were picked (bundle 19), it is 
now possible to understand more about bundle 19, like which systems would be required 
and what their role would be in providing or consuming those services.  Figure 118 
shows this detail. 
 
 
Figure 118.   Defining a Fn Spiral Engagement Pack Illustrative Example198. 
 
Figure 118 now drills down into more detail about bundle 19 and the distributed 
services that make it up.  Because of the system function/information exchange 
requirements defined in TVDB, it is possible to look at the individual 19 services within 
bundle 19 to understand more about the systems required to produce and consume those 
services.  Figure 118 shows for bundle 19, composed of 19 different distributed services, 
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there would be 106 producers and consumers of information, with the requisite systems 
listed.  Figure 119 shows which systems would make up the networking infrastructure 
needed to support bundle 19. 
 
 
Figure 119.   Spiral FORCEnet Development (Supporting Infrastructure)199. 
 
Figure 119 identifies 57 supporting network infrastructure systems would be 
required to implement all 19 FORCEnet distributed services within bundle 19.  In the 
spiral development method, these identified 57 supporting infrastructure systems defines 
the trade space of systems to refine, reengineer, migrate or cut to implement the 19 
services required within bundle 19. 
The next section of analysis conducted by SPAWAR System Center Charleston 
was done in order to understand  how best to conduct this joint, spiral development of the 
TAMD and Strike “Packs” taking into account other costing and investment options.  
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This section of the analysis is an attempt to show how, in conjunction with the 
engineering analysis, the business case analysis could be done to develop a “pack” with a 
sound business foundation.  With a foundation in optimal marketing200, Figure 120 
attempts to show one perspective of how investment analysis may be conducted. 
 
 
Figure 120.   Investment Analysis201. 
 
In Figure 120, the current allocation of budget dollars to individual programs is 
listed along the horizontal axis.  According to the current budgetary allocation, the rank 
order of budget percentage is; system 4, 1, 2, 3 and 5 which should all add up to 100% of 
the current budget.  However, the physical size of the system bubble is a notional way to 
indicate the system’s return on investment or % of total capability applied to a specific 
problem.  In this case, the current budget allocation is allocating a significant amount of 
money to system 2 and getting very little relative capability in return.  Conversely, 
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system 4 receives very little of the current budget, but its relative capability in return is 
very large.  The current allocation of the Navy’s budget could be synonymous to the 
POM-06 allocation of budget to systems.  The vertical axis is an ideal allocation of the 
(notionally, POM-06) budget which as been reordered based on capability return.  This 
reallocated budget is determined based on notional return on investment or % of total 
capability applied to a specific problem.  In an idealized budget allocation based on 
system bubble volumes, the rank order of systems now are; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 where the 
systems providing the most return on investment or % of capability provided, gets the 
largest budget allocation and the systems providing the smallest % of capability get the 
smallest amount of budget.  Essentially, the system bubble volume has become the pivot 
table by which the system budget allocation has been realigned to.  If one were to 
consider the five bubbles the five FnEP CRCs, then an analogy could be drawn between 
the systems’ budget allocation as it related to its individual contribution to solving the 
capability needed in the CRC for which is helps enable.  The perfect correlation between 
the two axis is a 45o line.  Programs above this correlation line merit an increased share 
of the budget, because they are better aligned with the ideal allocation to FnEPs given 
their current allocation of services to a portfolio. 
The next set of figures shows another way to look at investment options for 
realizing the FnEP development process.  Viability versus fit analysis has its roots in 
portfolio strategy and is about the selective allocation of limited resources202.  The best 
portfolios reduce risk by balancing investments with different characteristics, so the 
analogy to draw with FnEPs is the fact a “pack” has to be developed with a portfolio of 
systems all with different characteristics, inherent in them being things like cost and risk.  
Figures 121 and 122 are the POM-06 individual system assessment scoring criteria used 
to assess the systems. 
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Figure 121.   POM-06 Phase B System Interoperability Assessment Criteria 203. 
 
Figure 121 shows the criteria and criticality levels (1-4) for both system 
interoperability and redundancy assessments.  It also shows the criteria and criticality 
levels for individual system schedule and performance assessments. 
 
                                                 




Figure 122.   POM-06 Phase B System Interoperability Assessment Criteria 204. 
 
Figure 122 describes the ranking criteria used for the jointness assessment 
(interoperability and utilization).  Figure 123 shows the individual system viability versus 
fit calculations. 




Figure 123.   Viability versus Fit Calculations205. 
 
This spreadsheet shows how the ordinal viability and fit scores were arrived at.  
For each system, the assessment rankings were entered in and a weighted average of both 
viability components (light blue columns) and fit components (light orange columns) 
were calculated.  The weights give to the individual assessment rankings are shown in the 
2nd row across the top.  These numbers produced Figure 124. 




Figure 124.   Viability versus Fit (for All Systems, All Mission Areas)206. 
 
Based on the SPAWAR POM-06 Phase B individual system assessment metrics, 
Figure 124 is a graph, using HBR’s viability versus fit methodology, of system mission 
area fit on the left with system viability on the bottom.  Figure 124, broken up into 
quadrants, shows how each system fits within a viability matrix for all mission areas.  
Systems that are in the reprogram quadrant have a high mission area fit but are very low 
in viability.  Systems that are in the legacy quadrant are both low in fit and low in 
viability, making them likely candidates for disinvestment decisions.  Systems in the 
lower right quadrant, re-engineer, have higher viabilities and with some amount of re-
engineering effort can be brought up in their fitness.  These are candidates for modifying 
their system functionality.  Lastly, systems in the upper right quadrant, on target, are both 
very good mission fits and are highly viable and should continue development as 
planned.  The nominal value of 6 used to define the origin of the quad chart was either 
the mode or mean of all system assessment values given.  The strategy of when and how 
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to divest in systems who have become less viable and less fit as required by the FnEPs 
capabilities is based on the fact systems go through three phases of maturation during its 
life cycle 207.  First, a system goes through a launch phase, when a new system is being 
developed, providing new functionality and boosting the organization’s mission viability.  
Second, the growth phase is when a system is maturing, providing stable functional 
‘income’ for the organization and conducting a large share of the organization’s day to 
day operational business.  The third and last phase is when a system is mature and 
undergoes operational marginalization, becomes merged with or overcome by other 
systems in their launch phase or becomes too costly to manage and maintain as compared 
to their functional ‘return’.  The viability versus fit analysis attempts to quantify when 
systems have reached their divestiture point or help to quantify reasoning for 
reengineering a system to make it viable. 
 
 
Figure 125.   Viability versus Fit (for All Systems, All Mission Areas), Increase 
Viability208. 
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In first addressing a systems’ viability, Figure 125 shows how increasing a system 
from the ‘reprogram’ quadrant into the ‘on target’ quadrant will increase the systems’ 
viability.  Viability is generally thought to correspond to addressing programmatic issues 
or better/more efficiently implementing system requirements.  By increasing the viability, 
the system will be more joint, have an increased utility (be used in multiple missions or 




Figure 126.   Viability versus Fit (for All Systems, All Mission Areas), Increase Fit209. 
 
In addressing system fitness, Figure 126 shows that in order to move a system 
from the ‘re-engineer’ quadrant into the ‘on target quadrant’, the system fit in the 
TACSIT must be increased.  This is generally thought of to be the technical side of fixing 
a system.  The system may have to be reengineered to make it open architecture 
compliant or based on some commonly held standards by which a greater level of 
interoperability can be achieved.  Generally, this will have the effect of opening a system 
up to be supportive of distributed services and making its unique functionality available 
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to many more subscribers of information.  By increasing the system fit into the TACSIT, 
system interoperability will be increased, system measures of performance will increase 
and the number of FORCEnet services provided will increase.  Systems will also seek to 
remove function redundancies and increase their value to the TACSIT through increased 
function uniqueness, therefore providing a higher return on investment or increased % of 
capability provided to the TACSIT use-case. 
 
 
Figure 127.   Viability versus Fit (COP/CTP)210. 
 
In Figure 127, it depicts where certain common operational picture or common 
tactical picture systems fall on the viability versus fit graph.  It is interesting to note that 
the original assertion that the military does some planning and collaboration systems well 
seems to be supported here with empirical data but it also shows there are a vast majority 
of systems which are either low in fit and low in viability or low in viability.  There 
seems to be a much larger trend of COP/CTP systems to the left of the graph.  The 
numbers outlined in red are ordered pairs (of viability, fit) for each system listed. 
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As previously discussed, target bundle 19 was the bundle which had the 
maximum number of end-to-end threads for the minimum number of services.  Bundle 19 
included 19 distributed services and mapped to 152 systems (106 producers and 
consumers, with 57 infrastructure systems).  120 of the 152 systems have been identified 
as redundant to some degree using the FORCEnet Phase B assessment data.  By taking a 
different view of the POM-06 phase B system assessment data with target bundle 19, 
Figure 128 was produced to graphically visualize how one might bundle systems by 
engagement chain phase according to their functionality and redundancy. 
 
 
Figure 128.   Bundle Systems by Engagement Chain Phase and Redundancy211. 
 
Figure 128 are candidate systems for an initial Strike “Pack” developemental 
spiral, based on preliminary SYSCOM FORCEnet system assessment data.  The systems 
arranged in Figure 128 are color coded according to their overall viability versus fit 
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assessment and categorized according to where they fit into the engagement chain 
process.  The systems in the green band are essentially the systems on the FORCEnet 
vision systems list that should migrate to support “packs.”  The green-banded systems 
have minimal system functional redundancy and are high in both viability and fit 
assessments.  Again, the functional redundancy definition and assessment criteria are 
found in Figure 121.  The unique system functions contained within the green band are 
systems which have fulfilled valid warfighting requirements and continue to be value-
added to the engagement chain.  At the other end of the spectrum, the red band are the 
systems which have the highest system function redundancy and are low in both viability 
and fit assessments.  These systems should not migrate to support “packs” and would be 
ideal systems to cut and use the freed-up fiscal resources to address either re-engineering 
or re-programming efforts for the systems in the yellow and orange bands.  The systems 
within the yellow and orange bands are those that should be further investigated for 
migration into this particular “pack” development spiral. 
With the TAMD and Strike TACSIT use-case architectures and their attendant 
systems now analyzed according to both various technical and programmatic criteria, the 
part of the discussion will briefly focus on bringing it all together in a notional FnEPs 
migration approach.  Figure 129 is a visualization of this approach. 
212 
 
Figure 129.   FORCEnet Migration Illustrative Approach212. 
 
Starting with the TAMD and Strike TACSITs, the GEMINII methodology 
analyzed the interfaces between the various activities and created SV-6 lines in TVDB to 
keep track of system function/information exchange requirements.  As the architectures 
were changed to better implement the five CRCs in support of distributed services, 
optimized bundles of services were put together to cover the end-to-end TACSIT use-
cases.  With an understanding of the trade space for systems that would provide those 
distributed services, system assessments and viability versus fit criteria can be applied.  
By using the NTIRA current system costing data, platform system configurations, force 
planning tools as well as installation planning tools, a picture of how to not only design 
but also implement FnEPs becomes apparent.  Using the GEMINII methodology and 
toolset, clear, traceable and repeatable decisions can be arrived at for implementing a 
spiral FnEPs development method.  Currently, however, NTIRA and other GEMINII 
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tools, e.g., TVDB, are somewhat limited by the resident data being restricted primarily to 
systems under the cognizance of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.  
While the GEMINII methodology and toolset are an excellent approach to designing and 
implementing a “pack”, the full spectrum of system data must support not only 
predominately C4ISR systems, by systems under the cognizance of the Naval Air 
Systems Command, the Naval Sea Systems Command and other joint programs to fully 
realize the potential of a “pack.”  For instance, the specific NTIRA costing data must be 
expanded to include other programs besides those under the cognizance of SPAWAR.  
NTIRA needs to be expanded to be more like WINPAT, PBIS or RAD-S which prepares 
the President’s Budget and to capture all financial data of all systems similar to the 
costing data in those official PPBS systems.  Once a more complete picture is produced, 
NTIRA would be able to capture costing data across multiple system function domains to 
show implications of specific realigned architectures and analyze how system 
realignments will impact costs while helping to define and perform trade space analysis.  
For instance, NTIRA has the potential to be a financial tool which could be able to track 
systems financial histories throughout their life cycle so the joint services can acquire the 
needed systems in order to implement FnEPs.  GEMINII attempts to address how an 
FnEP can be analyzed, engineered and tested, however the programmatic and 
organizational challenges are just as significant.  Figure 130 is a reasonable visualization 
of how, programmatically, systems might be synchronized in order to build a “pack”. 
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Figure 130.   OPNAV Capability Evolution Description:  Program Alignment to Mission 
Capabilities213. 
 
This CAPT John Yurchak concept attempts to show how the system programs of 
record can be integrated into capabilities and specifically, could be used to synchronize 
systems into the five CRCs.  By starting with individual systems and migrating/aligning 
their functionalities along a distributed services paradigm but keeping focused on a 
physical platform (because the elements making up the various distributed services must 
be resident somewhere) it would be possible to track how an individual program is 
contributing to the five CRCs needed for FnEPs.  With a system becoming more and 
more FnEPs-enabled as it’s development, migration or re-engineering took place 
throughout various Fiscal Years, the system could turn from red to yellow to green, 
becoming fully integrated into a FnEPs CRC capability objective.  The dependencies of 
system migration, realignment or re-engineering are notionally shown and once the end-
to-end integration requirements are completed, CRCs are developed.  This new program 
                                                 
213 Cambell, FnEPs Assessment Overview Brief, Slide 30. 
215 
planning exhibit called the Capability Evolution Description or process to align programs 
to mission capabilities being proposed by the OPNAV N81 IWARS office could be 
expanded upon to help realize FnEPs in the near term. 
D. ANALYSIS ROAD AHEAD 
As discussed in the prior sections, this thesis focused the contextual aspects of 
FnEPs and high- level, first order assessments.  Future assessment efforts will require 
more detailed design and implementation requirements analysis.  In order to continue to 
refine the FnEPs concept, requirements and analysis will need to expand into greater 
detail of information exchanges, computational elements (system functions), and Intra- 
and Inter-nodal networking considerations.  As an example, we (to include SSC-C) 
experimented with such an assessment utilizing the Navy Integrated Fire Control – 
Counter Air (NIFC-CA) concept assessed an example of technology/processes which 
support the IFC CRC. 
From a GEMINII perspective, we developed the Use-Case based on the Engage 
on Remote (EOR) sequence provided as part of a NIFC-CA briefing.  Our goal was to 
take the FnEPs concept and overlay it on top of the NIFC-CA EOR sequence to get a 
better understanding of how the five CRCs would interact.  The next issue was to refine 
the computational architecture and provide greater detail to the Combat Reach 
Functionality.  To accomplish this, we chose the ASN (RD&A) Chief Engineer’s 
(CHENG) developing Common System Function List (CSFL).  Figure 131 shows our 
first attempt at how the EOR sequence of events, augmented with some detail from the 
CSFL would be overlayed on top of all five CRCs. 
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Figure 131.   FnEPs Overlay onto NIFC-CA Engage on Remote (EOR) Scenario. 
 
The arrows imply system function interactions and dependencies.  Note that there 
are sets of system functions that would behave in a looping fashion, which are not 
displayed here.  What is depicted is a threat being detected in the upper left-hand corner, 
and subsequently this setting off the system functions shown.  As a result of this exercise, 
there were new system function interactions added due to the adaptability, and flexibility 
precepts which were not present in the current EOR sequence followed.  Furthermore, the 
exercise demonstrates where the required functionality should be partitioned into the five 
CRCs. 
This overlay is a critical first step in developing the CRC threads for the 
FORCEnet Integrated Architecture.  The interrelationships shown here begins to get at 
the: “what information to what warfighter at what time for what specfic purpose” issue.  
This type of information will be useful in developing IERs that will eventually define 
network requirements.  Future steps to complete this Strike and TAMD analysis would be 
to take other existing concepts and programs like NIFC-CA and overlay them onto the 
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FnEPs concept to understand the interactions between the five CRCs.  This process 
allows the discovery of new functionality and the framework by which to assess 
duplicated functionality that should be consolidated with a CRC.  Once a more complete 
and detailed understanding as well as mapping of legacy program functionality is 
overlayed on top of the five CRCs, the interaction arrows can be turned into interfaces.  
With a parameterized DSM model of these interactions, clusters of interactions can be 
analyzed.  We propose that these clusters of interactions could identify system 
function/information exchange pairs and QoS metrics that are required to be present to 
implement the clusters of interactions.  We propose using TVDB to assess and redesign 
new TACSITs based on those discovered and optimized interactions, TVDB will also 
incorporate the new or altered SV-6 lines to show those system function/information 
exchange pair requirements.  Once new TACSITs are designed, which reflect the 
understanding of the warfighter process and activities, the functions constituted within 
the CRCs and interactions required between the CRCs could be assessed against actual 
legacy system functionality and how well it supports that specific interface in the new 
TACSITs.  By doing system analysis on their functionalities and looking for gaps and 
duplication in system functions, newly realigned systems would emerge to support those 
TACSITs.  NTIRA could possibly be used to analyze the cost, schedule and performance 
impacts of realigning those system functions within legacy systems given an expanded 
view of all Navy system financial data.  Perhaps more importantly, the GEMINII process 
would be able to cluster identified and needed, but as of yet not available, system 
functionality which would be properly clustered into new systems or families of new 
systems (based on their required interactions) to properly fill the operational gaps, system  
functional gaps and produce the end-to-end CRCs.  Analysis up to this point and trends 
point to the largest gaps in CRCs as being within the sets of decision support tools needed 
to implement the required functionality of the ABMAs. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The section has discussed the evolving GEMINII toolset and chronicaled a year-
long cooperative analysis effort aimed at further refinement of the FnEPs concept as it 
specifically relates to the Strike and TAMD “Packs.”  Overall, GEMINII revealed and 
validated the tremendous near-term potential of FORCEnet and FnEPs to our operational 
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forces.  At its roots; however, FnEPs remains a dynamic concept applicable across many 
mission areas.  “Packs” will exist and function throughout a networked virtual 
environement with virtual borders between packs and amongst pack members.  “Packs” 
must be capable of dynamically adapting within this environment of ever-changing and 
asymmetric threats.  Accordingly, future analysis will require a commitment to challenge, 
refine, and challenge again working engagement chain models, where the steps are 
complex and have ambiguous boundaries.  Only through such analysis can we ensure this 
transformational concept fully develops FORCEnet and NCW across all mission areas. 
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IV. FROM ARPANET TO THE FUTURE . . . BUILDING A 




duced in 1969 
as a research 
and develop-




Research Project Agency (DARPA),214 the ARPANET was originally envisioned as a 
network of computers connected for the purpose of providing fast, reliable 
communications between host computers.215  In short, this project laid the groundwork 
for today’s network technology and the Internet.  However, the real value of the Internet 
today is clearly not simply the connection of computers or the ability to communicate and 
share information.  Instead, the Internet provides the means to conduct transactions 
between users of the network.  In the “civilian” and business sense, these transactions are 
about execution and facilitating the transfer of good and services.  In the “military” sense 
the analog for these transactions is the prosecution of adversary forces through the 
execution of the engagement or “kill-chain”. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  Part I will seek to examine some of the 
critical technical factors impacting the future of the networking and military applications 
in general.  Part II will specifically discuss the establishment of a “Warfighting Internet” 
supporting FORCEnet and SSG XXII’s Concept of FORCEnet Engagement Packs  
                                                 
214 University of Texas “Think” Project Page. “A Technical History of the ARPANET: A Technical Tour,” 
available from [http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/chris/nph/ARPANET/ScottR/arpanet/tour/overview.htm], Accessed 
May 2003. 
215 totse.com. “A History of ARPAnet,” Available from 
[http://www.totse.com/en/technology/computer_technology/arpanet2.html], Accessed May 2003. 
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(FnEPs).  To assist the less knowledgeable reader, Appendix B “Networking Basics” 
provides additional background and basic information regarding networking and network 
technology.    
B. CRITICAL FACTORS 
For years and years enthusiasts have been saying that the Internet will 
happen “tomorrow.”  You're going to keep reading prognostications that 
the big change will happen in the next twelve months. This is just baloney. 
The social adaptations that have to occur take years and the infrastructure 
has to be built out.  But when the social and technical changes reach 
critical mass, the change will be quick and irreversible. 
---Bill Gates “The Road Ahead” 
While today’s commercial data and communications networks have advanced far 
beyond those of yesterday and the original ARPANET, the future will demand even 
greater performance and technological advancement.  The most critical technological 
challenges for these networks include the need to support advanced applications requiring 
ever-increasing levels of bandwidth and Quality of Service (QoS), often over wireless 
media and in support of mobile applications and functionality.  Further, such applications 
and services are becoming more and critical to the successful operation of individuals and 
organizations alike, demanding higher levels of security and information assurance in 
general.   
But if these challenges seem daunting in the commercial sector, they are even 
more so for our military.  While wireless and mobile technology is still largely a 
convenience for civilians and in the commercial sector, such technologies are critical and 
indispensable to the military, especially in deployed scenarios.  Under combat conditions 
security and information assurance assume life and death importance.  While businesses 
and individuals certainly depend on the timely delivery of the ir critical data and 
information, military weapons systems often require a much higher order of performance 
from a QoS perspective.  Finally, the unique nature of deployed and combat 
environments result in special human systems integration (HSI) considerations, including 
training and integration related issues.  
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As a result of these challenges, military “networks” will require unique 
performance functionality when compared to commercial networks and the “Internet” 
with which most of us are so familiar.  The remainder of this section seeks to address 
some of this unique functionality, including the following: 
· Protocols 
· Mobile Routing and Networking 
· Satellite Communications 
· Wireless Communications 
· RF Communications and Antennas 
· Bandwidth 
1. Protocols   
As reviewed in Appendix B “Networking 
Basics” network protocols are critically important to 
the functioning of computer networks.  Originally, 
the Internet Protocol (IP) was designed to be highly 
scalable in terms of application support and the 
number of devices and/or users on a network.  Further, IP’s scalability would enable the 
creation and interoperability of “networks of networks”, such as the Internet.  Since the 
introduction of IP; however, the exponential growth of information technology in general 
and networking more specifically have combined to result in greater and greater demands 
being placed on IP to provide “plug and play” network interoperability.  More 
specifically, three major challenges to IP currently exist.  1) The rise in popularity and 
demand for streaming audio and video and other demanding multimedia applications has 
greatly increased the requirement for provisioning some sort of Quality of Service (QoS) 
mechanism, especially in bandwidth limited situations such as a radio-wide area network 
(WAN).  2) A rise in the criticality of the data, applications, and other services being 
provided across the Internet and the resultant requirements to provide security.  3) The 
exponential growth in the popularity of the Internet itself, and the number of wireless and 
mobile users and devices being connected to the Internet has created address space 
shortages and routing challenges.  Individually and collectively these three challenges 
were unforeseen by the developers of the current version of the IP protocol, called IPv4.  
 “32 bits should be enough 
address space for the 
Internet.” 
 
- Dr. Vint Cerf, 1977 
Founder of the IP Protocol 
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Fortunately; however, these challenges have not surfaced overnight and efforts have been 
ongoing to not only solve these problems but also foresee and forestall others.  Chief 
among these efforts have been the development and implementation of IPv6 – a new and 
improved version of the original IPv4.  
2. IPv6 




· Performance and QoS 
a. Scalability 
As discussed previously, IPv4 is sorely in need of an increase in its 
address space.  The most obvious reason is to provide for a unique IP address for every 
device currently connected or envisioned as connecting to a network in the future.  
Currently, IPv4’s address space is only 32 bits, which only allows four billion addresses.  
By comparison, the world’s population currently exceeds six billion, limiting addresses, 
and therefore individually networked devices to less than one device per person (Network 
Address Translation (NAT) notwithstanding).  Conversely, IPv6 uses a 128-bit address 
space, theoretically enough for 340 trillion trillion trillion addresses.216  Again, put into 
perspective, this number is estimated to provide enough IP addresses for every grain of 
sand on Earth. 217  An added benefit of so many available addresses is the ability to 
improve the prefix aggregation problem discussed previously, thus reducing external 
routing tables to roughly 8000 items from over 100,000 currently seen in some routers.  
This will obviously increase the speed and efficiency of routing decisions.  
b. Autoconfiguration 
One of the most significant improvements offered by IPv6 is its address 
autoconfiguration features.  More and more, networking is evolving beyond the wired 
                                                 
216 There will actually be somewhat fewer available addresses in practice, due to the way addresses are 
structured, but even a conservative estimate will still allow about 35 trillion sites, each with an 80-bit local address 
space. 
217 Technology & Business, “IPv6: Time to Change?,” 5 November 2002, Available at 
[http://www.zdnet.com.au/printfriendly?AT=2000034884-20269647], Accessed May 2003. 
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world to include a tremendous variety of wireless and other mobile devices and 
applications.  An example of such an application might be a network of 
chemical/biological sensors, each with their own IP address and perhaps its own 
management information base (MIB) structure.  Each of these nodes would have 
individual IP addresses and function independently in order to conserve energy and other 
resources.  Autoconfiguration is the basic functionality that allows IPv6 to support these 
kinds of devices as they function within this network and even move among various 
networks, all while retaining their original IP addresses.  Address autoconfiguration 
enables more robust plug-and-play network connectivity among the tremendous number 
and variety of wired and wireless devices connected to today’s and the future’s networks.  
Figure 132 depicts the basic functionality of IPv6 in support of mobile networking. 218  




Figure 132.   IPv6 Supporting a Notional Mobile Network219. 
 
                                                 
218 Notably, this model would also work equally well implementing IPv4. 
219 IpInfusion, Disruptive Technologies: Applications that Will Drive Ipv6, Available at 
[http://www.ipinfusion.com/pdf/DisruptiveTechnologies.pdf], Accessed May 2003. 
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c. Security 
The IPv6 specification includes security features in the form of packet 
encryption (Encapsulated Security Payload, or ESP) and source authentication 
(Authentication Header, or AH).  Both these features are optional parts of the IPv4 
specification, but it is mandatory that they are included in every IPv6 implementation.  In 
the context of the security discussion below, this functionality helps to ensure 
confidentiality, authenticity, and non-repudiation.  AH also provides assurance that the 
packet has not been altered in transit.  That said, it is not mandatory that either ESP or 
AH are actually used.  This IPv6 support of security is more elegant than that of IPv4 and 
is one of the more compelling reasons to migrate to IPv6.  More specifically, IPv6 
implements IPsec such that only the payload and extension header require encryption 
while the primary header remains untouched. 
d. Performance and QoS 
IPv6 packets include a Flow Label field, allowing routers to establish 
virtual circuit-style connections.  The Flow Label field identifies a set of packets that 
belong to the same flow—much like the IPv4 Service Type (Diffserv or DS) field.  The 
Flow Label field for a particular flow is a pseudo-random number.  No other flow from 
the same source is assigned the same Flow Label.  The Flow Label and the source 
address are therefore the only information needed for a router to classify a packet for the 
purpose of determining its priority, and they are stored in the packet header.  This is a 
much more simple method than with IPv4, whose process typically requires examination 
of the source address, source port, destination address, and destination port.  This  
simplification in terms of the fixed size and reduced number of fields in the IPv6 header 
also allows for simplified processing by routers.  Further advantages include improved 
performance by preventing packet fragmentation.  This functionality is accomplished via 
an algorithm designed to discover the transmission path and the smallest MTU 
(maximum transmission unit) along it, and then restricting packet sizes to that minimum.  
Collectively, these advantages help routers and other network devices provide QoS and 
traffic management.  Furthermore, routers will be able to use the information they collect 
to analyse traffic patterns and use the results to improve overall network performance.  
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e. Challenges to IPv6 
One of the most critical challenges facing IPv6 is the transition from IPv4.  
Despite so many applications and equipment already supporting IPv6, we have 
remarkably little knowledge or experience about IPv6 or its practical implementation.  
Unlike other Asian countries who face far more immediate challenges with continued use 
of IPv4, such as critical shortages of available IP addresses, in North America, the 
conduct of necessary research and development to ensure a smooth transition from IPv4 
to IPv6 has been lackluster.  Beyond the implementation of IPv6; there remain 
unanswered questions related to the security and mobility support enhancements being 
touted as advantages to IPv6 as well.  In order to rectify this shortcoming, the North 
American IPv6 Task Force (NAv6TF), in collaboration with the University of New 
Hampshire Interoperability Lab (UNH-IOL), the Joint Interoperability Test Command 
(JITC), and the Department of Defense (DoD), developed the Moonv6 project.  The 
Moonv6 project is combination of a muti-site, IPv6 based network and series of of 
interoperability events designed to test the functionality and interoperability of equipment 
and operating systems that will support IPv6.  Fundamentally; however, IPv6 goes 
beyond simply addressing the shortcomings and other challenges facing IPv4 and/or 
adding improvements to the IP protocol.  IPv6 is about developing a global technology 
that will truly enable the ubiquitous potential of current and future networking, including 
true IP mobility and ease of use for the end user.220  Ultimately, while IPv6 will help to 
enable FORCEnet and FnEPs, of far larger importance is the transition of other, currently 
non-routable networks (e.g., Link 11, Link 16, etc.)! 
f. Other Protocol -Related Challenges 
As discussed previously, due to the unique nature of military networking 
in deployed and combat scenarios, requirements exist beyond those of commercial 
networks and the Internet, especially related to security, QoS, and performance in general 
(e.g., performance requirements associated with ISR, C2, and FC/weapons applications 
across wireless and RF networks).  The remainder of this section seeks to discuss 
examples of current network protocol research and development related to these 
challenges.        
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These requirements are fundamentally related to providing the high levels 
of availability and reliability (the network must stay up), scalability (the network must 
support higher and higher numbers of users and devices or “end systems”221), and 
connectivity (nodes must stay connected, even as they transit between network domains).  
Examples of highly developed software that supports such functionality requirements is 
Cisco’s Internet Operating System (IOS).  Just like any other operating system, IOS is a 
package of network systems software, and specialized delivery and discovery protocols 
that provides a common IP fabric, functionality, and command-line interface across a 
(mobile) network.222     
In terms of support for latency requirements, military networking 
requirements result in one of the most difficult overall challenges to IP-based networking.  
This challenge is twofold and results from the fundamental “connectionless” nature of IP-
based networking and the fact that all packets have the same priority.  While this problem 
can be mitigated through the use of the IPv6 protocol, which will provide packet 
prioritization through QoS functionality, a second issue involves the laws of physics.  
The nature of a “Warfighting Internet” is such that routing will in some cases involve 
multiple wireless and/or satellite link “hops”.  Such routing will introduce both increased 
latency times and “faults” related to increased Bit Error Rates (BER).  Notably, IP in and 
of itself, does not increase latency, nor does it add to BER.  IP does permit the 
multiplexing of multiple datastreams together, thereby greatly increasing bandwidth 
efficiency.  Unfortunately, one result of such efficiency is an increase in the “bursty” 
behavior which can effect latency.  A tradeoff exists between reducing such latency while 
maintaining bandwidth efficiency.  Overall, both problems of latency and BER can 
combine to result in increased dropped connections.  Further, in the case of real- and 
near-real time latency demands of weapons and other fire-control related requirements, 
network faults and latency can become unacceptable.  One of the greatest “criticisms” of 
IP-based networking is the latency intolerant nature of IP itself.  Ironically, this 
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intolerance is actually a function of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).  One of 
TCP’s strongest fault correction features is that long delays (such as those encountered in 
satellite link and multi-hop situations) are interpreted as faults or worse, as dropped 
connections.  As a result, packets are resent.  At a minimum, this has the effect of 
inefficient resource usage, and at worse, leads to an infinite loop of undeliverable packets 
and possible network instability. 
This reference to TCP highlights, while the existing IP protocol is 
sufficient in most circumstances, there are other challenges related to the Transport Layer 
of the ISO 7-Layer Model such as the growing requirement for Portable, Real-Time 
Protocols (PRTP).  As a result, significant research and progress is being made in the 
areas of fault-tolerant and real- time protocols, suitable for the environment of a 
Warfighting Internet.  Examples include basic protocol standards and research such as the 
Real-Time Protocol (RTP), an IETF standard that provides end-to-end delivery services 
for data with real-time characteristics, such as interactive audio and video.  Another such 
standard is the Real-Time Control Protocol (RTCP), an IETF standard that provides 
feedback on the transmission and reception quality of data carried by the RTP.223  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is research on the technology utilizing the aforementioned 
standards to provision real-time applications and services over IP-based networks.  
Generally speaking, any future transport layer protocol should exhibit the following four 
characteristics: 
· Support for reliable multicast. 
· Inherent security, particularly in the area of resistance to syn-flood denial 
of service attacks. 
· “Early open” – This would allow real data to be passed on the 3-way 
handshake datagrams thereby reducing latency during the connection 
opening process. 
· Support for QoS sensitivity must be improved, eliminating the current 
assumption a lost datagram is automatically the result of congestion. 
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One such example is Bang Networks, whose technology is enabling the 
real-time delivery and live updates of information over millions of simultaneous 
connections.224  This architecture is depicted in Figure 133. 
 
 
Figure 133.   Bang Networks Real-Time Network Data Center225. 
 
Fundamentally, a final issue exists related to the development and 
implementation of protocols and applications supporting the real-time requirements of a 
Warfighting Internet.  Aside from the aforementioned circumstances which have given 
rise to real-time requirements, there is the extensive use of proprietary, real-time 
operating systems (OS), especially in weapons and fire-control systems.  Such OSs are 
generally custom built and require custom built and proprietary protocols as well.  As 
discussed previously, this runs counter to the desire for open-systems architectures, 
common standards, and the use of commercial/off the shelf (COTS) technology to the 
maximum extent possible, especially where network architecture and protocols are 
concerned.  A further related issue of interoperability and real-time support is the need 
for a Uniform Driver Interface (UDI).226  By specifying and implementing a UDI, a 
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229 
single device driver could support an I/O card across multiple platforms and operating 
systems as appropriate for a given task.  When such COTs OSs and UDIs are combined 
with improved protocols, the overall performance of a Warfighting Internet will be vastly 
improved, especially in terms of reduced network latency.  One example of one such 
standardization is that of the POSIX interface standards.  These are well developed, 
mature, and would greatly enhance support for real-time performance if implemented and 
adhered to. 
While the protocol related issues discussed above are perhaps the most 
critical for a Warfighting Internet, other critical considerations and challenges remain.  
The following sections address these issues individually. 
3. Mobile Routing and Networking 
For more than a decade, data roaming 
services using private and proprietary wireless 
technologies have enabled delivery trucks, police, 
fire, and other emergency vehicles to communicate 
with networks.227  With the growing popularity of 
an assortment of personal wireless devices such as cell phones, PDAs, and others 
designed to access the Internet and other business and personal networks, the requirement 
for mobile support and networking technologies is growing at an exponential rate.  
Moreover, ‘mobility’ implies a variety of applications and circumstances: 
· Mobile IP requires end system mobility. 
· MANETs require mobility in the form of rapidly changing network 
topologies. 
· Satellite Communications and WLAN applications require mobility in the 
form of “radio reach.” 
· Radio Frequency communications require mobility in the form of small 
and non-steerable antennas, especially for disadvantaged users. 
· Submerged submarines require mobility in the form of Low Frequency 
(LF) or lower communications. 
Figure 134 depicts this exponential growth curve into the near future. 
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 “640K ought to be enough 
for anybody, and by the 
way, what’s a network?” 
 
- Bill Gates, 1984 
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Figure 134.   Growth of Mobile Networking228. 
 
Like protocols and OSs discussed above; however, such proprietary solutions 
typically lack interoperability and therefore restrict true mobility between systems and 
“network domains”. 
Mobile technologies are currently among the most highly researched networking 
technologies.  With the explosion of mobile devices that need always-online connectivity, 
it is imperative that mobile routing and networking be developed in order to allow for IP-
supported connectivity regardless of the physical location of a device.  As discussed 
previously, one of the biggest problems is that IP was not originally designed to support 
mobile “roaming” devices.  The answer to this problem is the development by the IETF 
of the mobile IP standard.229  This standard defined the concept of a Home Agent (HA) 
and Foreign Agent (FA), together with a Mobile Node (MN), and Care-of-Address 
(COA).  One basic concept, originally developed by Charlie Perkins at IBM, called 
Mobile Routing, is depicted in Figure 135. 
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Figure 135.   Cisco Mobile Router Technology230. 
 
Fundamentally, each Mobile Node (MN) has a Home Agent (HA). When a MN 
roams or leaves the network domain of the HA, it registers with a Foreign Agent (FA). 
The FA then contacts the mobile node’s HA.  When a Corresponding Node (CN) wishes 
to contact an MN, it sends its packets to the HA.  The HA then tunnels the packets (over 
IP) to the FA, which delivers the packets to the MN.  This is generically referred to as the 
discovery and registration process and is defined in RFC 2002.231  A notional 
implementation of Mobile Router technology implemented in a military scenario is 
depicted in Figure 136. 
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Figure 136.   Notional Scenario Utilizing Mobile Router Technology232. 
 
While the above scenario is notional, NASA and Cisco recently put together a 
project team to conduct an experiment and utilizing Mobile Router technology deployed 
aboard the Coast Guard icebreaker Neah Bay.  Specifically, the Neah Bay was equipped 
with mobile IP and mobile networks.233  When the ship is in its homeport on Lake Erie, it 
accesses the network via Cisco Aironet wireless Ethernet antennas on the Federal 
Building in downtown Cleveland.  As the ship moves about the lakes, it accesses the 
network via foreign agents via satellite links and other terrestrial antennas deployed 
throughout the Great Lakes along the main shipping channels.  Network routing is 
accomplished utilizing the aforementioned Mobile Routing technology.  Detroit will be 
one of the initial deployments with Pelee Island soon to follow.  Further ranges will be 
obtained in the future via satellite links covering the Great Lakes and other ocean areas 
when the ship is out of range of the terrestrial links.  Such links will be obtained through 
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routers serving as FAs located at satellite ground terminals in places such as Southbury, 
Connecticut or Smith Falls, Canada.  Both INMARSAT and Globalstar satellite systems 
are also being considered for use.234  Figure 137 depicts the network architecture 
developed and implemented to support this experiment. 
 
 
Figure 137.   Neah Bay Mobile Router Experiment 235. 
 
4. Satellite Communications  
With today’s services, latency [involving GEO sats] is not an issue, but as 
consumer, two-way interactive services come along, that could change.  
New satellites are just another method for Internet. 
-Robert Collet, Teleglobe Com Corp.236 
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For three decades, satellite communications systems have played a key role in 
domestic and international telecommunications services.  In terms of civilian systems and 
services, examples include fixed satellite services (e.g. television and telephone) and well 
as mobile satellite services (typically, communications related).  More recently, other 
services have been growing in popularity, including direct broadcast satellite (DBS) 
services, and the new consumer-oriented high–data-rate multimedia satellite systems.  
One factor has remained consistent; however; that is that for civilian systems, the role of 
satellite technology has been largely that of a support facility rather than a primary 
system.237  Conversely, while the same kinds of general fixed and mobile satellite 
services have been utilized by the military, the nature of deployed and combat scenarios 
dictates that satellite-based communications and data transmission services are often not 
only the primary, but sole means of providing service.  Further adding to the challenge, 
military communications and data transmission requirements face critical requirements in 
terms of protection and security.  These kinds of requirements have historically dictated 
that military satellite communications and data services be provided via specialized 
military communications satellites.  The demand for increased coverage and bandwidth 
has risen over time however; and, spiked drastically during times of conflict.  One 
solution that has been implemented to help solve the challenges of insufficient coverage 
and bandwidth has been the contracting for and usage of commercial satellite assets.   
Even the use of commercial assets has not ensured sufficient bandwidth has been 
available at all times; however, due to the fact that most conflicts in which commercial 
assets were utilized, such as Iraq, Kosovo, and Afgahnistan, were regional.  Even 
considering a combination of all available military and commercial satellite assets, 
including the redirection and re-tasking of other assets, resources were insufficient to 
meet demand.238  Worse still, as depicted in Figure 138; the trend in demand for 
bandwidth and coverage area for satellite communications is expected to continue to 
grow exponentially. 
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Figure 138.   Growth Trends for SATCOM BW Usage239. 
 
Considered across the board, military and commercial satellites can be classified 
into three groups.  As Figure 139 illustrates, each of these types of satellites have 
characteristics making them more or less suitable to a variety of missions and functional 
requirements.   
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Figure 139.   Satellite Data Network Types240. 
 
Having discussed some of the specific challenges related to the shortage of 
resources in terms of coverage and bandwidth, it would seem that a Warfighting Internet 
faces predominantly technical challenges.  Regardless of such challenges, or resource 
availability in terms of the type or number of military and/or commercial satellites; 
however, technological issues are not the only challenges related to satellite 
communications.  As highlighted by a number of studies and reports, including the 
Global Information Grid Support to CINC Requirements Study (Apr 2001) however, 
other significant challenges exist.  Chief among these are the following:241 
· DoD Communications requirements and acquisition requirements are 
disjointed, inflexible, and inconsistent with the GIG vision 
· Current SATCOM requirements process cannot produce reliable capacity 
estimates 
· Capability shortfalls are not always bandwidth related 
While the need for overhaul of the requirements generation process is widely 
acknowledged, the second two bullets are somewhat counterintuitive.  As the study 
reveals, while bandwidth is widely cited as the prevailing shortfall, problems associated 
with separate funding and management of assets reduces the number of joint solutions  
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and a concurrent reduction in the interoperability and efficient usage of available assets.  
Further, the study recommended that if assets were more efficiently and fully utilized, 
perceived and actual bandwidth shortages could be reduced242.  Beyond such technical 
considerations; however, cultural factors exist as well.  Organizationally, even within the 
Navy, different communities have different priorities and perspectives with respect to 
networking and communications (e.g., satellite, terrestrial and deployed networks and 
communications require different trade space considerations). 
The remainder of this section will briefly discuss major initiatives, such as 
Transformational Communications Study (TCS) and other more narrowly focused 
technological solutions, which could combine to help ensure both the future availability 
of satellite communication resources and services and their efficient usage.  In terms of 
high level efforts to address the challenges associated with satellite communications, TCS 
is the overarching initiative.  Although the specific architecture that eventually be fielded 
has yet to be determined, one option to relieve bandwidth demands in theater would be to 
develop a tiered architecture such as that envisioned by the TCS as the Transformational 
Communications Architecture (TCA) notionally depicted in Figure 140.  Note that the 
lowest tier or “Tactical Internet” is complimentary to the notion of a Warfighting 
Internet.   
Regardless of the eventual architecture developed and fielded for the TCA, the 
Warfighting Internet will be further influenced by two other technical areas closed tied to 
satellite communications—wireless technology and battlefield communications.  In 
considering these areas, the major takeaway should be that RF communications be used 
only when necessary while wired networks should be used to the maximum extent 
practical.  Further, HF will still play a complimentary role.  These topics are further 
addressed in the following sections.  The TCA will also be further detailed in a following 
section. 




Figure 140.   Relationship of Warfighting Internet to Tiered Architecture243. 
 
In terms of specific technology there has been significant research and 
development of a variety of possible solutions aimed at mitigating other challenges 
associated with satellite communications.  Three of these include optical (laser) 
communications and data links, the Space Communications Protocol Standards (SCPS), 
and WildBlue’s SkyX Gateway technology, are representative of possible solutions to 
challenges directly impacting not only satellite communications and data services, but the 
development and operationalization of a Warfigthing Internet as well.  Overall, 
significant advances in optical communications technology have been made that have 
particular application for wideband satellite crosslinks and the technology is being further 
developed to extend links to airborne platforms and terrestrial base stations.  Such 
technology faces challenges associated with tracking very narrow optical beams 
(especially in the case of geosynchronous satellite crosslinks) and the physical challenge 
of beam dispersion under lower atmospheric conditions.  When matured, such technology 
will offer bandwidth in the 10s and even 100s of gigabits per second and greater security 
and resistance to jamming.  Aside from such specific technological improvements, 
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optical connectivity will enable greater economics associated with lower satellite 
crosslink costs through the elimination of multiple intermediate ground relay stations.244  
As will be discussed in a section specifically dedicated to bandwidth below, this paper 
does not purpose bandwidth as the simple solution to the challenges of modern and future 
networking, but optical communications are one of the technologies under development 
that will enable the levels of bandwidth required by a Warfigthing Internet.   
Another of the most significant challenges facing a Warfighting Internet is its 
requirement to utilize IP-based networks (including IPv6) over satellite links.  This 
challenge results directly from the inefficiency of TCP due to latency created by long 
transmission path lengths and the noise associated with wireless links.  As discussed 
above, the need exists for improvements to transport layer protocols.  While many 
examples currently exist (e.g., XTP, XCP, etc.), we will only discuss SCPS.  Formally 
accepted in 1999, the SCPS suite of protocols was developed cooperatively by the 
Department of Defense and NASA, for use primarily in handling Internet packet traffic 
over wireless channels, including those with very long transmission delays, such as 
geosynchronous satellite-earth links and satellite crosslinks.245  Importantly; however, 
from the user's perspective, this technology uses the same IP and performs equally well 
over the existing terrestrial Internet.  This is accomplished because instead of being an 
entirely new set of standards, the SCPS suite is essentially a new version of the existing 
standards, (including both TCP/IP and File Transfer Protocol (FTP)) optimized to operate 
over networks containing one or more wireless paths such as a ground to geosynchronous 
satellite link or a wireless terrestrial link.  If desired, an optional Security Protocol 
(SCPS-SP) can also be utilized in order to provide a variety of security functionality. 246  
In general, SCPS helps to mitigate problems associated with a variety of other specific 
challenges related to long-distance satellite links and wireless communications in general.  
These include the following transport layer related issues: 
· Error rates caused by channel noise (not simply network congestion) 
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· Link asymmetry (different bandwidths in opposing directions) 
· Long propagation delays  
· Interrupted connectivity 
Figure 141 depicts the increase in performance of SCPS over IP and was 
measured as a function of varying channel bandwidth, bit error rate and link asymmetry. 
Parallel tests were conducted using both SCPS and IP so that a direct comparison could 
be made between them under identical conditions.  
 
 
Figure 141.   File Transfer Performance of SCPS vs. IP247. 
 
Another example of a technology developed to help provide IP-based networking 
over satellite links, while simultaneously mitigating the challenges associated with such 
situation’s is generically called Performance Enhancing Proxy (PEP).  One specific of 
such is Wild Blue’s SkyX Gateway technology.  By transparently replacing TCP with a 
highly efficient protocol especially designed for the long latency, asymmetric bandwidth, 
and high loss conditions typical of satellite networks, the SkyX Gateway will enable 
high-performance connectivity over satellite links by reducing latency through cuts in 
connection set-up times248.  As an example of this technology’s performance, is its 
capability of delivering 3 mb/sec download speed across a commercially available Ka-
band spot beam.  The architecture for this technology is depicted in Figure 142. 
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Figure 142.   SkyX Gateway Architecture249. 
 
5. Wireless Communications  
In terms of its technical challenges and critical impact on military applications, 
the field of wireless communications is also important to consider.  The following section 
seeks to address some of the most critical aspects of this area and their impact on the 
Warfighting Internet.  Wireless technology in general and a family of related technology 
to support wireless networking called mobile ad hoc networks or MANETs have emerged 
as a promising approaches to support mobile networking and mobile IP applications of 
the future.  From a technical perspective, MANET supports robust and efficient operation 
in mobile wireless networks by incorporating routing functionality into mobile hosts.250  
More specifically, MANET addresses the fact that conventional IP uses un-normalized 
data, meaning a single piece of data has two elements of information, 1) The data’s 
identity, analogous to a person’s SSN and 2) the data’s location on the network, 
analogous to a person’s home address.  Mobile IP decouples, or normalizes, the data such 
that the end system IP address is now the sole source of identity for the data, while the 
data’s location is stored in the HA’s forwarding table.  This process requires any 
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MANET converging protocol to post the details of a piece of data’s “mobility” in the 
form of net conversion to the HA such that the data’s identity and location can again be 
paired.  As with other technologies, applications, and capabilities discussed throughout 
this paper, wireless and MANET technology have gained in popularity through civilian 
application, and their use in military applications should follow as well.  While wireless 
technologies answer many of the requirements and related demands in deployed and 
combat scenarios, MANETs add the following advantages: 
· No need for fixed infrastructure 
· Each node equipped with one or more radios 
· Radios can be heterogeneous  
· Each node free to move about while communicating 
· Paths between nodes can be multi-hop251 
In general, wireless and mobile computing are combined and collectively exhibit the 
following general limitations: 
Wireless Network 
· Packet loss due to transmission errors 
· Variable capacity links 
· Frequent disconnections/partitions 
· Limited communication bandwidth 
· Broadcast nature of the communications 
· Security and Information Assurance-related considerations 
Mobility 
· Dynamically changing topologies/routes 
· Lack of mobility awareness by system/applications 
Mobile Computer 
· Short battery lifetime 
· Limited capacities252 
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At the root of some of these challenges lie protocol issues, many of which were 
addressed above.  In the context of wireless networking; however, it is appropriate to 
highlight some additional difficulties.  It is especially important for these hurdles to be 
overcome if the Warfighting Internet is to be possible.  In the case of all general Internet 
implementations, including both wired (terrestrial) and wireless, IP is typically paired 
with its sister protocol, the Transport Control Protocol (TCP).  IP is fundamentally 
responsible for moving packets of data from node to node via the IP or “Internet 
Address”.  Conversely, TCP is responsible for verifying the correct delivery of data end-
to-end across any number of nodes or “hops” between the sender and receiver of the data.  
As pointed out above, wireless networks are especially vulnerable to data loss.  There are 
many reasons for this, but what is critical is that TCP is responsible for data delivery 
verification. 253  As discussed in the Satellite Communications section above, there has 
been significant research and development into new and improved protocols and protocol 
extensions to ensure the successful operations of wireless networks.   
Another significant challenge fo r wireless applications and services is that of 
security.  Apart from user passwords and physical network security and hardware devices 
such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems and mechanisms, the most fundamental 
means of security remains encryption.  Packet-based traffic can be encrypted at any point 
in the network, and remains so until de-crypted, regardless or wired or wireless 
connections.  A further layer of security can be added for military application, and that 
has been used successfully in radio frequency communications for some time.  This 
method, called Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) spreads the data 
communication over the full transmission frequency spectrum and sends a specific 
sequence of pieces of 32 bits of data called data “chips”.  Safety and reliability is achieve 
by sending many copies of the data “sliced up” across the link, and only one copy of the 
data needs to be received to have complete transmission of the data or information.  The 
primary reason DSSS is used by the military goes beyond simply making it more difficult 
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to read the data, but also makes the transmission difficult to “jam.”254  Another of the 
challenges faced by wireless networking technology is a relative lack of bandwidth.  
While wireless technology will likely continue to lag wired solutions in this area, a 
number of advanced technologies are currently available and will enable a Warfigthing 
Internet to meet current and future bandwidth requirements.  The first of these is the 
IEEE 802.11 standard, which governs wireless networking.  The 802.11 standard is 
further broken down into other “sub” areas.  The first of these standards, 802.11b utilizes 
a carrier frequency of 2.4 GHz to achieve bandwidths of up to 11 mb/sec.  Due to the 
variety of limitations associated with the wireless environment; however, actual 
throughput is typically less.  A second standard, 802.11a utilizes a higher 5.2 GHz 
frequency and is therefore able to achieve higher bandwidth which under ideal 
circumstances approached 50mb/sec.  While the question of which standard to utilize 
may seem trivial especially in terms of bandwidth, a number of considerations must be 
taken into account.  These considerations include the propagation characteristics of 
higher wavelengths, which severely limits the ranges over which 802.11a devices can 
successfully achieve consistent network links.255  Generally speaking, the 802.11 
standard faces the following shortcomings: 
· Because layer 1 only has one pseudo-noise (PN) code, there is no low 
probability of interception (LPI)/low probability of detection (LPD) 
functionality 
· Because layer 2 does not support MAC address encryption, it is vulnerable 
to traffic analysis. 
· Because the layer 2 carrier sense MAC algorithm is adapted from the 
wired Ethernet standards, it is unstable if faced with too many users 
sharing a common channel. 
Both layer 2 shortcomings are fixed in 802.11b; however, the first could be solved 
through the adoption of COTS technology.  A final potential drawback of the 802.11 
standard is that it utilizes unlicensed RF spectrum.  As a result, it must “compete” with 
other unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) users.  As with all tradeoffs; 
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however, solutions exist to help mitigate or even eliminate a variety of challenges.  The 
following section addresses these issues in the context of communications in general and 
antennas more specifically,   
6. RF Communications and Antennas 
While this paper introduces the term “Warfigthing Internet”, the concept of a 
deployed “Internet” is not new.  DoD has worked to digitize units and forces from the 
highest echelons down to individual platforms and even individual warriors for years.  
Whether via wired or wireless means, digital communications form the basis for any such 
Internet.  Presently, the ability exists to provision a rudimentary tactical Internet via 
existing radio systems, including a combination of the single channel ground and 
airborne radio system (SINCGARS) and a vehicle-mounted wideband radio, the 
enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS).   At higher echelons, other 
equipment is available, such as that found in the Army’s tactical operations center, where 
commanders rely on the mobile subscriber equipment’s tactical packet network, and the 
near-term data radio (NTDR).256  NTDR extends its capabilities beyond those of other 
digital radios like SINCGARS and EPLRS by implementing routing functionality.  This 
allows disparate communications systems to connect via Internet routers using IP. 
As discussed throughout the preceding sections; however, a Warfigthing Internet 
will need to support a number of advanced services, all of which combine to far exceed 
the current capabilities of deployed, tactical implementations of an internet.  At least for 
the foreseeable future, at the individua l and small unit level, the backbone of the 
Warfigthing Internet will continue to be provided via digital means across RF devices.  
The remainder of this section will seek to discuss RF comms options, including the 
AN/PRC-138B HF radio, the AN/PRC-117F UHF/VHF radio, and the Joint Tactical 
Radio System (JTRS), and the implications for their use as part of the Warfighting 
Internet.  At present, the the AN/PRC-138B is used to augment the SINCGARS and 
EPLRS radios for over the horizon communications at ranges in the hundreds of miles, 
albeit at a modest 2.4 kb/sec data rate.  The second example, the AN/PRC-117F is an 
example of today’s more modern software programmable radios, and as currently fielded 
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is capable of UHF and VHF operations, as well as SATCOM capable up to 64 kb/sec.  
The most advanced option, is that of JTRS, which will utilize software control of various 
modulation techniques, wide- or narrow-band operations, communications security 
(COMSEC) functionality, and waveform requirements.257  JTRS will be by far the most 
versatile of tactical radios ever fielded, virtually eliminating the need for multiple radios 
and other communications devices, especially at the tactical levels.  As with the various 
802.11 standards discussed above, no single radio type currently available combines the 
best advantages of all frequencies and modulations, but JTRS will come close.   
JTRS is envisioned as the tactical- level backbone of the Warfighting Internet for 
another critical reason.  Not only will JTRS be able to replicate the existing SINCGARS 
and EPRLS waveforms, thus eliminating the need for these radios, but JTRS will provide 
a wideband network waveform, needed to move large amounts of data, video and voice 
services, at high data rates.258  JTRS will also offer a common operating system and 
common architecture for all foreseeable radio applications.  This open architecture is 
what will separate JTRS from the AN/PRC-117F and other such digital multi-mission, 
multi-band radios, software programmable radios.  This open-architecture 
implementation is similar to that of the commercial PC industry whereby companies are 
becoming increasing required to build hardware to support open-standards architectures.  
This has become a prime driver of the popularity of the Internet, and will likewise drive 
the Warfigthing Intrernet.  JTRS will take many years to fully develop and ensure Joint 
integration; however, and until this occurs, today’s crop of software-based radios such as 
the AN/PRC 117F will continue to help provision tactical internets via their embedded IP 
interface, which eliminates the need for Internet controller cards, or other external 
hardware.  There is danger in an over-reliance on such systems; however, as these have 
demonstrated the following shortcomings: 
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· Lack the necessary integration with other services’ communication 
equipment 
· Lack the necessary bandwidth capacity to support future requirements 
· Lack the adaptability to support tactical internetting and data-transmission 
7. Antennas 
Another related technical aspect of communications and wireless networking in 
general and which will significantly impact the Warfighting Internet is that of antennas.  
The following section will review these issues and some of the technologies currently 
available or under development to help solve such challenges. 
Antennas play a critical role in the provisioning of modern communications 
services and networks, including the Internet.  While traditional phone lines and 
terrestrial fiber networks continue to carry the bulk of all communications and network 
traffic throughout the United States, such infrastructure is extremely expensive and time-
consuming to emplace.  In fact, in certain more remote areas within the U.S. and 
throughout the rest of the world, wireless networks, such cellular phone networks are a 
more economical and prevalent solution.  As has been pointed out in the context of 
virtually every aspect of networking throughout this paper, while the applications such as 
communications and data transfer required under both civilian and military applications 
are in large measure similar, again, the circumstances under which these services are 
provided are often far more challenging for the military, especially under deployed and 
combat conditions.  Antenna requirements are one of the most extreme examples of such.  
Antennas of all varieties support such networks by providing the connectivity across open 
air links.  While this concept and especially the antennas themselves seem simple, in fact, 
modern antennas are carefully designed and engineered to meet a demanding set of 
performance characteristics, and are often optimized for a single particular application.  
Cell-phone towers are an example.  A final critical consideration is that of placement of 
the antenna, and again, this is typically driven by the desire to optimize performance for a 
given applications.  Again, cellular network antenna placement is offered as an example.  
The example of civilian cellular networks is chosen for its demonstration of flexibility 
enjoyed by civilian applications, especially in terms of the number, size, and geographic 
location of the antenna(s) themselves.  Conversely, many military antenna applications 
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are subject to restrictions in terms of geographic location. (especially aboard platforms 
such as ships, submarines, and aircraft.)  Herein lies some of the greatest challenges 
related to “radiation” in the sense the close proximity of multiple antennas leads to issues 
of interference, and potential weapons restrictions.  Military applications often face 
greater challenges in terms of available output power and security issues associated with 
both radar cross section and being located or “DF-ed” (direction found) by potential 
adversaries.  While typically not a concern for ships or aircraft, ashore forces, especially 
those in urban areas with buildings and other vertical structures in close proximity, face 
reception challenges due to reflected signals.  This phenomenon is called multipath 
distortion. 259   
As with other technological hurdles, ongoing research and development has led to 
a number of possible solutions to such challenges.  The remainder of this section will 
discuss two potential solutions to the problems discussed above.  The first of these 
solutions is related to what are generally referred to as “smart antennas”.  A smart 
antenna system combines multiple antenna elements with a signal-processing capability 
to optimize its radiation and/or reception pattern automatically in response to the signal 
environment.260  Such antennas are used extensively in civilian applications, including 
cellular network antennas, and have great promise for military applications as well.  The 
benefits of such antennas include the efficiency and security of steered beams, and the 
ability to “target” desired receivers (in the case of networks, other “nodes”) without 
interfering with others, in crowded or otherwise “dirty” or interference prone 
environments, such as urban areas.  Smart antennas offer the following specific benefits: 
· Better range/coverage – Focusing the energy sent out into the cell 
increases base station range and coverage.  Lower power requirements 
also enable a greater battery life and smaller/lighter handset size. 
· Increased capacity – Precise control of signal nulls quality and mitigation 
of interference combine to frequency reuse reduce distance (or cluster 
size), improving capacity. Certain adaptive technologies (such as space 
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division multiple access) support the reuse of frequencies within the same 
cell. 
· Multipath rejection261 – Can reduce the effective delay spread of the 
channel, allowing higher bit rates to be supported without the use of an 
equalizer 
· Reduced expense—Lower amplifier costs, power consumption, and higher 
reliability will result.262 
In terms of specific impact on the Warfigthing Interne t, smart antenna technology 
offers the opportunity to improve the performance of MANETs and other kinds of 
distributed networks, especially as this performance relates to the advantages cited above.  
Another technology that is currently subject to significant research and development is 
that of planar arrays and apertures combined with software switching.  One such example 
under development at the Office of Naval Research (ONR), called the Advanced Multi-
Function RF Concept of AMRF-C allows ship designers to significantly reduce the 
number and size of antennas, called the “antenna farm” aboard platforms.  AMRF-C will 
also integrate radar and communications functions in a few sets of high-performance 
transmit and receive antenna apertures.263  Figure 143 is a conceptual diagram of such 
arrays of antennas aboard a surface platform.  The potential benefits to the Warfighting 
Internet of such a system include the ability to rapidly and dynamically change 
frequencies, enabling flexibility in terms of bandwidth and function 
prioritization/reprioritization under a variety of situations. 
This situation highlights an entirely different perspective; however.  While the 
above scenario assumes we maintain dozens of separate, stove-piped RF systems and 
devices, our real goal ought to be consolidating such systems, perhaps into a single 
wideband radio WAN.  The advantage of such a system would be a reduction in 
redundancy and infrastructure complexity, as well as a tremendous savings in bandwidth.  
Further, we would still achieve the original goal of reducing the topside “antenna farm” 
into a single high performance transmitter/receiver.  
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Figure 143.   ONR's AMFR-C Concept264. 
 
8. Bandwidth    
In this section, bandwidth is defined 
simply as the amount of data that can be sent 
through a given communications circuit per 
second.265  While bandwidth is certainly an 
important variable to be considered in both 
civilian and military networks, the requirement for the Warfighting Internet to support 
deployed and mobile forces introduce special challenges to the discussion of bandwidth.  
While many of these challenges are mitigated by the kinds of advanced technology 
discussed in previous sections of this paper, the issue of bandwidth highlights what is 
perhaps one of a Warfighting Internet’s ultimate challenges—The growth in demand for 
bandwidth itself.  Figure 144 depicts this growth. 
                                                 
264 Naval Research Lab Radar Division, ONR AMFR-C Concept, Office of Naval Research, Available at 
[http://radar-www.nrl.navy.mil/], Accessed May 2003. 
265 HostingWorks, HostingWorks Networking Definitions, Available at 
[http://hostingworks.com/support/dict.phtml?foldoc=bandwidth], Accessed May 2003. 
 “Its not just about Bandwidth.” 
 
- Harold Powell 




Figure 144.   Growth of Bandwidth Requirements266. 
 
To observe the growth of bandwidth requirements in a more narrowly-focused 
context, the following statistics shown in Figure 145 are offered as a comparison between 
Operation Desert Storm (1991) and Operation Enduring Freedom (2002). 
                                                 
266 Carol Welsch, Major, USAF, Battlespace Bandwidth, Warfighter Implications and the Way Ahead, 
(Headquarters, USAF) Available at [http://www.sspi.org/art2/presentations/Welsch_Presentation.PDF]; Accessed May 
2003, (PowerPoint Brief). 
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Figure 145.   Bandwidth Comparison of Past and Present Conflicts267. 
 
From a civilian perspective, bandwidth has demonstrated an almost unimaginable 
growth curve.  Historically, the bandwidth of the Internet was provided over copper cable 
and existing phone lines.  Even as late as 1983, ARPANET’s bandwidth per link was a 
mere 56k. Today, these same phone lines support DSL connection to individual users, 
often in excess of a megabit/sec.  Figure 146 shows the recent and continuing growth of 
bandwidth to the end-user in terms of residential service alone! 
 
 
Figure 146.   Growth of Bandwidth to Residential End-Users268. 
                                                 
267 Ibid. 
268 WebsiteOptimization.com, May Bandwidth Report - US Broadband Penetration Breaks 35%, Available at 
[http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0305/]; Accessed May 2003. 
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Interestingly, experiments and efforts at “bandwidth world records” are common, 
and as recently as 2001 Alcatel and NEC in separately demonstrated bandwidth in excess 
of 10 terabits/sec across over 100 km of fiber-optic cable.269  By December 2002, a 
company called Yotta Yotta was able to utilize similar technology to demonstrate a file 
transfer of 5 terabytes of data between Chicago, Illinois to Vancouver, British Columbia 
and Ottawa, Ontario, at a sustained average throughput of 11.1 gigabits/sec.  “This is 
equivalent to transferring all printed collections from the Library of Congress within two 
hours time,” said Wayne Karpoff, vice president and CTO for Yotta Yotta.270  While 
such technology is certainly not ready for deployment, today’s Internet is largely 
supported by a fiber-optic backbone with cables commonly supporting bandwidth from 
hundreds of megabits/sec  (OC-12) to over 10 gigabits/sec (OC-192).  It should be noted; 
however, from a commercial perspective the Internet remains highly overprovisioned, 
and that most backbone links are utilized at no greater than 10% of overall capacity271.  
The real problem remains provisioning such bandwidth across “the last mile” to the end-
user remains a significant challenge, at least economically.    
What is the impact of such technology?  In terms of pure throughput, sufficient 
bandwidth is available via terrestrial fiber, especially in and between major metropolitan 
areas, to support any current and foreseeable network applications.  In terrestrial 
networks, more bandwidth simply costs money.  Conversely, the RF spectrum is limited 
so more money can only buy more bandwidth up to a certain spectral constraint, limited 
by the laws of physics.  The preceding discussion has highlighted one of the key 
differences between civilian and military networking and its critical impact on bandwidth 
availability – that of stationary nodes (e.g. buildings) versus mobile nodes (e.g. ships).  
While much of the provisioning of the Warfighting Internet could be accomplished across 
terrestrial fiber networks in exactly the same manner as its civilian counterpart deployed 
scenarios introduce “air gaps” which no amount of fiber can bridge.  This introduces two 
critical challenges which must be overcome.  First, is a problem related to the laws of 
                                                 
269 Light Reading, “Alcatel Holds World Record for a Day,” (Light Reading), (22 March 2001), Available at 
[http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=4380], Accessed May 2003. 
270 Yottayotta, “New World Record Set for Tcp Disk-to-Disk Bulk Transfer,” Press Release, Available at 
[http://Www.Yottayotta.Com/Pages/News/Press_04.Htm], Accessed May 2003. 
271 Rex Buddenberg, Senior Lecturer of Information Systems, Naval Postgraduate School. 
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physics governing many of the deployed environments, including at-sea, undersea, air, 
and space, as well as the long distances involved.  Second is the problem of what are 
called “disadvantaged users”.  Such users, such as submarines, are not only challenged by 
the physics of the environments in which they operate, but the restriction(s) they are 
faced with in terms of power and antenna aperture size.   
While technological solutions such as those discussed throughout this section will 
likely continue to help answer the bandwidth challenge—and may perhaps even someday 
render the bandwidth variable irrelevant, part of the near-term solution lies in more 
efficient use of available bandwidth.  One example of technology designed to help 
accomplish this is DARPA’s Adaptive Spectrum Utilization. 272  This is actually a 
concept which includes a number of related technologies designed to facilitate adaptive 
spectrum sharing  by employing unused spectrum, including frequency, time, and power, 
when and where available using special waveforms, protocols, and etiquette to overlay 
and underlay frequencies without interference. 
While possibilities for increased efficiency lie in technological solutions, perhaps 
the greatest opportunity for bandwidth savings and efficiency lies in how we utilize a 
Warfighting Internet.  More specifically, opportunities exist in terms of C3 processes and 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that would reduce the demands placed on the 
network(s) on the first place. 
9. Networked Virtual Environments (net-VEs) 
Another promising area for networking technology related to FnEPs can be found 
in the field of networked virtual environments (net-VEs).  Fundamentally, net-VEs is a 
construct in which multiple users interact with each other in real time, even though those 
users may be geographically dispersed, perhaps even around the world.  This definition 
aligns well with the concept of an FnEPs “pack”, whose assets will also likely be 
geographically dispersed yet still need to interact.  Another generalized challenge net-
VEs have sought to address is that of resource management.  In order for net-VEs to 
work effectively the following resource management trade spaces must be considered: 
                                                 
272 Paul Kolodzy, A DARPA Perspective on Broadband Wireless Systems, (DARPA), (6 September 2000), 
Available at [http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/meetings/art/art00/Slides00/kol/kol_s.pdf], Accessed December 2003. 
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· Communications protocol optimization, including bandwidth and 
processing requirements 
· Data flow restriction, including compression, packet aggregation, area of 
interest filters, multicasting, and caching 
· Leveraging of limited user perception 
· System architecture modification, including peer-to-peer, client-server, or 
hybrid architectures 
Many of these same resource trade spaces will exist for FORCEnet and FnEPs as well.  
Interestingly, multiple net-VEs may be required to operate simultaneously over the same 
network (The may be an example of an application of a Common Operational Picture 
(COP) whereby different net-VEs could service the needs for multiple levels of command 
(e.g. platoon, company, battalion)).   
Overall, current and future net-VEs are facing the situation where today’s network 
infrastructures and ever-increasing numbers of users are demanding that these systems 
scale to sizes that make traditional methods for resource optimization unsuitable.  These 
same network infrastructures will introduce some of the same problems to the 
development and implementation of FORCEnet and FnEPs namely that: 
· While the computers that support the requirements for information 
processing will become more powerful, such capacity will remain limited.  
This is likely to remain especially true in applications where space and 
power are limited. 
· Networks will continue to face limited capacity in terms of latency and 
bandwidth—factors which are the two most significant resource 
constraints for many aspects of FORCEnet and FnEPs. 
Fortunately, as this section has discussed, great progress has been made towards 
addressing these challenges in many areas of network technology and development, 
especially in the field of net-VEs.  We anticipate many of the same techniques developed 
or under development will have similar application to the development and 
implementation of the network infrastructure necessary to support FORCEnet and FnEPs. 
One example of a particular concept developed to support net-VEs that has 
applicability to FnEPs is that of the Composite Agent Model, developed by Commander 






















Figure 147.   Composite Agent Model273. 
 
The net-VE concept depicted above aligns well with the Network-Centric Warfare 
perspective and forms the foundation for how we see FnEPs operating in a future net-VE.  
With all FnEP pack factors interoperable and “network aware,” net-VEs enable the 
“packs” to function.  With the pack components participating in a net-VE and under a 
distributed services architecture using the “publish and subscribe” ontology, all 
participating “pack” network nodes must have a place to “publish and subscribe” to.  This 
place, what we will call the collective ‘state space’ of the pack assets is depicted as the 
“inner environment” in Figure 147.  This “state space” would be the collective pack 
repository, albeit distributed as well, where the complete “state” of the pack asset is 
known.  This state is envisioned to contain details about services the pack asset can 
provide and what services the pack asset will need to subscribe to in order to conduct its 
mission.  This collective pack “state space” is also envisioned to contain information on 
interface data standards, readiness state, geographic location, as well as other physical 
and virtual attributes of the pack asset at a particular moment in time.  This “state space” 
becomes one of the main resources that the ABMAs will use to constitute, optimize, task, 
and reconstitute FnEPs “pack” assets.  The Sensor Control Agents (SCAs) are intelligent 
                                                 
273 Brian Osborn, Commander, U.S. Navy, An Agent-Based Architecture for Generating Interactive Stories, 
(Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), (PowerPoint Brief).  
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agents which monitor the net-VE and feed “pack” asset state attribute changes back into 
the collective “state space.”  These SCAs, would be present in all networked pack assets 
to monitor the net-VE.  Once a changed attribute “state” (e.g., low UAV fuel, new pack 
asset, new threat, changed course/speed/heading of an in-flight weapon, etc.) is published 
to the “state space,” Reactive Agents (RAs) will have updated the “state space” attribute 
and will alert the ABMAs to take appropriate action to change the activity within the net-
VE.  This step will continue as a feedback loop until the desired attribute value is shown 
in the “state space.”  This monitoring, processing, action and appropriate feedback is a 
continuous loop, managed primarily by ABMAs. 
C. FORCENET FNEPS AND THE NEED FOR A “WARFIGHTING 
INTERNET” 
Having outlined some of the technical 
considerations for military networking in Part I, 
the following section will discuss the concept of a 
“Warfighting Internet” as it relates to the concept 
of FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs). 
As presented in Chapter I FnEPs is defined 
as: 
The FnEPs Concept represents the operational construct for FORCEnet 
and demonstrates the power of FORCEnet by integrating a specific set of 
joint sensors, platforms, weapons, warriors, networks and command & 
control systems, for the purpose of performing mission-specific 
engagements.  Initial pack asset allocation and configuration to constitute 
a pack will be based on a specific threat or mission; however, the 
capability to dynamically re-configure and re-allocate assets “on the fly,” 
to reconstitute a new pack will enable cross-mission engagement 
capabilities.  Integrating the six FORCEnet factors must focus on enabling 
five critical functions called the “Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs)”.  
These CRCs are:  Integrated Fire Control (IFC), Automated Battle 
Management Aids (ABMAs), Composite Tracking (CT), Composite 
Combat Identification (CCID), and Common/Single Integrated Pictures 
(CP).  Ultimately, FnEPs will help “operationalize” FORCEnet by 
demonstrating a network-centric operational construct that supports an 
increase in combat reach and provides an order of magnitude increase in 
combat power by creating more effective engagements, better sensor-
shooter-weapon assignments and improved utilization of assets.  FnEPs  
 “Good ideas are not adopted 
automatically, they must be 
driven into practice with 
courageous impatience.” 
 
- ADM Hyman G. Rickover 
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achieves fully integrated joint capabilities focused on the engagement 
chain, and represents a revolutionary transformation in Naval operations 
complimentary to FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea Supremacy. 
Implicit in this definition is the requirement for a network infrastructure which supports 
the functional requirements of ISR, C2 and FC.  Figure 148 below274 depicts the 
traditionally vertical integration of these functions.  Critically important; however, the 
five CRCs discussed in the definition of FnEPs presented above require a horizontal 
integration across the ISR, C2, and FC functions.  Such horizontal integration and the 
combat reach enhancements enabled by the five CRCs are not only the essence of FnEPs, 
but represent a capabilities-based set of requirements which drive the network 
infrastructure requirements for FORCEnet and FnEPs275.  Two key perspectives critically 
these concepts.  1) FnEPs was envisioned by SSG XXII as an enabler for the 
operationalization of FORCEnet in the near-term.  2)  SPAWAR and the office of the 
FORCEnet Chief Engineer have assessed FnEPs define the FORCEnet operational 
construct. From these two perspectives, the alignment of FORCEnet and FnEPs is 
critical.  The following implication is clear – the current efforts of SPAWAR and the 
Office of the FORCEnet Chief Engineer to design and implement an architecture which 
supports FORCEnet must also address the networking-related challenges associated with 
FnEPs.  The following section will in large measure discuss FnEPs from the perspective 
of the proposed FORCEnet architecture, as discussed in the FORCEnet Architecture 
Vision.  In general, we will seek to “overlay” the FnEPs concept on top of the FORCEnet 
Architecture Vision and, where necessary, we will identify critical networking issues. 
 
                                                 
274 Hesser and Rieken., Slide 9. 
275 This is in marked contrast to other major programs such as the TCA and GIG, both of which seek to build 
infrastructure without such an understanding of just what the performance requirements are—and which will ultimately 
dictate capabilities we are stuck with!   
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Figure 148.   FnEPs Functional Architecture, Notional Strike “Pack”. 
 
FORCEnet identified that its C4ISR infrastructure should enable warriors to 
decisively plan, execute, and sustain an aggressive operational-tempo.276  FnEPs’ goal to 
optimize the engagement chain parallels closely parallels this.  The FORCEnet 
Architectural Vision further defines three key “Domains” of the C4ISR infrastructure 
including: 
· Ashore 
· Afloat – On Board 
· Afloat – Off Board 
Each of these is discussed in greater detail below. 
1. Ashore 




                                                 
276 SPAWAR, Code 05, Office of the Chief Engineer, FORCEnet Architecture Vision, (Version 1.2), 18 July 
2003. 
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· Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
· Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG BE277) 
· Base Level Information Infrastructure (BLII) for OCONUS network 
infrastructure. 
Figure 149 illustrates these components. 
 
 
Figure 149.   Naval Ashore Network Infrastructure278. 
 
These programs will combine to enable efficient, secure, and reliable performance 
consistent with the GIG Systems Reference Model as illustrated in Figure 150. 
                                                 
277 Present development of GIG-BE has resulted in its being more commonly referred to as GIG 2.0, and we will 
use this term throughout this section. 
278 FORCEnet Architecture Vision,33. 
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Figure 150.   Naval Network Infrastructure with Supporting Infrastructure Services279. 
 
Generally, the goal for the ashore domain will include interconnecting terrestrial 
CONUS networks while allowing for growth and surge potential.  From a security 
perspective, DoD PKI authenticated login procedures will be implemented for all users, 
as well as strong security architecture and security services administration.  While initial 
laydown of infrastructure will be service-centric, follow-on infrastructure service 
contracts are expected to become more Joint as services and DoD move collectively to an 
IP-based grid based on common standards.  While initial lack of Joint interoperability is 
to be expected, FnEPs functionality will critically depend on Joint interoperability of not 
only combat and weapons systems, but C4ISR infrastructure as well.  For this reason, we 
strongly agree with the assessment FORCEnet plans should incorporate and leverage 
significant proposed OSD investments in GIG BE and DISA’s Network Centric 
Enterprise Services (NCES). 
                                                 
279Ibid, 34. 
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2. Afloat – On Board 
Afloat systems associated with the C4ISR infrastructure supporting FORCEnet 
seeks the establishment of a common, standardized networking infrastructure and a set of 
common core services that: 
· Support the transfer and distribution of information via multiple medium 
and data types on ships and at shore Network Operations Centers (NOCs) 
for both tactical and non-tactical mobile forces of the Navy, Marine Corps, 
joint, and allied operational elements; 
· Deliver online, anytime, anywhere connectivity supporting ship operations 
that is responsive, seamless, and secure across multiple classification 
levels that meet the QoS requirements of the user or application. 
· Support hosted systems, applications and the Family of Systems (FoS) 
concept without degradation or resource diversion to mission focus; and 
promote and facilitate technology refreshment and capability growth 
throughout a ship's life cycle 280. 
Generally, most C4I, Hull, Mechanical and Electrical (HM&E) and Combat 
Systems (CS) fall within scope of the FORCEnet Afloat – on board Network (FAN).  
While the ultimate goal is a single network infrastructure, based on the unique 
availability and data latency requirements required by these systems will require that 
separate physical networks be maintained in the near-term.  Figure 151 depicts the initial 
interface between Combat Systems Open Architecture and the current FORCEnet 
shipboard network; however, the requirements for such architectures will have to be more 
fully developed in the future under the FnEPs concept.  For example, under the future 
FORCEnet vision for Distributed Services such interfaces may change significantly. 
 
                                                 



























   C4I 
ISNS 
FORCNnet  Afloat Network 
Open Architecture pen rchitecture 
AEGIS I  Carrier rri r E - 2C  -  
   C4I 
E  
 
Figure 151.   Interface Between Combat Systems and FORCEnet Afloat Network281. 
 
3. Afloat – Off Board 
The afloat off-board portion of the FORCEnet Wide Area Network (WAN) 
includes all the radios, radio channels, satellites, and associated routers that connect our 
afloat onboard communications networks, ashore communications networks, 
expeditionary forces ashore, sensors, shooters and weapons.282   
Further, the FORCEnet Architecture Vision lists the following network 
infrastructure characteristics presently identified as necessary to support FORCEnet:   
4. Joint 
The radio-WAN must be joint interoperable and offer tactical joint connectivity.  
New routing protocols should be developed to ensure interservice connectivity, and we 
agree with the assessment such protocols should be consistent with JTRS.  Currently 
service-to-service IP communications are via the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), (e.g., 
                                                 
281 Ibid, 37. 
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the interface between the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) and MAGTF 
routers).  This characteristic will be especially critical for enabling full FnEPs 
functionality. 
5. Sea Bed to Space Scope  
Sea Power 21 implies the requirement for communications between a full range 
of assets operating across a continuum of sea bed, surface (and land-based), and space   
6. Internet Protocols 
As discussed previously, using IP-based networking and communications will 
provide a number of benefits.  While technical challenges remain, migration to IPv6 from 
IPv4 or other circuit-switched, currently non-routable networks promises improved 
features and performance necessary to FORCEnet and FnEPs and we agree should form 
the basis of the network layer throughout the network.  A variety of network performance 
characteristics (e.g., ISR –vs- Fire Control) will always exist.  At least in the near term 
and due to constraints associated with legacy systems, proprietary systems, and 
specialized networks will remain.  The challenge lies in ensuring the interoperability and 
integration of these systems in order to achieve and end-to-end, engagement chain 
focused network architecture. 
7. High Capacity 
The network must support the rapid growth of information exchange 
requirements, especially from the perspective of bandwidth and required QOS.  The 
following factors will help to ensure the necessary capacity is available in the future: 
· From a “space” perspective, Advanced Wideband System (AWS), 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Mobile User Objective 
System (MUOS), next generation SHF, and TCS. 
· JTRS and Tactical Targeting Networking Technology (TTNT) will 
provide the future growth in LoS networking.   
· Microwave trunks such as Multipoint Common Data Link (MPCDL), and 
Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) will provide high data rate point to 
point connectivity.   
8. Efficiency 
Congestion is a chronic problem in Navy RF communications today. This is in 
large measure due to static communications and bandwidth allocations.  What is required 
is the ability to dynamically allocate resources on an as-required basis, while ensuring 
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required QOS.  Other efficiency tasks relate to ensuring the router to router interconnects 
are in place, and that the network pipes are consolidated.  Dynamic bandwidth allocation 
can be implemented by utilizing modern communications protocols such as IPv6, while 
also and utilizing the lowest tier consistent with communications needs.  A critical aspect 
of QOS is the need Joint standards and enforceability.  These are especially important 
because FnEPs will require networks support the real-time performance requirements of 
weapons and other combat systems.  In general, further efficiency gains can be gained via 
advances in compression and caching, reducing the redundancy in transmissions.  Flow 
control, traffic monitoring, bandwidth management, network management, and user 
discipline are mechanisms that enable the 
warfighter and network managers to manipulate the network for efficiency and to control 
communications flows, thereby allowing the most important communications to receive 
priority, giving speed to critical information.   
9. System-to-Warfighter Interfaces  
FORCEnet and FnEPs critically depend on the integration of the warfigther.  
Accordingly, we strongly agree with the assessment of the need to offer common 
interfaces to our warfighters.  This implies the requirement for providing “the right 
information to the right place at the right time, in the right context”.  As specific 
examples from the perspective of FnEPs, these interfaces will need to include mission 
and system status, especially as provided by ABMAs. 
10. Dynamic & Mobile 
The deployed and expeditionary nature of today’s forces and operations makes 
this particular characteristic of C4ISR infrastructure particularly important.  More 
specifically, both FORCEnet and FnEPs will take advantage of the opportunities from 
massing capabilities without massing forces.  Examples of the implications for such 
mobility of forces and assets and the corresponding requirement for dynamic networking 
and routing include next generation software defined radios, such as JTRS, and 
accompanying routers.  Such systems need to be able to auto-discover the channels and 
routes with least cost and minimal latency in coordination with localized and global 
network managers and their accommodating service level agreements283.  Such 
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capabilities will eliminate the current satellite channel and (manual) routing 
reconfiguration difficulties experienced as assets change operational commands (i.e. 
inchop during transit from one AoR to another) as well as the difficulties experienced 
when a platform joins or leaves the Joint Task Force.284  A notable aspect to improving 
this challenge is to take advantage of existing opportunities to reduce redundant resource 
usage by forces when they are not mobile (deployed).  An example is that while ships are 
pierside, they should maximize their use of all terrestrial-based networks, thereby making 
available SATCOM resources for those who are deployed.  Currently, the Base-Level 
Information Infrastructure (BLII) pierside connectivity does not provide ALL in-port 
shipboard communication services.  This results in the requirement to maintain CA-III 
SHF connectivity while also in port.  We need to fix this problem! 
11. Scalable 
This characteristic is closely related to the requirement for C4ISR infrastructure to 
support dynamic and mobile routing.  From a FORCEnet perspective, scalability must 
support force- level changes, as battle groups join or split, and in littoral areas where joint 
forces and coalition forces could be operating together within close proximity.  FnEPs’ 
cross-mission functionality is especially dependant on the ability of individual assets or 
“nodes” to join and/or leave the network “on-the-fly”.  We agree with the assessment 
current tactical data links should be enhanced in their flexibility to add or delete users 
from the network automatically and adaptively reallocate bandwidth resources.  As 
communications loads and channel availability change, routers must balance the 
communications load across the available channels, thereby allowing the network to scale 
up or down while mitigating congestion. 285 
12. Robust  
While FORCEnet implies a high reliance on network robustness, FnEPs’ 
introduction of weapons and other combat systems into consideration will make this 
characteristic even more critical.  Similar to today’s Internet, availability will be 
improved via route diversity and mesh density.  More, specifically, FORCEnet envisions 
a transition from hub and spoke architecture toward a “Tiered Architecture” (discussed 




below) that will enable multiple communications and data paths, thereby improving 
network robustness and availability communications infrastructure as possible, 
Transformational Communications Satellites, and JTRS. 
13. Tiered Architecture  
 
Figure 152.   Tiered Architecture. 
 
From the perspective of FORCEnet, the network depicted in Figure 152 will 
allow better connectivity between forces ashore, at-sea, and airborne.  From the 
perspective of FnEPs, this connectivity will enable the configuration of the “packs,” as 
well as their reconfiguration and adaptability to multiple missions.  To be efficient, the 
architecture must be viewed as tiers of connectivity with each communications need 
being serviced by the lowest tier consistent with the communications service required and 
the current state of the network.286  In addition to offering multiple redundant paths for 
reliability, this tiered architecture enables us to save the greater range and coverage 
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satellite connectivity for the communications that require it, thereby mitigating 
congestion in the space segment and ensuring warfighter access to critical operational 
information and systems.  The dense connectivity offered by these multiple paths 
converts our ships from end hosts in the network to fully enabled network nodes capable 
of sending, receiving, and relaying information.   
As discussed in the FORCEnet Architectural Vision, the four tiers are: 
· Tier 1:  Within platforms and radio handhelds.  This tier would include 
shipboard LANs (wired and wireless [e.g. 802.11]) and radios such as 
SINCGARS. 
· Tier 2:  Networked LoS and BLoS among platforms and expeditionary 
forces ashore.  This tier includes most JTRS components, Intra-
BattleGroup Wireless Networking, Tactical Digital Information Links 
(TADILs), Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT), and HF 
Alternate Low Energy (ALE)287.  Each platform at this tier should, in 
general, be able to serve as an end or a relay in the communications path, 
thereby giving platforms access to each other’s communications assets 
consistent with operational priorities and the state of the network.  
Participation of airborne assets in Tier 2 is very important due to the LoS 
limitation and the distances associated with surface ships and submarines.  
JTRS cluster 4 provides the standards and interfaces for airborne networks 
and how airborne communicators connect to land, sea, and space 
communications assets.  Most antenna patterns for Tier 2 will be omni 
directional, thereby facilitating each node’s ability to know the state of its 
neighbors and to route packets to its reachable neighbors.  Dynamic 
routing and dynamic physical layers will be the chief technical challenges 
at this tier.  There must be a single joint mobile ad hoc network layer that 
can be applied globally across any data link layer.  This layer needs to be 
consistent with plans for the JTRS WNW and facilitate incorporation of 
coalition units.  Possible Mobile IP enhancements include dynamic low 
overhead routing protocols such as the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) routing protocol. 
· Tier 3:  Trunked LoS and BLoS.  This tier includes TCDL, Digital 
Wideband Transmission System (DWTS), and HF ALE.  Trunked LoS is 
high capacity, high range connectivity typically via an airborne 
communications node.  This provides wideband connectivity between 
littoral ships and land forces on the beach or between clusters of ships 
spaced too far apart for tier 2 connectivity.  Tiers 1, 2, and 3 will typically 
be organic. 
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269 
· Tier 4:  Geosynchronous Satellite.  This tier includes TCS, MILSATCOM, 
DSCS, MUOS, Challenge Athena, and INMARSAT.  This tier will 
provide the most reliable connectivity and therefore often the most 
desired.  The links in Tiers 1, 2 and 3 will often not support the distances 
required and will be dynamic in nature, but Tier 4 availability is near 
100% outside the polar regions.  For maximum efficiency, satellite 
capacity connections need to be established and relinquished automatically 
on demand via a latency-tolerant multiple access protocol288.  This 
specifically will facilitate efficient routing by passing most ship-to-ship 
traffic via one satellite hop vice today’s typical double hop via a shore 
facility.289 
14. Logical Architecture  
As discussed in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision, the WAN serves both combat 
and C2 systems.  Due to the need to ensure the func tionality of such systems under 
conditions of limited bandwidth, such systems have historically been developed as 
stovepiped systems and dedicated communications links.  This has not only resulted in 
the interoperability challenges highlighted throughout Chapter I, but has resulted in 
inefficient use of available assets and bandwidth.  Fortunately, internet protocols and 
QOS mechanisms offer the opportunity to not only ensure the availability of required 
communications resources, but to do so in an efficient manner.  This will require us to 
prioritize communications requirements in terms of latency, bandwidth, and jitter.  One 
way of envisioning this prioritization from an architectural standpoint is to assign ranges 
of priority to virtual routers.  Such virtual routers allow a simple and effective description 
of the logical architecture for routing and prioritizing traffic on the radio links off board 
ships.  Routers in the middle of Figure 153 are designated for their logical function but 
may be physically implemented as a single router. 
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Figure 153.   FORCEnet Implementation Architecture290. 
 
Such virtual routers are envisioned by the FORCEnet Architecture Vision as 
supporting SEA POWER 21 through: 
· A Horizontal Fusion (or Sea Basing) virtual router, focused on peer-to-
peer communications across the deployed force.  Such communications 
will enable communications among Naval, Joint, Federal, and other non-
DoD organizations and nodes 
· A Force Projections (or Sea Strike) virtual router, focused on supporting 
the “on-battlefield” targeting architecture.  This function is precisely 
where FnEPs will offer the greatest potential to improve operations 
associated with the engagement chain.  Key to this functionality is 
maintaining system interoperability focused on persistent ISR, joint strike 
targeting and real-time strike execution. 
· The Force Protection (or Sea Shield) virtual router, focused on supporting 
the “on-battlefield” air defense and access denial threats.  Again, this 
function is closely aligned with the FnEPs concept in terms of its focus on 
the engagement chain as it relates to air defense and related threats. 
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It is important to emphasize that the goal of FORCEnet to implement a 
centralized network management solution and that no specific RF communication 
solution will be dedicated to support any one of the FORCEnet component networks 
discussed above.  Further, FORCEnet will rely on a network implementing a dynamic 
access scheme to ensure that any radio resource can be allocated to any mission based on 
Joint BMC2ISR needs.291  Again, such goals are in direct alignment with the 
requirements of FnEPs.   
15. Systems Architecture  
As outlined in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision, a critical consideration is that 
of the interface between the on-board communications (internal) and the RF channels 
allowing for the passing of data and communications to and from a given platform 
(external).  The functionality such an interface must enable includes: 
· Automatic routing 
· QoS enforcement 
· Encryption 
· Autodiscovery of radio channels, and the radios themselves.   
The black IP router depicted in diagram xx below controls IP traffic among and 
between any of the other security enclave routers, combat systems, or “packs”.  In 
addition to route determination, this router will provide QoS enforcement. 
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Figure 154.   Red Side IP Enclave Routing. 
 
The other routers depicted in Figure 154 will prioritize packets according to 
differentiated service code points (DSCP) in the IP header.  The label will indicate the 
operational priority and tolerance for [round-trip] latency, jitter, and the deterministic 
requirements (bounded delay delivery) of the packet.  Such labels are critical to allowing 
for end-to-end QoS.  Together, the security enclave routers and the black router will share 
QoS enforcement roles.  As depicted in diagram 154, each of these LANs is connected to 
the RF devices off the ship via its enclave router, a COMSEC device, and the black 
router.  While we agree this is a viable near term solution, in the long run, providing data 
security (layer 7) is a better way to go. 
16. Data Links 
It is important to note that even considering relatively less demanding networking 
functionality, current and near term C4ISR infrastructure implementation may not fully 
support performance requirements.  From the perspective of FnEPs and the latency, QOS, 
and security requirements of combat systems, these requirements will be even more 
critical.  It will take time for the open architecture and open standards approach that the 
FORCEnet Architectiure Vision proposes to be fully implemented.  In the meantime 
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specialized and stove-piped network and communication links will remain.  It is 
important to note; however, that QoS and other performance challenges appear as a result 
of the applications within these links, not as a result of protocol shortcomings.  In short, 
the issue of IP-based data links is one of provisioning not of IPs unsuitability for such 
networks.  Figure 155 represents a proposed architecture that supports the merger of Joint 
Planning Networks (JPN) and Joint Data Networks (JDN), and bring IP capability to 
tactical data links.  As discussed in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision, such an 
architecture will be implemented in a time-phased manner, ensuring alignment and 
evolution of standards, programs, protocols, ship/air/ground-based systems, initiatives 
and technologies.  This architecture will also provide a framework to ensure that the 




Figure 155.   High Level Data Link Vision293. 
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Unfortunately, current TDL operations, including Link 11 and Link 16 do not 
provide the throughput, bandwidth, QoS control, and flexibility necessary to meet the 
information exchange requirements envisioned by FORCEnet.294  Such requirements will 
change, and likely increase in terms performance, when the CRC functionality of FnEPs 
is considered.  As a result, we agree with the assessment acceleration of engagement time 
lines and seamless data exchange from sensor-shooter-weapon necessitates enhancements 
to current Link-16 capabilities.  One such solution to this challenge is the Next 
Generation Command and Control Processor (NGC2P) Program, which will allow the 
Navy to incorporate Link 22 and Joint Range Extension (JRE) capability in conjunction 
with a preplanned upgrade to the existing C2P and Combat Data Link Management 
System (CDLMS).  Together with other integration efforts including the airborne Low 
Cost Integration (LCI), this effort is being accomplished as a joint US Navy and USAF 
effort under the name of Common Link Integration Processing (CLIP).  This effort 
represents potential development of a joint service, cross-platform, TDL message 
processing and integration application which will provide the interface to various tactical 
data communication systems including current terminals and radios and those under 
development such as MIDS SCA and JTRS.  Additional advantages of CLIP include its 
ability to interface with any host (i.e. combat) system, and its utilization of primarily 
open systems software that can reside on any operating system or hardware.295 
Overall, the following are goals of the FORCEnet Data Link architecture outlined 
in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision: 
· Migrate all network systems to include IP capability  
· Convergence to three Tactical Data Links 
· Low-end BLoS link for use with coalition partners (Link-22) 
· Hi-end BLoS link for high bandwidth (JRE) 
· LoS link (Link-16) for bandwidth and ATC functions 
· Use of JTRS for radio functions for all links 
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· Invest in a single network and communication processing capability for 
use across all ship and aircraft systems to include dynamic networking and 
network management functionality; 
· Link-16 uses IP, JRE uses JREAP, CEC moves to IP as part of Open 
Architecture (OA) 
· CDL and TCDL need to be converged through a common, light-weight 
processor and migrated to IP. 
While we generally agree with these goals, we caution that careful modularization 
of the network architecture and its member systems should be the overarching goal.  
Further, as COTS technology improves and as other solutions become available we 
should not “blindly pursue” the specific systems identified above.  Proper modularization 
will help to ensure that we are not constrained to a particular system or “boxological” 
approach. 
17. A FORCEnet Scenario  
As discussed in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision, the requisite network 
infrastructure characteristics and “capabilities” can best be identified and portrayed 
within the context of a war-fighting scenario.  The following discussion relates such a 
scenario, presented in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision (Version 1.2 dtd 18 July 2003), 
and set against the stage of the Philippine Islands.  While this scenario was originally 
designed to demonstrate how FORCEnet will change the way Navy conducts warfare and 
generates force as a component of a Joint, Allied and/or Coalition Force, we will overlay 
the FnEPs concept onto this scenario, and specifically inject networking-related 
considerations, especially as they relate to the five CRCs.  As noted in the FORCEnet 
Architecture Vision, from which the following scenario was taken, this scenario can serve 
as the basis for a demonstration framework, which can evolve in a laboratory and 
development environment to showcase applications, composeable functionality, network 
tools, interoperability mechanisms, and other components that are key parts of making 
FORCEnet and FnEPs a reality296.   
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a. Act 1:  Composing the Force and Building a Shared 
Understanding297 
The Joint Task Force (JTF), an ad hoc force formulated more on the basis 
of proximity than capability, arrives on the scene.  This ad hoc nature does not concern 
the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF), since each element’s J3 and J6s are well versed 
in the art of composing command and control interoperability and supporting technical 
infrastructure.  Under direction of the CJTF J6, distributed, converged IP-based networks 
are established.  Bandwidth management and control tools allow all the J6’s to build their 
information exchange and management plans, based on the CJTF’s preliminary guidance.  
Agents will monitor traffic in real time and recommend adjustments to maximize 
connectivity and throughput. 
Since distributed services were instituted across DoD, operators have 
grown accustomed to gathering needed information and display the same coherently.  
This capability will allow the virtual JTF intelligence organization to rapidly assemble an 
accurate, timely Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).  Employing information 
derived from national and theater Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
assets, the IPB is updated and currency is maintained as the crisis evolves.  In addition to 
an IPB, both sensor-derived data and seamless support from the theater JIC acquired by a 
network agent is integrated into the Predictive Battlespace (in this case, perhaps, 
operational space) Awareness (PBA) process allowing for the assembled forces to be 
fully aware of the situation, recent events, and potential hazards of their mission, to 
include potential adversary courses of action.   
From an FnEPs perspective, in this scenario, no “packs” are yet formed, 
rather the CP is being developed and the ABMA system is “ready” in terms of its 
awareness of available pack assets and their status.  From a networking perspective ISR 
and C2 functionality are being utilized, however bandwidth, Availability/Survivability, 
and QOS demands are relatively low, due to the “pre-conflict” status of the situation.  
Conversely, available bandwidth may be relatively low, due to the fact relatively few 
assets may be available or dedicated for use in theater.  
                                                 
297 Ibid., 15. 
277 
As highlighted in the FORCEnet Architecture Vision, at this point the 
network infrastructure closely resembles current technology, with various LoS or BloS 
links.  However, through dynamic network configuration and bandwidth allocation, now 
the transmission path is transparent to the force, and redundant, fault-tolerant links are 
provisioned.  Additionally, sophisticated, defense in depth information assurance 
protocols guard against constant net intrusion, yet still enable needed coalition (and 
allied) information sharing at several levels of security. 298  
b. Act 2:  Creating Shared Situational Awareness 
Based on the information centric computing environment alert agents 
determine an inconsistency in data is likely based on Global Positioning System (GPS) 
jamming, and send an alert to all GPS subscribers.  Cross cueing and fusion of 
Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS), JSTARS, and ESM receivers quickly leads to 
detection, identification and a track of the GPS jammer.  From an FnEPs perspective, this 
is analogous to the initiation of the engagement chain, more specifically sensor assets 
have been cued in order to “find” and “fix” possible targets. Within minutes, the CJTF 
initiates an on-demand high resolution Video Teleconference (VTC) with their 
components, where collaboratively they determine the operational impact of the jammer, 
conclude action is required, and generate courses of action.  Graphical depictions of plans 
reduce misunderstanding and the high resolution VTC allows the various commanders to 
learn from body language, tone of voice, and words, each other’s true perceptions.  
Satisfied they are on the same page, the CJTF moves on to the next challenge.  From the 
perspective of FnEPs, this human decision-making intensive process can be made more 
efficient through the use of of ABMAs which can help optimize the decision-making 
process of determining optimum sensor-shooter-weapons linkages. Rather than removing 
the warfighter from the decision-making process; however, ABMAs enable the use of 
advanced decision support tools and allow Commanders and their staffs to focus on other 
tasks.  In terms of networking technology, ABMAs have the advantage of being 
dynamically “adjusted” or “tuned” depending on any number of situational factors.  Two 
key factors are 1) Time and 2) Available processing power and other network resources.  
First, from the perspective of time, the given scenario is transitioning from pre-conflict to 
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conflict.  Accordingly, there would likely still be time and other necessary resources to 
leave the decision-making process largely to the CJTF and his staff.  Given an increase in 
optempo; however, ABMAs could be allowed to operate in an increasingly automated 
manner, thus assisting the warfighter with decision-making in the face of increasingly 
chaotic situations and the “fog of war.”  Interestingly, by significantly decreasing 
engagement timelines, FnEPs will likely similarly compress the time available for 
optimal decision-making as well.  This further highlights the importance and value of 
robust ABMAs functionality.  The second perspective, that of available processing power 
and other network resources, also highlights the need for the dynamic functionality of of 
ABMAs.  For example, especially during pre-conflict or other less operationally intensive 
phases of conflict, computing power and other network resources to process complex 
algorithms and challenging optimization problems would likely be available.  As 
optempo increased, these resources  
could be dynamically reconfigured and optimized to support decision-making under a 
variety of conditions.  The remaining two “acts” of the FORCEnet operational scenario 
have been overlayed with the CRC functionality inherent to the FnEPs concept.   
c. Act 3:  Self-Synchronization 
At this point, the CJTF directs his staff to execute the mission.  Due to the 
facilitation of common awareness (through CP functionality), subordinate commanders 
understood the intent and plan as well as the commander.  In this case, four V-22s ingress 
the rebel-controlled area, while their current tactical picture highlights Special Forces on 
the ground positioned to neutralize the one nearby surface to air missile site.  
Preprogrammed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) circled in stealth mode, listening for 
any signals from the Miscellaneous Command Ship (AGF).  Unexpectedly a brief hint of 
a previously unidentified AGF unit is detected by one of the UAVs.   
UGS detected an unidentified hovercraft approaching the LZ.  In-country 
special forces launch a rapid reaction mini-UAV, confirming with the sensor coordinator.  
Identified as hostile (through CCID functionality), the forces are now in a quandary; the 
key LZ for the V-22’s is at risk, jeopardizing the operation.  The fires coordinator, alerted 
by a change in plan cue (and assisted by ABMA functionality), rapidly analyzes the 
situation.  The V-22 has Hellfire laser designated missiles onboard but an F-35 is 
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available and also capable of providing mensurated targeting data in the form of in-flight 
target updates to Extended Range Guided Munitions (ERGM) fired from surface ships 
located over the horizon and out of harms reach.   
An infiltration team notes that the area to the east is devoid of AGF and 
recommends that the V-22s change flight path easterly and save Hellfire for other 
emerging threats.  (Because CT have been passed throughout the JTF)  The fires 
coordinator recognizes the F-35 is capable of rapidly engaging the hovercraft with 
JSOW-ER.  Without requiring orders, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) reports that 
the mini UAV could lase the hostile hovercraft immediately following notification 
(through IFC functionality).  In less than five minutes from detection, a single Joint 
Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) destroys the hovercraft from a 60-mile range.  The V-22s are 
then redirected to the LZ where the Special Forces deploy from them and eliminate the 
GPS jammer.  Through operational synchronization, an element of Sea Strike had been 
masterfully executed in support of Joint Forces.  
d. Act 4: Intra Theater Missile Defense 
Through netted National Intelligence sources, (CP functionality) the CJTF 
learns of an Army Ground Force (AGF) request to affiliated Al Qaeda terrorist cells 
operating within nearby Brunei for assistance in a retribution attack for the loss of their 
GPS jammer asset.  The CJTF directs that the AGF commander’s third generation 
cellular technology IP enabled PDA become a target for exploitation and offensive 
Information Operations.  This exploitation indicates an imminent cruise missile attack.  
Using Predictive Battlespace Awareness applications, possible enemy Courses of Action 
are posted to the Knowledge Web (KWEB) where Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander (JFACC) begins dynamic replanning of Airspace Controls (Airspace Control 
Order - ACO) to counter the threat against critical Government of Philippines 
infrastructure targets on the Defended Assets List (ABMAs functionality).  This includes 
designation of Overland Cruise Missile Defense kill boxes for extended range SAM 
engagements using airborne Fire Control (FC) radar.  The change to the ACO is posted to 
KWEB for situational awareness and automatically forwarded to the operational forces 
via the network for real-time deconfliction of airborne fixed and rotary wing assets 
(ABMAs functionality).  Airborne Early Warning aircraft detect the low observable 
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cruise missile by building a composite track (CT functionality) through networked 
sensors and preplanned responses published on the KWEB allow immediate engagement 
of the threat (CCID functionality) by a surface ship operating off the coast.  An active 
seeker SAM completes a successful engagement, destroying the cruise missile, by using 
the network to subscribe to the fire control solution for the target published by several 
ground and airborne FC radars (IFC functionality).   
It is critical to note that while the preceding scenario demonstrated the 
integration of the existing combat systems and processes into FORCEnet, the vast 
majority of these systems are Naval systems and TTPs such as those required to support 
IFC are assumed to have been transitioned to.  FnEPs will absolutely require integration 
of joint assets and new TTPs in order to maximize the five CRCs identified in Chapter 2!  
Through machine to machine collaboration using an Open-Architecture Computing and 
Networking Environment, sensors, Combat Systems, C2 nodes and weapons become the 
peripherals and applications that ride the network to enable FORCEnet to satisfy required 
operational capabilities as the “new” construct of a composeable combat system. 
18. TCA and GIG 2.0 
The C4ISR infrastructure proposed by the FORCEnet Architecture Vision is only 
one part of a “triad” of network infrastructure programs that also includes the 
Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and the Global Information Grid 
2.0 terrestrial infrastructure upgrade (GIG 2.0), which together will provide a standard 
means to interconnect all deployed and fixed users and facilities in a global network, 
while improving our architecture’s bandwidth, survivability, and in-theater reach 
capabilities.  This relationship is depicted in Figure 156.299 
In conjunction with NSA and GIG 2.0, the TCA will provide wide-band, black 
network layer IP-based communications.  Tremendous increases in available bandwidth 
will be made possible by the NRO Optical Relay satellite (ORCA)300, MILSATCOM 
Transformational Satellite (TSAT), and advanced Polar Satellite (APS) interoperating 
with each other using wideband cross links.  Further, space based IP routers and/or circuit 
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switches, and interoperating through the terrestrial GIG 2.0 infrastructure upgrade with 
Advanced EHF (AEHF), Wide band Gap Filler (WGS), MUOS, and Commercial Satcom 
systems will also combine to provide significant increases in connectivity between fixed 
facilities and mobile/relocatable deployed users.301  Advanced terminals programs are 
another large part of the TCA.  Such programs will allow for fewer types of terminals, 
each of which would be software reprogrammable to handle various waveforms, use 
dynamic bandwidth management to increase effective throughput, and are multiband and 
multi waveform capable.  Further, such terminals would be equipped with IP routers and 
circuit switches that operate in the black to support the rest of the TCA capabilities.302  
 
 
Figure 156.   FORCEnet and Transformational Communications 303. 
 
It should be highlighted that while the preceding discussion presumes the 
optimum architecture maximizes the use of space-based assets while minimizing the use 
of terrestrial infrastructure.  Such is not necessarily the case.  For example, while this 
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discussion does not presume a particular satellite constellation or architecture, if the 
satellites were assumed to be in a Geo-Stationary or Geo-Synchronous orbit, global 
communications could be achieved using only two ground relays.  GIG 2.0 assumes that 
with approximately 100 points of presence (POPs) you would need no such ground 
relays.  Another example is that of current polar orbiting satellites that cross- link to other 
“GEO” satellites which then downlink to customers or communication stations at either 
end.  This requires complicated technology included cross- linked beam steering.  A better 
idea might be to modify the current GIG 2.0 program to establish communication stations 
at high Northern and Southern latitudes such that each could acquire polar orbiting 
satellites without requiring cross- links or further burdening the “GEO” satellites 
discussed previously. 
19. Composeable Services 
As discussed in Chapter II, FORCEnet will utilize a Technical Reference Model 
(FnTRM) based on a Distributed Service Architecture which implements “composeable 
services,”304 allowing the flexible and dynamic combination of those services necessary 
to accomplish a given mission.  Figure 157 depicts the “Composeable Mission 
Capability” which is the goal of this approach. 
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Figure 157.   The Vision:  Composeable Mission Capability305. 
 
Composeability occurs when “selections” from functional (such as sensors or 
communications) “bins”, are combined to facilitate mission accomplishment.  
FORCEnet’s distributed services architecture and its ability to facilitate composeability is 
closely aligned with and critically important to the FnEPs concept.  This relationship is 
analyzed and discussed in greater detail in both Chapters III and IV. 
From a networking perspective, and in the context of a TAMD “Pack,” distributed 
services will support a virtual networked environment of automation-aided sensor to 
weapon linkages providing potentially thousands of rounds on target per hour and 
extending combat reach far inland against raids of cruise and ballistic missiles.  As 
discussed in Chapter IV, the initial analysis of the FnEPs concept allowed the discovery 
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of relationships between combat system functions and their information exchange 
requirements, and the packaging of service areas, prioritized to support a variety of 
missions.   
As discussed in Chapter IV; however, achieving distributed services presents a 
number of technical challenges.  Figure 158 seeks to characterize the problem. 
 
 
Figure 158.   How Do We Move to Distributed Services?306. 
 
Distributed services require the ability to access “services”, such as the common 
operational picture (COP), data link subscription, or other information.  Presently, these 
services are complex, face interoperability problems, and are generally via a closed, 
rather than open architecture.  Ultimately, this prevents the composeability of the 
information into different information flows.  The distributed services FnEPs seeks to 
create or take advantage of in a networked virtual environment look much different.  The 
                                                 
306 Charles, Assessments to Define Composeable Mission Capability, Slide 33. 
285 
services should be much simpler in operation.  These services should focus on providing 
standardized enterprise-wide service, functions and information.  Distributed services 
allow portable applications and an optimization of “where” the application is executed.  
This could be termed “locality” of an application where there is a balance to be struck 
between where the data physically resides, where the processing power is coming from 
and what network assets are needed and available to support these activities.  
Presumably, ABMAs would need to facilitate this functionality.  Such functionality 
would be enabled via an Open Architecture Computing Environement (OACE), and a 
management of producer and consumer activities.  Figure 159 shows how “composeable 
capabilities” based on distributed services allow system like capability to be “composed” 
in response to requirements, challenges and demands of the very dynamic current 
operational situation.  Further, this diagram highlights the potential to enable 
composeable organizations across Navy, Joint and potentially Allied and Coalition 
components.  The flexibility in organizational structure and services allows the 
composition of TTPs and doctrine at all levels of warfighting.   
 
 
Figure 159.   Distributed Services Provides Composeable Capabilities307. 
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Other networking implications for distributed services include a “publish and 
subscribe” ontology and the requirement for certain “fixed applications” and a directory 
service of services to optimize such an architecture.  Beyond FORCEnet, such directory 
services must be supported by an infrastructure of enterprise services like NCES, 
DoDIIS, DII/COE, etc.  Figure 160 depicts distributed services and describes how the 
“publish and subscribe” ontology will work. 
 
 
Figure 160.   Establishing Distributed Services, Overland Cruise Missile Defense 
(Example)308. 
 
As depicted in this figure, a given combat node or element will logon and 
authenticate (register) themselves in order to “publish and subscribe” to a service or set of 
services.  This example depicts an AEGIS cruiser that is assigned the mission to project 
overland cruise missile defense to defend a ground force.  Additionally, a joint theater 
Global Hawk asset has been assigned to support the mission.  This example has each of 
the nodes advertising and registering services that it has available to support the mission, 
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additionally, each of the nodes request to subscribe to services that are needed for the 
node to execute its mission.  This figure demonstrates when a new member wishes to join 
a distributed service, once authenticated, the user publishes to the rest of the distributed 
services subscribers what kinds of information, what data formats, system functionalities 
are supported, and what are the things this new member can provide to the collective 
members of the service.  But for the other half of this transaction, the new distributed 
service member must subscribe to what other system functionalities are being provided 
by the rest of the distributed service members.  The new member of this distributed 
service asks for certain data, information, interface requirements, formats and system 
functionalities being provided by the rest of the distributed service members, ir-respective 
of geographic considerations due to it’s network-centric nature.  Once this handshake 
between what information the new member can provide to the distributed service 
members and what information the new member needs from the distributed service 




Figure 161.   Service Delivery, Overland Cruise Missile Defense (Example)309. 
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Once ABMAs have composed the operational approach that will be used to 
execute the overland cruise missile capability, the FORCEnet infrastructure is quickly 
configured to support the publish and subscribe service capabilities needed.  In this 
example, the network establishes two consumer-to-consumer (C2C) services that allow 
the three nodes to exchange information.  One is a basic track services and the other 
missile alert service.  In this case, the AEGIS cruiser has subscribed to receive AMTI 
sensor feeds from the Global Hawk’s MP-RTIP radar.  The AEGIS cruiser’s on-board 
distributed sensor processor has the ability to mix the Global Hawk’s remote sensor with 
its local sensors to detect and ID a cruise missile threat, and to immediately report this 
data to prepare for an attack (employ chemical and biological defense mechanisms).  In 
addition, it provides the same information back to the Global Hawk so that the MP-RTIP 
radar can execute a High Resolution Radar (HRR) continuous track update information to 
the AEGIS cruiser.  This information is sufficient to provide the AEGIS with a fire 
quality solution that can be used to engage the cruise missile remotely. 
Further, the AEGIS has been made aware of the Global Hawk’s ability to not only 
support a remote engagement (sensor-to-shooter paradigm) for remote engagement, but 
also has the ability to support forward pass (sensor-to-weapon paradigm). This allows the 
Global Hawk to take control of the SM-2 and provide mid-course and terminal guidance 
support directly to the SM-2 in flight.  This enables the AEGIS to engage the cruise 
missile at a greater range, and potent ially support a shoot- look-shoot to engage the threat. 
As the scenario plays-out, the AEGIS indicates that it will engage the target, and 
request forward pass support from the Global Hawk.  The Global Hawk indicates it will 
comply with the engagement request – the AEGIS launches the SM-2, controls initial 
weapon fly-out, then turns final engagement over to the Global Hawk.  We assume a 
successful engagement and this example ends. 
As discussed previously, distributed services must be built on a common, open 
architecture that allows the ability to interoperate and collaborate without consideration 
to all the possible combinations or permutations of possible systems both already in 
operational use or those being designed.  Open architectures built on secure, common 
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modules with interfaces stabilized through standardization will allow nesting and 
chaining.  This will facilitate simple and completely defined interfaces for any number of 
architecture pieces into an arbitrarily complex service.  This approach allows distributed 
services to be composed of modular system functionality as the need or situation dictates 
and allows for the network infrastructure to be as flexible and adaptable as needed.  
These composeability, flexibility, and adaptability characteristics produce the needed 
“small pieces, loosely coupled” architecture so critically important to FnEPs.  As with all 
initiatives including FnEPs, this notion of distributed services must be joint and 
incorporate service participants from all services because the FnEPs concept cannot be 
achieved with only single service inputs.  The question remains, how do distributed 
services become a reality?  Figure 162 seeks to show a process to be used that would 
accomplish the goal of realizing distributed services. 
 
 
Figure 162.   FnEP Strategy to Align Systems with Warfighting Capabilities310. 
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Figure 162 depicts a strategy to align systems and programs using the FnEPs 
concept.  This strategy critically hinges on the understanding of system decomposition 
into FnEPs Pack Factor (PF) components as the first step.  When recomposing PF 
components into “packs,” combat reach capabilities and a few critical services (horizontal 
“lanes”) become critical enablers to pack composition.  The GEMINII approach used 
throughout our analysis of FnEPs supports more detailed understanding of integration 
management to understand if all system interrelationships are possible, optimal, desired 
or affordable.  There would be a need for system designers to use this information to 
focus on interactions that yield the most effectiveness.  Understanding how combat reach 
capabilities provide warfighting distributed services are key to understanding how 
distributed services support pack adaptability across both Strike and TAMD mission 
areas. 
As highlighted in Chapter III, the first step in the process is to establish the 
FORCEnet architecture with respect to services required.  FnEPs depends on both the 
integration of all six FORCEnet factors (warriors, sensors, platforms, networks, 
command and control and weapons) and the functionality provided by the five Combat 
Reach Capabilities (CRCs).  The figure above lists these as FORCEnet “services” along 
the left, but also depicts other services such as Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT), 
Mission Planning (MP) and FORCEnet Information Grid (Fn IG)) (Single/Common 
Pictures (synonomous with the CP CRC) referred to as the Common Tactical Picture 
(CTP)).  Step two involves overlaying “As-Is” operational systems/programs onto a map 
which shows how these individual Stove-piped systems’ deliver the required FnEP 
capabilities.  Step three decomposes these “As-Is” operational systems into their system 
functions and/or information categories and map them to the respective CRCs and 
services.  This is where the transformation process begins by decomposing systems into 
small pieces (system functions/information pairs) that will align functionality to 
distributed services.  The SSC-C GEMINII methodology (NTIRA, TVDB and associated 
tools) was critical in facilitating this decomposition.  Step four focuses on the analysis of 
the gaps and overlaps of system functionality as provided by current systems in support 
of the defined FORCEnet services.  The GEMINII methodology supports the gap and 
overlap analysis process but also provides tools to do dynamic modeling of new 
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integrated, distributed architectures.  This realigned system functionality, combined with 
defined architectural interfaces at the CRC and service level and organized around and 
end-to-end perspective of the engagement chain will make FnEPs analysis possible.  At 
this critical point analysis could be conducted to determine FORCEnet network 
infrastructure requirements from a CRC and distributed service perspective using “like” 
systems while maintaining capability context within a particular engagement chain, 
called TACSITs in this situation.  The final and critical step is to align and integrate those 
new CRCs (system functions) and distributed services along the TACSIT-defined 
engagement chain and propose new funding and integration alignment changes which 
will allow for an end-to-end engagement chain integration based service.   
Overall, in addition to providing the basis for network infrastructure requirements, 
this process will allow for prioritization and synchronization of program funding and 
capability increments across naval and joint programs.  This strategy also begins to 
support composeable warfighting analysis because the analysis is general and abstract 
enough such that it is not strictly limited to an individual TACSIT, but permits the 
definition of new TACSITs based on whatever operational threat or situation is 
presented.  This strategy and analysis process can support operational architectures of Fn 
factors based on new tactics, techniques and procedures as they evolve. 
20. Joint Fires Network (JFN) and the Distributed Common Ground 
Station (DCGS) 
Two examples of current programs that approach the kinds of functionality FnEPs 
require are the Joint Fires Network (JFN) and DGCS.  JFN consists of three major 
components: 
· JSIPS – A shipboard system that can receive, process, exploit, store and 
disseminate digital imagery fed from national (spy satellites) and tactical 
sensors aboard aircraft, for example.  
· GCCS – A multi-service network mandated by the Defense Department 
which seeks to provide information in support of the development of 
situation awareness and a “common operational picture (COP).  
· TES – A ground station that receives, processes and disseminates 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information. 
· JFN started out as a Navy-only effort to address the demanding 
functionality necessary to support time-critical strike by compressing the 
target engagement cycle, from hours to minutes, necessary to support 
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time-critical strike.  It has grown to a joint program which functions by 
expediting the gathering, processing and fusing of imagery and other 
intelligence from national and tactical sensors, enabling operators aboard 
ships and aircraft to develop targeting data usable by a “shooter” all within 
a 10-minute cycle.  Ultimately the goal of JFN is to support the Marine 
Corps requirement to meet a 2.5-minute response for call for fire.  
Interesting, by focusing on the engagement chain, JFN demands much of 
the same kinds of requirements and functionality as FnEPs.  This section 
will briefly discuss these similarities while outlining in broad terms the 
increased demands of FnEPs.  This comparision will prove useful in 
subsequent discussions of networking and integration requirements of 
FnEPs.  
First and foremost, similar to the vision of FnEPs, JFN is a joint program which 
requires a high degree of interoperability between a variety of otherwise service-specific 
platforms and systems.  Although it is important to note JFN currently faces a number of 
technical hurdles, such as bandwidth, the most difficult challenges JFN faces are those 
associated with the integration of these platforms and systems.  Until these are overcome 
JFN only approximates the answers to the demands of FnEPs.  Interestingly, it is the 
requirements of the Marine Corps to meet a 2.5-minute response for a call of fire that 
may become a forcing function driving JFN towards the levels of performance FnEPs 
will require.  Such levels of performance will absolutely demand the Navy and the other 
services come up with common standards for JFN, as opposed to its current makeup of 
disparate technologies that have been forced to talk to each other via “middleware,” or 
software interfaces.311  
This demand for common standards is the second major similarity between JFN 
and FnEPs.  As a result of the demand for common standards, “the most desirable course 
in JFN is to develop an entirely new architecture, one that is designed specifically to be 
interoperable among the services and to meet the stringent requirements for fire support 




                                                 
311 Navy, Air Force Team Up in “Joint Fires Network”, Sandra I. Erwin, March 2003, 
312 Capt. James Phillips, head of the Navy’s surface warfare division warfare systems branch.  
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· Until the Navy and the other services can come up with common standards 
for JFN, the system will remain a mix of disparate technologies that have 
been forced to talk to each other via “middleware,” or software interfaces.  
· The definitive standards for Joint JFN implementation have not been 
determined. 
A third similarity is that JFN will follow the “spiral development” approach, 
similar to that envisioned for FnEPs.  Spiral development makes sense in this program, 
because the technology changes rapidly and the integration is so complex. 313 
Despite the improvements to the engagement chain timelines JFN represents, JFN 
currently faces the following challenges: 
· JFN does not address the actual engagement of targets or the “pulling of 
the trigger”. 
· JFN is not fast enough for Marines, who want to reduce the current 
engagement timeline to 2.5 minutes due to close proximity to targets on 
the ground. (The problem is that national- level intelligence takes too long 
to arrive.  Only tactical on-board sensors can provide the intelligence fast 
enough).  
· JFN is expensive, requires trained analysts, and is bandwidth and 
processing intensive.  As a result, it is currently only planned for 
deployment aboard aircraft carriers.  
Overall, while JFN is promising from a system integration and interoperability 
perspective, the only way to have “true” interoperability is to have common hardware and 
standards for displaying information across the services, Deutsch said.  “The 
interoperability problem is largely solved when you have the same equipment, same 
architecture.”  The Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) program seeks to 
develop such common standards for intelligence processing and an acceptable format for 
the display of information that all the services can agree to.  Much broader than JFN, 
DCGS is a combination of hardware, software transmit/receive devices and data links. 
At present the Navy and Air Force have largely adopted DCGS, but while the 
Army and Marines have similar, they lack the same architecture.  RADM(sel) Deutsch 
explains a number of the advantages of DCGS, especially if it becomes fully adopted by 
all services, “If we go in that direction, we can save money with a larger buy, and we 
would have more commonality, guaranteed interoperability by the fact that you are 
                                                 
313 Robert W. Hesser, JFN and FnEPs, SSG XXII, June 2003. 
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purchasing the same systems.”  One of the reasons services have been reluctant to fully 
accept a single standard such as that of DCGS is the requirement to address service-
unique applications.  DCGS and JFN; however; seek to allow for such, but under a 
common “core” system. 
Beyond the opportunities that programs such as JFN, and DCGS offer to 
FORCnet and FnEPs; however, we must again highlight that such programs seek 
standards and commonality while missing the point of the need for modularity.  
Standards yield commonality, yet appropriate modularization is required for 
interoperability.  Each is distinct from the other, yet both are required.  In order to 
achieve interoperability among systems, we must 1) begin with standards, 2) decompose 
system functionality based on system function interaction patterns, 3) rebuild the 
appropriate system modules based on optimized system function interaction patterns as 
end-to-end systems using standardized interfaces.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
As this chapter has highlighted, determining the network infrastructure 
requirements for a “Warfighting Internet” enabling FORCEnet and FnEPs is decidedly a 
non-trival task.  While we have highlighted many high level and more specific 
consideration, we assess the requirement for detailed analysis in two additional areas.  1) 
The specific requirements associated with integration and interoperability of legacy and 
future systems within each “Pack” mission area, (e.g., Strike, TAMD, ASW, ASuW, etc.) 
and 2) Identification of specific C4ISR network infrastructure performance requirements 
(e.g., bandwidth, QoS, security). While time prevented us from completing this analysis, 
fortunately, there are a number of ongoing programs related research and development 
efforts (e.g. JFN, NIFC-CA, DCGS) which will help to determine system requirements 
and network performance parameters associated with such functionality the CRCs will 
require.  Most importantly, as highlighted in Chapter II, SPAWAR and the Office of the 
FORCEnet Chief Engineer have matured the vision for a C4ISR architecture that is 
closely aligned with, and will likely address many of the technical networking-related 
challenges associated FORCEnet and FnEPs. 
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V. AREAS FOR FURTHER FNEP RESEARCH 
In conducting our 
research, we have demonstrated 
the FnEPs concept will 
significantly impact many aspects 
of Naval and Joint operations.  
FnEPs will not only impact our 
warfighting capabilities and allow 
for the improved use of warfighting resources, but fundamentally drive changes to the 
organization of technological architectures and the infrastructure of supporting 
operations.  Perhaps most importantly, FnEPs will improve operations through enhanced, 
cross-mission area system integration efforts and overall combat reach capabilities by 
“operationalizing” current FORCEnet activities.  During the course of our research it 
became clear FnEPs would have far reaching impacts into many other specific areas as 
well.  This chapter’s purpose is to acknowledge these areas, and to highlight and briefly 
discuss their relationship to, and dependence upon, technical and organizational 
challenges which remain to be solved.  This is important in order to more fully address 
the FnEPs concept and its impact upon FORCEnet and future Naval Network-Centric 
efforts.  Another reason for this chapter is to address topics that were important and 
relevant to the FnEPs concept, but were not central to the scope of our research or 
possible due to time or other resource considerations.  As areas for future research, they 
will help to more fully develop the interconnectedness and interdependent relationships 
required to make FORCEnet and FnEPs a reality.  These interconnected and 
interdependent relationships reveal a critical concept of NCW, namely, 
“A central concept of initial network-centric warfare writings was ‘coevolution,’ 
in which ‘interrelated changes in concepts of operation, doctrine, organization, command 
and control approaches, systems, education, training, and people’ occur as NCW 
develops.”314 
                                                 
314 Hardesty, 70. 
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Understanding and managing these complex dynamics from more than just the 
technical, engineering perspective is important to realizing the full potential of NCW and 
FnEPs. 
A. MISSION AREA ANALYSIS 
Within the Strike and TAMD mission areas, significant work remains to be done 
in order to fully understand the five CRCs within the context of the FnEPs concept.  
Major challenges remain to more fully understand FnEPs as they apply to Strike and 
TAMD with the inclusion of more systems and pack factors (PFs) into these mission 
areas.  Specifically, this research includes the integration of legacy systems to include 
system function realignment, the retiring of older systems, and the development of new 
systems and technology.  The spiral development of FnEPs will continue to require 
refinements to the analysis and answering questions related to the definition and 
understanding of CRCs.  The “meta-questions” include: 
· What are the CRCs? 
· How do these support other mission areas? 
· Are there other CRCs? 
· Beyond the tactical level, how will FnEPs impact the strategic, 
operational, and strategic levels of warfare. 
More specifically, other questions remain, examples include: 
· How will the CRCs be integrated, modeled, tested and measured against 
performance metrics in their design. 
· What CRC capabilities are realizable given current technology and fiscal 
resources, 
· What are the required information flows within and between CRCs,  
· What are the security implications of standardization and OACE.  
· What are the implications for warfighting effectiveness, given major 
network or other combat system failure.  What are the TTPs in the event 
of such failures (e.g., are there platform-centric options available within 
FnEPs). 
While this thesis focused on the Strike and TAMD mission areas, this scope was 
chosen simply due to practical time and resource constraints.  There are a number of 
other mission areas which need to be examined using the same methodology and rigor to 
understand those areas with the same level of fidelity as Strike and TAMD.  Examples 
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include such MCPs and related areas as, Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Antisubmarine 
Warfare (ASW), Antisurface Warfare (ASuW), and Homeland Defense (HLD).  Figure 
163 presents other potential pack mission areas. 
 
 
Figure 163.   Additional FnEP Pack Mission Areas315. 
 
The analysis done on the Strike and TAMD mission areas was representative of 
the breadth and depth of analysis that would be required to fully define other mission 
areas.  Overall, the potential interactions between mission area packs also remain to be 
more fully analyzed. 
The discovery and investigation of new trade-spaces highlighted by FnEPs will be 
another area of further research which will be required as FnEPs matures.  Such trade-off 
analysis surrounding the development and fielding of FnEPs have already begun to 
emerge.  Some of them are:  
                                                 
315 Hesser and Rieken, FORCEnet Engagment Packs (FnEPs), Slide xx. 
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· Cost-benefit tradeoffs between more robust networks and smarter weapons  
· Roles and missions between manned and unmanned vehicles  
· Centralized vs decentralized C2, especially with respect to situational 
considerations.  For example, on the eve of war, C2 is typically centralized 
to prevent precipitation of unwanted events.  As soon as the shooting 
starts, however, C2 rapidly decentralizes as events unfold.   
· Platform-centric vs distributed activities/services   
It is reasonable to expect others will come to the forefront as deeper and more thorough 
analysis continues within and between various mission areas.  
Several new trade-space areas where there will have to be further research 
include: 
· Determining the balance between management schemas and technology.  
Just how, when and to what extent is a management schema adequate and 
optimized for use within the FnEP concept balance with the technology 
and it’s limitations (whatever those are) on computing, communications, 
option generation and use of pooled, networked assets.  
· Determining the balance between a FnEP capable of guiding a “dumb” 
weapon all the way through the terminal phase of flight to target impact 
with that of the capability to put a “smarter” weapon with some low-cost 
terminal seeker and left to engage the appropriate target given the weapon 
is within the target error basket.  Further, the question of Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) in either of these scenarios is appropriate 
· Economic trade-off analysis of network options of tangible and intangible 
benefits and/or factors as well as the evaluation of risks.   
B. FURTHER FNEP DEVELOPMENT EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION 
The next area of important consideration for further analysis is the need for 
immediate and continual integration beyond Naval assets as the FnEPs (spiral) 
development progresses.  Critical to realizing the ultimate vision of FORCEnet and 
“operationalizing” this concept, FnEPs was established on the premise of joint 
interoperability.  The primary reason for this is that individually, the services possess 
neither the platforms nor capabilities necessary to achieve the five CRCs.  While it is 
acknowledged joint integration is critical to FnEPs from the beginning and continuous 
throughout the entire pack development processes, it is also pragmatic to realize joint  
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integration is a long, tedious process impacted by many things in addition to simply 
technical considerations, so integration beyond Naval assets is critical to the FnEPs 
concept.  Admiral Clark comments,  
FORCEnet is an initiative to tie together naval, joint, and national 
information grids to achieve unprecedented situational awareness and 
knowledge management . . . FORCEnet will be central to commanding 
joint operations from the sea.316 
A fundamental FnEP objective is the further development of Naval combat reach 
capabilities with full interoperability among service components, joint task force 
elements and allied/coalition partners.  This goal should be supported by high- level 
architecture tenets and standards, supported by a strong cross-functional systems 
engineering effort across C2, FC and ISR systems.  These efforts should result in FnEPs 
development coordinated, supported and integrated with both legacy system and 
transformational initiative development including the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Coast 
Guard.  
1. Joint Services 
First of all, Joint integration of other U.S. services’ assets as they relate to and can 
participate in their appropriate FnEPs development process has to be aggressively 
pursued.  This is an area that will continue to be a centerpiece of FnEPs and as such, will 
require large, ongoing efforts across all services and across a wide variety of systems.  
Specific areas or tasks for follow-on research will have to address joint requirements 
definition, validation and apportionment of system functionality and funds to specific 
services’ systems.  Systems engineering processes that address joint, warfighting 
integration from pack and combat reach perspectives instead of the traditional stove-
piped system perspective.  While there may be initial quick-wins such as the ability to 
integrate several existing joint systems into a prototype “pack,” the ultimate vision for 
FnEPs is that of fully intergrating joint assets.  Particularly important is the identification 
and inventory of functionality provided by all systems such that gaps and overlaps can be 
identified allowing for mission-specific functionality to be appropriately managed and 
migrated into core pack functionality.  Initiatives such as the Transformational 
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Communications Architecture (TCA), Future Combat System (FCS), Command and 
Control Constellation (C2C), Global Information Grid – 2.0 (GIG-2.0), Teleports and 
others will have to take into account the requirements generated by the end-to-end 
engagement chain focus of FnEPs and could result in new or modified requirements. 
2. NATO, Allied and Coalition Partners  
Another important area for further FnEPs integration analysis will be system 
development, engineering, testing and support such that integration between U.S. military 
systems and those of our NATO, Allied and Coalition partners are possible because most 
future conflicts will involve U.S. forces operating with forces from many different 
countries.  The following quotes highlight the importance of this, 
The significant involvement of coalition forces in Operation Enduring 
Freedom –including over 100 ships deployed in Central Asia for an 
extended period – has re-emphasized the requirement for improved IP data 
systems interoperability with allied and coalition forces.317 
Developing a networked capability will be fundamental to joint and 
coalition warfighting in the Information Age.318 
In addition to the military perspective, Allied and Coalition partner integration is 
becoming increasingly important socially, politically, and diplomatically.  Within the 
FnEPs concept, “packs” will not realize their full warfighting potential until all 
participants are fully integrated and contribute their systems and capabilities to “pack” 
funictionality.  There are foreseeable situations where Allied or Coalition partners are the 
only ones with the requisite assets, response times or expertise in order to accomplish a 
specific mission.  FnEPs must be flexible, adaptable and responsive enough to address 
the full spectrum of warfare from peacekeeping to Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) to full force-on-force engagements in response to a wide variety of 
asymmetric or conventional threats.  In order to accomplish this, FnEPs should be able to 
utilize the Allied and Coalition partner capabilities and coevolve complementary, non-
redundant programs and weapons systems.  An understanding of ours and their 
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Information Warfare,” CHIPS, Summer 2002. 
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capabilities to ident ify overlaps and gaps in system capabilities as well as how these 
capabilities fit into the 1-4-2-1 threat scenario would be a logical starting point.  One 
possible example of Allied interoperability would be the Netherlands’ use of Aegis fitting 
into a TAMD “Pack” with U.S. forces.  In a new, more dangerous and far-reaching 
asymmetric threat environment, FnEPs should be able to conduct major conventional 
warfare, but simultaneously have an increasing ability to address unconventional threats 
via unconventional methods or conventional methods applied in new ways.  These 
MOOTW, peace-keeping/peace-enforcement, GWOT, humanitarian missions are and 
will continue to require more flexible, adaptable, responsive and scaleable capabilities 
reliant on NATO, Allied and Coalition assets. 
There will continue to be challenges related to technological advancements, 
doctrine, cultural, language, physical resources, trust, security and releasability between 
the U.S. and other partners, therefore FnEPs development will have to take these 
considerations into account as well.  There could also be several challenges related to 
simply integrating coalition systems into a “pack” using the same distributed services and 
composeable force structures this concept envisions simply because of the wide variation 
of systems wanting to be integrated.  Research in this area should focus on addressing 
these and other challenges related to identifying NATO, Allied and Coalition integration 
into FnEPs development. 
There may be value added in continued evolution of CENTRIXS across all AORs 
helping to provide a common coalition baseline that allows for coordination, 
collaboration and a common operational picture in the near term.  A longer term prospect 
might be to develop a coalition baseline in parallel with a “pack.”  There may also have 
to be an increased integration and training efforts of coalition partners in FnEPs 
development efforts.  There also may have to be a redefinition of information 
classification and standardization across many functional system domains to match the 
principles of NCW.   
In focusing on NATO, Allied and Coalition partners, it will be important to 
involve as many partners as possible, as early as possible in the FnEP concept  
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development, requirements and warfighting procedures processes such that partner 
integration can be a part of the spiral development effort rather than being a bolted-on, 
underutilized, marginalized asset.    
3. Homeland Security/Homeland Defense 
The events of September 11th, 2001 
crystallized the American need to secure our 
homeland against all kinds of conventional 
and unconventional terrorist threats.  This has 
precipitated the realization that although the 
Navy can and will continue to protect 
America's security through overseas engagements, the Navy now also must act to take 
decisive and deliberate steps to protect our domestic maritime domain and be prepared to 
engage threats there as well.  In collaboration with Coast Guard the U.S. Navy must be 
able to conduct synchronized maritime operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at our homeland. 
FnEPs should be prepared to execute uniquely homeland security or homeland 
defense missions while at the same time using proven warfighting capabilities.  FnEPs 
will have to work with and integrate the U.S. Coast Guard’s important capabilities and 
resources available to the Captains of the Ports (COTPs), Groups, Districts and Areas and 
keep pace with their fleet modernization initiative, Deepwater.  While Deepwater 
represents significant integration opportunities by “getting in on the ground floor” of the 
development, it should be noted; however, Deepwater is almost totally a fleet 
modernization program focused on platform replacement and has much less to do with 
modernization of their information systems and architectures.  This introduces challenges 
due to the broad scope and breadth of homeland security and homeland defense missions 
because USCG assets must also be integrated into “packs.”  Further FnEPs relies on 
system interoperability within a larger coalition of Department of Homeland Security, 
Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, law 
enforcement, FBI, CIA, Canadian and Mexican governments, to name a few.  Another 
good example of a program which could integrate with FnEPs is the U.S. Customs  
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Agency’s Container Security Initiative. This program could provide information and 
decision support, for example, into a homeland defense “pack” improving the defensive 
posture of “pack” participants. 
In general, the integration of organizations responsible for homeland 
security/homeland defense will be an important enabler to FnEPs flexibility, agility and 
responsiveness to time-critical threats against the U.S. homeland from many different 
domains (e.g., maritime environment, air or land-based).  Even other organization such as 
the FAA could be important contributors to FnEP functionality.  As an example, the FAA 
is responsible for the domestic air picture and would be needed to form a complete air  
picture for a given “pack.” 
FnEPs will have to be designed and “operationalized” to implement Global 
Maritime Awareness (GMA) as a key enabler of realizing how the FnEPs concept will 
lend operational and organizational structure to providing for homeland 
security/homeland defense.  The Navy has traditionally focused on providing homeland 
security and homeland defense by addressing threats in the forward theater.  However, as 
threats seek to encroach upon the continental U.S., FnEPs will be the warfighting concept 
flexible, agile and responsive enough to act upon that threat irrespective of its theater or 
origin.  FnEPs will enable the Navy, NORAD and the FAA to monitor air traffic over 
home waters.  Where the Navy operates in the forward theater, air contacts are tracked as 
well as warships.  However, the vast majority of vessels in the world are not tracked.  
Any one of those vessels could be a threat, so this is the Global Maritime Awareness 
(GMA) foundation FnEPs will be able to implement.  GMA is a comprehensive 
understanding of who or what is in the global maritime setting and who may pose a threat 
to the U.S. or its allies319.  In pursuing GMA, there currently is no single solution to 
gaining effective knowledge of who and what poses a threat to the U.S.’s Sea 
Supremacy. 320  FnEPs will address this by bringing together a collection of activities, 
systems and pack factors such that the network-centric capabilities afforded to any other 
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320 GMA is distinct from the USCG’s Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) concept in that GMA focuses on 
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specifically on protecting U.S. Coastal waters out to the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) only.  
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mission area are applied to defending the U.S. maritime environment as well.  A key 
element of GMA, FnEPs will have to integrate vessel tracking technologies supported by 
new processes and organizational alignments.  FnEPs will have to provide a network-
centric ability to carry out GMA’s enmeshment strategy of locating, identifying and 
continuously tracking a maritime threat on a global scale.  There are areas for future 
research on how FnEPs will be able to integrate with other domestic and international 
agencies to develop the ability to track INMARSAT-C polling on vessel traffic in 
conjunction with efforts already on-going at COMLANTFLT’s Naval Control and 
Coordination of Shipping (NCAPS) Organization.  The use of the International Maritime 
Organization’s (IMO’s) Automatic Identification System (AIS) on military aircraft and 
ships is an area that FnEPs would have to utilize in keeping a persistent track of threats 
for possible future engagement.  Research into how FnEPs would be able to work within 
the new Fleet Response Plan and with the USCG to contribute significantly to Homeland 
Defense through these integration efforts would be another important mission area.  
FnEPs should be able to seamlessly integrate Coast Guard Deepwater and legacy assets 
into the homeland defense “pack” such that missions like Maritime Interception 
Operations (MIO) or surging a CSG or ESG during the sustain-readiness phase of the 
IDTC to conduct Homeland Defense operations on short notice is possible.  The mission 
area of mine countermeasures also seems to be particularly important to FnEPs because 
the Navy is the only service capable of this mission area, yet many other service and 
government agency assets would be involved if there were a mine threat in the U.S. 
maritime environment.  The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) would be a 
key part of future FnEP research to implement GMA because NMIC does a good job in 
tracking a small number of vessels of interest and mining information out of various 
databases.  However, NMIC is advantageously positioned to establish a critical, central 
fusion point for GMA information which should evolve into a comprehensive joint and 
interagency operation, a key part of the end to end engagement focused activities of 
FnEPs321.  There will have to be substantial research efforts between the Department of 
Homeland Security, USCG, Customs and other agencies to understand and help integrate 
military unique defensive capabilities into the entire civil defense and civil support 
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picture of homeland defense from the maritime environment when called upon to do so.  
Homeland defense from an air and ground picture would involve NORTHCOM, NORAD 
and others being involved with FnEPs development, testing and implementation to assure 
those FnEPs defensive (and as needed offensive) capabilities would be integrated into the 
entire homeland defense picture.  Within the domestic maritime environment, FnEPs will 
need to be integrated with the Joint Harbor Operations Centers (JHOCs) to expand the 
awareness and control of vessel movements in harbor areas.  Organizational research 
with COMLANTFLT, COMPACFLT, Commander Navy Installations, NORTHCOM, 
COMTHIRDFLT, COMSECONDFLT, PACOM, ALCOM, USCG PAC and LANT 
Area Commanders, USCG District Commanders and Captains of the Ports (COTPs) will 
ensure FnEP development takes into account the Navy and Coast Guard’s systems, TTPs, 
and mission area responsibilities such that the five CRCs are available to defend the U.S. 
maritime area as well as any forward theater.  FnEPs will help to “operationalize” 
FORCEnet within the domestic maritime environment as a more definitive approach to 
GMA emerges.  With an expanded JIATF organization that not only focuses on drug 
operations in SOUTHCOM’s AOR but leads GMA efforts off the entire coastal area of 
the U.S., FnEPs will drive system integration with USCG, Customs, INS, Border Patrol 
and other agencies’ system capabilities to provide a complete and through defensive 
posture which becomes increasingly harder to penetrate as a threat encroaches the U.S. 
maritime environment from international waters. 
In conclusion, the abilities of FnEPs-employed homeland defense resources will 
enable the Navy to be proactive and “manage” the threat, rather than remain reactive and 
remain defensive.  Here, “managing” implies a certain control over the threat whether it 
be by controlling information, its means of transportation, it's ability to deliver a weapon, 
or whatever effect-based operation is deemed necessary. 
C. EXPANSION OF FORCENET ENGAGEMENT PACK INTEGRATION 
There are also several categories of functional data interchange systems that will 
support and enable FnEPs.  In addition to the core functional data interchange systems 
addressed in this thesis (Command and Control (C2), Fire Control (FC) and Intelligence,  
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Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)), logistics, modeling & simulation as well as 
training system domains all add to the agility, flexibility and responsiveness required by 
FnEPs as depicted in Figure 164. 
Logistics, Modeling and Simulation as well as Training systems should be 
integrated as a critical part of FnEPs fo r several reasons.  While not directly essential to 
the engagement chain, such systems play vital indirect roles in terms of 1) supporting and 
sustaining combat and other operations, 2) critical to improving warfighting efficiency 
through lessons learned and simulations, 3) important to producing trained and proficient 
warriors, to name a few.   
 
 
Figure 164.   Expansion of FnEP Integration322. 
 
                                                 
322 Hesser and Rieken, FORCEnet Engagment Packs (FnEPs), Slide xx. 
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1. Logistics Systems  
Logistics system information, when integrated into a “pack,” will be able to 
provide just- in-time logistic supplies, maintenance requirements and anticipatory 
warfighting needs, all critical to keeping the engagement chain working.  These logistics 
systems, as integral PFs, will be able to demonstrate the application of combat 
effectiveness of ‘user interface agents’ working with the ABMAs that automatically 
notify crews and schedule required corrective maintenance actions when ammunition or 
other warfighting supplies need replenishment.  Such notification will be based on in- line 
condition or utilization of monitoring data, and will serve to update commanders and 
other decisison makers regarding the status of their forces.  Other related capabilities 
include the ability to compute mileage a vehicle can travel based on fuel capacity and 
proposed mission parameters.  It is important to note DoD’s Office of Force 
Transformation’s Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) Concept of Operations shares 
many parallel characteristics with that of FnEPs.  The Office of Force Transformation’s 
draft SLRC Functional Concept323 document describes S&RL as “an adaptive method for 
maintaining operational availability of units by managing their end-to-end support 
network.”  The document goes on to describe its prominent characteristics, which include 
the following: 
· It is a functionally-organized network of units (as opposed to a 
hierarchical organization) 
· All units within that network are potential consumers and providers of 
supply to and from all other units in the network 
· Units dynamically synchronize to satisfy demand in respond to changes in 
the environment. 
Further, OSD Office of Force Transformation identified the following key ideas of the 
S&RL Concept:324  
· Assume demand is ultimately unpredictable, so success depends on speed 
of pattern recognition and speed of response 
· The best supply chain is no longer one that is highly optimized, but one 
that is highly flexible 
                                                 
323 OSD Office of Force Transformation, SRLC Functional Concept, (Draft Version), (20 June 2003). 
324 Linda Lewandowski, S&R Project:  Co-Evolution of an Adaptive Logistics Capability, OSD Office of Force 
Transformation, 30 May 2003. 
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· Organizes business units and subunits into “modular capabilities” that 
negotiate with one another over commitments 
· Networks “self-synchronize” via a common environment and set of shared 
objectives; typically business financial and customer satisfaction measures 
· Depends on sophisticated IT support to enable data sharing, “knowing 
earlier,” commitment tracking, and role reconfiguration 
In short, S&RL aligns closely with FnEPs in that it is based upon highly adaptive, 
self-synchronizing, dynamically reconfigurable demand and supply networks that 
anticipate and stimulate actions to enhance capability or mitigate support shortfalls.  Like 
FnEPs, S&RL will change the way we interact with producers and consumers of 
information, as well as fundamental interactions between Service entities that will no 
longer have stovepiped logistics systems that cannot communicate.  As outlined in the 
S&RL Conops, support bases and end-to-end pipelines will be devoid of color and the 
supply network will be dynamically reconfigurable utilizing all of the DoD and its 
partners resources to meet customer demands directly in a timely manner.  In addition, 
because of the new capabilities, the S&RL system will provide enhanced options for 
operational activities that were previously nonexistent.325 
2. Modeling and Simulation Impacts on/by FnEPs  
Integrated into FnEPs, modeling and simulation systems could possibly capture 
and store, for later use and analysis, real-world warfighting activities to be used in 
doctrine refinement or new tactical procedures.  The use of modeling and simulation 
systems as ‘quiet observers’ of pack activity could help answer many questions like; 
when and where should “packs” form, how “packs” should form, what resources should 
“packs” use, when should those resources be used and from whom, threat engagement, 
better sensor-weapon-shooter linkages, etc.  Modeling and simulation systems as pack 
components could also be important for real-world, deployment training and work up 
exercises, helping to make the Fleet Response Plan an exercise in honing warfighting 
skills using real-world, relevant and current environments yet in a simulated and 
protected environment for exercise.  The area of modeling and simulation as it impacts 
the development of FnEPS and conversely how FnEPs could influence the use, 
                                                 
325 OSD Office of Force Transformation, Sense and Respond Logistics Concept of Operations (SRLC), (Draft 
Version 1.0), (4 August 2003), 5. 
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development and implementation of modeling and simulation tools seems immense. In an 
FnEPs network-centric environment of distributed services, composeable forces 
organized around the five CRCs, modeling and simulation should be able to help and aid 
in real-time capability assessments and mission area analysis.  Because modeling and 
simulation assets will eventually become integral PFs, these assets could add real-world, 
as-it-is-happening training to other people not directly involved with the ongoing 
operations because of the network-centric nature of all PFs.  Modeling and simulation 
should have the ability to do real-time or off- line operational option analysis and course 
of action analysis which could either help with time-critical decisions in real-word 
operations or be used to build up the repository of ABMAs options and baseline analysis 
for use in a set of circumstances some time later.  Integrated modeling and simulation 
assets into a “pack” would be able to conduct course of action analysis in real time and 
recommend the best course of action or options while they would still be implementable 
as well as other value-added assistance to reduce demands on crew.  Overall, the role of 
modeling and simulation in the FnEPs environment should be one that seeks to 
incorporate the technology push concepts as well as new requirements being pulled from 
the operational user into new operational requirements.  Figure 165 identifies this role. 
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Figure 165.   The Role of Modeling & Simulation326. 
 
3. Training Systems  
As an integral part of FnEPs, training systems would be able to push information 
and real-world events as they are happening into the classroom for training on current 
tactics, techniques and procedures.  Development of Soldiers, Navy and Coast Guard 
Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and National Guardsmen, would benefit from FnEPs and 





                                                 
326 Victor Cambell, Acquisition in the Network Centric Age:  A Perspective, SPAWAR Systems Center, 
Charleston, SC, October 2003, (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 15. 
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D. DOCTRINE ORGANIZATION TRAINING MATERIAL LEADERSHIP 
PERSONNEL AND FACILITY (DOTMLPF) 
The area of DOTMLPF is an 
overarching area of activities which will also be 
impacted by and on the FnEPs concept to 
varying degrees.  This section’s purpose is to 
simply highlight some of these perceived 
possible impacts and briefly explore why future research in these areas will be needed. 
Doctrine – The new edition of Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1: Naval 
Warfare, scheduled for completion in 2003 by the Naval Warfare Development 
Command (NWDC) will be the Navy’s first servicewide doctrinal document in 50 
years327.  The new NDP-1 will be written from the operational art perspective and will 
focus on the employment of U.S. numbered and theater forces at the operational level of 
war328.  The concept of FnEPs will have eventual impacts on NDP-1 because FnEPs will 
impact the Navy’s view on the employment of its forces in joint and combined major 
operations and campaigns.  Critical to FnEPs is communication and integration among 
services and with allies and coalition partners which will have to be addressed in NDP-1.  
With FnEPs being a flexible, adaptable and self-synchronizing way of conducting NCW, 
NDP-1 will have to be an equally broad, flexible framework for the employment of naval 
forces in peacetime and wartime and throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.  FnEPs 
creates an environment for Naval forces to be employed in many new ways, given their 
reliance on composeable forces and distributed services.  The network-centric manner in 
which the five CRCs will be implemented and fought within FnEPs will drive changes to 
planning, preparation, execution and sustainment of major naval operations as well as 
asymmetric threats as a part of joint or combined operations.  NDP-1 should be based on 
the idea of achieving Sea Supremacy within the context of SEA POWER 21 and how this 
strategic vision will be possible within the FnEPs concept.  Warfighting operations have 
traditionally been conducted in a ‘waterfall’ or sequential approach, under FnEPs, 
operations will become more spiral, parallel and multi-threaded instead of a deliberately 
                                                 
327 Milan Vego, “New Doctrine Must Be Flexible & Dynamic,” Proceedings, May 2003, 75. 
328 Ibid. 
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phased approach.  This mode of operations could quite possibly become more 
experimentally dependent, hence the increased and vital role of the modeling and 
simulation pack assets.  Even though NCW is focused on the tactical level of war at sea, 
FnEPs has operational and strategic implications to how warfare will be conducted in the 
future, which brings to bear the full potential of NCW.  NDP-1 will have to examine how 
doctrinal changes related to the FnEPs concept will impact the tactical, operational and 
strategic levels of warfare.  Improvements as a result of FnEPs will also impact the 
Navy’s capabilities, including how the Navy is employed, coordinated and integrated 
with the other services’ doctrines.  In an FnEPs focus on distributed services and 
composeable forces, the idea of operational art will evolve due to the fundamental 
decisions about when, where and how to fight and then, to what severity combat 
operations will be involved.  The identification of a center of gravity or a concentration of 
combat power is now totally transformed within the FnEPs concept.  With distributed 
forces and services integrated along the engagement chain, the center of gravity may also 
be much more distributed and certainly, the combat capabilities are, making them harder 
to counter. 
In conclusion, FnEPs will also change the Navy’s culture as highlighted by the 
following quote: 
commonly held, concisely stated, and authoritatively expressed beliefs, 
fundamental principles, organizational tenets, and methods of combat 
force employment intended to guide the planning, preparation, and combat 
employment of one’s forces to accomplish given military objectives.329  
Dudley Knox, writing for Proceedings in 1915 on the role of doctrine in naval 
warfare, noted that no matter how well ships perform individually, “they must be welded 
into a body” that “can act collectively” before they are ready for action. 330  FnEPs is the 
tactical level instantiation of this collective action. 
                                                 
329 Ibid., 77. 
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Organization and Process – Due to the horizontal, engagement chain focus of 
integration with the emphasis on the five CRCs, organizations and their boundaries will 
become increasingly blurred.  The organizational effects of FnEPs may be many within 
and between organizations now forced to integrate in this new defined manner.  With 
FnEPs forcing organizations to migrate from being focused on individual weapon 
systems and platforms to Joint Mission Area Acquisition Programs and supporting 
research, development, and engineering across 
mission areas in support of the engagement 
chain, there quite possibly will be many 
implications on how organizations will address 
this challenge.  A diffusion of system functions 
will cause system and program dependencies to 
drive portfolios of system functions (i.e., capabilities) rather than individual system/s 
cost/benefit analysis driving the capabilities fielded.  Currently existing ‘rice bowls’ and 
‘stove-piped’ system boundaries could possibly become so blurred, organizational 
boundaries will exist only to serve administrative personnel needs vice facilitating 
execution of specific missions.  Organizational mission work could quite possibly move 
in the same ‘pack’ direction to support and be aligned with mission areas rather than 
specific systems.  Currently, our society is undergoing a transition from the Industrial 
Age to the Information Age.  New technology has been a tremendous driver in this 
transition, but as Figure 166 depicts, while technological change has been exponential, 
social, business, and political changes have lagged.   
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Figure 166.   The Law of Disruption331. 
 
There are many reasons for such lag; however, most are related to the challenges 
associated with organizational change and change management.  In looking at the Navy 
and DoD, it is apparent their organizations and processes remain a product of the Cold 
War and are not yet optimized or able to efficiently adapt to the technological 
advancements and growth of the Information Age.  Specific examples related to FnEPs 
and FORCEnet include: 1) Jointly integrated systems, which will demand concurrent 
organizational and process changes in order to “work” together efficiently and effectively 
2) From a Human Systems Integration (H S I) perspective, we must reorganize and 
change warfighting processes in order to take advantage of improvements in technology 
and automated systems in particular. 3) From a C2 perspective, we must adapt our 
processes to become more efficient in our decision-making.  This list is far from all-
inclusive, and the solutions implied in the examples are neither simple, clear-cut, nor 
possible to achieve by simply increasing defense spending or other resources.  Taken to a 
fully implemented future, FORCEnet and FnEPs will ultimately require changes to the 
                                                 
331 Cambell, Acquisition in the Network Centric Age:  A Perspective, Slide 5. 
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very cultures of DoD and the individual services, a change which can only occur 
incrementally over time, through a combination of education and commitment across all 
levels of organization.   
Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) within an FnEPs environment – Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to operate in an FnEPs environment will be one of the 
transformational aspects of FnEPs.  Everyone from E-1 to O-10 will have to understand 
how operating in an FnEPs environment increases their warfighting capabilities and how 
best to take full operational advantage of the tools FnEPs brings to warfighting.  The 
operational implementation training on how, when, with whom and under what 
circumstances an FnEPs “pack” can be utilized and fought will have to be examined.  
Training in distributed, collaborative, flexible and adaptable joint environments with 
composeable warfighting services and a number of different PFs will require new 
warfighting management, C2 and system understanding in a FnEPs environment.  The 
implications and processes of how decisions will have to be made, how to evaluate 
options, understand new consequences and still operated effectively against a wide range 
of time-sensitive  and asymmetric threats in a FnEPs environment will also be needed.  
The overall role of the training community will be to provide an early and continuous 
training context within the FnEPs environment and to assess the impacts of or 
implications to TTP and Doctrine on/as a result of design concepts like FnEPs.  Training 
activities should be able to provide a trained crew simultaneously with the first fleet 
deployment, which means crew training must be done simultaneously as the FnEPs 
prototype “pack” and other related development efforts mature.  Training must be an 
integral part of FnEPs as software and simulation are reused to support embedded and 
distributed training, operational planning, course of action analysis and becomes an 
indistinguishable part of a deployed capability.  FnEPs tries to elicit a warfighting 
organization which can evolve to cover multi-missions and have a cross-trained, adaptive 
force. 
Material – Material considerations in light of FnEPs will have impacts based on 
the new horizontal integration efforts between functional system areas.  Systems will 
have to be redesigned and reengineered over the course of time as a result of system 
functionality gaps, overlaps and realignments take place to implement the five CRCs.  
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Over the course of time, this will cause systems to be retired, legacy system functionality 
realigned or new systems developed to cover gaps in functionality needed to realize the 
CRCs.  Because of this end-to-end engagement chain integration focus of systems around 
mission areas, there will also be new requirements for support equipment and material 
not previously needed in the current stove-piped environment. 
Leadership-Impacts of FnEPs onto the Information Professional (IP) Officer and 
IT Rating Communities – Another area for further research is envisioned to be how the 
Information Professional (IP) officer community and the Information Technology (IT) 
rating community (among others) would be involved in the engagement chain processes 
as envisioned or as impacted by FnEPs.  This could very well be the key to the future 
viability of the IP community.  Specifically, IPs and ITs could have vastly different roles 
in the warfighting community than they currently do.  In a truly network-centric 
environment where the pack has the capabilities envisioned, the IP and IT communities 
are going to be critical to helping to establish and maintain the collaborative efforts 
amongst all warfighting assets throughout the entire engagement chain.  This research 
area would help to lend an understanding to the various facets of how the IP and IT 
communities would enable FnEPs.  The IP and IT communities will be in a new role 
where visibility and active participation in the entire engagement chain coupled with an 
understanding of network and communication systems/technologies will help fuel smart 
disinvestment decisions on where C4ISR systems can and should be realigned to 
recapitalize money for new investments.  Research activities in this area can help 
understand how the IP and IT communities can support the war fighter through out the 
engagement chain, much like the Intelligence community does today, but with a 
deliberate focus.  Research in this area would help to understand how the IP can become 
a fully integrated member of the warfighting team, with both supported and supporting 
roles across all warfare areas. In the supported role, IP’s are a member of the team that 
executes the engagement chain.  In the supporting role, IP skills enable the Commander’s 
decision making and execution at every step.  FnEPs will enable the IP and IT 
communities to assume both roles and perhaps define new ones, within the engagement 
chain.  Future research in this area will help to show how these communities will help 
enable and advance warfighting capabilities and the Naval Combat Reach through their 
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unique set of combat skills.  Possible questions for this research to answer could be, what 
will be the impact of FnEPs to Operations Relevance, the Information Warrior, and/or 
Operational and Technical expertise?  How can IPs and ITs further the understanding of 
the doctrinal role of the IP in the naval command structure and the role of the IP in the 
enterprise as it is focused on the engagement chain.  Within the context of FnEPs, how 
can the Navy utilize IP and IT experience and expertise to reduce overall “Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO)” of information/C4I systems, services and/or products as they relate to 
the engagement chain?  This research can hopefully generate a clear definition of IP and 
IT community roles which will enable more efficient assignment of personnel and more 
efficient use of training resources as they are related to warfighting capabilities and the 
engagement chain. 
Personnel – In the area of personnel, FnEPs could possibly have impacts on such 
things as how human resources are tracked, assigned, employed and managed.  Having 
human resources assigned to pack assets, if a “pack” asset needs certain human resources 
because of a specific set of circumstances, or during the normal course of duty rotations, 
there could feasibly be an avenue for the “packs” to interface with other systems to 
address this need. 
Facility – Lastly, in the area of facilities, the FnEPs concept might have primary 
or secondary impacts on facilities used to house, develop, test, implement or operate 
these CRCs.  Platforms may be impacted by form, fit and function of systems used to 
implement the CRCs.  There may need to be modified or new facilities built to facilitate 
interoperability between the sea, air and land domains as well as interoperability between 
NATO, allied and coalition partner support facilities.  Facility impacts within mission 
areas, especially one like homeland defense, may be realized when military and 
homeland defense-oriented government agencies are required to interoperate and work 
together. 
E. OTHER FNEP INFLUENCING FACTORS 
There will also need to be an understanding of how FnEPs will both influence and 
be influenced by other challenges internal and external to DoD within the Defense 
Planning Systems shown in Figure 167. 
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Figure 167.   Defense Planning Systems - Interrelationships332. 
 
There will be FnEP implications on the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 
System (JOPES), the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as well as the Acquisition 
processes, life-cycle support, technology, programmatic phasing, PPBS 
Funding/alignments and POM/PR Cycles. 
1. Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES) 
JOPES is a planning system focused on producing warplans for the employment 
of military foces to support a military strategy and attain specific objectives.  FnEPs will 
change how deliberate planning and crisis action planning is conducted based on the 
warfighting capabilities FnEPs will have.  With distributed services and composeable 
foces making up “packs” within a NCW environment, deliberate planning tasks will 
change in response to the engagement capabilities present within a pack.  Crisis action 
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planning will also be changed because FnEPs are specifically designed to be flexible, 
adaptable across all mission areas and focused on the end-to-end engagement chain 
process.  There will be impacts into how OPLANs, CONPLANs and Functional Plans are 
produced and documented in light of how “packs” are envisioned to operate.  The manner 
in which TPFDDs are produced and carried out could foreseeably be changed 
significantly given the ABMAs function within FnEPs.  TPFDDs could be automated by 
the ABMAs such that plans for scheduling and movement of foces, loading of 
transportation (e.g., size, weight, deck space, etc.) and dispersion of routing deploying 
units to the AOR would be automatically produced.  The deliberate and crisis action 
planning processes would take advantage of the five CRCs to make the strategic 
planning, movement and execution more automated, efficient and optimized in response 
to GWOT, terrorism or asymmetric threats so that the combat response is more flexible, 
adaptable and takes advantage of distributed services to put composeable forces in place 
to neutralize the threat in a much more timely manner.  The automated generation and 
processing of TPFDD, Warning, Planning, Alert, Execute, Deployment Fragmentary 
(FRAGO’s) Orders by ABMAs and supported by integrated logistics systems using 
humans as decision makers would make the planning products fully integrated, 
transportionally feasible, logistically adequate, politically acceptable and executable 
within an optimized set of criteria.  The implications for the importance of integrating 
training, modeling & simulation as well as logistics systems into a “pack” are 
unmistakable within this context.  Those systems must be integral to FnEPs to support all 
the Defense Planning Systems. 
2. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) 
The Joint Strategic Planning System is responsible for producing strategic 
planning documents like the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which articulate the roles 
and objectives of the military within the National strategic objectives.  While the direct 
impact FnEPs might have in the production and planning aspects of these documents may 
be small, FnEPs will have significant indirect impacts.  With the combat capabilities 
FnEPs will possess, the options for strategic planning and what the nation will be capable 
of doing militarily will definitely impact the contents of these planning documents.  With 
flexible, adaptable capabilities integrated across multiple mission areas and focused on 
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the engagement chain there will be many more options available to be employed within 
the wide spectrum of conflict.  These new combat options will present the planners 
within the JSPS system more flexibility when developing these plans.   
3. Acquisition Business Processes 
The acquisition business processes are ones which will have an influence on and 
be influenced by FnEPs.  The way PFs are acquired will also be influenced by FnEPs.  
The current method of platform-centric acquisition will not support a FnEPs concept 
because it has no other choice but to continue creating stove-piped and independent 
systems which are not necessarily supportive of an engagement-oriented concept like 
FnEPs.  Senior Lecturer Rex Buddenberg makes some excellent observations regarding 
the unsuitability of the current “program manager methodology”: 
But as we consider how to build large1 information systems, we find that 
the conventional program manager methodology does not work - at least 
not without some modification.  Information systems cut across multiple 
platforms.  Indeed, interoperability impacts an indefinitely large number 
of diverse platforms when we consider multiple services and allies as 
within the scope of 'enterprise wide'.  It is not conceivable that we would 
give any program manager that much authority.  Further, if we tried, the 
mega-program would be so large that it would collapse of its own weight.  
Indeed, the landscape is littered with far less sizable information system 
programs that have failed.”333 
Rex Buddenberg continues by assessing the need for multiple program managers 
to have the central authority and “teeth” to force such a plurality of managers to “play 
nicely together in the sandbox.”  Rex Buddenberg recommends tackling the problem of 
building our architectures in two stages: 
· First, require all information systems to be cross-program interoperable.  
How to achieve this is the subject of the referenced paper. 
· Second, include the interoperability requirements in each program 
manager’s charter. 
One observation on the impact of architecture design by “committees”: 
All of the existing `architecture' documents are a product of committees7. 
Enter the natural bureaucratic, committee tendencies: reach a common 
denominator that all on the committee can agree upon.  Motivation was 
less to do something good; more not to do something bad. As a result, we 
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got deforestation without compensation8.  Some of the standards are 
mutually contradictory and unnecessarily complicated, but that's 
secondary: none of these committees produced anything so risky as a real 
architecture. Ironically, we seem to have produced the inverse of the 
crypto system that is described by Lt Keefer to Ens Willie Kieth in The 
Caine Mutiny: “The Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for 
execution by idiots9.”  We can all agree that standards are a necessary part 
of architecture. But the various Joint Technical Architectures are mere 
collections of standards - not architecture10.  The committees tended to 
work on the things they knew how to work on - compendia of standards - 
rather than the things that needed to be worked on.  This well-meaning 
work has diverted us from the main objective of an architecture.334 
Also, Moore’s Law precludes successful acquisition in traditional 10-20 year time 
frames, especially within an FnEPs environment.  Collaboration between users, builders 
(industry and program managers) and trainers will occur concurrently through integrated 
digital environments in which data is transferred seamlessly across COTS and non-COTS 
tools and applications. 
a. Requirements Generation and Validation 
Requirements generation and validation will have to be relooked at now 
that an end-to-end, engagement chain, perspective is being used and the five CRCs are 
the focus.  Requirements generation and validation processes will also have to be 
relooked at because of the integration requirements of cross-functional domain 
requirements.  C2, FC and ISR systems still need to be integrated with other C2, FC and 
ISR systems, but they now also must interoperate with each other horizontally across C2, 
FC and ISR domains as well.  This could possibly have far-reaching impacts into system 
modularization, decisions of which system maintains which functionality, commonality, 
standardization and interoperability amongst all service initiatives instead of stove-piped 
interests and specific warfighting domain requirements.  This will foster and demand a 
much more wide ranging understanding of requirements traceability and cross 
functionality.  The role of the requirements community will be to provide continuous user 
operational context of the requirements from an overall end-to-end engagement 
perspective, that is, provide an understanding of the operational environment, viewpoint 
and surrounding set of circumstances which will help the acquisition community make 
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cost/performance and other tradeoff analysis meaningful in an FnEPs environment.  The 
requirements generation and validation community will have to identify, early-on, the 
unrealistic requirements and certain enabling technologies which may help FnEPs grow 
and mature.  This will require a much more integrated understanding of cause and effect 
analysis amongst and between links in the systems which make up the “packs.”  The 
requirements community will also have to help address life cycle cost concerns earlier 
than anyone else in the acquisition community due to this pack asset integration 
perspective. 
b. Testing 
Testing requirements, scenarios and other testing procedures will have to 
be done within a “pack” and consequently, focused on the engagement chain, rather than 
on just specific individual system testable criteria which may or may not be related to the 
overall CRC functionality or furthering the maturation of the CRCs. 
c. Logistics 
Logistics will now have to understand linkages from warfighting activities 
to logistics-based requirements of warfighting sustainment in a time-critical, 
collaborative environment. 
d. Contract Management 
All aspects of contract management will now be focused on integration 
and interoperability of pack components, because if a new PF does not integrate with a 
pack, it doesn’t get to the fight.  RFIs, proposals, FARs, contract evaluation, 
administration, even incentive fees and how the contracts are structured will have to be 
synchronized within the “pack” and it’s requirements for warfighting, mission 
requirements and engagement chain implications. 
e. Program Management Incentivization 
Program managers will have to be incentivized to deliver integrated and 
non-duplicitive systems that fill a critical niche to the pack, but do not utilize fiscal 
resources to implement functionality better suited for another system, either within or 
external to the PM’s service.  By reducing duplicative functionality, resources will be 
saved thereby incentivizing PMs who will be permitted to keep such savings in order to 
further develop other requirements. 
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4. Life-Cycle Support 
Life-cycle support and maintenance must be planned, resource and implemented 
on the timeframe compatible with all PFs if the “packs” are to be viable warfighting 
assets.  There must be a way for life-cycle support to be conducted without adversely 
impacting the “packs” flexibility, responsiveness, agility or warfighting capabilities.  
Life-cycle support will have to be delivered in new ways, perhaps more in-situ than 
before. 
5. Technology Drivers  
Moore’s Law also indicates that technologies will require a more iterative and 
experimental approach to drive the cost down.  Technology drivers will need to be 
planned for, their integration managed and easily supported or readily identified by PFs.  
Evolutionary technology insertion as it relates to implementation analysis and trade-offs.  
Technology drivers will help to push pack capabilities to new levels of maturation and 
capability, while they will also have secondary effects on many other areas such as 
support, training, etc. 
6. Programmatic Phasing 
The FnEPs concept will require programmatic phasing to be addressed in such a 
manner that will allow multiple individual programs, and systems and other PFs, to be 
separately funded, developed and supported while maintaining a consistent pack 
integration schedule to deliver a capability at some predetermined point in time.  For 
example, terminals can not be years ahead or behind of their supported satellite or 
weapon system launchers can not be still in development while the missile is 
independently designed, tested and fielded (by another service).  If programs become out 
of schedule alignment, there will have to be a way to ensure the “pack” capability is 
developed together, so funding and/or time would have to be reallocated across programs 
and across services to maintain the integrity of the overall capability’s development. 
7. Technical Impacts of FnEPs on Current Programs of Record 
In addition to the program management aspects of current programs, there are 
engineering aspects to current programs of record which will be impacted by FnEPs.  As 
a result of the FnEPs concept and its attendant requirements for flexibility, agility, and 
cross-mission area integration on-the-fly, these new requirements should cause a re-
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examination of programs already under development to assess if the currnet programs 
will support these future warfighting requirements.  Numerous ongoing programs of 
record and other initiatives should be assessed to determine their ability to support FnEPs 
through their current forms.  These include: 
· Programs such as; NIFC-CA, DCGS, JFN 
· Iniatives such as FORCEnet distributed services/composeable forces and 
horizontal fusion 
· Research and development projects such as ONR’s DWC and other Future 
Naval Capabilities (FNCs) 
Some initial insight came into this from a detailed look at the Engage-On-Remote 
(EOR) sequence being used in the NIFC-CA program.  While the currnet sequence was 
certainly able to be overlayed into the FnEPs concept, there were additional engineering 
issues of interfaces and data sharing which were brought out by the capabilities needed to 
make a ‘Pack’ operate.  Also as an example, in conducting our research, we learned 
programs such as the Transformational Communication Architecture (TCA) and Mobile 
User Objective System (MUOS) Satellite Programs will probably not be able to support 
the FnEPs concept for an integrated, networked warfighting environment under their 
current system engineering plans.  The ability to support highly mobile, sometime 
autonomous, networked, PFs in a highly flexible, adaptable and composeable force based 
on networked, distributed services in a time-critical environment should be critcally 
looked at.  The ability to meet simple challenges with geosychronous time delays, 
multiple decryption and reencryption times, information processing times and the ability 
to route data to the end user within very time-critical threshholds seems doubtful at best.  
With TCA achieving IOC shortly after IOC for FnEPs Block I, TCA must support FnEP 
CRC requirements at IOC, therefore planning and system engineering efforts must begin 
now in earnest.  This kind of detailed analysis of how the current programs of record fit 
underneath and hang together under this new FnEP integration concept will also be a 
critical, continuous process.  
8. PPBS Funding, Funding Alignments and POM/PR Cycles 
Funding considerations, POM and PR cycles which attempt to find money, pay 
unexpected DoD fiscal bills or the general management of fiscal funds within DoD will 
have to understand how impacting a programs funds (i.e., taken away) will impact not 
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only the programs’ cost, schedule and performance criteria, but there must be an 
understanding of how the proposed funding actions impact the pack capabilities as a 
whole and what ripple effects that has on their development cycles.  From a 
programmatic standpoint, the current PPBS and acquisition processes suffer from many 
of the antiquated Industrial Age characteristics that hinder the organizational and process 
changes discussed above.  Chapter I discussed the challenges associated with weapons 
and other “engagement” systems from an integration perspective; including the fact such 
systems have historically been notoriously stove-piped and tightly coupled.  Even though 
Figure 168 is somewhat dated, the message is still valid; to fix today’s stove-piped 
interoperability problems, we must change the paradigm to a networked environment. 
To Fix Today’s Problem &
Achieve Joint Vision 2010,






















Anywhere, Anytime, Any Mission
 
Figure 168.   SPAWAR 00--View from the Bridge335. 
 
Senior Lecturer of Information Sciences at NPS Rex Buddenberg makes some 
excellent observations regarding the shortcomings of the current acquisition process, 
specifically with respect to the unsuitability of the current “program manager 
methodology” to build large information systems: 
                                                 
335 John A. Gauss, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy. SPAWAR 00--View From The Bridge, (SPAWARSYSCOM, San 
Diego, California, 23 March 1998), (PowerPoint Brief), Slide 15. 
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Information sys tems cut across multiple platforms.  Indeed, 
interoperability impacts an indefinitely large number of diverse platforms 
when we consider multiple services and allies as within the scope of 
'enterprise wide'. It is not conceivable that we would give any program 
manager that much authority.  Further, if we tried, the mega-program 
would be so large that it would collapse of its own weight.  Indeed, the 
landscape is littered with far less sizable information system programs that 
have failed.336 
We agree with Buddenberg’s assessment, however, we believe there also needs to 
be a central authority with the “teeth” to force these PM’s to work together.  Buddenberg 
suggests the following steps to address the challenges presented above 
· First, require all information systems to be cross-program interoperable.  
· Second, include the interoperability requirements in each program 
manager's charter. 
We would add to these recommendations the need to “modernize” the acquisition 
process in order to better incentivize PM’s to achieve these interoperability requirements.  
Unfortunately, without changes in programmatic and acquisition processes, such 
challenges are likely to remain.  More specifically, and as highlighted previously, one of 
the most glaring deficiencies is the near total lack of incentives for program managers to 
integrate their systems or to work towards the level of (joint) interoperability FnEPs and 
FORCEnet will require.  Further, the kinds of programs necessary to support the 
development of the integrated architectures required by FORCEnet and FnEPs introduce 
new challenges to the current acquisition process.  Finally, the acquisition process 
mandates a set of statutory requirements and limitations that mandate the allocation of 
fiscal resources.  The result of these constraints, as depicted in Figure 169, is that stove-
piped systems are a result of the organization and fiscal partitioning which resources and 
supports their development. 
 
                                                 
336 Buddenberg, 3. 
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“As Is” Organization,
The Money Flow & The Results
“SYSCOMs” Follow


































Stovepipes EVERYWHERE!!!  
Figure 169.   “As-Is” Organization, Money Flows and Results337. 
 
It is important to note that while the FnEPs concept will be initially built utilizing 
legacy systems, certain requirements associated with the integration of legacy and future 
systems and programs will be revealed.  FnEPs can be thought of as an umbrella concept 
which articulates a way to conduct cross-mission area integration in a spiral development 
effort which builds on the significant work already being done in many critical areas.  
FnEPs seeks to integrate and build on these efforts in such a manner that will produce 
increased combat reach and increased combat power.  The integration requirements for 
current programs and systems to develop the five critical CRCs will, undoubtedly, be the 
combination of current requirements (perhaps realigned) and new ones.  These new or 
realigned system function requirements will have programmatic implications which may 
ultimately impact program budgets and other resources. 
While it is beyond the scope of our thesis to fully discuss the inefficiencies of the 
PPBS and acquisition processes, or to propose specific changes to such, as with the 
organizational and process issues discussed above, this section has highlighted some 
                                                 
337 Gauss, Slide 16. 
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general opportunities for improvement, while acknowledging the tremendous challenges 
associated with programmatic and acquisition related changes.  Such changes can only 
occur if supported across the leadership of DoD.  Notably, this support must include 
program managers and other acquisition decision authorities. 
F. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED 
In the digital information age, there is a shift from knowledge management to 
“getting the warfighter connected.”  There should be an in depth look at collaboration and 
how best to utilize it in an FnEPs environment.  Perhaps the publishing model for 
information sharing should be examined with an eye towards a collaborative management 
based scheme built on some kind of ‘Brokering’ model.  Current knowledge management 
models assume people know how, when and where to get available information.  The 
challenge within the knowledge management domain given the current data explosion 
trends are to find the right, appropriate information in a vast sea of data based on specific 
user needs in a timely manner.  Using knowledge management in this manner would 
bring people together in an innovative, collaborative environment to create value added 
to FnEPs.  This would be an area to study and understand how knowledge management 
and knowledge value added concepts could both help to mature FnEPs or conversely, to 
help understand how FnEPs he lps the military better perform knowledge management 
and better understand what parts or aspects of packs are, or are not, knowledge value 
added.  These two concepts of knowledge management and knowledge value added 
might better provide for increased insight into existing warfighting capabilities, their 
realized or potential capabilities and potential for further refinement or streamlining. 
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VI. RESULTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESULTS 
NCW, FORCEnet, and FnEPs will generally require the Navy to change its 
culture and move away from platform-centric systems, and their related TTPs.  
Fortunately, this change is already beginning.  The Navy has already started to transform 
its operations in ways that are aligned with these concepts.  Examples include 
collaborative planning, chat, etc. where operations, rules and interactions are based on 
web interactions.  By becoming more “loosely coupled,” the Navy will be better able to 
respond to emerging and future threats such as terrorists and asymmetric threats because 
operations and our engagement chains can respond and adjust to much more compressed 
timelines, and time critical threats.  A large challenge remains; however, in terms of 
unbinding our combat systems to fully integrate them in this loosely joined, adaptive and 
responsive world, in order to effectively and efficiently address asymmetric as well as 
conventional threats.  Figure 170 visually depicts this notional difference in threats. 
 
 
Figure 170.   Small Asymmetric Threats versus Massed Threats338. 
 
                                                 
338 David Weinberger, Small Pieces Loosely Joined {a unified theory of the web}, (Cambridge, Massaschusetts; 
Perseus Publishing, 2002), Cover. 
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The military typically knows how to counter ordered, clustered, easily observable 
and massed threats.  In contrast, there are unordered, independent, and difficult to detect 
asymmetric threats that are much harder to counter.  This precipitates the use of 
conventional means against unconventional threats.  These loosely joined, small threats 
are not aligned and orderly but may be the deadliest, against which massive response is 
neither effective nor desired.  FnEPs is about using networked, distributed forces to have 
massed effects on a global theater.  Put another way, FnEPs are everywhere while being 
nowhere at the same time!  FnEPs is based on network-centric principles.  Due to this 
fact, FnEPs is focused on the alignment and focused integration of system functionality 
and relationships of this system to one another rather than individual systems.  This focus 
allows for increases in combat reach and combat power and provides for better utilization 
of assets.  Examples of such improvements within the Strike and TAMD mission areas, 
our research identified339: 
· Improvement in kills against massive raids of missiles 
· Reduction in number of TAMD leakers 
· Increases in engagement envelope intercept range  
· Increases in numbers of re-engagement opportunities 
· Increases in overland percent area protected 
These research activities have led to some lessons learned about how loose coupling 
applies to FnEPs. 
· System decomposition is key.  To begin with, systems must be 
decomposed and decoupled into their appropriate combat reach capability 
areas.  This focus on system interfaces and modularity must maximize the 
integration of the five end-to-end combat reach capabilities. 
· PF component integration must be based on the five combat reach 
capabilities (CRCs). 
· Integration complexity can and should be minimized through the 
elimination of duplicative or otherwise unnecessary functionality 
according to defined criteria.  Similarly, functionality gaps or single points 
of failure must be identified.  Fundamentally, levels of integration are  
 
                                                 
339 GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, Phil 
Charles, LCDR Phil Turner and Rebecca Harman, SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston, Slide 33. 
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simply about nesting and chaining of smaller, simpler components.  This 
is shown by Figure 171 which depicts redundant and/or missing system 
functionality within the current Strike TACSIT use-cases.’ 
 
 
Figure 171.   Identification of Redundant Strike System Functionality340. 
 
· Combat reach capabilities will utilize FORCEnet distributed services 
including functionality to support adaptability, flexibility, and self-
synchronization across all mission areas. 
· ABMAs functionality, enabled by a net-VE ontology and FORCEnet 
distributed services will, in large part, enable “Pack” adaptability.  
Additionally, “Pack” flexibility will be ensured through the use of 
composeable and modular PFs. 
· FnEP “packs” will not be geographically constrained.  Moreover, the 
“geography” or composition of a “pack” must be as ephemeral as the 
threat it is trying to counter. 
                                                 
340 Assessments to Define Composable Mission Capability, by Phil Charles, SPAWAR System Center 
Charleston, Slide 12. 
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· FnEPs enables responding to pressures from asymmetric terrorist threats, 
time-critical targets, and other “fleeting” threats.  FnEPs is a like response 
to a like threat. 
· FnEPs must be decentralized and distributed while remaining secure, 
survivable, and reliable under the most austere conditions.  Much like 
decentralized network routers “Packs” must make decentralized decisions.  
This is similar to the routing of packets in a highly dynamic internet 
highway system, where the stop and ask technique for finding the path to a 
destination turns out not only to the more robust but also the more 
efficient.341 
· Just as collaborators are the heart of the web, groups of networked assets 
and other PFs are the heart of FnEPs. 
Another benefit of the analysis methodology chosen was to identify disinvestment 
opportunities by which capital to realign system functionality can be saved and/or 
reinvested.  Figure 172 shows some early results of the power to link redundant system 
function data in TVDB to real live programmatic data in NTIRA.  From the assessments 
that were conducted and the viability –vs- fit graphs shown in Chapter III, the following 
systems were categorized according to their alignment (level of risk) with FORCEnet.  
Additionally, the dollar figures in blue depict potential reinvestment opportunities if these 
systems were realigned.  In total, $740,756,000 was identified and allocated to 15 of 152 
systems.  This number is conservative because SSC-C lacked data for the remaining 
systems. 
                                                 
341 Weinberger, 80. 
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Figure 172.   Planned Funding to Install through 07 (NTIRA)342. 
 
The Virtual SYSCOM POM 06 technical assessment data can be used to prioritize the 
FORCEnet vision in the same spiral manner.  This produces the highest bang for the buck 
“packs”.  Figure 173 shows how the costing data is broken down by system within each 
level of redundancy (1=green/low redundancy, 4=red/high redundancy). 
                                                 
342 GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, Phil 
Charles, LCDR Phil Turner and Rebecca Harman, SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston, Slide 39. 
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Figure 173.   Potential Savings on Redundant System Functions 343. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ‘INSTITUTIONALIZING’ FNEPS 
As our thesis abstract concludes, fundamentally, the FnEPs concept seeks to 
achieve fully integrated joint capabilities focused on the engagement chain, thereby 
achieving a revolutionary transformation in Naval operations complimentary to the 
concepts of FORCEnet, SEA POWER 21, and Sea Supremacy.  While significant 
technologically-related challenges lie ahead, our research and analysis has revealed the 
FnEPs concept and its potential to “operationalize” FORCEnet faces a number of “non-
technical” challenges as well.  Ultimately, solutions to these issues must be implemented 
alongside the engineering and technology advancements in order to fully realize the order 
of magnitude increase in combat reach capabilities that FnEPs promises.  This section 
                                                 
343 GEMINII Overview, Global Engineering Methods:  Initiative for Integration and Interoperability, Phil 
Charles, LCDR Phil Turner and Rebecca Harman, SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston, Slide 55. 
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will take a look at efforts which address the need to “institutionalize” the FnEPs concept 
within the Department of Navy and provide a roadmap for FnEPs development and 
implementation in the fleet. 
At the conclusion of their brief to the CNO in July of 2003, the SSG assessed that 
Block I (IOC) of FnEPs could be reached by 2009344.  In order to reach this milestone, 
the SSG outlined a roadmap for the continued development, analysis and experimentation 
of the concept, as depicted in Figure 174. 
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Figure 174.   Roadmap to Achieve FnEPss Block I345. 
 
 
These recommendations are generally summarized as follows: 
                                                 
344 SSG XXII Quicklook Report, Slide 63. 
345 Ibid., Slide 66. 
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· Document specific “pack” warfighting, capability, 346 and system 
performance requirements, starting with already documented joint 
capstone requirements.  It was recommended to begin with the TAMD and 
Strike mission areas, because of current related activities and high, near-
term potential.    
· Consistent with recommendations made by SSG XXI, the Navy must 
accelerate the development of an integrated, cross service modeling and 
simulation and hardware- in-the- loop, assessment environment.  The 
DISA-led Joint Distributed Engineering Plant (JDEP) is such an example. 
· Align ongoing Navy- led efforts, including the Navy Integrated Fire 
Control, Counter Air Initiative (NIFC-CA), Joint Fires Network (JFN), 
and the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJCS) Program. 347  
· The Navy should closely tie FnEPs development to the Sea Trial process.  
Further, FnEPs development should leverage already planned exercises 
and demonstrations, including ONR’s Navy Integrated Fire Control event 
scheduled for 2007.348 
Broad-based support for the FnEPs concept has been given by senior Naval 
leadership as well as Joint Forces Command.  Subsequent to SSG XXII completing their 
work in August 2003, and building on that basis of support, our thesis has continued the 
development of, and pursued a more in depth understanding of the FnEPs concept leading 
to some analysis and options for FnEPs’ implementation.  Out of this work came ideas 
for refining the roadmap for the future and institutionalizing FnEPs within the 
Department of Navy.  As our research has continued, three significant events have most 
significantly impacted refinements to this roadmap, 1) The Naval Studies Board (NSB), 
who were chartered to examine “FORCEnet Implementation Strategy”, 2) The NPS 
Cebrowski Institute’s research effort focused on the development of a reference 
architecture for battlespace communications and related FORCEnet research, and 3) 
Commander, NAVNETWARCOM (at the time VADM Mayo) tasker to 
SPAWAR/OPNAV N61 to develop a prototype “pack” for review and potential fleet trial 
in FY04.  Each of these is addressed below. 
 
                                                 
346 Currently, such capabilities are collectively referred to as the five CRCs. 
347 This list is not all-inclusive. 
348 Ibid. 
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The FnEPs concept, as it related to their study charter and questions, resonated 
with the Naval Studies Board.  The NSB expressed great interest for the FnEPs concept, 
especially for its implications for the “operationalization” of FORCEnet as a much 
clearer and more achievable road for realizing the vision for NCW.  The focus on spirally 
developing the five CRCs based on the six FORCEnet factors provides the needed focus 
to being realizing NCW.  Figure 175 notionally shows how spiral development could 
enable an MCP-based “pack” (such as Strike or TAMD) to mature through an analysis 
effort and follow-on experimentation, in order to ultimately become a fielded mission 
capability.  Critically important to these pack and CRC development efforts, which 
typically focus on more technical and engineering tasks, are other “non-technical” 
challenges.  By coevolving these technical and “non-technical” requirements, FnEPs will 
















































Figure 175.   MCP Development Process349. 
 
With this spiral development method in mind and starting initial pack and CRC 
development based on systems and programs already being developed or in place, the 
NSB had strong enthusiasm for FnEPs.  One member, ADM Archie Clemins (Ret.) 
                                                 
349 David S. Alberts, NCW Report to Congress, 27 July 2001, 8-4. 
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reportedly mentioned; the Navy should not wait to implement FnEPs, but should begin 
immediately.  As a result, there are a wide range of potential impacts the NSB may have 
on institutionalizing FnEPs as a result of their report. 
The NPS Cebrowski Institute (CI) is charted to explore information innovations 
that support battlespace superiority.  The CI sponsors a theme of research that will draw 
multiple disciplines and teams of faculty, students and industry to contribute to new 
knowledge.  In October 2003, the Chairman of the Computer Science Department at NPS 
and the Director of the CI proposed the development of a reference model for battlespace 
communications as CI’s theme for 2004.  Upon learning of the FnEPs concept and 
ongoing research efforts, the director of the CI also voiced strong support and interest in 
continuing with FnEPs involvement.  The first step will be institutionalizing ongoing 
research and development activities already in progress with members of the CI over the 
course of the next few months. 
As a result of the CNO’s support of the FnEPs concept and in conjunction with 
ongoing activities at NAVNETWARCOM related to continued development of 
FORCEnet, VADM Mayo tasked SPAWAR/N61 to develop a prototype “pack” for 
review and potential fleet trial in FY04.  Several meetings and efforts have resulted in a 
response to this tasking, and include participants representing a variety of stakeholders 
and organizations.  Overall, consensus was reached that FnEPs is the operational 
construct for FORCEnet and a mechanism to rapidly achieve the full engagement 
capability of FORCEnet in the near term.  FnEPs was seen as giving a focus to the 
current FORCEnet way ahead by facilitating SEA POWER 21 warfighting capability.  As 
a result of the groups’ effort, the following high- level recommendations were made: 
· Formalize FnEPs as fundamental to Sea Power 21 implementation and 
operations 
· Define technical, operational, and fiscal requirements, including those 
from the joint/coalition perspective 
· Develop first FnEPs “Pack” candidates 
As a result of these recommendations, initial discussions were begun in October 
2003 to assess the feasibility of beginning FnEPs experimentation in Trident Warrior 
2004. Although the focus for FnEPs Spiral I is the demonstration of sensor-to-weapon 
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connectivity and basic combat reach capabilities, additional recommendations were also 
provided.  These were generally focused from a longer term perspective, and are 
discussed in Chapter VII, future areas for research.  In addition to the near and longer 
term recommendations outlined above, a number of organizational roles and 
responsibilities were proposed.  These organiza tional roles and responsibilities have 
become better refined during the course of our research and through follow-on  
discussions with leadership throughout the Navy.  Below are our recommendations for 
“institutionalizing” FnEPs based on those conversations, research and past professional 
experience. 
There are at least two distinct areas in which FnEPs has to be “institutionalized” 
in order for the concept to mature and become the truly revolutionary operational 
construct it was designed/envisioned to be.  These areas include 1) “institutionalizing” 
FnEP research and development efforts within the S&T community, and 2) 
“institutionalizing” FnEPs capability within the acquisition and PPBS communities of 
work through validated (via Sea Trial), fleet-driven requirements. 
First, the “institutionalization” of FnEPs within the research and development 
(both raw and applied) community will have to be done using efforts at within 
organizations like NPS, DARPA, ONR, and others, however there has to be pervasive 
and robust partnerships with private industry to infuse ideas, business processes and 
technology from respective leaders in their competitive market domains.  In addition, 
these combined military and private industry efforts will need to leverage the enormous 
amount of work already done and in progress with programs already underway that are 
working in areas which are directly related to FnEPs.  Programs like the Joint Fires 
Network (JFN), Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA), and the 
Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) are not only established but are relatively 
mature from a technology standpoint.  These programs will support the initial spiral 
development of FnEPs and provide an overarching vision for achieving Network-Centric 
Warfare.  Integrating the landscape of many good, albeit fragmented programmatic 
efforts, into alignment with one overarching concept, FnEPs, will produce the 
consolidated and synergistic efforts required to realize the operational concept of FnEPs.  
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In accomplishing these S&T tasks, there appears to be some short, mid and long term 
efforts that can begin now.  Some initial thoughts are outlined below. 
· NWDC  
· Act as conduit to acquisition and PPBS communities to access 
impact to and provide input to FnEPs research and development 
efforts. 
· Coordinate with DISA Joint Distributed Engineering Plant (JDEP) 
initiative to forward the development of a system-of-system land-
based hardware- in-the- loop and modeling and simulation 
assessment environment and integrate that environment with the 
Sea Trial experimentation process 
· NNWC/NWDC/SPAWAR (FORCEnet CHENG) – Evaluate and integrate 
appropriate ongoing ONR/DARPA initiatives with FBE plan, e.g., ONR 
2007 Integrated Fire Control event.  Ensure FBEs build and test CRC 
capabilities to achieve FnEP performance requirements. 
· NPS – Align FnEPs research efforts throughout NPS including: the 
Cebrowski Institute, Meyer Institute and other appropriate Information 
Systems (IS), Computer Science (CS), Modeling, Virtual Environements, 
and Simulation (MOVES) Institute, Busines and Public Policy, Operation 
Research (OR) or other departments/institues to: 
· Initiate discussions with DARPA regarding possible DARPA 
FnEP technology program to look at technology implications and 
technological challenges (e.g., system function decoupling into 
functional modules, horizontal mission area integration, system 
function alignment into capabilities-based areas, etc.) which would 
help in development of CRCs 
· Apply, develop or otherwise focus many other appropriate 
departments/institutes’ FnEPs relevant research and student 
activity 
· Use IP Community Center of Excellence (IP COE) to help position 
the IP Community to institutionalize FnEPs in the Fleet and 
conduct professional training on FnEPs.  Use the IP COE as the 
venue by which the IP Community uses FnEPs to define their 
future role in the warfighting community. 
· Take full advantage of proximity to cutting edge commercial 
technology and organizations in Silicon Valley which represents 
opportunities for continued FnEP coordination and development 
· Use Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 




· ONR/NRL – Realign current S&T roadmap to reflect FnEP operational 
concept 
· Coordinate with private industry to address maturing CRCs and 
looking for technology hurdles to a warfighting networked virtual 
environment. 
· ONR/NRL/DARPA/NPS conduct an annual FnEPs research and 
development symposium to focus on R&D efforts and forward tasks. 
The second community of efforts which need to be aligned with FnEPs in order to 
“institutionalize” and mature FnEPs into the revolutionary operational construct it is, will 
have to be done through the acquisition and PPBS communities, using fleet-validated 
requirements to drive the entire set of processes.  These efforts at “institutionalizing” 
FnEPs from the operational perspective must start with Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) 
working in concert with the Combined Fleet Forces Command (CFFC).  With JFCOM 
being the Navy’s transformational component commander there should be ample 
opportunity for departments, including the Experimentation Department (J9), to 
understand the truly transformational aspects of FnEPs.  JFCOM should spearhead the 
operational development and experimentation efforts.  Additionally, CFFC, in their role 
as consolidated fleet requirements sponsors, should develop and document a set of 
validated operational needs.  These must be validated thorough the numbered fleets, Type 
Commanders, Fleet Headquarters and eventually through the component commanders on 
their way to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).  Using Joint, fleet 
validated requirements to support FnEPs, POM and PR inputs into the PPBS processes 
will align funding such that ongoing program efforts can continue.  This alignment must 
also include the FnEPs operational construct such that system functionality includes the 
five CRCs.  In accomplishing these tasks, there are short, mid and long term efforts that 
can begin now.  Some initial thoughts are outlined below. 
· CFFC - Endorse FnEPs as an integral component of Sea Trial & Trident 
Warrior.  Act as consolidated operational fleet-validated requirements 
sponsor to the joint community and JFCOM. 
· Identify corresponding FnEP Fleet requirements via Fn 
Requirements OAG 
· JFCOM – Endorse FnEPs as a joint operational construct which will not 
mature with only Naval involvement.  Bring joint community 
requirements into alignment with developing CRCs.  Take the FnEPs 
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concept to the joint community for further alignment of efforts.  Sponsor 
an annual, joint FnEPs development conference to share ideas between 
private industry and the military on achievements, progress and future 
aspirations. 
· Coordinate Joint involvement and establish appropriate cross-
service and interagency MOUs. 
· OPNAV N7/N8 – Align program resources with system functionality in 
order to develop all five critical Combat Reach Capabilities (CRCs).  
Remove gaps and duplicates in specific programs’ system functionality as 
they become aligned with the CRCs.  Align program resources in concert 
with JFCOM and CFFC sponsored requirements to develop CRCs.  Start 
realigning POM and PR budget inputs to fund initial pack prototype assets 
· ASN(RD&A) 
· Convene a Naval Board of Directors (BOD) to oversee FnEP CRC 
development and program cost, schedule and performance 
alignments to continue maturing CRC development and 
warfighting capability assessments 
· Establish FnEPs Direct Reporting Program Manger (DRPM) 
Office to lead the Joint FnEPs effort.  An alternative course of 
action would be to coordinate with JFCOM BMC2 Agency 
(JSSEO) and NETWARCOM the solicitation for a FnEPs Program 
Manager and Deputy Program Manager to lead the Joint FnEP 
effort. 
· Initiate cross-service and interagency MOU development. 
· Document Joint Combat Reach Capability performance 
requirements in: 
· Initial Capabilities Documents 
· FBE success criteria (based on metrics) 
· Initiate POM funding and work to get FnEPs realigned 
FYDP budget to cover needed CRC development, 
integration, training, testing, M&S, experimentation, etc., 
costs not already covered or available by realignment 
within currently existing programs.  May have to start up 
programs that will contain system functionality gaps 
currently not being developed in any program, e.g., ABMA 
functionalities. 
· Define and coordinate technical, operational and fiscal 
requirements within cost, schedule and performance criteria 
· Define FnEP plan of action and milestones. 
· SYSCOMS - Support FnEPs in respective Sea Power 21 pillars.  Work 
with resource sponsors to align program system functionality to develop 
CRCs. 
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· Convene an FnEPs Oversight Board (FOB) to oversee CRC 
integration development.  Will align individual program cost, 
schedule and performance criteria to further CRC development.  
Decide on how best to Sea Trial FnEPs combat capabilities and 
oversee planning. 
· Decide on how best to manage CRC development work as it 
relates to ongoing programmatic efforts, funding and requirements 
alignments. 
· Nomination of FnEPs Sea Trial event candidate systems 
· Technical assessments 
· Develop a transition roadmap to the network-centric Combat 
Reach Capabilities and collectively decide on coordination of work 
· SPAWAR  
· Produce and validate an architecture capable of supporting 
dynamically reconfigurable mission capabilities beginning with 
TAMD and Strike Packs. 
· Use integrated architecture methodologies and modeling tools to 
demonstrate an increase end to end warfighting effectiveness and 
management of complexity 
· Technical lead as FORCEnet CHENG 
· Continue pack prototype development 
· Coordinate inclusion of FnEPs concept and vernacular in 
appropriate FORCEnet documentation.  Modification of Fn 
documentation (e.g., Campaign Plan, Architecture and Standards, 
Government Reference Vision, etc.) such that they can be built 
upon and expanded to reflect FnEP requirements will help 
communicate FnEP to all concerned.  There is a significant amount 
of Fn work that is directly related to FnEPs by design.  
· NWDC  
· Rewrite existing Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to reflect 
FnEPs operational construct 
· Develop FnEPs operational CONOPs 
· Develop or coordinate changes to DOTMLPF areas of impact  
· Work with CFFC and JFCOM to ensure coordination with Sea 
Trial process 
· Act as conduit to S&T community to access impact to and provide 
input to FnEPs research and development efforts. 
344 
· Modify FORCEnet Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) to 
accommodate FnEPs objectives. 
· Modify Hairy Buffalo and Giant Shadow exercises to include 
FnEPs requirements. 
· Plan for FnEPs requirements in Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs) 
· NETWARCOM  
· Officia lly initiate and take ownership of and be Naval operational 
authority for FnEPs 
· In coordination with FnEPs program office, SYSCOMs, JFCOM 
and CFFC, lead the development of FnEPs 5-year Execution Plan.  
Plan should include: 
· Performance requirements and metrics (see CRC 
definitions, capabilities and metrics in Chapter III) 
· Organizational responsibilities and cross-service 
coordination 
· Program capability milestones (of which initial 1-year pack 
prototype effort is one). 
· Experimentation schedule 
· Funding requirements 
· Develop a Joint Services Inclusion Plan (example: JRAE) 
· Advise CFFC with respect to requirements and implementation of 
FnEPs.  Coordinate issues such as modernization needs, training 
initiatives and operational concept development coordination with 
CFFC and NWDC.  
· Coordinate alignment of the following efforts and organizations to 
support FnEP execution plan 
· NWDC for Naval component of joint doctrinal 
development and network infrastructure concept 
development 
· Joint Fires Network (JFN) 
· Deployable Joint Command and Control System (DJC2S) 
· SPAWWAR 05 FORCEnet Architecture Vision 
· Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air (NIFC-CA) 
· NAVSEA 06/PEO(IWS) 
· NAVAIR Director NCW 
· PEO (IT), (C4I) & NRO 
· Evaluate Transformational Communication Architecture (TCA) to 
support FnEPs operational construct and technical implications for 
mobile, adaptive Naval platforms 
· Evaluate MILSATCOM and Commercial SATCOM programs for 
FnEP requirement supportability (e.g., MUOS, etc.)  
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· MCCDC 
· ONR Missile Defense Future Naval Capabilities transition 
strategy, e.g., 
· Distributed Weapons Coordination (DWC) 
· Composite Combat Identification (CCID) 
· Multi-Source Integration 
· Advanced Sensor Netting Technology 
· FnEPs development with JFCOM and other services, 
interagencies (JTAMDO, MDA, etc.) 
· Coordinate inclusion of FnEPs concept and vernacular in 
appropriate FORCEnet documentation 
· Coordinate with CNO N6/N7/N8 to identify and support funding 
and requirements for FnEP development. 
· Continue to evaluate POM-06 and PR-07 for funding 
alignments. 
· Use FnEPs as the overarching concept for POM-08 inputs. 
· Coordinate with CNO N7 to define operational scenarios to 
support FnEP development 
· Naval Capabilities Development Process 
· New/revised OPSITs and TACSITs 
These are significant recommendations.  However, we strongly feel if FORCEnet 
and NCW are to be realized, FnEPs will be the operational construct which will provide 
the focus and purpose for their achievement.  We believe the alignments between 
NAVSEA, NAVAIR, SPAWAR and PEOs should take on a much more proactive, 
integral role in FORCEnet development, and is absolutely key critical to implementation 
of FnEPs.  Without NAVSEA and NAVAIR’s involvement, FnEPs will not happen, 
because the whole premise of FnEPs is engagement focused.  The alignment of efforts 
between SPAWAR, NAVSEA, NAVAIR and MARCORSYSCOM have to be all 
focused on the engagement chain for the purposes of increased combat reach and 
increased combat power through cross-warfighting functional system integration.  These 
aligned efforts must be supported by alignments in funding and funding support as well 
as resource sponsorship.  FnEPs development, prototyping, testing, experimentation, 
deployment and operational use have to be supported fiscally as well as via capstone  
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requirements documents, most of which already exist, in order to sustainable at any level 
or pack size.  Our recommendations form the framework and provide the support for the 
significant technical integration and engineering analysis which must also be conducted. 
We believe these “formal” activities are necessary but insufficient - 
transformational change requires “institutionalize” change and concepts such FORCEnet 
and FnEPs are no exception.  FnEPs has already gone through several iterations of 
concept development from its initial construct as the Adaptive Engagement System 
(AES) to the Joint Adaptive Engagement System (JAES) to the current FORCEnet 
Engagement Packs (FnEPs) concept.  FnEPs will doubtless continue to evolve on many 
different levels and from many different perspectives on its way to “operationalizing’ 
FORCEnet. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Today, the Navy and our 
Nation face new challenges that 
demand we transform the Navy.  In 
addition to its role in forward 
power projection, the Navy now 
faces a new role in homeland 
defense.  These changes require 
that the Navy be able to go places 
and fight in ways it has never done 
before.  In doing so, we are taking the Navy to a place where no one else can follow 
through big, fundamental, high-technology, collaborative warfighting capabilities which 
will ensure the Navy’s overwhelming strength and ability to deter, defend and obviate 
global threats including those to our homeland.  The Navy's overarching strategy to 










“There are 2 types of people; Requirements people and 
“Big Idea” people.  Requirements people like to deal in 
deliberate detail, while “Big Idea” people start with a 
general vision and create from there . . . the Army’s 
“Own the Night” initiative is a Big Idea” 
Bran Ferren, 
Executive VP for Creative Technology 
Walt Disney Imagineering 
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Achieve and maintain global Sea Supremacy by using its unique 
capabilities in an unprecedented collaborative effort with joint, 
interagency, and coalition partners to defend against threats from the 
maritime environment.  This collaborative effort will assure a focused 
response, permitting the "right" partner with the "right" asset to engage 
the "right" threat at the "right" time350. 
We believe this overarching strategy, squarely supports the Navy’s Vision of SEA 
POWER 21 and “operationalizing” FORCEnet is critically important to getting there. 
In its truest, fully developed form, FnEPs represents the operational construct for 
FORCEnet and will enable FORCEnet to become an integral and undistinguishable part 
of Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea Basing.  Beyond simply the ‘glue’ that holds SEA 
POWER 21 together, FnEPs will allow FORCEnet to disappear into Sea Strike, Sea 
Shield and Sea Basing and making distributed, composeable warfighting services 
ubiquitous, yet focused, throughout the battlespace.  Ultimately, FnEPs will help 
FORCEnet achieve more aligned warfighting capabilities that can address both force-on-
force as well as asymmetric threats.  
FnEPs is the ‘Big Idea’ Concept for 21st Century warfighting which will enable 
big, fundamental, high- technology, collaborative capabilities.  FnEPs will do nothing 
short of truly transform how the Navy, at least, and quite possibly DoD, conducts warfare 
in the future by delivering tomorrow’s Network-Centric combat reach capabilities . . . 
today. 
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VII. EPILOGUE 
As discussed in the introduction, the current development of FnEPs is a result of 
initial efforts by SSG XXII, (including the analysis efforts of other organizations) and 
follow-on work as a part of this thesis at NPS.  While to date, these efforts have reflected 
countless briefings, this thesis represents the most complete discussion of FnEPs and its 
relationship to FORCEnet to date.  A significant part of this thesis is its recommendations 
with respect to the roadmap for future development and “institutionalization” of FnEPs.  
Even as this thesis is being written, some of the recommendations are being 
implemented. 
· Prior to his retirement, VADM Mayo tasked SPAWAR with the 
development of a plan for an initial prototype “pack” and its 
implementation within the next year.  Efforts as a result of this tasker have 
lead to NAVNETWARCOM’s planning the first FnEPs conference to be 
held in January 2004 to further refine the FnEPs road ahead. 
· Another critical aspect of the development of FnEPs is its continued 
research and development.  As a result, several organizations within NPS 
have stepped forward and agreed to align their efforts with the FnEPs 
concept. 
· Beyond the initial enthusiasm and support of the Department of Navy 
senior leadership, significant interest within the acquisition community 
continues to grow as FnEPs has been identified as the operational 
construct for FORCEnet.  Such groups as the Virtual SYSCOM and others 
have engaged to explore this opportunity. 
· From its inception, FnEPs was developed to be integral to FORCEnet.  
Thoughout its initial developement by the CNO’s SSG XXII, and our 
continued efforts at NPS, SSC Charleston and the office of the FORCEnet 
Architect Chief Engineer have been instrumental in FnEPs evolution.  As 
a result, significant and continuing efforts are being made to ensure the 
alignment of FnEPs and FORCEnet.  These include a number of ongoing 
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APPENDIX A 
A. COMMON SYSTEM FUNCTION LIST (CSFL) TO FNEP CRC MAPPING 
Table 1 is part of the draft Common System Function List (CSFL) in development 
by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and Acquisition (ASN, 
RD&A).  The CSFL has over 1100 functions organized into a 9-tier (as defined by the 
FORCEnet Operational, Strategic and Tactical Hierachy in the Government Reference 
Architecture, version 1.0, dated 08 April 2003) system function hierarchy.  The CSFL is a 
combined list of several system function lists already in use by various organizations for 
such activities as the PR-05 Strike assessment, POM-06 assessment, and original FnEPs 
analysis conducted by SPAWAR Systems Center Charleston for SSG XXII.  These 
system functions are descriptions of common system functions which are implemented in 
Navy systems and would form the basis by which systems are described, understood and 
mapped to.  This list in Table 1 is not all inclusive of the 1100+ system functions due to 
the fact they are not all directly related to the level of FnEPs analysis at this point.  The 
attempt to better understand the system functionality required of the five CRCs dictated 
that we only analyze the area ‘1.0 Combat’ of the CSFL.  There were over 430 system 
functions which were mapped to the CRCs.  The CRC legend was: 
1 – Composite Tracking (CT) functions 
2 – Composite Combat Identification (CCID) functions 
3 – Integrated Fire Control (IFC) functions 
4 – Common/Single Pictures (CP) functions 
5 – Automated Battle Management Aids (ABMA) functions 
This CSFL to CRC mapping exercise led to a more refined understanding of what 
each CRC should be able to do and helped further refine the NIFC-CA Engage on 







Table 1. Common System Function List (CSFL) to FnEP CRC Mapping. 
 




Recommended Definition or Description Source 
1 1.0 Combat 1,2,3,4,5Directly support combat and mission operations Unknown 
2 1.1 Sense 1,2,4,5
Detect and identify mission objects in area of interest 




1.1.1 Single Sensor 
Sense 1,2,5
Detect, identify and develop imagery, track and 




4 1.1.1.1 Search 1
Observe an area of interest either passively, looking 
for energy emissions that conform to expected signals 
of interest, or actively, transmitting energy to detect 






Detect by propagation of signal through water via 
reflected return of signal off target/object. OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.1.1 Transmit 
and Detect Underwater 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Transmit, intercept and register the presence of signals 





Underwater Signals  1,5
Process underwater signals to filter noise, ECM, and 
clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, 
or otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Underwater Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of underwater 









Based on signals received, estimate presence of 







Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw underwater data and convert data to a form 
suitable for the production of finished intelligence; 
includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of 
information stored on film and magnetic media 











Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of underwater FF signals. Process IFF 
signals to filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, 
simplify or otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.10 Over the 
Horizon Passive 
Search 1,5
Passively search from surface, airborne, or space-






OTH Signals  1Intercept and register presence of OTH signals.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.10.2 - Process 
Signals  1,5
Process signals to filter noise, ECM, and clutter, 
improve the signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 
retransmission, or conversion to another format.  
RDA 
CHENG 
6 1.1.1.1.10.3 - 1,5Determine type and basic characteristics of received OA/Fn 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 
Recognize Signals  OTH signals. 
6 
1.1.1.1.10.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.10.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on signals received, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw over the horizon data and convert data to a 
form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 







and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 






Detect via intercept of an underwater signal emanating 
from a target or other source through an open 
receiver/detection device. SIAP 
6 
1.1.1.1.2.1 Detect 
Underwater Signals  1
Intercept and register the presence of signals under the 





Underwater Signals  1,5
Process underwater signals to filter noise, ECM, and 
clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, 
or otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Underwater Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of underwater 









Based on signals received, estimate presence of 







Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw underwater data and convert data to a form 
suitable for the production of finished intelligence; 
includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of 
information stored on film and magnetic media 











Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of underwater FF signals. Process IFF 
signals to filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, 
simplify or otherwise improve signals for reception, 







Actively transmit energy to detect objects of interest 








Recommended Definition or Description Source 
6 




Transmit, intercept and register the presence of 
surface/ground signals.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.3.2 - Process 
Surface/Ground 
Signals  1,5
Process surface/ground signals to filter noise, ECM, 
and clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, 
amplify, or otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.3.3 - Recognize 
Surface/Ground 
Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of 
surface/ground signal received.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.3.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  SIAP 
6 
1.1.1.1.3.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on measured return, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw surface/ground data and convert data to a 
form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 










Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of surface/ground IFF signals. Process IFF 
signals to filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, 
simplify or otherwise improve signals for reception, 







Detect via intercept of a signal emanating from a 





1.1.1.1.4.1 - Detect 
Surface/Ground 
Signals  1
Intercept and register the presence of surface/ground 
signals.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.4.2 - Process 
Surface/Ground 
Signals  1,5
Process surface/ground signals to filter noise, ECM, 
and clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, 
amplify, or otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.4.3 - Recognize 
Surface/Ground 
Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of 
surface/ground signal received.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.4.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.4.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on signals received, estimate presence of 







Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 
sensor signal processing. OA/Fn 
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Gather raw surface/ground data and convert data to a 
form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 










Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of surface/ground IFF signals. Process IFF 
signals to filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, 
simplify or otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.5 Horizon Air 
Active Search 1,5
Actively transmit energy to detect airborne objects of 




1.1.1.1.5.1 - Transmit 
and Detect Horizon 
Air Signals  1,2,4,5
Transmit, intercept and register presence of horizon air 
signals.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.5.2 - Process 
Horizon Air Signals  1,5
Process horizon air signals to filter noise, ECM, and 
clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, 
or otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.5.3 - Recognize 
Horizon Air Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of received 
horizon air signal.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.5.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  SIAP 
6 
1.1.1.1.5.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on measured return, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw horizon air data and convert data to a form 
suitable for the production of finished intelligence; 
includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of 
information stored on film and magnetic media 








and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.6 Horizon Air 
Passive Search 1,5
Detect via intercept of a signal emanating from a 











Horizon Air Signals  1,5
Process horizon air signals to filter noise, ECM, and 
clutter, improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, 
or otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Horizon Air Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteris tics of received 
horizon air signal.  OA/Fn 
6 1.1.1.1.6.4 ECM 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  OA/Fn 
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Based on measured return, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw horizon air data and convert data to a form 
suitable for the production of finished intelligence; 
includes translations, decryption, and interpretation of 
information stored on film and magnetic media 








and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Horizon Air Active 
Search 1,5
Actively transmit energy to detect objects of interest in 





and Detect Above 
Horizon Air Signals  1,2,4,5Transmit, intercept and register presence of signals.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.7.2 - Process 
Above Horizon Air 
Signals  1,5
Process signals to filter noise, ECM and clutter, 
improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.7.3 - Recognize 
Above Horizon Air 
Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of received 
above horizon air signals.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.7.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  SIAP 
6 
1.1.1.1.7.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on measured return, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw above horizon air data and convert data to 
a form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 







and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Horizon Air Passive 
Search 1,5
Passively search for energy emissions from airborne 
and/or space threats. 
RDA 
CHENG 
6 1.1.1.1.8.1 Detect 1Intercept and register presence of above horizon air OA/Fn 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 





Above Horizon Air 
Signals  1,5
Process signals to filter noise, ECM, and clutter, 
improve signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 





Above Horizon Air 
Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of received 
above horizon air signals.  OA/Fn 
6 
1.1.1.1.8.4 ECM 




Based on signals received, estimate presence of 







Distinguis h lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw above horizon air data and convert data to 
a form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 







and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 




1.1.1.1.9 Over the 
Horizon Active Search 1,5
Actively transmit energy from surface, airborne or 





1.1.1.1.9.1 - Transmit 
and Detect Signals  1,2,4,5Transmit, intercept and register presence of signals.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.9.2 - Process 
Signals  1,5
Process signals to filter noise, ECM, and clutter, 
improve the signal-to-interference ratio, amplify, or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 
retransmission, or conversion to another format.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.9.3 - Recognize 
Signals  1,5
Determine type and basic characteristics of received 
OTH signals. SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.1.1.9.4 - ECM 
Signal Recognition 5Determine existence of ECM within measurements.  SIAP 
6 
1.1.1.1.9.5 - Multiple 
Object Estimation 1,5
Based on measured return, estimate presence of 





Distinguish lethal object from debris based on local 





Gather raw over the horizon data and convert data to a 
form suitable for the production of finished 
intelligence; includes translations, decryption, and 
interpretation of information stored on film and 
magnetic media through the use of highly refined 













and Process Air IFF 
Signals  1,2,4,5
Intercept and register the presence, range, azimuth and 
code values of air IFF signals. Process IFF signals to 
filter noise, improve signal-to-noise ratio, simplify or 
otherwise improve signals for reception, 
retransmission, or conversion to another format. 
RDA 
CHENG 
3 1.1.2 Data Fusion 1,2,4,5
Create and maintain a correlated and fused common 




1.1.2.1  Single Object 
Estimation 1,2,4,5
Track Formation Manager, Services (e.g., Data 
Registration and Track Number Assignment), and ID. 
Through these functions it: Provides the combat 
system with a single integrated track picture. Provides 
tracks and measurements for weapons control, 
distributes tracks and measurements to and from the 
force through external communications. Estimation 
and prediction of entity states on the basis of 
observation to track association, continuous state 
estimation (e.g. kinematics) and discrete state 
estimation (e.g. target type and ID) (ISIF 1999). 
Combining data to obtain estimates of an entity's 
location, motion, attributes, characteristics, and 
identity. (The term entity involves a spatially or 
geographically localized object such as a target (a tank 
or small military unit), a fault condition in a 
mechanical system, or a localized tumor in a human.) ISIF 1999 
5 
1.1.2.1.1  Track 
Formation 1,5
Track Formation has sole responsibility for forming 
and maintaining tracks from local and remote sensor 
and systems. This function shall provide tracking 
capability for sensors that require this capability to 
generate track states. This function shall fuse 
measurements from multiple sensors into track states 
for incorporation into the track database. It is also 
responsible for the correlation and association of new 
tracks and track updates with existing tracks. This 
function is the sole point of synthesis for all tracks and 




Measurement Fusion is responsible for initiating and 
updating tracks based on measurements from local and 
remote sensors with specified accuracy, precision, 
update rates, and latencies. This function will fuse 
measurement data in such a way as to enhance 
track/measurement continuity and track/measurement 
accurace. This function maintains an estimate of the 
current track state and track state errors. Measurement 
Fusion is also responsible for processing (e.g filtering, 
tracking) measured attributes over time to provide 
tactically significant information. Track states are 
provided to the correlation function for inclusion in 
the track database. Track-associated measurement data 
is also provided to the Measurement Distribution 
function for direction fire control quality data to 
measurement consumers. If MF receives a TAMR, it 
will not attempt to re-associate it. MF may contain SIAP WG 
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trackers for source sensors.  
6 1.1.2.1.1.2  Correlation 1,2,4,5
Correlation is responsible for the emerging of air, 
surface, land and subsurface track data with existing 
combat system track data. In addition to merging track 
data, this function will determining when existing 
merged tracks need to be split. This function will also 
provide to the association function any air, surface, 
land and subsurface track data that is not merged for 
new track initiation and additional characterization. 
These tracks can be from local or remote sensors or 
systems. This merging process will provide the “best” 
characteristics from each of the merges tracks in 
forming the combat system track. This function shall 
use track updates as well as the track histories. This 
function shall rely on spatial/kinematic characteristics 
and tagged attributes (e.g. modes and codes) to 




Association reviews the uncorrelated tracks from the 
Correlation function to determine and establish any 
linkage between tracks for further track 
characterization. This additional characterization 
provides linking between those tracks that do not meet 
all correlation criteria but that do have similar 
characteristics which will assist in characterizing the 
uncorrelated tracks (e.g. TBM debris clouds, 
formation tracking information.) SIAP WG 
5 
1.1.2.1.2  Track Report 
Filtering 1,5
Track Report Filtering performs Reporting 
Responsibility and implements the Track Reporting 
Rules, thereby adjusting the flow of track data to and 
from remote units. SIAP WG 
5 
1.1.2.1.3  Remote 
Track Coordination 1,5
Remote Track Coordination controls the content of 
multiple communications links. This function: 
Implements Data Forwarding Rules, 
resolves/precludes duplicate track data across multiple 
communications links, arbitrates communication link 
track numbers other units on the communications 
links. SIAP WG 
5 
1.1.2.1.4  Data 
Registration 1,4,5
Data Registration provides accurate alignment of all 
local and remote track and measurement data from 
both registered and unregistered sources. SIAP WG 
6 
1.1.2.1.4.1  Geodetic 
Alignment 1,2,3,4,5
Geodetic Alignment removes own-unit transnational 
and rotational biases/errors from local track data and 
translates to the WGS-84 reference frame for 
transmission. SIAP WG 
6 
1.1.2.1.4.2  Relative 
Alignment 1,2,3,4,5
Relative Alignment converts own-unit track data 
positions (transnational and rotational) to a Gridlock 
Reference Unit (GRU) reference frame for 
transmission. Relative Alignment also includes 
receive-only Interface Unit Registration. And Pair-
wise. SIAP WG 
6 
1.1.2.1.4.3  Inter-Link 
Alignment 1,2,3,4,5
Inter-Link Alignment (ILA) converts track data 
position from one network's (i.e., Data Link) reference SIAP WG 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 
frame to another network's (i.e., Data Link) reference 
frame. 
5 
1.1.2.1.5  Track 
Number Assignment 1,4,5
Track Number Assignment is responsible for 
assigning all CS and communications link track 
numbers. Track Number Assignment assigns numbers 
to unassociated measurements and tracks for use 
internally and on the communications networks of the 
force. These assignments shall uniquely represent the 
track across the force and are made in such a way that 
coordination among communications links is inherent 
(e.g., are recognized as fused tracks). Track Number 
Assignment shall manage the reuse of track numbers 




Convert data from each sensor to a common 
coordinate system, and align data both temporally and 
spatially. (i.e. Time Tag data and provide it in a 






Determine which measurement/track data are valid 
candidates to update existing tracks; Assign valid 




1.1.2.4 Data Fusion 
Evaluation 5
Evaluate performance and effectiveness of fusion 
process to establish real time control and long term 
process improvements.  ISIF 1999 
5 
1.1.2.4.1 Data Fusion 
Performance 
Refinement 5
Identify changes or adjustments to processing 
functions within data fusion domain which may result 




Recommend changes to fusion roles and 
responsibilities of nodes based on location, resources, 
and system capabilities at nodes.   SIAP 
5 
1.1.2.4.2  Sensor 
Management 1,2,4,5
Sensor Management utilizes the force/local sensor 
plans and manages their implementation. Sensor 
Management is responsible for prioritizing local 
sensor tasks and coordinating with remote sensor 
assets. It s assumed that the battle force sensor 
management plan exists and that units would 
implement their portion of the sensor management 
plan. At the unit level, Sensor Management can make 
requests for remote services from other units, and 
honors remote requests for services on its' local 
sensors. Unknown 
5 
1.1.2.4.3  Sensor 
Control 5
Local Sensor Control and Management monitors 
sensor capabilities and directs all sensor assignments 
based on those capabilities in order to meet CS-
directed missions. Specific responsibilities include: 
Directs all Sensor Assignments, Accepts requests from 
CS Sensor Management, Assigns search and tracking 
responsibilities to each sensor, Assigns responsibility 
based on sensor capabilities, availability, 
environmentals (i.e. electronic protection, clutter, EMI 
weather), Performs spatial, time and frequency 
management, Ensures local sensors honor battle force-
level sensor requests (e.g., Engage on Remote, search) Unknown 
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4 
1.1.2.5  Sensor and 
Sensor Processing 
Control 5
Monitor on-going Sense process to optimize 
utilization of sensors or information sources and 
algorithms to achieve most useful and accurate set of 
information.   SIAP 
5 
1.1.2.5.1  Sensor 
Characterization 1,2,3,4,5
Sensor Characterization registers sensors coming 
online and records their capabilities and limitations 
(e.g., operational frequencies, volume coverage, 
detection range) in terms of their abilities to meet 
specific classification capabilities, and vulnerability to 
an adverse RF environment. These capabilities are 





Operational Assessment receives readiness, status and 
loading information from online sensors. It continually 
determines the operational capability of a sensor based 
on sensor status and loading information. This 
function provides Sensor Control with a continuous 




and Tasking Requests  1,5
Request/recommend sensor tasking and/or allocation 
to improve quality or completeness of situation 





Determine source specific data requirements (i.e. 
identifies specific sensors/sensor data, qualified data, 
or reference data) needed to improve multi-level 
fusion products. ISIF 1999 
3 1.1.3 Track 1,5
Identify a series of sensor data points as having come 
from the same source, assign an identifier to each 




1.1.3.1 Assign Track 
Category 1,2,4,5
Indicate track category using predetermined 
categorization procedures.  SPAWAR 
4 
1.1.3.2 Assign Track 




Determine latitude, longitude, and altitude (or depth) 
of a sensor contact/track.  SPAWAR 
4 1.1.3.4 Classify Track 1,2
Classify source being tracked using predetermined 
applicable classification procedures. SPAWAR 
4 
1.1.3.5 Estimate Track 
Count 1,2,5
Determine number of tracks currently in the 




Store and maintain track information for a 
predetermined period.  SPAWAR 
4 1.1.3.7 Qualify Track 1,2,5
Indicate if track meets qualification criteria and/or 




Measure or estimate parametric data on a target (e.g., 
length, rcs).  
RDA 
CHENG 
4 1.1.3.9 Identification 1,2,5
Analyze parametric data of a track in order to establish 




1.1.3.9.1 Activity and 




Assign vehicles to a category (i.e., Space, Air, 
Ground, etc.). SIAP 
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Determine classification or identity of entities such as 
emitters, platforms, or low-level military units, based 
on attributes or features. ISIF 1999 
6 
1.1.3.9.3.1 Determine 
Composite ID 2,5Provide multiple source track identification. SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.3.9.3.2 Determine 
Comprehensive ID 2,5Provide all data track identification. SPAWAR 
6 
1.1.3.9.3.3 Determine 
Discrete ID 1,2,5Provide individual source or contact identification. SPAWAR 





Determine identification based on association of 





Assess and identify air breathing tracks by combining 
existing sensor tracks and civilian/FAA flight plans 
and track position track reports. SIAP 
5 
1.1.3.9.4 Procedural 




Provide estimate of country/force identification from 
fused data. SIAP 
5 
1.1.3.9.6 Resolve ID 
conflicts1 1,2,5
Use established criteria to eliminate identification 
conflicts.  SPAWAR 
2 1.2 Command 4,5
Support and perform decision-making processes that 
effectively and efficiently direct the force(s) under 
command, and that support employment of offensive 






Generate a common tactical picture and provide 
awareness of the tactical situation, including 
engagement status reporting, battle damage reporting, 





1.2.1.1 Tactical Picture 
Generation 1,2,4,5
Fuse track, engagement, geographical, navigational, 
time synchronization, METOC, and operational data 
from multiple sources to form a display of the 




1.2.1.1.1 Assess the 
Current Situation and 
Signal Environment 1,4,5
Assess the current ELINT/SIGINT environment for 
what that environment can imply in terms of threat 
unit, platform and weapon, status, location, movement, 




Develop hypotheses for associations between physical 
objects and their organizations. Associations are 





Associate multiple closely spaced objects as a 
formation and represent those multiple objects as a 




Analyze data in context of an evolving situation 
including weather, terrain, sea-state or underwater 
conditions, enemy doctrine, and socio-political 
considerations.  SIAP 
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Fuse multi-source (kinematic, identification 





Establish relationships among diverse entities (ground, 
air and surface) in time to identify meaningful events 
or activities. Assumed to be a near-real time activity 
with both automation and man-in-the-loop.  SIAP 
5 
1.2.1.1.5 Management 
of Defended Assets 
Information Sets 1,2,4,5
Relatively rank and prioritize all aerospace and ground 




Establish relationships among objects including 
temporal relationships, geometrical proximity, 





Compile all source post-engagement data for display 





Fuse all resources into an overall assessment of 





Assess status of all weapons, sensors, command and 
control nodes and networks including current loading, 






Merge health and status of peer architecture and 
available (computing) resources within architecture. 
Assess network connecting peers.  Assess performance 
of peer architecture.   SIAP 
5 
1.2.1.1.8 Commander's 
Intent Translation and 
Distribution 5
Translate and distribute Commander's Intent and 
Guidance into rule sets for support of real-time 




Monitor progress of current engagement situation to 







Assess the engagement of effectiveness of individual 
engagements based on individual reports fro m 
multiple sensors [SIAP WG 08/05/03] SIAP 
4 
1.2.1.3 Battle Damage 
Assessment 1,3,4,5









Evaluate all source post engagement information to 




Evaluate reports which state determination of effect of 
attacks on targets.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.1.3.1.2 Estimate 
Extent of Collateral 
Damage 3,4,5
Predict and evaluate likelihood of damage from 
friendly weapons on personnel, equipment, and 
structures not intended for destruction.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.1.3.1.3 Estimate 
Extent of Target 
Damage/Destruction 3,4,5
Evaluate likelihood of destroying targets. Used to 
determine appropriate weapon system, time and 
manner of attack.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.1.3.2 Determine if 
Target is Functioning 1,3,4,5
Evaluate capabilities of a target to determine extent of 
damage from attack or ability of target to wage war 
against friendly forces.   SPAWAR 
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5 
1.2.1.3.3 Record 
Events for Post 
Operations Analysis  3,4,5
Collect or store data to be used during post attack 




on/from Target List 3,5
Evaluate targets to either remain on targeting list and 
be engaged at a later time, or, if target has been 
assessed as no longer valid, destroyed, or no longer of 




Create visual or audible warning to indicate presence 






Evaluate threat data against predetermined doctrine to 
initiate alerts on any track that meets threat 




Build engagement order from weapon data base, 
including weapon selected, firing time, rear reference 
data, flight parameters, target geolocation, and 
waypoints.  Transmit the order to the firing platform 




Sort missions against weapon availability to generate 
engagement schedules.  Adjust schedules based on 
changing relative threat value (RTV) and mission 
priorities.   SPAWAR 
3 1.2.2 Plan 4,5
Allocate assets, determine coverage requirements, 
assign areas of responsibility, develop platform 
movement orders, and determine sensor and weapon 
system configurations required to execute a mission. 
RDA 
CHENG 
4 1.2.2.1 Force Planning 4,5
Allocate assets to an operation and provide policies, 
resources, intelligence, indications and warnings 







Determine force reporting responsibilities and 
establish procedures for preparing reports from 
combat operations.  Required reports address 
operational status of forces, weapons, and control 
system equipment, as well as range of intelligence 




Identify forces and their phasing into theater of 
operations. Provide force requirement determination, 
force list development and refinement in light of force 




Platform to Mission 4,5
Identify and assign platforms to specific missions 
based on platform capabilities and mission 




Report on status of platforms in the functional area 
(e.g. logistics, communications, medical, etc.).  Utilize 
database information and collaborate with functional 
units to ensure timely and accurate reporting of 
readiness status and to coordinate corrective actions 
for identified deficiencies. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.1.2.3 Map Force 
Composition to 
Requirements 5
Validate and coordinate user requirements to 
determine force composition.  SPAWAR 
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Identify and assign multiple platforms/personnel and 
their distribution to specific missions based on 
combined platform/personnel capabilities and mission 




Develop air, land, and sea coverage and control 
policies; Determine requirements for intelligence 
preparation of battle space; Assign areas of 
responsibility including sensor coverage and 
engagement zone requirements; Develop platform 
movement orders including selected platform, 







Collect and compile in -depth knowledge and 
intelligence information on battle space and its 
environment. This accounts for friendly and adversary 
capabilities and intentions, doctrine, and the 





Evaluate Operational Environment defined and 
quantify objectives that will contribute to 






Determine satellites that pass over the area of interest 
and provide a means to maneuver, support, and sustain 






Evaluate latest intelligence (threat) information 
concerning location and capability of enemy forces to 
plan the safest routes for mission completion.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.2.3.1 Develop 
Enemy Order of Battle 
(EOB) 1,2,4,5
Determine identification, strength, command structure, 
and disposition of  personnel, units, and equipment of 





Create and update operational plans (OPLANS), 
concept OPLANS (CONPLANS), and functional 
plans.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.2.2.5 Identify 
Status of Forces 4,5
Identify manpower resources and provide status and 
progress of mobilization.  Provide operational plan 




Develop course of action (COA) using deployment 
databases as primary means for exchanging detailed 
planning information and developing tentative COAs, 
evaluate adequacy of each COA, create force lists and 
support packages, estimate transportation feasibility of 
each COA, and begin to prepare deployment estimates 





Determine impact of military support for civil defense; 
capability to support OPLANs; force operational 
readiness based on manpower availability and dates 
needed; manpower shortfalls; and manpower 
feasibility of OPLANs.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.2.2.6 Perform 
Vulnerability Analysis  5
Perform analysis which identifies characteristics of a 
military force/system that causes+O181 it to suffer 
degradation in its capability to perform a mission as a 
result of having been subjected to a certain level of 
effects in a hostile environment.   SPAWAR 
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Model and analyze all Electronic Warfare (EW) 
functions to include propagation, radio line of sight, 
self-protect jamming, standoff jamming 
(communications and non-communications),  
Electronic Support (ES) vulnerability and 
effectiveness, expendables effectiveness (chaff and 
flares), decoy effectiveness (active and passive), 
SEAD, acquisition and tracking (radar, electro-optical 
and infrared), clutter effects, satellite coverage and 
link analysis, missile flyout (effects of 
countermeasures), effects of evasive maneuvers, C3 
processes, EP, and effects of lethal attack on critical 




Determine effective electronic masking of military 
equipment being used in or supporting the operation; 
including assessment of:  1) assessed adversary 
Electronic Support (ES) and Signal Intelligence 
(SIGINT) collection capability (or access to third party 
collection); and 2) degree to which electronic 
signature of forces must be masked in order to 






Identify potential IO threats to the fielded forces, 
which can then be used to develop a plan to respond to 
or restore capabilities from an adversary or potential 




1.2.2.2.7 Plan OPORD 
/ OPTASK / OPLAN 
Inputs  4,5
Conduct joint planning to determine best method of 
accomplishing assigned tasks and direct actions 
necessary to accomplish mission. In peacetime 
conditions, the process—called deliberate planning—
produces operation plans, either OPLANs or concept 





Identify JEZ involving one or more service 
components, simultaneously and in concert, engaging 
enemy airpower in the same airspace; including 
friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft.  Develop 
coordinated allocation of air defense systems to avoid 




Overlay operational data on a map to depict locations 
of targets, location of enemy and other information 
required in order to make targeting decisions.  





Overlay operational data on a map to depict locations 
of targets, location of enemy and other information 
required in order to make targeting decisions.  
Configure, edit and display Restricted Navigation 
Zones.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.2.7.4 Identify 
Return to Force 
Profiles 1,2,4,5
Develop return to force profile to identify returning 
mission plan for friendly aircraft.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.2.7.5 Identify 
Weapons Free Zones 3,4,5
Overlay operational data on a map to depict locations 
of targets, location of enemy and other information 
required in order to make targeting decisions.  SPAWAR 
367 
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Configure, edit and display Weapon Free Zones.  
6 
1.2.2.2.7.6 Plan Air 
Space Utilization 4,5
Develop joint air and space strategy and assess its 
effectiveness in supporting the theater campaign. The 
developed Joint Air and Space Operations Plan 
(JASOP) is the vehicle through which JFACC 
articulates and disseminates its strategy.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.2.7.7 Plan Water 
Space Utilization 4,5
Develop water space utilization procedures, guidelines 
and directions that provide for carrying out mission 
plans and includes appropriate maritime platform (e.g. 
ships, submarines, and any other sea surface and/or 
subsurface crafts) protection and deconfliction. SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.2.2.8 Retrieve and 
Review Rules of 
Engagement 4,5
Access/retrieve ROE data including Joint Forces 
Commander (JFC) and Component commander 




Generate supplemental ROE (SROE) requests based 
on changing threat or mission.  Assist in interpreting 
SROE and existing ROE for CJTF, JTF staff, and 




Develop plans to include route generation, airspace 
control policies, I&W, terrain and threat information 
necessary to conduct mission.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.2.3.1 Generate 
Input to Mission Plans 5
Using format assigned in JTF OPORDs, generate 
inputs to mission plans based on analysis, and higher 
authority guidance.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.1.1 Define 
Return to Force 
Profiles 4,5
Define specific RTF profile information to include 
course, altitude, waypoint, low fuel procedures, loss of 
comms procedures, and clearance procedures.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.1.2 Determine 
Best Positioning for 
Access to the 
Adversary 3,4,5
Using available weapon, environmental, topographic, 
geopolitical, and platform information, generate a 
recommended platform positioning for a given 




Using format assigned in JTF OPORDs, generate 
attack plan for a given strike mission.  Plan will 
include, but not be limited to, asset assignment, route 
plan, secondary missions, support asset assignment, 
assigned communications and data frequencies, threat 
information, and RTF criteria. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.1.4 
Ingress/Egress Routes  3,4,5
Define ingress/egress routes for aircraft assigned to a 
strike mission accounting for both 4D Deconfliction 
and threat analysis.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.1.5 Generate 
Mission Analysis  4,5
Using all available IPB sources, build an analysis of 
the mission to be conducted including potential threat 
to strike platforms, logistics requirements, value of 
target vs. value of weapons required, impact on other 





In the format required by JTF OPORDs and 
OPTASKs, create intelligence products which refine 
raw intelligence data into processed analysis products 
supporting the tasked mission.  SPAWAR 
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Based on review of current intelligence,O212 known 
enemy order of battle, terrain analysis, geopolitical 
situation, and existing analysis of threat TTP, calculate 
and weigh probabilities for most likely enemy courses 
of action.   SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.3.1.6.1 Perform 
Terrain Analysis  4,5
Analyze using IMINT and existing topographic 
information current target area terrain condition.  
Analysis includes changes to topography resulting 




In the format required by JTF OPORDs and 
OPTASKs, generate I&W reports, templates, and 
information to support mission. I&W information may 




Update Requests  5
Based on review by the Operational or Mission 
Commander, generate request to update information 




Allocate specific sensors to coverage areas, 
frequencies, and targets based on generated sensor 




Document electronic emanation from target for future 




Determine number and placement of sensors to 
provide needed coverage based on geographical areas 
and volumes to be sensed, environmental conditions, 
sensor-platform capabilities, and expected enemy 





Track changes to software, hardware, firmware and 








Using models and/or simulations, predict performance 
and coverage of a system based on environmental 
conditions, clutter, background noise, and sensor 





Using sensor location error,  beam pattern dimensions, 
pointing, and biases, determine resulting 
error/uncertainty in target location.  SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.3.2.2.3 Generate 
National ISR Sensor 
Tasking 5
Program national sensors for collection and 
identification of Intelligence, Surveillance and 





Plan distribution of theater/external sensors for 
collecting Intelligence, Surveillance and 





Program theater/external sensors for collection and 
identification of Intelligence, Surveillance and 




Determine validity, importance and location of a 
contact of interest.  Calculate requirements, both time 
and accuracy, to refine geolocation.  Focus is on 
target's functional characteristics and the effects that 
must be applied to target to degrade its functionality. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.3.1  Plan 
Theater/External ISR 1,2,5    
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Analyze target area, e.g., terrain analysis, roadways, 
structures, distribution of civilians, threats, etc., and 
impacts on ability to support target development, 




Correlate data from all available sensors to develop 




Match significant features in a received image to 
locations for those features in a validated database.  
Calculate resulting offsets and locations for targets of 









Determine asset requirements given target 
development information coordinates and time for that 
location [target information may be aggregated in an 







Determine time requirements given target 
development information coordinates and time for that 
location [target information may be aggregated in an 




Analyze, using all available intelligence, the threat 
specific to a given mission, and generate EOB relative 





Plan weapons allocation to planned targets based upon 




1.2.2.3.3.4 Select and 
Prioritize Targets 5
Identify, prioritize, and select specific targets from 
joint target lists, component requests, intelligence 
recommendations, electronic warfare inputs, and 
current intelligence assessments that meet the 







Analyze capabilities and limitations of a target system 
to a specific or potential threat to determine the level 
of risk the system may encounter from exploitation or 




Update tabulation of confirmed or suspect targets 
performed by any echelon for informational and fire 
support planning purposes. SPAWAR 
8 
1.2.2.3.3.4.2.1 Identify 
Time Critical Targets 1,2,5
Specify TCTs with command priority within the area 
of operations, including a list of expected targets.  
Coordinate intelligence data to locate and identify 




Plan a weapon's effective launch parameters, define 
necessary state of launch platform to support those 
launch parameters, and develop and format data 
suitable for downloading into weapon that will enable 




and Generate Weapons 
Employment 3,5
Based on commander's tactical intent for degradation 
of a specific target or target complex, evaluate, 
prioritize and select from available lethal and non-








Recommended Definition or Description Source 
7 
1.2.2.3.4.1.1 Calculate 
Probability of Damage 3,5
Document expected performance of weapon-related 
systems, expected threat and target postures, and 
expected environmental conditions, predict  
effectiveness of weapon to produce desired physical 
damage, and/or degradation of target's function.   SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.3.4.1.2 Conduct 
Target to Weapon 
Pairing 5
Accounting for target type, course, speed, altitude, and 
range, evaluate and assign optimum weapon available 





Determine availability of weapons and delivery 
platforms to support assigned mission, including 





Send weapon-target pairing and tasking 
recommendation to commander for force employment 





Determine parameters required for effective delivery 
and function of the weapon, including parameters of 
weapon's internal systems (autopilot, sensors, fusing, 
etc.), platform's navigation and maneuvering systems, 
platform's weapon-specific control system. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.3.4.2 Generate 
Weapon Mission Plans 3,5
Produce weapon mission plans that support or meet 
the applicable overall mission objectives given 





As an optional transition between the navigation/flight 
plan and the terminal guidance plan, define a 
coordinated flight plan and terminal seeker operation 
plan to support a search for a target whose location 
indeterminacy is larger than the seeker's field of view. SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.3.4.2.2 Deliver 
Weapon Mission Plan 3,5
Deliver weapon mission plan or updates  to the weapon 
mission plan from the mission planning workstation to 
appropriate weapon on appropriate platform. SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.3.4.2.3 Generate 
In-Flight Weapon Plan 
Changes 3,5
Based on conditions and parameters that have changed 
since the weapon mission plan was created, update one 
or more elements of the mission plan.  Format this 
plan and integrate with other planning elements  as 





Select a weapon launch point and plan suitable 
waypoints, altitudes, and other appropriate parameters 
to manage fuel/energy of weapon, keep clear of 
terrain, avoid air defense threats and approach the 
target area in a profile that supports the terminal 
guidance plan.  Format  this plan and integrate with 
other planning elements  as appropriate for delivery to 





In coordination with target planning and weapon 
navigation/flight planning, define the weapon's 
terminal approach time/space profile, and supply any 
necessary reference data to support terminal guidance, 
including data link configuration, impact/penetration 
point and direction, and fuzing for warhead 
penetration or proximity, to maximize desired weapon 
effects at the aim point.  Format  this plan and 
integrate with other planning elements  as appropriate SPAWAR 
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Estimate and predict effects on situations of planned 
or estimated/predicted actions by the participants; to 







Estimate size, location, and capabilities of enemy 




Identify potential opportunities for enemy threat based 
on prediction of enemy actions, operation readiness 
analysis, friendly vulnerabilities, and analysis of 









Predict results of hypothesized enemy engagements 
considering rules of engagement, enemy doctrine, and 




Determine enemy intention based on actions, 





Predict weapon, sensor and warfighting unit readiness 
based on current status information. In addition, 
predict sensor or weapon performance based on 







Assess current and historical atmospheric and 
oceanographic conditions and generate predictions of 





Produce Meteorological and Oceanographic 
(METOC) weather forecasts, warnings, gridded field 
data, satellite imagery, briefing symbology, and 
observations.  The analysis includes weather 
information linked with weapons thresholds to 
determine feasibility of employing specific munitions, 
and includes the use of wind, cloud, precipitation, 





Calculate environmental impacts from munitions 
employment using wind, cloud, precipitation, 
temperature, smoke, etc., data.   SPAWAR 
8 
1.2.2.3.5.7.1.2 
Determine EMI Impact 5
Determine EMI impacts from munitions employment 
using wind, cloud, precipitation, temperature, smoke, 







Forecast weather/predict oceanographic environment 




Predict METOC dispersion using wind, cloud, 




Model/simulate mission scenarios to include enemy, 
war-gaming, and logistics and to predict probability of 













Model and simulate mission operational impact at the 




Provide logistics feasibility/capability assessments to 
deliberate and crisis action plans.  Consolidate, report, 
and access unit readiness statistics and logistics 
situation reports as required and provide planning and 
force apportionment personnel access to the 
availability of forces in support of deployment and 
redeployment operations. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.2.4.1.2 Calculate 
War gaming Scenarios 4,5
Create war gaming scenarios based on COA analysis.  
Scenarios include available weapons systems, both 
immediately available and those forecast in Air 
Tasking Order (ATO) for an operator defined time 




Develop and calculate the following weapon-
associated outputs: time -on-target (TOT) predictions; 
probability of Kill (Pk); probability of Survivability 
(Ps) of the weapon system; recognize existing 
Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) impacting COAs; 
and identify ACMs that need to be implemented in 





Calculate munitions effectiveness parameters 
including Circular Error Probable, Probability of Kill, 
and Probability of Electronic Kill. SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.2.4.1.2.3 Plot CBR 
Contamination Areas 4,5
Provide defense planning for force operations in an 
CBR environment.  Some of the planning 
considerations include enemy CBR capabilities; 
friendly CBR defensive capabilities; shipment, intra-
theater receipt, pre-positioning, and accountability of 
CBR defense equipment; and procedures and 
responsibilities for furnishing CBR defensive logistics 
support.  The process will be integrated with the CBR 
Detection and Warning System and coordination will 




Develop a battle space visualization of national 
guidance (especially the Joint Strategic Capabilities 
Plan [JSCP]), as well as the CINC’s evaluation of 
assigned regional area of responsibility (AOR) to 
create enemy scenarios and enemy courses of action. 
RDA 
CHENG 
3 1.2.3 Decision 3,4,5
Support development of engagement orders including 
threat prioritization, development of fire control 







Generate controls, orders, and target folder 
information required by platforms, and fire control 
systems and weapon launchers in order to direct 
weapons to the target.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.3.1.1 Acquire and 
Track Target 1
Detect, identify, and locate a target in sufficient detail 
to permit effective employment of weapons and 
recording of successive positions of a moving object. SPAWAR 
373 








Analyze target area, e.g., terrain analysis, roadways, 
structures, distribution of civilians, threats, etc., and 
impacts on ability to support target development, 





Calculate point at which a weapon system is vectored 




Specify coordinates of a target in sufficient detail to 





Calculate movements by taking into account target 
acceleration/deceleration, change of altitude, and 
direction, and atmospheric conditions.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.3.1.1.5 Refine Aim 
point Location 3,5
Continuously improve various prediction methods to 




Select targets and match appropriate response to them, 
taking account of operational requirements and 




Examine potential targets to determine military 
importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to 
obtain a desired level of damage or casualties.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.3.1.4 Employ 
Targeting Assets  1,2,3,5
Use available resources assigned to a specific object 
for the purpose of detection, identification, and 
location of a target in sufficient detail to permit 
effective employment of weapons. SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.3.1.4.1 Task/Re-
task Targeting Assets  1,2,3,5
Program target resources and augment/diminish same 
as circumstances warrant.   SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.3.1.4.1.1 Transmit 
Tasking and Target 
Data to Targeting 
Assets  3,5
Transmit (over appropriate communications channels 
using appropriate communications protocols) weapon 
tasking and target information to assets directed to 





Task subordinate units or direct weapon systems to 
engage, track, cover, or destroy an assigned target.  SPAWAR 
7 
1.2.3.1.5.1 Optimize 
Target Value vs. 
Weapon Value 3,5
Utilize type of resources consistent with target’s 




Produce an estimate of weapons destructive effect 





Enhance probability of kill by choosing appropriate 
weapon to fulfill desired outcome of attack based on 
required targeting parameters and known target 
location.   SIAP 
7 
1.2.3.1.5.2.1 Calculate 
Probability of Kill 3,5





Delineate targets on which fire is to be directed at a 




Relative to Target 
Location Error 3,5
Enhance probability of kill by choosing appropriate 
weapon to fulfill desired outcome of attack based on 
required targeting parameters and known target 
location.  SPAWAR 
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Relative to Target 
Location Error 3,5
Produce numerical probability that weapon will hit 
target using target location error as a factor in the hit 




Delineate targets on which fire is to be directed at a 






Determine the quantity of a specific type of lethal or 
non-lethal weapons required to achieve a specific level 
of damage to a given target, considering target 
vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery 
accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill and 





Provide current list of weapons that can be used for 
attack missions.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.3.1.5.6 Select Best 
Attack Asset 3,5
Select attack assets that will generate appropriate 
response and desired outcome taking into account 




Accessibility of Attack 
System to Target 3,5
Produce probability that attack system can get to a 
position to launch a successful attack on a specified 




of Attack Platform 3,5
Produce platform availability status from force 
platform capability, use, and maintenance status 




Produce time window of opportunity for attack 
platform to attack target with highest probability of 




Incorporating real-time track data, topography, 
platform route, weapons envelope, and current 
platform locations, evaluate the use of a selected 
weapon in order to determine potential interference or 
conflicts with other platforms or weapons in vicinity 






Evaluate engagement conditions to determine 
probability of engagement success.  This includes 






Evaluate whether or not threat is within engagement 




Determine time frame in which to conduct 




Intercept Prediction 3,5Determine probability of intercept of target.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.3.2.2 Certify Data 
Availability 1,5
Evaluate continuity and accuracy of a track over 
engagement timeline of weapons based on terrain, 
sensor locations, network resources and sensor 
resources .   SIAP 
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Generate controls and inputs necessary to control the 
employment of the force weapons, sensors and 
platforms.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.3.3.1 Configure 
Assets for Specific 
Missions 5
Develop asset configuration recommendations to 
include weapon, fuel load outs and sensor and 
protective system configurations based on mission 




Transmit sensor and communications configuration 





Translate alert and alert sequencing doctrine as 
appropriate for each unit into command and decision 




Generate orders to allocate sensors and platforms to 




Generate orders to align tactical weapon, sensor and 




Evaluate conditions and equipment performance data 
to optimize the performance and coverage assignments 




Evaluate system capabilities and Platform PVA data to 





Generate sensor configuration and reconfiguration 
commands to adjust sensor coverage, wavelength, 
power, pulse type, spectrum range, rotation, and 
reporting frequency as required.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.2.3.3.2 Position 
Assets IAW Mission 
Plans 4,5
Generate and update movement orders for units 






Evaluate threat information, friendly platform and 
weapon system capabilities and limitations, current 
PVA data for all co-located tracks, and threat system 
vulnerabilities to generate and update maneuver 




Process and maintain a visual display reflecting status 
of units engaged in a mission.  Provide information 
exchange between mission commanders and mission 




Build coordination and tactical status displays, 
overlays and reports using data from all units involved 
in a mission.  Communicate coordination information, 





Based on environment, requirements and assets, 
calculate optimum alignment of available 
communications assets to requirements.  SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.3.4.1.2 Identify 
Weapon Danger Zones 3,4,5
Build Weapon Danger Zones overlays surrounding 
weapons platforms for both real time and non-real 




Calculate status of all units, incorporate all linked 
data, and build displays to enhance tactical situational 
awareness.   SPAWAR 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 
6 
1.2.3.4.2.1 Generate 
Command View of 
Situation 4,5
Fuse all available real time and non-real time data to 




Develop and monitor execution of plan to maintain 
minimum separation required between own force units 
to prevent fratricide.   SPAWAR 
6 
1.2.3.4.3.1 Develop 4-
D Deconfliction Plan 1,2,3,4,5
Incorporating the ATO, real-time track data, 
topography, air route, threat weapons envelope, and 
current ground unit location, generate a plan to 
maintain minimum separation between aircraft, 






Generate overlays, and procedure reports to prevent 
blue on blue engagements.  Communicate procedures 




Maneuvers to Avoid 
Interference 2,4,5
Generate maneuver recommendations for friendly 
units from real time sensor data and PVA data for all 
tracked contacts. Display recommendations and 




Incorporate approved plans, current situation, and 
position, velocity, acceleration (PVA) data, and target 
nominations to generate recommendations to prevent 
multiple unit assignments to single targets.  SPAWAR 
2 1.3 Act 1,2,3,4,5
Deploy, maneuver, sustain, and/or configure, 







Generate controls and orders necessary to support and 
collect information needed to evaluate efficacy of an 
engagement. SPAWAR 
4 1.3.1.1 Integrate ROE 5
Follow directives issued by competent military 
authority which delineate circumstances and 
limitations under which United States forces will 
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other 
forces encountered.  Unknown 
4 
1.3.1.2 Direct 
Maneuvers to Avoid 
Interference 5
Promulgate commands to forces or weapons systems 
to prevent contact with hostile forces or weapons 








Utilize Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) assets to 
collect and analyze damage done to enemy by friendly 











Request Combat Assessment assets to collect, analyze 
and assess attack results.   SPAWAR 
7 
1.3.1.3.1.1.1 Transmit 
Tasking and Target 
Data to BDA Assets  3,4,5
Send Combat Assessment requests via appropriate 
communications channels.  SPAWAR 
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Generate controls, plans, and orders to platforms, fire 
control systems and weapon launchers enabling 




Determine acceptable level of target destruction to 
accomplish mission objectives.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.1.1 Determine 
Time to Complete the 
Mission 5
Estimate total time required to execute engagement, 
compute time to target and time when engagement 





Using ROE, commander's guidance, weapon 
effectiveness and targeting errors, determine extent of 
collateral damage.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.1.3 Specify Time 
on Target 3,5
Compute time from start of mission execution to time 




Deploy/activate electronic deception escape and 




Provide indication of engagement outcome (e.g., kill, 






Deliberate emission of electronic radiation for the 








Determine mission objective, select appropriate 
weapon to achieve acceptable level of destruction and 





Control coordination of platforms involved in the 





Display and coordinate all weapon trajectory/ flyout 
routes to ensure acceptable level of separation between 




Transition weapon from manual to automatic/ preset 
control.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.2.3 Select Air to 
Air 3,5
Select A-A weapon based on target type, level of 
destruction, and protective measures of the platforms 
in the engagement.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.2.4 Select Air to 
Surface 3,5
Select A-S weapon based on target type, level of 
destruction, and protective measures of the platforms 
in the engagement.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.2.5 Select 
Surface to Air 3,5
Select S-A weapon based on target  type, level of 
destruction, and protective measures of the platforms 
in the engagement.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.2.6 Select 
Surface to Surface 3,5
Select S-S weapon based on target type, level of 
destruction, and protective measures of the platforms 
in the engagement.   SPAWAR 
4 
1.3.2.3 Task/Re-task 
Attack Assets  3,5
Assign platforms to engagement tasks or reassign 
assets as required.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.2.3.1 Transmit 
Tasking and Target 
Data to Attack Assets  1,3,5
Communicate tasking and target status to attack 
platforms. Unknown 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 
4 
1.3.2.4 Prepare 
Weapon for Launch 3,5
Configure the internal systems of the weapon to the 
point of readiness for launch, including application of 
external power, initiation of internal power sources, 
software configuration through the loading of mission 
plans, including required data for navigation, terminal 
guidance, and payload function, setting of software 
switches, application of AC or DC signal voltages, and 
transfer alignment of navigational instruments 





Configure the internal systems of the weapon to the 






Generate response to fire control orders based on the 
current ability of weapon system to execute command. Unknown 
5 
1.3.2.5.2 Compute Fire 
Control Solution 3,5
Employ dedicated computer-based fire control systems 




Execute engagement firing plans by developing 
weapon presets.  SPAWAR 
7 
1.3.2.5.2.1.1Transmit 
Firing Order to 
Selected Attack 
Systems  3,5
Communicate firing instructions to applicable 




Evaluate engagement conditions to determine 
probability of engagement success.  This includes 





Determine weapon usage, platform requirements, and 




Determine time frame in which to conduct 




Determine target location and probability of 




Following navigation of the launch platform to an 
appropriate weapon launch/release condition, 
completion of platform launch readiness and safety 
checks, and preparation of weapon for launch.  Initiate 
any weapon thrust and/or autopilot systems, initiate 
autonomous navigation and/or guidance systems, and 
release weapon from the launch platform for free 
flight.  Perform any post-launch operations or 
maneuvers required of the platform for safety or 
survivability. SPAWAR 
4 1.3.2.6 Fire Control 3,5
Following weapon launch, provide weapon control, 
target/navigation updates, and other actions to support 
the weapon during flight, including deployment of 






Following weapon launch, provide any necessary 
support and/or interaction necessary to support the 
weapon in its mission, including deploying penetration 
aids such as jamming or decoys.  Provide post-launch 
weapon control, target/navigation updates, and   
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 
weapon initiation via data link as required. 
4 1.3.2.7 Illumination 3,5
Support interceptor fly-out of semi-active systems 
requiring target illumination for terminal guidance.  SIAP 
4 1.3.2.8 Intercept 3,5
Stop, deflect, or interrupt progress or intended course 







Execute plan of engagement and conduct evasive 




Generate controls, orders, and threat evaluation for Air 
Targets required by platforms, and fire control systems 
and weapon launchers in order to direct weapon to 
target. SIAP 
3 1.3.4 Force Positioning 3,4,5
Place individual weapon launch and/or control assets 
in required posture to deliver weapon and return to 
base or host platform, with mission effectiveness, and 




Place weapon launch and/or control platform in 
required posture to deliver weapon and return to base 
or host platform, with mission effectiveness, and 






Navigate the weapon launch or control platform from 
its host platform to its weapon delivery and/or control 
point(s) and back to the host platform, in a manner that 
maximizes mission affordability, platform/weapon 
survivability (vs. terrain and threats,)  coordination 
with support assets, and minimal interference with 






Coordinate flight paths, joining times, and Comms 
plans, to ensure proper support of the weapon delivery 
mission with: 1) Support assets such as tankers, fighter 
cover, EW support, etc.; 2) Other mission elements 
such as weapon controllers or launchers, ground or 
aircraft-based target designators, etc.; 3) Other 
missions operating in the area, airspace controllers, 




Launch/Control Asset  3,5
Develop and deliver a plan to a weapon launch or 
control platform that will support its energy/fuel 
management, mission survivability, and weapon 




Deploy, maneuver, and configure systems to 







Deploy and maneuver troops, equipment, and cargo to 




3 1.3.5 Status Tracking 3,4,5Monitor progress of scheduled engagements.  SPAWAR 
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1.Manage, catalogue, determine requirements, 
procurement, distribution, overhaul, and disposal or 
material of weapon systems. 





1.Keep records for real-time information on weapons 
standing. 
2. Direction received from higher headquarters 
pertaining to weapons release instructions.  Typically 
weapons status are Weapons Tight, Weapons Hold, or 




Acquire information pertaining to a specified mission 
or event.   SPAWAR 
5 
1.3.5.3.1 Track Safe 
Return/Passage 2,4,5
Monitor friendly forces to ensure return into friendly 
territory free of enemy forces.   SPAWAR 
4 
1.3.5.4 Track Launch 
Preparation 3,4,5
Follow current engagement situation with verbal or 
electronic updates that enable an operator or system to 




Follow current engagement situation with verbal or 
electronic updates that enable an operator or system to 
make the appropriate decision.   SPAWAR 
2 1.4 Interoperate 1,2,3,4,5
Support data dissemination, including formatting, 
access, and routing of data to and between all other 
functions; also, includes the development and 
dissemination of common reference time, navigation, 






Support the dissemination, including formatting, 
access and routing, of sensor data which is to include 








Manage transmission of data, including physical 
addressing, bit synchronization, hardware  (Layers 1 







End-to-end delivery of data including software 
addressing, routing and switching, and data flow 





Sense Data Services 1,2,4,5
Manage user interface and provide file access; 
establish and maintain connections; format conversion 
and data encryption, compression, and expansion  




1.4.1.4  Measurement 
Distribution 1,2,3,4,5
Measurement Distribution is responsible for 
distributing measurement data within the combat 
system and across the battle force. Measurement 
Distribution distributes measurement data to support: 
Reporting local measurements to the battle force, 
delivering remote measurements to measurement 
fusion, weapons control, early detection and track 
initiation, C2 functions, for example, auto special 
doctrine or identification. Unknown 
381 




Recommended Definition or Description Source 
4 
1.4.1.5  Track 
Distribution 1,5
Track Distribution distributes tracks within the CS and 
across the battle force to support: Inclusion of remote 
tracks into the Track Database, track data exchanges 
for entry of a participant into communications 
networks, local track reporting to the battle force, 
track forwarding between communications networks, 









Support dissemination, including formatting, access 
and routing, of rules of engagement, target lists, 







Manage transmission of data, including physical 
addressing, bit synchronization, hardware  (Layers 1 







End-to-end delivery of data including software 
addressing, routing and switching, and data flow 





Force Order Services 1,2,3,4,5
Manage user interface and provide file access; 
establish and maintain connections; format conversion 
and data encryption, compression, and expansion  






Support dissemination, including formatting, access 
and routing, of engagement results and status, 







Manage transmission of data, including physical 
addressing, bit synchronization, hardware  (Layers 1 






End-to-end delivery of data including software 
addressing, routing and switching, and data flow 






Manage user interface and provide file access; 
establish and maintain connections; format conversion 
and data encryption, compression, and expansion  




1.4.3.4  Interface 
Control 1,2,3,4,5
Interface Control assimilates individual 
communication network statuses into a complete 
network status for forwarding to the CS External 
Communications Manager. Interface Control also 
breaks down the network configuration sent from the 
CS External Communications Manager into individual 
communication link configurations geared to each 




Support dissemination, including formatting, access 
and routing, of calls for fire, weapon tasking, aim-








Manage transmission of data, including physical 
addressing, bit synchronization, hardware  (Layers 1 












End-to-end delivery of data including software 
addressing, routing and switching, and data flow 






Manage user interface and provide file access; 
establish and maintain connections; format conversion 
and data encryption, compression, and expansion  





Navigation and Time 
Generation 1,2,3,4,5
Supply current time, navigation data, and METOC 





















Navigation Signals  1,2,3
Collect and register presence of signals supporting 
navigation.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.4.5.2.2 Generate 
Navigation Signal 1,2,3Provide navigation signal for transmission. SPAWAR 
5 
1.4.5.2.3 Process 
Navigation Signals  1,2,3,5
Process navigation signals to filter noise, improve 
signal-to-noise ratio, amplify, or otherwise improve 
signals for reception, retransmission, or conversion to 
another format.  SPAWAR 
5 
1.4.5.2.4 Receive 
Navigation Signals  1,2,3Capture and pass thru navigation signals. SPAWAR 
5 
1.4.5.2.5 Recognize 
Navigation Signals  1,2,3
Determine type and basic characteristics of navigation 
signal being received. SPAWAR 
5 
1.4.5.2.6 Search 
Navigation Signals  1,2,3
Observe area of interest for navigation signals of 




This  function receives and processes navigation data 
from platform navigation sensors and remote sensors 
over the navigation net, correlates local navigation 
data with remote navigation data, selects the best 
navigation sensor to provide navigation data, and 
forwards navigation data to the Dissimilar Source 




Correlate multiple sources of navigation information 
to a single representation of position. OA/Fn 
5 
1.4.5.2.7 Transmit 
Navigation Signal 1,2,3Send Navigation signal to an object of interest. SPAWAR 
4 
1.4.5.3 Generate and 
Communicate METOC 
Data 4,5
Determine and disseminate meteorological and 




Determine local weather conditions by using 





Process environmental signals/data to filter noise, 
improve signal-to-noise ratio, amplify, or otherwise 
improve signals for reception, retransmission, or SPAWAR 
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Recommended Definition or Description Source 




This function Receives and process local and remote 
Environmental data, Correlates local-to-local, local-to-
remote, and remote-to-remote tracks, For correlated 
tracks, computes a triangulation range, Maintains the 
data in the Environmental intermediate track file, and 
Forwards the correlated Environmental data to the 





Processing and hardware interfaces shall be provided 
that permit exchange of data between data links. T/F 
shall support both link to link and multi-link 
operations as described in the below subparagraphs. 
Operator control on the T/F function shall be provided.SIAP WG 
4 1.4.6.1  T/F Control 5
Processing shall be provided for operator control of 
the T/F functions. Control functions shall consist of 
control of the router and data link filters. SIAP WG 
5 
1.4.6.1.1  Router 
Control 5
Processing shall be provided to allow the operator to 
control the routing for transferring data between data 
links. Default control parameters shall be used at 
system initialization. The operator shall have the 
ability to set the router at system initializations and 
concurrently during operations. SIAP WG 
5 1.4.6.1.2  T/F Filters 5
Processing shall be provided for filtering transmit and 
receive data on each active link interface Filters shall 
be applies as specified in the applicable data link 
standard. Default filters shall turn all filters off at 
system initialization. The operator shall have the 
ability to set the filters at system initialization and 
concurrently during operations. SIAP WG 
4 
1.4.6.2  Forwarding 
Participating/Reportin
g Unit (FPU/FRU) 
Operation 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability for own-unit to 
function as an FJU forwarding data between TADIL-J 
and both TADIL-A and TADIL-B in accordance with 
the requirements of MIL-STD-6016. Processing shall 
proved the capability for won-unit to function as a 
FPU/FRU forwarding data between TADIL-A and 
TADIL-B links in accordance with the requirements of 
MIL-STD-6011. Processing shall provide the 
capability to function as a data forwarder to OTH 
shipboard and land-based TADIL-J participants 
utilizing the Joint Range Extension Protocol (JREP). SIAP WG 
5 
1.4.6.2.1  Forwarding 
NATO Link-1 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability to 
automatically exchange data between NATO Link-1 
and TADIL-A, NATO Link-1 and one or more 
TADIL-B links in accordance with the requirements of 
Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) 5601; NATO 
Link-1 and TADIL J; and NATO Link-1 and ATDL-1. SIAP WG 
5 
1.4.6.2.2  Forwarding 
ATDL-1 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability to 
automatically exchange data between TADIL A and 
one or more ATDL-1 links; TADIL B and one or more 
ATDL-1 links, ATDL-1 and TADIL J and ATDL-1 SIAP WG 
384 




Recommended Definition or Description Source 
and NATO Link-1 
5 
1.4.6.2.3  Forwarding 
GBDL 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability to 
automatically exchange data between TADIL A and 
one or more GBDL links; TADIL B and nor or more 
GBDL links; TADIL J and one or more GBDL links; 
ATDL-1 and one or more GBDL links; and PPDL and 
one or more GBDL links. SIAP WG 
5 
1.4.6.2.4  Forwarding 
PPDL 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability to 
automatically exchange TBM message data from 
PPDL to a TADIL J link, and one or more GBDL 
links. SIAP WG 
5 
1.4.6.2.5  Forwarding 
Link-22 1,2,3,5
Processing shall provide the capability to 
automatically exchange data between Link-22 and 
TADIL J in accordance with NATO STANAG 5616, 
Volume II and Link-22 with TADIL A and one or 
more TADIL B links in accordance with the 
requirements of NATO STANAG 5616, Volume III SIAP WG 
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APPENDIX B.  NETWORKING BASICS 
In general, “computer” networks consist of three major parts: technology, 
topology, and protocols.  Technology can be thought of as the equipment used to build 
the network, such as hubs, routers, and switches, as well as the means to connect this 
equipment, such as fiber-optic cable, satellite links, or some other form of wireless 
communications.  The topology of a network can be thought of as its architecture and 
determines how the various components of the network are connected.  Finally, protocols 
can be thought of as the “laws” of the network, which collectively ensure the information 
is transmitted across the network and understood by the receiver(s) and sender(s).  The 
following sections will discuss three alternative technologies currently used in core 
networking:  
· SONET 
· Dense Wave Division Multiplexing (DWDM) 
· Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)  
Note:  Due to the relative complexity of each of these, they will each be addressed in 
individual sections below. 
A. SONET 
SONET351 is a standard method to interconnect fiber optic systems.  Its 
bandwidth ranges from over 50 Mbps at the OC-1 level to nearly 10 Gbps at the OC-192 
level.  SONET uses TDM (Time-Division Multiplexing) to multiplex multiple channels.  
To have two distinct paths between any two systems, and therefore withstand accidental 
fiber cuts or electronic equipment failures, SONET systems are built around rings, with 
fast protection-switching schemes.  Rings can be interconnected with cross-connects 
using optical-to-optical electronic 
Conversion (O-E-O) to perform switching. High speed O-E-O cross-connects are 
not yet widely deployed, and therefore automatic end-to-end provisioning of services is 
not possible.  Carriers typically offer SONET to interconnect corporate sites at very high 
speeds, either within one SONET ring, i.e. the MAN (Metropolitan Area Network) or 
                                                 
351 J. Manchester, et al., “IP over SONET”, IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 5, May 1998, 136-
142. 
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across the WAN (Wide-Area Network) with linear SONET connections.  Examples are 
provided by C1-D1-A1 and B2-A4, (see Figure 176).  
Drawbacks of SONET include slow provisioning times, because (1) a route 
through the network of interconnected rings has to be found manually, possibly requiring 
human intervention and (2) coarse bandwidth granularity.  Figure 176 depicts an older 
SONET network structure. 
 
Figure 176.   An Example of a SONET Network Connecting Four Remote Sites352. 
 
Network management systems such as MISA (Management of Integrated SDH 
and ATM networks)353 exist that allow automated provisioning of SONET services, but 
the deployment of such systems is very limited because it requires flexible ADMs (Add-
Drop Multiplexors) and SONET cross-connects.  IP packets can be carried directly in 
SONET using the PPP protocol encapsulation “Packet over Sonet” (PoS).354  The 
efficiency of such an encapsulation is clearly more efficient than ATM for transporting IP 
packets.  Based on usual packet-size distributions, the IP/ATM overhead is around 25%, 
whereas the PoS overhead is 2%.355 
                                                 
352 Joel Conover, “No Competition Among Local Providers,” Network Computing, 15 May 2000, Available at 
[http://www.networkcomputing.com/1109/1109f2full.html], Accessed May 2003. 
353 Alex Galis, “Multi-Domain Communication Management System,” CRC Press, 2000. 
354 A. Malis, and W. Simpson, “PPP over SONET/SDH,” IETF RFC 2615, June 1999. 
355 Jon Anderson et al., “Protocols and Architectures for IP Optical Networking,” Bell Labs Technical Journal, 
January-March 1999, Available at [http://www.lucent.com/minds/techjournal/common/arc_issues.html], Accessed May 
2003. 
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B. DENSE WAVE DIVISION MULTIPLEXING (DWDM) 
DWDM356 is a newer technology that allows multiplexing over different 
wavelengths, thereby virtually multiplying the available capacity per individual optical 
fiber. Cost savings on equipment are huge when compared with the alternative of laying 
additional fiber, especially in the case of long haul transmission where amplifiers are 
required on each fiber.  For a carrier that needs to upgrade its SONET network, adding 
DWDM makes it possible to keep the existing SONET investment, and scale up the 
remainder of network based on the newly available wavelengths.  The major difference 
with DWDM systems is that traffic is handled purely optically, and only converted 
electronically where necessary.  Optical cross-connects are also available that switch 
entire wavelengths optically.  By reducing optical to electronic conversion bit error rates 
approach zero, thus eliminating the need to detect such errors (as in SONET networks).  
All-optical DWDM networks are also have the advantage of being compatible with 
existing fiber networks and well as CWDM (Coarse WDM).  This compatibility allows 
for LAN architectures and LAN economics (e.g. low price per port, simplicity of 
management).  Further, infrastructure upgrade costs are much lower because fiber 
represents a 20 year investment, as opposed to SONET equipment which quickly 
becomes obsolete.357   
C. ASYNCHRONOUS TRANSFER MODE (ATM) 
Similarly to SONET, ATM358 is circuit-based, with the main difference being that 
ATM circuits are virtual. Instead of performing TDM, each fixed-size cell carries the ID 
of the virtual connection to which it belongs in its header.  This allows one to benefit 
from statistical multiplexing gain on the link, and therefore make better use of existing 
resources.  ATM is still the only transport technology capable of guaranteeing Quality of 
Service (QoS)359, and therefore offers “integrated services”.  ATM circuits are sometimes 
referred to as “software” circuits, and can therefore be dynamically established and 
                                                 
356 N. Ghani, S. Dixit, and T.S. Wang, “On IP over-WDM Integration,” IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 
38, No. 3, March 2000, 74. 
357 IBM Research Division, IP over Everything. 
358 Ibid. 
359 AT&T believes otherwise, and are currently provisioning their communications backbones with MPLS CIP 
traffic shaping technology in place of SONET.ATM.  
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disestablished very quickly.  As discussed above ATM has the disadvantage of high 
overhead it incurs for IP packets and the difficulty to interface IP packet-switched 
technology on top of circuit-based ATM.  Notably, ATM uses SONET framing; 
accordingly ATM switches are commonly used to aggregate traffic from various sources 
before it is sent onto SONET rings, so that multiplexing gains can be achieved.360  
Notably, this technology is not currently used in larger capacity backbones above OC-48 
capacity. 
D. TODAY’S NETWORKS 
Today’s long-haul core networks typically implement a 4-layer architecture (see 
Figure 177).  
 
 
Figure 177.   Four Layer Model Network361. 
 




At the lowest layer, point-to-point DWDM allows the number of installed fibers 
to be virtually multiplied as discussed above, thereby realizing considerable resource 
savings.  At the termination of these fibers, SONET equipment provides point-to-point 
physical transport, though again, these provisioning capabilities are relatively slow.  Most 
QoS support and provisioning, otherwise known as “traffic management”, occurs at the 
ATM layer, due to its much faster provisioning times than the SONET layer.  Finally, the 
IP layer serves the transport function at the top layer. 
Note that the dynamic QoS-routing feature of the ATM layer (PNNI) often is not 
present, instead PVCs (Permanent Virtual Circuits) are set up statically throughout the 
network.  The SONET network consists of rings, interconnected with ADMs.  Setting up 
circuits through multiple rings still is essentially a manual task, as cross-connects 
(switches) are not deployed widely. 362  Ring topologies are more fault-tolerant 
characteristics than star networks because two alternate distinct paths are created between 
any pair of nodes.  The drawback here is that rings are a less bandwidth-efficient design 
because intermediate nodes between a given pair of nodes cannot utilize the same circuit. 
Four- layer networks typically suffer from slow provisioning, dictated by the 
underlying SONET layer and the functional overlap provided by redundant fault-tolerant 
features found at all layers:  The SONET layer performs protection switching, ATM 
reroutes the VCs, and IP finds alternate routes for any arbitrary packets.  The combined 
effect of these redundancies is not only inefficient, but can lead to network instabilities.  
Finally, cost inefficiencies are introduced due to the fact SONET back-up fibers typically 
remain unused. Overall a more ideal network model would include provisioning 
capabilities directly into either the optical or the IP layer, while the ATM and SONET 
layers could be eliminated (see Figure 178). 
 




Figure 178.   A More Ideal Network Model. 
 
There is currently such a trend towards leaner networks with fewer layers, a trend 
which relies on the following changes in network technology and protocols:363 
· High Speed Router Interfaces  IP router interfaces are now capable of 
much higher speeds, in most cases equivalent to SONET speeds across a 
given wavelength. Wavelength switching in the optical layer can therefore 
provide similar features as ATM VP switching, albeit with coarser 
granularity. 
· Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)  A new protocol called MPLS 
provides traffic engineering features similar to ATM. Used at the optical 
layer, MPLS provides the traffic-engineering capability at wavelength 
granularity, thus allowing for the replacement of ATM VP switching.  
Used at the IP layer, it provides packet-granularity traffic-engineering. 
· Fault Tolerance As discussed above, the fault tolerance and error 
detection previously provided at the SONET layer is no longer required 
and is instead provided through mesh routing.  This has the additional 
advantage of freeing up bandwidth on many of the fibers previously 
reserved for back-up functionality. 
Overall this push towards a two-layer networking model, with an IP layer over an 
Optical layer, with the traffic engineering function handled at each layer by MPLS.  To 
provide finer granularity switching while staying at the optical layer, optical packet 
switches are being developed, thereby imitating the ATM switching concept at the optical 
layer. 
E. INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP)  
Technically speaking, Internet Protocol (IP) is silent about the format of the data.  
Instead, IP species the “envelope” including the header information containing the 
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addressing scheme by which this information is sent between a source and its destination.  
Information to be sent across the network is aggregated into “packets” each of which 
begins with a header containing, among other information the “addresses” of the sender 
and receiver.  A simple analogy is that of a letter (the packet), which contains the 
information being sent, and an envelope (the header), which contains the addresses of the 
sender and receiver.   
From its origins, the Internet Protocol (IP) was designed to be highly scalable in 
terms of application support and the number of devices and/or users on a network.  
Further, IP’s scalability would enable the creation and interoperability of “networks of 
networks”, such as the Internet.  As a result, IP has come to dominate the networking 
market for several reasons: 
· Open Source  IP is open and available to everyone, encouraging rapid 
innovation. 
· Application Independent  IP is application- independent, requiring no 
proprietary application- layer gateways. 
· Service Location  Services are placed at the edges of the network rather 
than integrated into the network itself; this allows services to evolve 
without impacting the network and keeps complexity out of the network 
core. 
· Global Address Scheme  The ability of packets to carry globally 
meaningful addresses enables network nodes to make autonomous 
decisions in processing each packet. This allows the distribution of work 
throughout the nodes, providing redundancy as well as improving 
scalability.364 
Further, and perhaps most importantly, the complexity of the network itself, as 
well as application definition occurs at the edge of the network, not the core.  This is a 
critical distinction in that you can completely define the application in terms of Sense, 
Decide, and Act functionality at the end systems or “nodes” that are attached.  Since the 
introduction of IP; however, the exponential growth of technology in general and 
networking more specifically have combined to result in greater and greater demands  
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being placed on IP to provide “plug and play” network interoperability.  If IP is to 
become the convergence layer for seamless networking and interoperability, the 
following challenges will have to be met:   
· Quality of Service (QoS) 
· Security 
· IP Multicast and Broadcast 
· Addressing and Routing 
Note:  Due to the relative complexity of each of these, they will each be addressed in 
individual sections below. 
F. QUALITY OF SERVICE 
Historically, most network traffic has been bursty, rather than continuous, 
therefore, IP was originally designed not make hard allocations of bandwidth or circuit 
resources.  This “burstiness” is also a side-effect of the muxing together of multiple data 
streams in order to increase bandwidth efficiency.  Instead of providing dedicated 
circuits; however, IP provides what is called a “best-effort” service which routes packets 
according to the most efficient path from the sender, through a network, before rebuilding 
the “message” on the receiving end of the network.  While this is appropriate for less 
time critical traffic and data that is not sequence dependant, and has the advantage of 
being highly bandwidth efficient, it is not suitable for streaming network flows such as 
voice and video.  Such traffic demands the data be transmitted from the sender in such a 
way that it arrives “on time” and in the “proper order”.  Typically this has required 
circuit-switched technology such as ATM in order to guarantee the network resources 
would remain available throughout time the critical traffic was being routed.  As 
discussed in the previous section, such technology, while effective, is bandwidth 
inefficient.   
QoS refers to the capability of a network to provide better service to selected 
network traffic.  The primary goal of QoS is to provide priority for critical traffic, 
controlled jitter and latency (required by some real-time and interactive traffic such as 
streaming audio and video), and improved loss characteristics.365  Also important is 
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[http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/qos.htm#wp1024961], Accessed May 2003.  
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making sure that while some applications require some level of determinism (or bounded 
delay delivery,) such does not result in other applications or network traffic fail.  One of 
the primary shortcomings cited of IP, (more accurately IPv4) is that it does not enforce 
QoS demands.366  This is an inaccurate assumption!  Today Internet Services Porviders 
(ISPs) do not “look at” the DS byte contained in every IP packet and whose function is to 
dictate priority.  There are reasons for this, including reducing the possibly for Denial of 
Service attacks; however is not a reflection of the inability of IP to enforce QoS.  Because 
IP is capable of supporting end-to-end communications across networks, it will need to 
be able to provide QoS across links of varying bandwidths and link layers where 
bottlenecks might occur.  Although not introduced yet in this discussion, wireless 
networks will remain bandwidth disadvantaged for the foreseeable future, and are thus 
even more dependent on QoS provisioning.   
There are currently two techniques for achieving QoS provisioning in IP 
networks.367 368  The first of these, Int-Serv is a more deterministic method, and requires 
routers to keep state throughout the transmission in order to maintain the connection 
resources required.  This approach obviously runs counter to the notion of the 
connectionless design of internets and therefore does not scale well.  The second method 
is Diff-Serv, a more qualitative approach whereby each packet signals to the router what 
priority it has.  Unlike like the previous technique; however, no resources are actually 
dedicated to actual traffic.  Given unlimited bandwidth, QoS would of course not be an 
issue.  Until improvements can be made in the area of bandwidth current techniques to 
avoid QoS problems remain rudimentary.  Two examples are: (1) caching packets and (2) 
utilizing more or less dedicated links for high demand traffic such as 
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G. SECURITY 
Network security is fundamentally a five step process369 (see Figure 179). 
· Confidentiality   The assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized persons, processes, or devices.  In other words, 
confidentiality ensures protection from unauthorized disclosure of data or 
information to anyone other that the sender and receiver. 
· Authenticity  A security measure designed to establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an 
individual’s authorization to receive specific categories of information.  In 
other words, authentication ensures verification of originator and that the 
receiver knows for sure who sent the message. 
· Integrity   Reflects the quality of an Information System (IS), including 
the local correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical 
completeness of the hardware and software implementing the protection 
mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures and occurrence of 
the stored data.  In other words, integrity ensures protection from 
unauthorized changes to data or information and that the receiver “hears” 
exactly what the sender intended. 
· Non-Repudiation  Provides assurance the sender of data is provided with 
proof of delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s 
identity, so neither can later deny having processed the data.  In other 
words, non-repudiation ensures undeniable proof of participation.  An 
analogy is that of receipt-requested mail – both the sender and receiver 
know the receiver got the package. 
· Availability (also commonly called Assurance)  Ensures timely, reliable 
access to data and information services for authorized users.  In other 
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370 Notably, the first four steps of this process are protocol (Layer 7) related issues.  Availability and 
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Figure 179.   Five Step Model for Network Security. 
 
Because all data carried over IP is done so in plain language (unencrypted) it is 
relatively easy for malicious users to “sniff” packets and monitor network transmissions 
relatively easily.  Encryption can be accomplished by higher level protocols thus 
achieving the confidentiality function discussed above.  The issues of Integrity, 
Authentication, and Non-repudiation remain; however, which can be addressed by the 
use of IPsec and the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).   
IPSec involves encryption and the use of a digital signature, which signs the 
packet or datagram and its header.  The recipient can then notice any modification to the  
packet, thereby assuring the integrity of packet or datagram sent and/or received.  
Authentication and Non-Repudiation are assured through the use of IPsec, because the 
return address of the packets cannot be changed (IP spoofing).  The second critical part of 
this process is that of PKI, which allows for the decryption of packets encrypted by IPsec.  
PKI begins with the assumption the recipient knows the public key of the sender.  When 
combined with the private key of the receiver, the packets can be decrypted.  PKI is 
currently challenged with the problem of key distribution.  In other words, how can the 
recipient reliably and authentically obtain the public key of the sender?  Although the 
problem has been solved theoretically, key technical, political, infrastructure, and 
economic challenges remain.  Technically, IP requires a mechanism to obtain the 
Certificate Authority’s (CA) public key, a critical first step to ensuring the trust of the 
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entire PKI infrastructure.  On the political and economic sides, there is the need for a 
global public key infrastructure.  Even if such an “GKI” infrastructure existed; however, 
questions would remain such as “How easy is it to deny access to certain countries?” or 
“Is it desirable to have the functionality to exclude anybody?  Finally, there is the issue of 
revocation of certificates.  This is analogous to merchants keeping lists of bad credit 
cards, albeit a more fundamentally difficult problem to solve.  
Security support in IP is a key element for the growth of IP-based networks for a 
very simple reason.  Current solutions are largely implemented through the use of private 
leased networks.  Not only is this expensive, but defeats the fundamental advantages of 
leveraging the near-ubiquity of the Internet.  Although ATM VCs offer the functionality 
of such dedicated and relatively secure connections, the move towards IP-based 
networking will make such an option unavailable.  One answer answer currently lies in 
the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).  VPNs are IP-based, and are thus 
connectionless, yet still maintain the relative security advantages of dedicated circuits.  
Overall, it is important to note that IPsec is not a security “cure-all.”  IPsec does not 
prevent problems from DOS attacks and “Syn-Floods,” nor does it address security 
challenges at layers 1 & 2.   
H. IP MULTICAST AND BROADCAST 
As discussed in the QoS section above, older network traffic demands focused on 
data transfer and applications were typically shared between single or small groups of 
users located on the same LAN or subnet.  As technology and the use of networks have 
grown, new applications have emerged such as LAN TV, desktop conferencing, 
corporate broadcasts, and collaborative computing.  A critical difference such 
applications have over more traditional network applications is the requirement for 
simultaneous communication between groups of computers.  This process is known 
generically as multipoint communications, and can be extremely bandwidth intensive in 
either IP-based or circuit-switched networks.  The reason for this is that if user requests 
information from a sender, this information is sent as any other traffic in a point-to-point 
manner.  Depending on the type of traffic (e.g. audio and video applications), even such 
communications between single users can be both bandwidth and QOS intensive.  Now 
scale the example to one requiring collaboration between multiple users.  In this case, the 
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same network traffic has to be sent as many times as there are users who request the 
traffic.  In such an example, it is easy to understand the bandwidth inefficiencies that 
quickly emerge.  Three existing solutions for ensuring bandwidth efficiency in multipoint 
communications are presented below. 371  
· Unicast  With a unicast design, applications can send one copy of each 
packet to each member of the multicast group. While technically simple to 
implement, this technique has significant scaling restrictions if the group 
is large.  In addition, it requires extra bandwidth, because the same 
information has to be carried multiple times, even across shared links.  
· Broadcast  In a broadcast design, applications can send one copy of each 
packet and address it to a broadcast address. This technique is even 
simpler than unicast for the application to implement.  However, the 
problem of “broadcast storms” exists, whereby unless the broadcast 
transmission is stopped at a given LAN boundary, the transmission is sent 
everywhere.  Sending the broadcast everywhere is a significant usage of 
network resources if only a small group of users required the information 
in the first place.  
· Multicast  With a multicast design, applications can send one copy of 
each packet and address it to the group of computers that want to receive 
it. Another way of describing this is the network layer delivery of 
information to to multiple end systems for the “price” of a single transit 
through each router.372  This technique addresses packets to a group of 
receivers rather than to a single receiver, and it depends on the network to 
forward the packets to only the networks that need to receive them.  
Importantly, the above solutions require protocol extensions to IP in order to provide 
proper functionality.  It is beyond this scope of this paper to discuss the details of these 
extensions; however, a reference is provided below. 373 
I. ADDRESSING AND ROUTING 
This area is one of the greatest challenges to the implementation of IP and, more 
specifically, its scalability.  There are two major reasons for this challenge.  First and 
foremost is the shrink ing availability of IPv4 addresses.  Originally, the 32 bit address 
space available under IPv4 was deemed sufficient for any foreseeable grown.  The 
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exponential growth of the Internet and the demand for IP addresses down to the 
individual level has resulted in smaller and smaller blocks and numbers of addresses 
available.  One result of this is that many organizations now have to use discontinuous 
blocks of IP addresses that do not necessarily aggregate with the IP address of their ISP.  
This leads to the second threat to IP and its scalability, the growing size of routing tables 
in major exchange points.  Routing tables with more than 100 k entries are commonplace, 
due to the numbers of exceptions in the aggregation of prefixes previously discussed.  
Although fast IP routers can cope with current table sizes and MPLS allows of short-
circuit address lookup in the core networks, IP routing tables will continue to grow in 
size, endangering scalability of IP routing protocols and forwarding schemes.374  
A short term solution to the shrinking number of available IP addresses is 
Network Address Translation (NAT).375  Basically, through manipulation of port 
numbers, NAT allows a large number of hosts to share a single unique IPv4 address.  As 
an example of the scale of the use of this workaround, consider 70% of Fortune 1000 
companies have been forced to deploy NATs.376  While NAT has been successful in 
slowing the problem of IP address depletion, it was never intended as a long-term 
solution, and presents a numbers of cha llenges to today’s and the future’s network 
environment.  These problems include the following examples: 
· Lack of peer-to-peer Functionality  NAT destroys a key benefit of the 
Internet as a network of ‘always-on, equally-connected, easily-reachable’ 
peers.  Peer-to-peer capability provides a powerful tool, empowering users 
to become “contributors” rather than simply “consumers” of data, 
information, and, ultimately, knowledge.  Peer-to-peer systems rely on the 
critical assumption a user can find and connect to another user.  If 
“hidden” behind NAT; however, this assumption is not valid.  To 
circumvent such a problem, peer-to-peer systems utilize an extra level of 
complexity, which leads to greater network efficiencies than should exist.   
· Security Challenges  NAT presents a variety of challenges to security 
protocols such as IPSec.  While these are outside the scope of this paper, 
as discussed previously, and in particular for peer-to-peer computing, 
strong security is essential.  
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· Lack of QoS Functionality  NAT is one of the single largest technical 
hurdles for applications requiring Quality of Service (QoS) such as Voice 
over IP (VoIP) and real-time video.   
The preceding section has discussed both the reasons why IP has grown to 
dominate the networking market and the challenges IP will have to face if it is to become 
the convergence layer for seamless networking and interoperability in the future.  In 
short, IPv4 has grown somewhat long in the tooth, and is poised for an upgrade to move 
into the future.  IPv6 represents that upgrade and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
IV. 
J. MILITARY NETWORKING CONSIDERATIONS, “A WARFIGHTING 
INTERNET” 
Fundamentally, networks that support military needs require that all of the above 
considerations be addressed.  Two basic issues are fundamentally critical; however—
available communications capacity and protection of the network(s) from congestion. 377  
While communications capacity is typically equated with bandwidth, the term “available” 
implies the need for a network(s) that have a high degree of reliability and security as 
well.  The reason that availability and freedom from congestion are so critical is 
intuitively obvious.  The nature of “military” networking demands the network support 
operations across the continuum of operations from peace to war.  Obviously, such a 
continuum also demands a range of functionality from in terms of latency and bandwidth 
demands (e.g. real-time weapons control vs, high resolution satellite imagery).  As a 
result of these considerations, many military systems and their supporting networks are 
designed, developed, and procured in a stove-piped fashion.  While this can lead to 
sufficient levels of security and performance interoperability with other systems is often 
sub-optimized.  This sub-optimization runs counter to the inherent and intuitive benefits 
of networking systems together, namely a synergistic effect that results from the 
integration of previously disparate systems.  Beyond such technical considerations; 
however, ultimately lives depend upon such networks, a fact which drives even higher 
levels of network availability, security, and overall functionality.  
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K. SUMMARY   
As with the design of any system, the process of network design involves a 
process of design tradeoffs with the goal of optimizing the performance of the network.  
While it is relatively straightforward to design and optimize a single purpose-built 
network, such as a fire control system, current and future networks are growing 
increasingly heterogeneous, and are relied on to connect more and different users and 
information.  Many of these networks, such as the Internet, are more accurately 
characterized as “networks of networks”.  Today and into the future, these networks of 
networks must integrate the designs and functions of individual networks that may or 
may not have been originally intended or designed to work together.  Regardless, 
ultimately, networks exist to achieve some process, function, capability, or group thereof.  
The definition of FORCEnet implies the ultimate example, demanding the networking of 
BOTH physical and largely deterministic “nodes” and processes (e.g. weapons and 
sensors), WITH warriors and C2 functions which are fundamentally subjective.  Chapter 
IV is focused on 1) A discussion of the critical technical factors impacting the future of 
the networking and military applications in general, and 2) Within the context of the 
current FORCEnet Architecture Vision, develop a “Warfighting Internet” supporting 
SSG XXII’s Concept of FORCEnet Engagement Packs (FnEPs). 
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